JUDGMENT : PIGGOTT, J. The question in issue in this appeal is whether a deed of gift, dated May 30th, 1906, by Musammat Hamid-un-nissa, is valid to the entire extent of the property conveyed, or as held by the lower appellate court to the extent of ?rd only by reason of its having been executed by the lady in question on her death-bed and “in immediate apprehension of death.” I have to determine first of all the law to be applied to the facts of this case. The parties are Shia Muhammedans, and the first point taken by the defendant before me is that under the law applicable to Muhammedans of this sect a gift by a person suffering from a mortal illness which ends fatally is valid with reference to the entire disposition, provided delivery takes place before the death of the donor and provided the donor is in perfect possession of his senses. I have been referred to no reported case as authority for the proposition. It will be found in Mr. Ameer Ali's Muhammadan Law on page 19 of the 3rd edition, and his authority there quoted for it is the Jamaa-ush-shittat. The learned author himself admits that the Sharaia-ul-islam lays down a different doctrine more in accordance with the rule of Hanafi law applicable to the Sunni Muhammedans, and that the principle stated in this work may probably be regarded as representing the old Shia doctrine, while the Jamaa-ush-shittat gives the opinions of the Mujtahids of Persia. In the well-known case of Agha Ali Khan v. Altaf Husain Khan,[1892] I.L.R., 14 All., 429, a Full Bench of this Court in dealing with a different question of Muhammedan law applicable to the Shia sect had occasion to deal at length with a number of authorities. The impression which I gather from that ruling is that the Sharaia-ul-islam is the leading and most weighty authority for the law applicable to the Shia sect in India and superior in this respect to the Jamaa-ush-shittat which represents rather, as Mr. Ameer Ali himself says, the views of Muhammedan jurists in Persia. The impression which I gather from that ruling is that the Sharaia-ul-islam is the leading and most weighty authority for the law applicable to the Shia sect in India and superior in this respect to the Jamaa-ush-shittat which represents rather, as Mr. Ameer Ali himself says, the views of Muhammedan jurists in Persia. It is true that this book is itself quoted as an authority in the case to which I have referred, but it seems to me that it is quoted rather because of the clearness and precision with which it enunciates certain principles to which the learned Judges had occasion to refer, than on account of its intrinsic authority. Besides this Mr. Ghulam Mujtaba, on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, who is contesting this deed of gift, has referred me to quotations from a number of authorities carrying weight among Shia Muhammedans. Those authorities admit that there has been a difference of opinion on the very point now in issue. They conclude one after another by stating that the better view which commends itself to them is that laid down in the Sharaya. Mr. Ghulam Mujtaba endeavoured to carry the argument further by contending that, so far from the Shia law being more favourable to the disposition of property by way of gift on the part of persons suffering from serious illness, it was in fact more stringent than the Hanafi law. He quoted passages from some of the authorities referred to by him to the effect that a disposition of property by way of gift made by a person suffering from illness of which he actually died should be presumed to be valid only to the extent of ?rd, apart from any express finding as to the state of mind of the donor at the time of making the gift. I find myself unable in the absence of the authority of any reported case to accede with reference to this question of law to the contention of either party. I find myself unable in the absence of the authority of any reported case to accede with reference to this question of law to the contention of either party. I prefer not to go beyond their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ibrahim Goolam Ariff v. Saiboo,[1907] I.L.R., 35 Cal., 1, where their Lordships purported to lay down a principle applicable to all Muhammedans, and where it was held that the invalidity in the case of a disposition made by a person suffering from illness of which he eventually died arises where a gift is made under pressure of the sense of the imminence of death. The real question is, whether the donor was or was not seeking to defeat the legitimate expectations of the heirs by means of a disposition of his property which though nominally a gift, was really of a testamentary nature, inasmuch as the donor was suffering at the moment from a fatal illness and entertaining no expectation of recovery, Such an alienation of his property would therefore affect his own personal interests no more than a testamentary bequest would. The law being thus settled and the finding of the lower appellate court being distinctly that Musammat Hamid-un-nissa executed this deed of gift in immediate apprehension of death, the only question which remains is whether this Court can go in second appeal behind that finding. A finding as to the state of mind of a person at the time when he performed a certain act may be said to be ordinarily a finding of fact, and there is distinct authority for treating the particular finding with which I am now concerned as one of fact, both in the Privy Council case already referred to and in the case of Muhammad Mashud Husain Khan v. Muhammad Anwar Husain Khan,[1909] 6 A.L.J.R., 503. It cannot be said either that the learned District Judge in arriving at this finding was labouring under any misapprehension of law, for he lays down the law on the subject substantially in the same sense as that in which I have held that it should be affirmed. The only question then is whether the finding can be described as one entirely unsupported by evidence. The only question then is whether the finding can be described as one entirely unsupported by evidence. The conclusion arrived at by a court of law as to the state of mind of a person performing a certain act is necessarily one based upon evidence of facts and circumstances tending to indicate a particular state of mind. The finding in this case is that Musammat Hamid-un-nissa had been suffering from consumption for a year or more prior to the 30th of May, 1906, and that she eventually died of this disease on the 6th of July, 1906. A post-card written by the lady's husband to a relative of the family has been produced and found by the lower appellate court to be proved in which Musammat Hamid-un-nissa's illness is spoken of in very serious terms. She is spoken of as “the patient” (alil), and it is stated that she is making no progress towards recovery, that on the contrary she is growing weaker every day. The female relative to whom this communication is addressed is asked to postpone her visit; and I do not think any real importance can be attached to a particular phrase in which she is told that she may come later on if the sick woman shows signs of improvement. It could scarcely be expected on any view of the case that the writer would be so brutal as to put it bluntly that there was no hope of recovery. There can be no doubt that the recipient of this letter must have taken the condition of the patient to be very serious and cannot have been greatly surprised when she; heard a couple of weeks later of the patient's death. This post-card was written on or before the 24th of June, 1906, and is certainly a valuable piece of evidence as to the state of Hamid-un-nissa between three and four weeks after the execution of this deed of gift. Another piece of evidence which must be taken into account is the recital in the deed of gift in which Musammat Hamid-un-nissa says that she is frequently (aksar) unwell and that life is uncertain. Another piece of evidence which must be taken into account is the recital in the deed of gift in which Musammat Hamid-un-nissa says that she is frequently (aksar) unwell and that life is uncertain. The words in themselves do not amount to much, and I find that in a reported case, Amiran Bibi v. Man Bibi,[1898] A.W.N., 104, a Bench of this Court declined to attach much importance to a similar expression used in a deed which was being impeached on the same ground as the one now before me. At the same time there is a certain significance about the use of this expression in the deed in suit. It would be natural enough in a will, but seems to have no particular point or congenita as appearing in a deed of gift. If the lady was simply making a present of certain property to a favourite nephew out of love and affection which she bore him, the fact of her being in indifferent health and conscious of the uncertainty of life, would appear to have no particular bearing on her conduct. It must be remembered that the essential ground on which a transaction of this sort is impeached under the principle of marz-ul-maut is that a conveyance by way of gift is being used in order to effect what is really a testamentary disposition. The mere fact, therefore, that the deed itself contains expressions more suitable to a will than to a deed of gift should not, I think, be regarded as wholly without significance. 2. These facts were placed before the learned District Judge, and on these he arrived at his finding. I have not to consider whether I should have drawn the same conclusion myself from those facts if I had been sitting, as the Judges of this Court were in the case to which I have referred above, as a court of first appeal. Taking cognizance of the matter in second appeal, it seems to me that it would be going altogether too far to hold that the finding arrived at by the lower appellate court as to Musammat Hamid-un-nissa's state of mind is one wholly unsupported by evidence, or is one which could not be reasonably arrived at upon the evidence before the court. I must, therefore, decline to interfere with the decision of the court below. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.