Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (December 6, 1906) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Backerganj (February 23, 1904). The suit was brought by three plaintiffs (of whom the first was an infant by his next friend and duly appointed guardian), alleging so far as material to this appeal that they were respectively the owners by right of inheritance of the property claimed in the plaint; that a purchase thereof at a court auction had been made by the first defendants vendors; that before the said court auction the first defendant, Mir Sarwarjan, had agreed to sell them the said property at the price which might be paid by him therefor; and they prayed for specific performance of the said agreement. The Subordinate Judge passed a decree as prayed and the High Court affirmed it. The agreement was dated October 25, 1895, and was made by Mir Sarwarjan and Basanta Kumar Goha, who acted as manager for Mr. Garth, who was the manager of the plaintiffs estate. The High Court on Mir Sarwarjans appeal found that the agreement was " obviously not entered into by Mr. Garth in his personal capacity. It was entered into by him as manager and for the benefit of the plaintiffs who have accepted and ratified it, and the defendant No. 1 cannot now I think be allowed to resile from it." The Court then proceeded " There remains the question of the plaintiff No. ls right to enforce specific performance of a contract. On this point there is some conflict of decision. The decision of Norris J. in the case of Fatima Bibi v. Debnauth Shah (( 1898) I. L. R. 20 Calc. 508.) is against the plaintiff. It lays down, following, it is said, the decision in Flight v. Bolland (( 1828) 4 Russ. 298.), that a minor in this country cannot maintain a suit for specific performance of a contract entered into on his behalf by his guardian. From the terms of the judgment it would appear as if the contract in that case was entered into by the plaintiff herself. I find, however, on reference to the papers of that case, that the head-note is right. From the terms of the judgment it would appear as if the contract in that case was entered into by the plaintiff herself. I find, however, on reference to the papers of that case, that the head-note is right. Fatima Bibi was a child of eight years of age, and the contract for specific performance of which she sued had been entered into on her behalf by her father and natural guardian, Hafiz Abdul Kadir. This case is, therefore, clearly an authority in favour of the appellant. But it has been dissented from in Khairunnessa Bibi v. Lake Nath Pal (( 1899) I. L. R. 27 Calc. 276.) and Etwaria v. Chandra Nath Mukherjee (( 1905) 10 C. W. N. 763.), of this Court, and in Krishnasami v. Sundarappyar (( 1894) I. L. R. 18 Madr. 415.), of the Madras High Court." The High Court added that in this case there was no want of mutuality, " for the agreement made by Mr. Garth with Mir Sarwarjan would seem to be as enforceable against the minors as it is against Mir Sarwarjan. The acts of a guardian in this country bind the minor. There is no difference between his position and powers and those of a manager. I would therefore refer the following questions to the decision of a Full Bench. 1. Can specific performance of a contract validly entered into on behalf of a minor be enforced ? 2. Has c the case of Fatima Bibi v. Debnauth Shah (I. L. R. 20 Calc. 508.) been rightly decided ?" On August 24, 1906, the High Court answered the question referred. Maclean C. J. said " The question submitted to us is Can specific performance of a contract validly entered into on behalf of a minor be enforced ? This is a wide and far-reaching question, and as we cannot deal with the facts of this case, it is not open to us to say anything as to the validity of the contract in the case. I think we can only answer the question by saying that if a contract is validly entered into on behalf of a minor and there is mutuality in such contract, it might be specifically enforced. Each case must depend upon its own particular circumstances and it is difficult to lay down any general rule. I think we can only answer the question by saying that if a contract is validly entered into on behalf of a minor and there is mutuality in such contract, it might be specifically enforced. Each case must depend upon its own particular circumstances and it is difficult to lay down any general rule. As regards the case immediately before us, we cannot, sitting as a Full Bench, go into the evidence and decide whether or not this is a case in which specific performance ought to be granted. The case must go back to the referring Bench, which must, on the evidence, decide that question. "As regards the second question, I do not think it becomes of any importance in the view I have taken of the first. But if the facts were as they are stated in the report, I should say the case was properly decided." The referring Court subsequently held that the contract was enforceable by a decree for specific performance. De Gruyther, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the appellant Mir Sarwarjan, contended that the agreement of October 25, 1895, if valid, had on the evidence been waived or abandoned by the respondents. As regards the minor respondent they submitted that the agreement was not enforceable by or against him. Neither as guardian nor as manager was Mr. Garth entitled to bind the minor by a contract to purchase immovable property. There was no authority in favour of so far extending his powers. The contract was not valid. So far as its validity depended upon his subsequent ratification of the contract, s. 199 of the Contract Act was referred to as shewing that a contract must be ratified as a whole and not in part. Dunne, for the respondents, contended that the contract was valid and that it was within the powers of Mr. Garth to make it and to bind the infant thereby; that it was proved to have been for the minors benefit, and that there was mutuality in the contract. Reference was made to Mohori Bibee v. Dharmo Das Ghose. (( 1903) L. R, 30 Ind. Ap. 114, 123) De Gruyther, K.C., replied, citing Fry on Specific Performance, 5th ed., p. 231. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. Reference was made to Mohori Bibee v. Dharmo Das Ghose. (( 1903) L. R, 30 Ind. Ap. 114, 123) De Gruyther, K.C., replied, citing Fry on Specific Performance, 5th ed., p. 231. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court at Calcutta affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Backerganj. All the questions raised in the litigation but one were disposed of before the appeal was taken to the High Court, and when the case was before a Division Bench of that Court that question was made the subject of a reference to the Full Bench. The reference was in the following terms—“Can specific performance of a contract validly entered into on behalf of a minor is enforced ? " The reference came before the Chief Justice and four other judges of the High Court. They agreed in returning an answer which seems to be carefully guarded and is perhaps rather enigmatical. The Chief Justice observed that the question submitted to the Court was " a wide and far-reaching question." His opinion was that they could only " answer the question by saying that if a contract is validly entered into on behalf of a minor and there is mutuality in such contract, it might be specifically enforced." The other learned judges concurred. The case was then sent back to the Division Bench to be tried, out; on the merits. The decree under appeal to the High Court was a decree for the specific performance of an agreement for the purchase and sale of immovable estate. The agreement was expressed to be made between a Mr. Garth and the appellant Mir Sarwarjan. Mr. Garth was at the time manager of the estate of the respondent No. 1, who was then a minor. After observing that they had already considered the evidence and had " come to the conclusions (1.) that it was a contract validly entered into and (2.) that there is mutuality with regard to it; for the agreement made by Mr. Garth was at the time manager of the estate of the respondent No. 1, who was then a minor. After observing that they had already considered the evidence and had " come to the conclusions (1.) that it was a contract validly entered into and (2.) that there is mutuality with regard to it; for the agreement made by Mr. Garth with Mir Sarwarjan would seem to be as enforceable against the minor as it is against Mir Sarwarjan," the learned judges of the Division Bench stated that they saw no reason to dissent from their views already expressed and recorded " (1.) that the contract was validly entered into particularly when, as pointed out, it was for the benefit of the minor, and was accepted and ratified by him, and (2.) for the reason given there is no want of mutuality in respect of this agreement." The agreement in question was entered into by an agent of Mr. Garth, without any express authority from him, but there was some evidence that Mr. Garth adopted or assumed to adopt the agreement on behalf of the minor. At any rate it was assumed in both Courts and it was the opinion of the Subordinate Judge that the contract was not intended to bind the manager personally, and therefore it was assumed that it was intended to bind the minor or the minors estate. It was also assumed that the purchase was an advantageous purchase for the minor. In this judgment and for the purpose of this judgment their Lordships accept all the foregoing assumptions. The learned judges of the Division Bench disposed of the question of mutuality at the first hearing in the following terms " There is no want of mutuality in this case for the agreement made by Mr. Garth with Mir Sarwarjan would seem to be as enforceable against the minors as it is against Mir Sarwarjan. The acts of a guardian in this country bind the minor. There is no difference between his position and powers and those of a manager." No other or further reason in regard to this point was given by the learned judges when the case was referred back to them. The acts of a guardian in this country bind the minor. There is no difference between his position and powers and those of a manager." No other or further reason in regard to this point was given by the learned judges when the case was referred back to them. Without some authority their Lordships are unable to accept the view of the learned judges of the Division Bench that there is no difference between the position, and powers of a manager and those of a guardian. They are, however, of opinion that it is not within the competence of a manager of a minors estate or within the competence of a guardian of a minor to bind the minor or the minors estate by a contract for the purchase of immovable property, and they are further of opinion that as the minor in the present case was not bound by the contract there was no mutuality, and that the minor who has now reached his majority canton obtain specific performance of the contract. Their Lordships, therefore, will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed, the order of the High Court discharged, and the suit dismissed. The respondent No. 1 must pay the costs of the appeal. Any costs paid under the order of the High Court must be repaid, but there will be no other order as to costs in the Courts below.