JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J. This appeal arises out of a suit for pre-emption. Both the courts below dismissed the suit. The evidence on the record consists of the wajib-nl-ars of 1833, and the wajib-ul-arz of 1860, together with the Kaifiat Serishta Nizamat. The wajib-ul-arz of 1833 clearly records a right of pre-emption. The wajib-ul-arz of 1860 also records a right of pre-emption. The right of pre-emption as recorded in 1833 was not so extensive as the right recorded in 1860. According to the wajib-ul-arz of 1833, the co-sharer was bound to offer the property to the co-sharers in the village before selling to a stranger. In 1860, the different grades of co-sharers to whom the property had first to be offered are set forth. There is not, however, in our opinion, any necessary inconsistency between the two rights. It might well have been that if the claim for pre-emption had been resisted prior to 1860, evidence might have been adduced to supplement the record contained in the wajib-ul-arz of 1833, so as to show that the different grades of proprietors had rights of pre-emption inter se. The fact remains that there is a record of the right of preemption going back as far as the year 1833 and carrying on to the year 1860. As against this evidence there is no evidence except the Kaifiat Sevishta Nizamat. The learned Munsif inferred from this document, that there was only one proprietor of the village between the year 1802 and the year 1860. A more careful consideration of the document, we think, shows that this inference was wrong. It was quite true that the village formed portion of the Raj of Raja Ishri Prasad, but the probabilities are that all along there were birt proprietors of the village and that the Raja's interest was no greater than a right to receive a yearly head rent. We find that the wajib-ul-arz of 1833 was signed by a number of proprietors as birt-holders and in the body of the wajib-ul-arz it is stated that the village was their ancestral birt and that they paid a malikana of Rs. 30 to the Raja. The settlement itself was made not with the Raja, but with the birt-holders. We think, therefore, that to some extent at least the judgment of both the courts below proceeded under a misapprehension of the evidence. 2. 30 to the Raja. The settlement itself was made not with the Raja, but with the birt-holders. We think, therefore, that to some extent at least the judgment of both the courts below proceeded under a misapprehension of the evidence. 2. It is said that the wajib-ul-arz of 1860 appears on its face to be a record of contract rather than that of a custom. This is no doubt the fact, tut this matter cannot be regarded as of vital importance having regard to the Full Bench ruling in Returaji Dubain v. Pahhvan Bhagat,[1910] I.L.R., 33 All., p. 196. Notwithstanding the language of the wajib-ul-arz of 1860, we think that the record of the right of pre-emption in that wajib-ul-arz, especially when it is taken in conjunction with the record of the right of pre-emption in the wajib-ul-arz of 1833, must be regarded prima facie at least as a record of a custom or usage of pre-emption. Once the Kaifiat Serishta Nizamat is out of the way, there is no evidence to rebut this presumption. In other words the evidence in support of the existence of the usage of pre-emption is all one way. It is possible that further evidence as to the existence or non-existence of this right might have been given by the parties. It has been too much the practice in many cases of pre-emption for the parties to neglect to produce any evidence except the wajib-ul-arz and to rely entirely on the latter. We think, in the present case, the plaintiffs made out their case. We are not, however, deciding that the mere production of a doubtful wajib-ul-arz is necessarily sufficient to establish even a prima facie case. The result is that we allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of both the courts below, and remand the case to the court of first instance through the lower appellate court, with directions to re-admit the case and to proceed to hear and determine the same according to law. Costs in this Court and heretofore will abide the result.