JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This appeal is directed against an order by which the Court below has overruled an objection of the judgment-debtor now Appellant before us to the attachment of a sum of Rs. 4,000 payable monthly as allowance to him by the representative in interest of his son. It appears that, on the 25th September 1905, the Appellant conveyed all his properties in favour of his son for the payment of his debts.' The conveyance provided that the purchaser would pay the vendor a monthly sum of Rs. 4,000 the first payment to be made on the 1st October 1905 and the payment for every succeeding month, on the first day of the month following, between the hours of 1 A.M., and 6 A.M. The deed further provided that the vendor would not, by mortgage or otherwise, seek to charge or alienate the allowance payable to him and that, on no account and under no circumstances was the allowance to become payable to, or demandable by, any person other than the vendor or his duly constituted attorney. There was also a provision that so far as was consistent with the then subsisting mortgages executed by the vendor himself the allowance payable was to be a first charge upon a specified share of the estate. The purchaser died some time after this transaction whereupon the properties vested in his widow, Rani Sashirama Kumari, and are now under the management of the Court of Wards on her behalf. On the 4th April 1910, the Respondents before us, who held a decree for a large sum of money obtained against the Appellant, Raja Padmananda Singh, on the 13th November 1908, applied for execution thereof. They prayed for recovery of the judgment-debt by attachment of the allowance of Rs. 4,000 from April 1910 up to the date of realisation, and also for rateable distribution of a sum of money, which had been already deposited in Court and apparently represented a portion of the allowance due to the Appellant from November 1909 to January 1910. They further asked that the allowance for the months of February and March 1910, which had already accrued due and was still in the hands of the Manager under the Court of Wards, might be attached and made available for the satisfaction of their dues. They further asked that the allowance for the months of February and March 1910, which had already accrued due and was still in the hands of the Manager under the Court of Wards, might be attached and made available for the satisfaction of their dues. Notice was in due course issued upon the judgment-debtor who objected that the allowance could not be attached before it became due ; that it was not attachable at all because it was in the nature of a maintenance grant; and finally, that in no case could the entire amount of the maintenance be treated as attachable. The Subordinate Judge has overruled these objections and has issued a prohibitory order upon the Manager under the Court of Wards, by which the latter is directed to withhold payment of the monthly allowance to the judgment-debtor from the month of April 1910 till the whole of the amount claimed by the decree-holders is satisfied. The judgment-debtor has now appealed to this Court, and, on his behalf, it has been argued that no attachment could be effected of the allowance before it had accrued due: in other words, that an annuity, not yet due is not garnishable under the provisions of the law. In our opinion, this contention is clearly well-founded and must prevail. The applications of the decree-holder falls, it is stated on their behalf, within the scope of rr. 46 and 52 of Or. 21 of the CPC of 1908. R. 46 in so far as it may be supposed to be applicable to the circumstances of the present case, provides that, in the case of a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument, the attachment shall be made by a written order prohibiting the creditor from recovering the debt, and the debtor from making payment thereof until the further order of the Court. A copy of the order is required to be affixed on some conspicuous part of the Court house and another copy sent to the debtor. Sub-r. (3) of r. 46 provides that a debtor thus prohibited may pay the amount of his debt into Court, and such payment discharges him as effectually as payment to the party entitled to receive the sum. R. 52 provides for the attachment of property in the custody of a public officer. Sub-r. (3) of r. 46 provides that a debtor thus prohibited may pay the amount of his debt into Court, and such payment discharges him as effectually as payment to the party entitled to receive the sum. R. 52 provides for the attachment of property in the custody of a public officer. In a case of this description, the attachment is made by a notice to the officer requesting that the property sought to be attached and any interest or dividend becoming payable thereon may be held subject to the further orders of the Court from which the notice is issued. It will be observed that the expression "debt" is not defined in r. 46, and that although in r. 52 the term used namely, "property," is wider in scope, an attachment can be affected only of property in the custody of a public officer. 2. In so far as r. 46 is concerned there is no room for controversy that the term "debt" is intended to be used in its legal sense of a debt either due or accruing due. As was explained by Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C. J., in the case of Banchharam Majumder v. Adyanath Bhattacherji 13 C. W. N. 966 : s. c. I. L. R. 36 Cal. 936 (1909), a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in future by reason of a present obligation. That is the definition given by Lindley, L. J., in Webb v. Stenton 11 Q. B. D. 518 (1883). It was further pointed out in the case mentioned that the principle applicable to cases of this description may be concisely stated in the words of the learned Judges who decided the case of People v. Arguello 37 California 524 (1869):-- "Standing alone the word debt is as applicable to a sum of money which has been promised at a future date as to a sum now due and payable. If we wish to distinguish between the two we say of the former that it is a debt owing and of the latter that it is a debt due. In other words debts are of two kinds solvendum in praesenti and solvendum in futuro. Whether a claim or demand is a debt or not is in no respect determined by a reference to the time of payment. In other words debts are of two kinds solvendum in praesenti and solvendum in futuro. Whether a claim or demand is a debt or not is in no respect determined by a reference to the time of payment. A sum of money which is certainly and in all events payable is a debt without regards to the fact whether it is payable now or at a future time. A sum payable upon a contingency however is not a debt and does not become a debt until the contingency has happened." On this principle it was ruled by this Court in the case of Haridas Acharjya v. Baroda Kishore Acharjya I. L. R. 27 Cal. 38 (1899) that when A is bound under deed to pay to B a monthly allowance during the lifetime of the latter, there cannot be a valid attachment of any portion of the allowance by a prohibitory order issued to A of a date anterior to the time when the same falls due to B. The learned Judges relied upon the observation of their Lord ships of the Judicial Committee in Tufuzool Hussain v. Raghoonath Pershad 14 M. I. A. 40 at p. 50; 7 B. L. R. 186 (1871) and it may be observed that the same view had been indicated many years earlier by Mr. Justice Colvile in Boistub Churn Bysack v. Battye 1 Taylor & Bell 307 (1850). The same principle has been adopted by the Allahabad High Court in Sher Singh v. Sri Ram I. L. R. 30 All. 246 (1908) and Devi Prasad v. Lewis I. L. R. 31 All. 304 (1909) and also by Madras High Court in Ayyavayyar v. Virasami I. L. R. 21 Mad. 393 (1897). It has been ingeniously argued however by the learned Vakil for the Respondents decree-holders on the authority of the decision in Harshankar Prosad v. Baijnath Das I. L. R. 23 All. 164 (1901) that the sum payable as annuity was in substance a portion of the consideration for the conveyance paid to the vendor in successive instalments, and consequently constituted a debt the payment whereof was deferred. But there is clearly no foundation for this contention. The aggregate amount of the consideration of which part was immediately payable and the balance payable in instalments was never fixed by agreement of parties. But there is clearly no foundation for this contention. The aggregate amount of the consideration of which part was immediately payable and the balance payable in instalments was never fixed by agreement of parties. The annuity, it cannot be contested, would terminate immediately upon the death of the grantee and cannot be treated as a debt the payment whereof was deferred. The case of Dambar Koeri v. Sham Kissen (1905) 9 C. W. N 703 is distinguishable, because there the annuity apparently accrued due from day to day, and consequently on the date the prohibitory order was issued, there was an actually existing debt though the sum was payable at a future date. The cases of Sree Nath Roy v. Brojendra Bhusan 10 C. W. N. 1102n (1892) and Gopal Lal Seal v. Marsden 10 C. W. N. 1102 (1906) cannot be treated as binding authorities upon this matter, because those decisions were based on the distinction between an annuity given by a Will and right to future maintenance, and the question was not decided whether a contingent right could be made the subject of a prohibitory order. In view of the principles already explained, the position cannot thus be seriously maintained that a prohibitory order may be validity issued in respect of sums which may never fall due and become payable to the judgment-debtor. 3. It is worthy of note that the view just indicated has been adopted as well-founded on principle both in the English and the American Courts. It is settled law in England that, to make a debt attachable it is essential that the relation of creditor and debtor should exist between the judgment-debtor and the garnishee. Two practical tests have been applied in relation to this matter, namely, first, could the judgment debtor sue the garnishee for the amount and recover it ? Secondly, would the debt vest in the judgment-debtor's trustee in the case of bankruptcy ? Hence a garnishee order can be made where the debt is payable by instalments, for payment of the accruing instalments as they become payable from time to time, Tapp v. Jones L. R. 10 Q. B. 591 (1875). Consequently though annuities payable by trustees are attachable, Nash v. Pease 47 L. J. Q. B. 766 (1878), the money must have reached their hands and be also payable, Webb v. Stenton 11 Q. B. D. 518 (1883). Consequently though annuities payable by trustees are attachable, Nash v. Pease 47 L. J. Q. B. 766 (1878), the money must have reached their hands and be also payable, Webb v. Stenton 11 Q. B. D. 518 (1883). These decisions recognise the distinction between a case where there is an existing debt payment whereof is deferred and a case where both the debt and its payment rest in the future : in the former case, there is an attachable debt, in the latter case there is not. See also Hall v. Pritchett 3 Q. B. D. 215 (1877), Both v. Trail 12 Q. B. D. 8 (1883) and Fellows v. Thornton 14 Q. B. D. 335 (1884). The distiction mentioned has also been recognised in the Irish Courts, Sparks v. Younge L. R. 8 Ch. 251 and Payne v. French 10 Ir. Jur. N. S. 52. It has similarly been ruled that an annuity payable under a trust-deed is attachable only in respect of sums that have accrued due, Nokes v. Manders 15 I. L. T. R. 18 and Bascombe v. Onge 15 I. L. T. R. 47. In America the principle is recognised as firmly settled that in case of annuities payable on fixed dates during the life of the annuitant without provision for an apportionment, as the claim of the annuitant is liable to be defeated on his death before the time of payment arrives, the claim is before such time contingent and not the subject of garnishment. It is hence stated in Rood on Garnishment, sec. 120, that on a promise to pay a certain sum on a certain date in each year as long as the annuitant shall live and at the same rate for any part of the year, the promisor can be charged as garnishee of the annuitant only for the amount which had accrued before the garnishment was served, for it is uncertain that she will live longer, Salim v. Cooper 15 Gray. 532, Easterly v. Keny 36 Com. 18, Sayward v. Drew 6 Maine 263, Dickinson v. Dickinson 59 Vermont 678 ; 10 Atlantic 821, Cony v. Day 2 Miles. (Pa.) 412, and Briggs v. Beach 18 Vermont 115 ; compare Damber Koeri v. Sham Kissen 9 C. W. N. 703 (1905). A similar exposition is given by Chief Justice Drake in his classical Treatise on Attachments, 7 Ed, sec. 555. (Pa.) 412, and Briggs v. Beach 18 Vermont 115 ; compare Damber Koeri v. Sham Kissen 9 C. W. N. 703 (1905). A similar exposition is given by Chief Justice Drake in his classical Treatise on Attachments, 7 Ed, sec. 555. The only solitary cases in which the contrary view has been maintained are those of Red v. Power 69 Miss. 242 ; 13 South 586 and Kaiser v. Shaw 104 Kentucky 119 ; 84 Am. St. Rep. 450 (1898). In these two decisions, however, no explanation is suggested upon which it may be held that a debt though it is uncertain and contingent and may never become due and payable, may yet be subject to garnishment. The preponderance of authority is undoubtedly in favour of the view that it is only indebtedness which is in its nature absolute and payable at some time without contingency, that can be reached by garnishment process, Smith v. Gilberts 71 Com. 149 ; 71 Am. St. Rep. 163. We are unable therefore to accept the contention of the Respondents that a fixed sum payable to the debtor monthly or only for life is subject to garnishment, although the aggregate amount which will be payable is uncertain and contingent. It is thus incontestable that the Respondents decree-holders were not entitled to the issue of a prohibitory order in respect of sums which had not accrued due, on the basis of their application: and that r. 46 of Or. 21 of the Code of 1908 is of no assistance to them. 4. In so far as r. 52 of Or. 21 is concerned, the case is equally clear. As already stated, that rule applies only where the property to be attached is in the custody of a public officer. It does not allow of an anticipatory attachment of money expected to reach the hands of a public officer, and is restricted only to money actually in his hands [Tulaji v. Balabhai I. L. R. 22 Bom. 39 (1896)]. The prohibitory order issued by the Court upon the application of the decree-holders cannot consequently be sustained. 5. It has finally been argued by the learned Vakil for the decree-holders that it is open to them to apply for attachment and sale of the right of the judgment-debtor to receive the allowance from the representatives of the purchaser. 39 (1896)]. The prohibitory order issued by the Court upon the application of the decree-holders cannot consequently be sustained. 5. It has finally been argued by the learned Vakil for the decree-holders that it is open to them to apply for attachment and sale of the right of the judgment-debtor to receive the allowance from the representatives of the purchaser. It has in substance been contended that, notwithstanding the restrictions upon alienation formulated in the conveyance, the right may be attached and sold in execution of a decree against the vendor. The question sought to be raised is by no means free from difficulty, and it is sufficient to state that when it arises, it must be answered in the light of the principles explained in the cases of Asadali Molla v. Hyder Ali 14 C. W. N. 918 : s. c. 12 C. L. J. 918 ; I L. R. 38 Cal. 13 (1910), Annapurni v. Swaminatha I. L. R. 34 Mad. 7 (1910) and Tarasundari Debi v. Saroda Charan Banerji 12 C. L. J. 146 (1910), where the earlier authorities on the question of the assignability of a right to receive maintenance or allowance will be found reviewed. It has also been suggested by the learned Vakil for the Respondents that the restraint upon alienation of this right was invalid, and that in fact the entire settlement was fraudulent and inoperative in law. This also is a question of considerable nicety, and, if we treat it as one of first principles untramelled by precedents, it does not follow by any means that the answer must necessarily be against the judgment-debtor [see also Erskine, Principles of the Law of Scotland, Book III, Sch. V I, sec. 4 ; On Arrestment of Alimentary Debts, 17th Ed., p. 444. Erskine, Institute of the Law of Scotland, Book III, Tit. VI, sec. 4; Bell, Commentaries on Law of Scotland, Book II, part II, Ch. 7, Ed. 1870, Vol. I, p. 124; Bell, Principles, sec. 2276, 8th Ed., Vol. II, p. 557. Irvine v. McLaren 7 Shaw 317 (1829), Harvey v. Calder 2 Dunlop 1095 (1840), Bell v. Innes 17 Dunlop 778 (1855). Green, Encyclopaedia of Scots Law, Vol. I, article on Alimentary Interest. Gloag and Irvine on Securities, p. 444. Hewahs v. Roberton 9 Rettie. 1870, Vol. I, p. 124; Bell, Principles, sec. 2276, 8th Ed., Vol. II, p. 557. Irvine v. McLaren 7 Shaw 317 (1829), Harvey v. Calder 2 Dunlop 1095 (1840), Bell v. Innes 17 Dunlop 778 (1855). Green, Encyclopaedia of Scots Law, Vol. I, article on Alimentary Interest. Gloag and Irvine on Securities, p. 444. Hewahs v. Roberton 9 Rettie. 175; 19 Scots L. R. 149 (1881), Hughes v. Edwards 19 Rettie 33; 29 Scots L. R. 911 (1892)]. It is sufficient for our present purpose to state that the application of the decree-holders by which the proceedings now before us were initiated, did not invite the Court to attach and sell the right of the judgment-debtor to receive the allowance. The interesting question suggested therefore cannot be discussed in this appeal. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the order of the Subordinate Judge reversed, and the application for execution in so far as it seeks relief in respect of allowance from April 1910 onwards, dismissed with costs in all the Courts. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at five gold mohurs. Carnduff, J. I agree.