JUDGMENT : PIGGOTT, J. In the years 1893 and 1897 the occupancy tenants of certain lands mortgaged their holdings with possession to the plaintiff, respondent in the present case. On the 30th of March, 1908, the occupancy tenants relinquished their holdings in favour of the zamindar, who is the defendant-appellant in this Court. On the 4th of September, 1909, the plaintiff mortgagee brought the present suit, seeking for a declaration that the relinquishment is of no effect, and that neither the zamindar nor the occupancy tenants are entitled to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff over the holding without paying his mortgage debt. Two days after this suit was filed, i.e., on the 6th of September, 1909, the present appellant as zamindar brought a suit for ejectment under the provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act against the mortgagee and his brother, treating them as his tenants at will in respect of the lands in suit. The mortgagee put in an appearance before the Revenue Courts, and entered a plea to the effect that a suit in respect of the same matter was pending in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. He seems to have thought that by merely entering this plea he freed himself from all liability in respect of any decree which the Revenue Court might see fit to make, for he took no further step to protect his rights in that court. The result was that, on the 8th of November, 1909, the Revenue Court passed an ex parte decree for possession in favour of the zamindar. Execution of this decree seems to have been delayed by some question which arose regarding the standing crops, but possession was actually given to the zamindar on the 19th of October, 1901. In the meatime the suit out of which this appeal arises had been proceeding, and the first court gave its decision on the 6th of April, 1910. The learned Munsif found that there had been no fraud or collusion about the relinquishment, and that the proceedings in the Revenue Court, which had already terminated in the ex parte decree of the 8th of November, 1909, were a bar to the plaintiff's suit by reason, both of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act (Act No. I of 1877). By the time the case came for decision before the lower appellate court, the ejectment decree of the Revenue Court had been executed, for the decision of the learned District Judge now under appeal bears date the 7th of December, 1910. The learned District Judge came to no finding on the question of fraud or collusion, and holding on the authority of two reported cases of this Court that the suit was in no way effected by the result of the proceeds in the Revenue Court has given the plaintiff a ‘decree prayed. The decisions relied on by the lower appellate count are Suba Bibi v. Raghubir Singh,[1909] 7 A.L.J.R., 291 and Ram Dhari Rai v. Ram Dhari Rai” [1909] 7 A.L.J.R. 305. Both are single Judge cases, and in the former the judgment of Aikman, J., is very brief and takes no account of the particular point upon which-the present case turns, namely, that during the pendency of the civil suit the zemindar had succeeded in effecting the ejectment of the plaintiff through the Revenue Court. In the second of the two cases above referred to, the question of res judicata is discussed at some length, and the decision is authority in favour of the decision arrived at by the lower appellate court. The question has, however, been since reconsidered by a Bench of this Court in Jaigopal Narain Singh v. Uman Datt,[1910] 8 A.L.J.R., 695. Although that case upon its particular facts ended in a decree in favour of the mortgagee, the ratio decidendi of the case is, in my opinion, entirely in favour of the present appellant. There is no question in this case of going behind the principle affirmed by the various rulings of this Court and the very recent one in Chote Lal v. Sheo Gopal Singh,[1911] 8 A.L.J.R. 117, that an occupancy tenant having mortgaged his holding with possession prior to the passing of the Tenancy Act of 1901, has no power to relinquish the same in favour of the zamindar. 2. The point for decision in the present case is as to the effect of the proceedings in the Revenue Court which resulted in the ex parte decree of November, 1909, and actual delivery of possession in October, 1910. 2. The point for decision in the present case is as to the effect of the proceedings in the Revenue Court which resulted in the ex parte decree of November, 1909, and actual delivery of possession in October, 1910. The correct view seems to me to be that the present suit must fail because of the combined effect of the principle of res judicata and of the general principle that a court will not grant a decree for a declaration where such decree can lead to no result in favour of the person obtaining the result. In the case of Jai Gopal Narain Singh v. Uman Datt where the mortgagee obtained a declaration sought under circumstances very similar to the present, not only was stress laid upon the fact that the relinquishment was fraudulent and collusive as between the occupancy tenant and the zamindar, but it was pointed out that the matter in the Revenue Court was still subjudice, as the question of the propriety of the ejectment was pending before the Board of Revenue, and in the words of the Chief Justice, there had been as yet in the Revenue Court “no final decree determining the occupancy tenancy.” There has been such a decree in the present case, and rightly or wrongly, the Revenue Court has ejected the mortgagee and put the zamindar in possession. If a declaration were given in favour of the present plaintiff as sought by him, it is clear that the Revenue Court would not restore him to possession; and any suit for recovery of possession in the Civil Court would be barred by the general principle that when a Revenue Court has tried and finally determined a matter in which it has exclusive jurisdiction, the party against which that decision has become final will not be permitted, by merely changing the form of the suit, to obtain a retrial of the same matter in the Civil Court. On this point I am content to refer to the case of Maharaja of Vizianagram v. Chhango Kurmi,[1910] 7 A.L.J.R., 555. I accordingly accept this appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the court of first instance. 3. The defendant-appellant will get her costs throughout.