JUDGMENT : CHAMIER, J. This was a suit by sons in a joint family consisting of their father and themselves to have a sale of family property by the father to the appellants set aside and for possession of the property. The plaintiffs alleged that their father was a dissolute person addicted to the use of ganja and that he had sold the property for the purpose of obtaining money for his own extravagances. The Munsif found that these allegations had not been proved and he dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed. By the time that the appeal came on for hearing, the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Chandra Deo Singh v. Mata Prasad, [1909] I.L.R., 31 All., 176, had been published, and the Subordinate Judge accordingly remitted two issues for trial, one of which was “whether there was any antecedent debt or family necessity to support and justify the sale.” He gave the parties permission to produce further evidence and ruled that the burden of proof lay upon the purchasers of the property to establish either legal necessity or an antecedent debt. Neither side produced any further evidence and the Munsif accordingly found on the issue in favour of the plaintiffs, and his decision has been affirmed by the Subordinate Judge who, however, gave the sons a decree for their shares only. The purchasers have appealed to this Court. They do not complain of the action of the Subordinate Judge in remitting an issue to the court of first instance. I mention this because it occurred to me that this might possibly have been made a ground of complaint, regard being had to the pleadings. But considering that the decision of the Full Bench was published after the decision of the first court, I think that the action of the Subordinate Judge was correct. The only ground of appeal is that the burden of proof has been cast upon the wrong party. But considering that the decision of the Full Bench was published after the decision of the first court, I think that the action of the Subordinate Judge was correct. The only ground of appeal is that the burden of proof has been cast upon the wrong party. The Full Bench in the ruling mentioned were dealing with the case of a mortgagee from a father in a joint family suing to enforce the mortgage against the sons, and it is contended on behalf of the purchasers in the present case that although the burden of proof may be upon the mortgagee when he is plaintiff seeking to enforce his mortgage, it is otherwise when the sons are challenging as plaintiffs a mortgage or sale made by their father. I take it that the decision of the majority of the Judges in the Full Bench case amounts to this that a father in a joint family cannot mortgage family property except for legal necessity or to pay an antecedent debt. It is impossible, I think, to read the judgments of the majority without seeing that they cast the burden of proof on the mortgagees not because they were the plaintiffs, but because it was for them to establish circumstances justifying the mortgage. Stanley, C.J., at pp. 197 and 198 of the report applies the rule regarding the onus of proof in the case of an alienation by a manager for an infant heir to the case of a father alienating joint family property. Where an alienation by a manager for an infant heir is challenged by the heir on coming of age, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances which justify the alienation or a reasonably credited necessity lies on the transferree. The same rule is contained in section 38 of the Transfer of Property Act. If the burden of proof lies upon a mortgagee when the sons challenge his mortgage, the burden of proof certainly lies upon a purchaser when the sons challenge his purchase. On the Full Bench ruling I feel bound to hold that the burden of proof in the present case lay upon the purchasers, the present appellants. 2. Supposing, however, that the burden of proof lay in the first instance upon the sons, in the circumstances very little evidence would be enough to shift the burden of proof on to the purchasers. 3. 2. Supposing, however, that the burden of proof lay in the first instance upon the sons, in the circumstances very little evidence would be enough to shift the burden of proof on to the purchasers. 3. The sons in the ordinary course would know little about the transaction, whereas the facts would necessarily be known to the purchasers. The deed of sale held by the purchasers states that about one-third of the consideration for the sale was paid in cash to the vendor, of the remainder Rs. 100 are said to represent the price of bullocks, grain and other things supplied by the purchasers, and about Rs. 100 are said to have been devoted to the discharge of antecedent debts of the vendor and his father. These statements may not be evidence against the purchasers, and the deed must be taken to prove as against them that the consideration did not consist wholly of antecedent debts. The deed does not even allege anything in the shape of family necessity except as regards a sum of about Rs. 100. The sons seem to me to have given prima facie evidence that a considerable portion at least of the consideration was not taken either to pay antecedent debts or for family necessity. If the burden of proof lay originally upon the sons, enough evidence was given to shift it to the purchasers. The latter made no attempt to prove either family necessity or antecedent debts. I hold that the claim of the sons should have been decreed in its entirety. This appeal is dismissed with costs. The cross objections are allowed with costs. The result is that the suit is decreed with costs throughout.