JUDGMENT Jenkins, C.J. - The only point that arises on this Appeal is whether the Plaintiff's suit is barred by Art. 3 in the third schedule to the Bengal Tenancy Act. This is an article which after a lapse of certain time deprives the Plaintiff of his right to come to Court for the purpose of vindicating a claim which is his, and therefore it must be clearly made out that any particular case falls within its terms. We recently had occasion to enter a protest against extending the terms of this article by use of figures of speech and metaphors. What we have to see in each case is whether in fact there has been such dispossession as the article requires. That dispossession, it is conceded, must be by the landlord. The Subordinate Judge untrammelled by the various authorities which can be cited one way or the other came to the conclusion on the facts that there had been no dispossession by the landlord. I see no reason why the High Court should interfere with that finding. It is a finding for which there is foundation in the evidence, and, in my opinion, it would be erroneous to interfere with it. Mr. Justice Coxe has interfered with it, and in so doing, we think, he has committed an error. We must, therefore, reverse his judgment and restore the decree of the lower Appellate Court. The Appellant before us must have the costs of the two appeals in the High Court. [On 16th July 1913, the Court added :-- Jenkins, C.J. 2. It has been brought to our notice that Defendant No. 2 was no party to the Letters Patent Appeal. That is doubtless because he was not an Appellant in the appeal to the High Court which was heard by Mr. Justice Coxe. Though Mr. Justice Coxe's judgment is expressed in general terms, where it directs that the suit muse be dismissed, we read his judgment as meaning that the suit must be dismissed as against Defendant No. 1 who also was Appellant before him : and, as regards Defendant No. 2 the decree of the lower Appellate Court was left untouched by his judgment. Justice Coxe's judgment is expressed in general terms, where it directs that the suit muse be dismissed, we read his judgment as meaning that the suit must be dismissed as against Defendant No. 1 who also was Appellant before him : and, as regards Defendant No. 2 the decree of the lower Appellate Court was left untouched by his judgment. It is therefore unnecessary for us to give any further direction, because we restore the decree of the lower Appellate Court as against Defendant No. 1, that being the only part of the decree that was disturbed.]