JUDGMENT : PIGGOTT, J. The circumstances out of which this application for revision arises require to be stated with some detail. In the month of April, 1911, Mr. F.C.M. Cruickshank was a Magistrate of the first class, exercising jurisdiction in the District of Bijnor, and was also Chairman of the Municipal Board of Dhampur in the same district. In the latter capacity he received certain information which led him to believe that there were valid reasons for proceeding against two mein, named Abbas Ali and Darbari Mal, in respect of an offence punishable under sections 417 and 511, Penal Code, 1860, for having attempted to cheat the Municipal Board of Dhampur. Having taken cognizance of the offence presumably under clause (c), section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he informed the accused persons that they were entitled to be tried by another court. But upon both of them replying that they had no objection to their being tried by himself, he proceeded to try them accordingly. A charge was framed against both men under sections 417 and 511, Penal Code, 1860, and eventually, on the 2nd of May, 1911, the Magistrate delivered a judgment by which he acquitted Darbari Mal and convicted Abbas Ali on the charge as framed, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for six months. Abbas Ali appealed to the Sessions Judge, who set aside the conviction and passed an order directing that “the accused be re-tried by some other Magistrate.” This order is dated May 26th, 1911, and proceeds upon the ground that under the circumstances of the case, and in accordance with the law as laid down in the case of Bisheshar Bhattacharya v. King-Emperor, [1910] 7 A.L.J.R., 749., Mr. Cruickshank was precluded by the provisions of section 556 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from trying the case in which the charge against Abbas Ali and Darbari Mal had been framed. On the 28th of May, 1911, the District Magistrate of Bijnor having before him the order of the Sessions Judge, directing a retrial, made over the case for trial to another first class Magistrate of the same district, and added the following directions :—“Both accused should be sent for at the new trial. On the 28th of May, 1911, the District Magistrate of Bijnor having before him the order of the Sessions Judge, directing a retrial, made over the case for trial to another first class Magistrate of the same district, and added the following directions :—“Both accused should be sent for at the new trial. It is by no means certain that the proper section was applied in the first instance or that the accused who was discharged or acquitted should have been released for the reasons given.” Darbari Mal has come to this Court in revision against the above order. If this were the only point which I had to consider, I could dispose of it briefly. The District Magistrate, having before him certain information of acts alleged to have been committed by Abbas Ali and Darbari Mal, had a right to take cognizance under section 190 of the Code of criminals Procedure of any offence which appeared to have been committed by those persons, and to make over the case for trial to a competent Magistrate. The question how far, if at all Darbari Mal was protected by the provisions of section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code would not arise until the Magistrate to whom the case was made over for trial was prepared to frame a charge. As a matter of fact, it appears that Darbari Mal at once pleaded section 403, Criminal Procedure Code, before the Magistrate who took cognizance of the case, and I understand that the said Magistrate has passed an order expressing his opinion that Mr. Cruickshank's order of acquittal, dated May 2nd, 1911, has no effect as regards Darbari Mal in connection with the proceedings now pending. Strictly speaking I might have required a distinct application in revision to be filed against this order of the trying Magistrate before proceeding to deal with this question at all. As, however, all the records in the case are before me, and the point has been fully argued, I think it expedient that I should not return the record to the Magistrate's court without an expression of opinion which may serve for his guidance. The questions involved are somewhat complicated. As, however, all the records in the case are before me, and the point has been fully argued, I think it expedient that I should not return the record to the Magistrate's court without an expression of opinion which may serve for his guidance. The questions involved are somewhat complicated. In the first place I am clearly of opinion that the Sessions Judge's order of May 26th, 1911, does not operate to set aside the order of acquittal in respect of Darbari Mal, and does not direct Darbari Mal's retrial. There is nothing in the wording of the order itself to suggest that the learned Sessions Judge intended that it should have any effect whatever as regards the proceedings against Darbari Mal. In any case, he had no jurisdiction to pass any order to such effect. The powers of an appellate court are defined in section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and in that section a clear distinction is drawn between the powers which may be exercised in an appeal from an order of acquittal and in an appeal from a conviction. In this case the Sessions Judge had before him nothing more than an appeal by Abbas Ali from his conviction. In dealing with that appeal it is clear that he had no jurisdiction to pass any order which would affect the acquittal of Darbari Mal. The learned Sessions Judge may have thought that that acquittal was in itself a nullity, or he may have been of opinion that there were no adequate grounds for moving this Court to interfere with that order in revision. In any case the order actually passed by him cannot affect the validity of the Magistrate's order of May 2nd, 1911, acquitting Darbari Mal of the offence charged against him, either one wav or the other. 2. The next question which has been argued before me is whether, as a matter of fact, the Sessions Judge was right in holding that Mr. Cruickshank was debarred by the provisions of section 556, Criminal Procedure Code, from trying the case against Abbas Ali and Darbari Mal. 3. 2. The next question which has been argued before me is whether, as a matter of fact, the Sessions Judge was right in holding that Mr. Cruickshank was debarred by the provisions of section 556, Criminal Procedure Code, from trying the case against Abbas Ali and Darbari Mal. 3. I am content to say that the point seems to me to be one of some difficulty but, as I am not prepared to distinguish the facts of this case from those of the ruling relied on by the learned Sessions Judge, I proceed to deal with this matter on the assumption that Mr. Cruickshank was, on a correct view of the law and of the facts, prohibited from trying the case instituted by him against Abbas Ali and Darbari Mal. 4. The question which now remains is whether the order of acquittal in respect of Darbari Mal is a nullity by reason of the provisions of section 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, or whether it remains in force and can be pleaded by Darbari Mal as a bar to a second trial to the extent provided by section 403, Criminal Procedure Code. In my opinion if a person put on his trial for an offence produces an order of acquittal, passed by a court which on the face of it was a court of competent jurisdiction, in that it had both territorial jurisdiction and jurisdiction under the second schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in respect of the offence charged, the court before which such order of acquittal is produced is not entitled to impeach the competency of the court which passed the order on the ground that the presiding officer of such court may perhaps have laboured under the disqualification prescribed by section 556, Criminal Procedure-Code. Technicalities apart, the equities of the case seem to me perfectly clear. We have here a man who has been put on his trial for a certain offence tried by a Magistrate who had jurisdiction to do so and who held him not guilty of the offence charged. Technicalities apart, the equities of the case seem to me perfectly clear. We have here a man who has been put on his trial for a certain offence tried by a Magistrate who had jurisdiction to do so and who held him not guilty of the offence charged. The only point raised against that Magistrate's proceedings is that he had directed the prosecution himself, and is believed to have had such an interest in the success of that prosecution as to make it inexpedient in the interests of justice that he should have decided the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In my opinion, until such order of acquittal has been set aside and a new trial ordered by some competent court, the applicant, Darbari Mal, is entitled to plead it under section 403, Criminal Procedure Code, in connection with any further proceeding that may be taken against him. The Magistrate before whom these proceedings are pending should consider the matter with due reference to the provisions of section 403, aforesaid, and should limit himself to considering the question whether the evidence before him does or does not disclose sufficient ground for framing a charge for some offence in respect of which a charge may legally be framed under the provisions of clause (2) of the said section. Otherwise Darbari Mal will be entitled to an order of discharge. The application for revision before me must stand dismissed, inasmuch as it has been made against an order to which, as I have already pointed out, no valid objection can be taken. The record will be returned to the Magistrate with the above remarks.