THAKUR RANG LAL SINGH v. MAHARAJAH SIR RAVANESHWAR PERSHAD SINGH BAHADUR
1911-07-27
AMEER ALI, LORD MACNAGHTEN, LORD MERSEY, LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE
body1911
DigiLaw.ai
Judgement Appeal from a judgment of the High Court (September 24, 1905) affirming a judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr (May 11, 1904) which refused an application by the appellants as judgment debtors to set aside a judicial sale. The application was made under s. 311, C. C. P., to have the sale of the appellants one-fourth share in Mouza Dumri in execution of a mortgage decree set aside. The date fixed by the proclamation for the sale was July 18, 1903, but it took place on July 20, which was not within seven days from the date fixed, and there was no fresh proclamation. The Subordinate Judge held that there was no objection under the circumstances to the sale taking place on July 20 and that no irregularities were proved. The High Court held that even assuming (1.) that the sale ought not to have taken place upon July 20, being more than seven days from the date fixed by the proclamation, and (2.) that the notices were 10 Law Rep. 38 Ind. App. 200 ( 1910- 1911). Rang Lal Singh v. Maharajah Sir Ravaneshwar 111 served in only one out of the thirteen mouzas, the same constituted mere irregularities, and that it was necessary for the appellants to establish that they had suffered substantial loss in consequence thereof. It was further found that the price obtained was an adequate one, being at the rate of nineteen years purchase, and that therefore the appellants had sustained no damage. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Dunne, for the appellants, contended that the sale having taken place more than seven days after the advertised date was held in contravention of s. 291 of Act XIV. of 1882, and that the price obtained was entirely inadequate and due to the irregularity of the sale. Other material irregularities were that the value of the property was under-estimated in the proclamation, and the notices were served in one mouza only out of thirteen. Reference was made to C. C. P., ss. 286, 287, 291, and 811, and Woodroffe and Ameer Alis Civil Procedure Code (190S), p. 949; Basharntulla v. Umachurn Dutt. (( 1889) I. L. R. 16 Calc. 794.) De Gruyther K.C. and Ross, for the Maharajah respondent, were not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. AMEER ALI.
Reference was made to C. C. P., ss. 286, 287, 291, and 811, and Woodroffe and Ameer Alis Civil Procedure Code (190S), p. 949; Basharntulla v. Umachurn Dutt. (( 1889) I. L. R. 16 Calc. 794.) De Gruyther K.C. and Ross, for the Maharajah respondent, were not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. AMEER ALI. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Bengal which affirmed the order of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr dismissing the application of the judgment debtors, appellants, under s. 311 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV. of 1882) to set aside a sale of certain landed property in execution of a mortgage decree. The grounds on which the sale was impugned in the first Court were two-fold, (1.) that the property sold was a ghatwali tenure and therefore inalienable; and (2.) that there was material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale which resulted in substantial injury to the appellants. The first ground appears to have been abandoned in the High Court and is not pressed before this Board. The appellants now rest their case mainly on the provisions of ss. 287 and 291 of the Code. They urge that on May 16, 1903, the sale was postponed to July 13 following, and a sale proclamation was directed to issue fixing that date for sale ; that it was not sold on the 13th, but on a later date, without a fresh proclamation as required by law, and that consequently the sale is null and void, and ought to be set aside. An examination, however, of the proceedings culminating in the sale shews that there is no substance in the appellants contention. It is clear from the order-sheet that sale proclamations had issued, at the instance of the appellants, not less than six times. On March 30, 1903, the sale was stayed on their application and a sale proclamation had issued fixing May 11. On this day the appellants asked for three days grace, which was granted, the property being " kept under hammer." It was not, however, put up to sale until May 16, when it was found that there were not sufficient bidders present, and a fresh proclamation was therefore ordered to issue fixing July 13 for the sale.
On this day the appellants asked for three days grace, which was granted, the property being " kept under hammer." It was not, however, put up to sale until May 16, when it was found that there were not sufficient bidders present, and a fresh proclamation was therefore ordered to issue fixing July 13 for the sale. In the proclamation it was notified that " in the absence of any order of postponement the sale would be held at the monthly sale, commencing at 6 oclock in the morning of July 13, 1903, at Monghyr." The presiding officer was, however, absent from Monghyr from July 13 to 16. On the 17th an application was made to him for a postponement, which was rejected. The property, however, was not sold until the 20th. It is evident that on May 16 the sale was postponed to July 13, the day on which the monthly sales were to commence; those sales did not actually begin until the 17th, owing to the absence from the station of the presiding officer, and the sale was held on the 20th in the course of the monthly sales. On the facts appearing on the record their Lordships think the Subordinate Judge did not act in contravention of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in holding the sale on July 20. 10 Law Rep. 38 Ind. App. 200 ( 1910- 1911). Rang Lal Singh v. Maharajah Sir Ravaneshwar 112 Both the Courts in India have found against the appellants on the question of substantial injury. The evidence regarding the value of the property is meagre and unsatisfactory, and their Lordships are not satisfied that, assuming even there was any irregularity in publishing the sale, any substantial injury has been caused thereby to the appellants. On the whole their Lordships are of opinion that the order of the High Court is right, and that this appeal should be dis missed with costs. And they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.