JUDGMENT : Richards, Banerji, JJ. This appeal arises out of a suit instituted in the Civil Court for a declaration of the plaintiff's title to a certain occupancy holding or in the alternative for possession. The plaintiff's title was based upon his being the adopted son of one Mawashi, who admittedly was, prior to his death, the occupancy tenant. The defendant was a rival claimant to the tenancy. He also claimed to be the adopted son of Mawashi. The court of first instance dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had not made out his adoption. The court of first appeal agreed with the finding of the court of first instance that the plaintiff had not made out the adoption, but it found that the plaintiff was a collateral relative who had been joint in the cultivation of the holding, that he had been in possession, and that therefore his title was superior to that of the defendant, and it gave a decree for possession against the defendant, whom it held not to be the adopted son of Mawashi. On second appeal to a Judge of this Court the decision of the Court of first appeal was confirmed. The present appeal has been instituted under the Letters Patent. It appears that prior to the institution of the present suit an application in the Revenue Court was made by the plaintiff for mutation of names. In the course of those proceedings the very same question of adoption was raised and considered, with the result that the plaintiff was unsuccessful. The argument which has been addressed to us was chiefly one based upon the contention that having regard to the provisions of sections 95 and 167 of the Agra Tenancy Act the suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court. Section 95 provides that at any time during the continuance of a tenancy either the landholder or the tenant may sue for a declaration as to any of the matters specified in the section. Clause (a) is the name and description of the tenant of the holding. Section 167 provides that no Civil Court shall take cognizance of any suit or application of the nature specified in the fourth schedule. Amongst the suits and applications specified in schedule IV are proceedings, under section 95. Clause (a) is the name and description of the tenant of the holding. Section 167 provides that no Civil Court shall take cognizance of any suit or application of the nature specified in the fourth schedule. Amongst the suits and applications specified in schedule IV are proceedings, under section 95. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff's proper and only course was an application or suit in the Revenue Court for a declarations to the name and description of the tenant. It is further argued that the proceedings that took place in the Revenue Court were proceedings of this very nature. In our opinion section 95 was not intended to apply to the case of disputes between rival claimants to a tenancy. It was intended to apply to questions arising between the landlord on the one side and the tenant on the other. Primâ facie the Civil Court is the proper court to try all questions, and it is only when suits are expressly excluded from its cognizance that its jurisdiction is ousted. It certainly does not appear to us that the provisions of section 95 coupled with the provisions of section 167 exclude the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in questions between rival claimants to tenancies. The very words of the section itself in which it says the “landlord or tenant” may sue, seems to demonstrate that the intention of the section was to provide a tribunal for questions arising between a landlord and tenant. The section does not provide for possession, it only provides for a declaration; this also goes to show that the section contemplated the case of a landlord and a tenant and an existing tenancy. A number of cases have been cited by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant. Many of these cases were decided on the construction of the provisions of Act No. XII of 1881. The provisions of that Act are by no means the same as the provisions of the present Tenancy Act. Practically the same question arose in the case of Kali Charan v. Musammat Utmi, (1910) 7 A.L.J., 658. In a quite recent case, namely, F.A. No. 164 of 1910, the same question in principle arose and was decided by one of us and Mr. Justice TUDBALL. Practically the same question arose in the case of Kali Charan v. Musammat Utmi, (1910) 7 A.L.J., 658. In a quite recent case, namely, F.A. No. 164 of 1910, the same question in principle arose and was decided by one of us and Mr. Justice TUDBALL. The only other question which was urged in the appeal was that the zamindar was a necessary party to the suit inasmuch as if the occupancy tenant had died leaving no heirs, as defined by section 22 of the Tenancy Act, the tenancy would be extinguished for the benefit of the zamindar. In our opinion there is no force whatever in this contention. It would be quite wrong that the zamindar should be brought into a dispute between rival claimants to a tenancy with which he had nothing to do. The zamindar is, of course, not bound by any decree which might result in litigation between two rival cliamants. In our opinion the decision of our learned brother was quite correct, and we dismiss the appeal with costs.