JUDGMENT : PIGGOTT, J. The plaintiffs in this case represent the holders of the mortgagee-rights over certain property under three deeds of June 18th, 1879, August 22nd, 1883, and July nth, 1884. There was also an usufructuary mortgage of June 19th, 1879, but the existence of this document only indirectly affects the questions now in issue before us. The predecessor-in-title of the plaintiffs brought a suit for sale on the mortgage of July 11th, 1884; the property concerned was put up to sale subject to the charges created by the two deeds of June 18th, 1879, and August 22nd, 1883, and purchased by the decree-holder himself. The defendants are the sons and grandson of the original mortgagor. They brought a suit to have the auction sale set aside to the extent of their two-thirds share in the property sold, on the ground that their share was not liable for the debt incurred by the mortgage of July nth, 1884; this suit was decreed in their favour, subject only to the rights of the present plaintiffs under the usufructuary mortgage of 1879. The latter pleaded this mortgage as a defence to the suit, but did not plead the mortgages of June 18th, 1879, and August 22nd, 1883. The present suit is to enforce these mortgages by putting up to sale the two-thirds share of the defendants in the property concerned in satisfaction of two-thirds of the debt due under the said mortgages. The court of first instance held that the defendants were not liable for anything under the bond of 1883, but gave the plaintiffs a decree on the bond of June 18th, 1879. Both parties having appealed, the learned Additional Judge held that the plaintiffs having failed to plead these bonds of 1879 and 1883 in defence to the suit brought by the present defendants for recovery of their two-thirds share, were now debarred by the principle of res judicata from maintaining any suit in respect of the same. He accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's suit altogether, and we have now before us two appeals by the said plaintiffs against the two decrees passed by the Additional Judge. The decision of the lower appellate court appears, however, perfectly correct. He accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's suit altogether, and we have now before us two appeals by the said plaintiffs against the two decrees passed by the Additional Judge. The decision of the lower appellate court appears, however, perfectly correct. The result of the previous suit was virtually to give the present defendants a decree under which they were declared proprietors of two-thirds of the property originally mortgaged, and were further declared to be entitled to actual possession of the same on payment of two-thirds of whatever was due to the present plaintiffs under the usufructuary mortgage of June 19th, 1879. We are not concerned to enquire whether this is the decree which ought to have been passed on the facts found in the former suit, or whether it is the decree which would have been passed if the present plaintiffs had then pleaded their rights under mortgages of June 18th, 1879, and August 22nd, 1883, it was the decree actually passed, and the present suit is virtually one to supersede that decree by another, the effect of which would be to make the property in suit (namely, the two-thirds share belonging to the defendants) liable for a heavy charge over and above that due under the usufructuary mortgage. What the plaintiff acquired by the auction sale was the full proprietary title over the property originally mortgaged, what they paid for it was not the trifling sum paid by them at the auction sale, but this sum plus all that was due to them under the usufructuary mortgage of 1879 and the two simple mortgages of 1879 and 1883. They ought to have pleaded in reply to the suit brought by the present defendants that the latter were entitled, at most, to a conditional decree subject to payment of whatever was due to the auction purchasers on account of the antecedent mortgages subject to which the property was sold. 2. There would then have been a decree which finally determined the rights and liabilities of the parties inter se upon a complete set of findings, and after the auction purchasers had been put to proof (just as they have been in the present suit) of the nature and extent of the liabilities of the sons and grandson of the original mortgagor under the deeds of June 18th, 1879 and August 22nd, 1883. The matter was one which could and ought to have been determined in the former suit; it has virtually been determined against the present plaintiffs by reason of their failure to plead their rights under the two deeds in question at the proper time. To hold otherwise would involve difficulties the very nature of which shows how imperative it was that the entire question of the mutual rights and liabilities of the parties should be finally determined in the former suit. When the present plaintiffs purchased the proprietary rights in the mortgaged property at the auction sale, it is incontestable that their rights as mortgagees under the deeds of June 18th, 1879, and August 22nd, 1883, merged in their rights as proprietors. Therefore these mortgages became extinguished; interest on them ceased to run. They represented in effect simply a part of the consideration which the auction purchasers had paid for the proprietary rights. On what principle can it be said that interest once more began to run on these deeds and, if so, from what date? These considerations show that an account of what was due to the mortgagees on these deeds could not be taken otherwise than up to the date of the auction sale, and that the amount so due ought to have been made a ground of defence in the former suit. This appeal must therefore fail. It is dismissed with costs.