JUDGMENT 1. This is a Rule issued at the instance of the auction-purchaser calling upon Formula and Nazamuddi, Petitioners in the Court below, to show cause why the order of the District Judge, dated 11th February 1911, remanding the case to the Munsif's Court should not be set aside. It appears that in March 1907 Formula and Nazamuddi purchased a portion of a jote from one Kathu Shada who in his turn purchased it from the judgment-debtor. In 1909 a decree for rent was obtained against the recorded tenant, and in execution the property was put up for sale on 23rd November 1909. On 22nd February 1910 these persons, Faimulla and Nazamuddi, presented a petition to the Munsif, alleging that they had only come to know of the sale on 8th February 1911. The petition was in a somewhat peculiar form. It contained all the allegations as to fraud and irregularity necessary to support an application under or. XXI, r. 90, but it concluded by a prayer to be allowed to deposit the amount as required by r. 89 and have the sale set aside. The Munsif threw out the application as the deposit was not made within 30 days. Between the date of hearing, 30th July 1910, and the date originally fixed for judgment, 6th August 1910, namely, on 3rd August 1910 the Petitioners presented a petition praying (inter alia) that the application might be treated as one under r. 90. The Munsif delivered judgment on 29th August 1910, disallowing this request and altogether dismissing the application. The District Judge has in appeal set aside that order and remanded the case to be dealt with as an application under r. 90. The question is whether we should interfere in revision. After hearing the arguments on both sides we do not think that we should. R. 89 (2) no doubt prevents a person who has preferred an application under r. 90 from making or prosecuting an application under r. 89 until he has withdrawn his application under r. 90; but the converse is not provided for in the Code and 1 here is no express prohibition against an application being made under r. 90 where an application under r. 89 has been made and has been withdrawn or dismissed, It is noteworthy that such a provision is contained in sec. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 174 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It may be reasonably inferred that the framers of the CPC deliberately omitted it. Some attempt was made to argue that as the jote was non-transferable the Petitioners Formula and Nazamuddi had no locus stand to apply either under r. 89 or r. 90. That depends on questions of fact which we cannot investigate in revision proceedings. We may however point out that r. 89 and r. 90 permit of applications by persons who could not have applied under secs. 310A and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. We think that the Petitioners are entitled to have their application heard as one under r. 90 and we must therefore decline to interfere at the present stage. The question whether their application is in time will depend upon circumstances. It will be for them to show that they are entitled to the extension of time allowed by sec. 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908. This Rule is discharged with costs. Hearingfee one gold mohur.