JUDGMENT Coxe, J. - This appeal arises out of an application to set aside an execution sale. It has been refused and the Defendant appeals. In my opinion the order of the learned Subordinate Judge refusing the application is right and should be maintained. The property was sold on the nth September 1907, and the application was presented on the 5th July 1909. To succeed therefore it is incumbent on the applicant to prove fraud. It is of no avail to her to prove a material irregularity, not amounting to fraud, unless she can show that her right to make the application was fraudulently concealed from her. 2. The learned Vakil for the Appellant has criticized the evidence for the opposite party at considerable length. I am far from accepting that criticism but I do not think it necessary to follow him in detail in the discussion of that evidence, because the burden of proof is on the applicant, and the evidence of the applicant, when considered with the admitted facts of the case, seems to me wholly insufficient to justify any suspicion of the decree-holder's honesty, or to shift the burden of proving his honesty upon him. The fraud pleaded is three-fold, (1) suppression of the sale proclamation, (2) under-statement of value in the sale proclamation, (3) omission to state in the sale proclamation the area and profits of the land. Now as to the publication of the sale proclamation the applicant has examined 5 witnesses including herself. Of these, three only including herself deny the publication. The other two do not live in the village, but in other villages a mile off. They say that they do not know if the proclamation was published or not, which of course may be perfectly true without in any way justifying the inference that the proclamation was not made. Of the three witnesses, who swear that no proclamation was made, none have any pretence to be regarded as independent. Two are the applicant herself and her Karpardaz, who could hardly be expected to say anything but what they have said. The third is a co-sharer who has been detected in two deliberate untruths. I do not think it just on evidence of this nature to hold that the decree-holder is bound to prove the regularity of the proceedings. 3. Two are the applicant herself and her Karpardaz, who could hardly be expected to say anything but what they have said. The third is a co-sharer who has been detected in two deliberate untruths. I do not think it just on evidence of this nature to hold that the decree-holder is bound to prove the regularity of the proceedings. 3. But when the undisputed facts of the case are considered the supposition that the sale was clandestine seems to me to become wholly untenable. The original suit was against 23 persons. The decree is not printed but it appears from the Plaintiff's sale certificate that 7 of these 23 were recorded as judgment-debtors, 10 as Defendants and the others as pro forma Defendants. When the property came up for sale an order was passed for an adjournment of four days after hearing the judgment-debtor's pleader. It appears from the written statement of the opposite party in this case that the party who applied for adjournment was not a judgment-debtor but one of the Defendants. The sale took three days as the Court was not satisfied with the price realised. Bids were offered by Pitambar and Akhoy, both Defendants in the original suit and kinsmen of the Petitioner. These circumstances show that the sale was conducted with publicity, that the people interested in the property knew about it, and to my mind are inconsistent with the supposition that it was concealed. No doubt, the Petitioner makes a vague and general charge that the judgment-debtors colluded with the decree-holder. Such a charge is easily made but she has made no serious attempt to substantiate it. All that there is in its support is that some of the judgment-debtors have taken settlement of their former lands from the decree-holder purchaser. Such an arrangement between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor after the sale seems to me only reasonable and not to justify the inference of collusion. There is evidence that such a settlement was offered to the Plaintiff herself. On the other hand, it is proved that several of the Defendants in the original suit, including some of the judgment-debtors and including Pitambar and Akhoy, took the crops of the land after the sale and were sued for damages by the decree-holder. This does not look much like collusion, even though the suit ended in a compromise. On the other hand, it is proved that several of the Defendants in the original suit, including some of the judgment-debtors and including Pitambar and Akhoy, took the crops of the land after the sale and were sued for damages by the decree-holder. This does not look much like collusion, even though the suit ended in a compromise. There were also criminal proceedings between Pitambar and the decree-holder over a small portion of the purchased land. 4. In my opinion the allegation of collusion has not been established and it seems clear to me that some of the judgment-debtors and of the other Defendants to the original case, who were their kinsmen, were on inimical terms with the decree-holder after the sale. That being so, I do not believe that if the sale proceedings had been fraudulently suppressed they would have acquiesced in it and contented themselves with taking settlements, some time later, of subordinate interests in the land. Yet all the male judgment-debtors did so acquiesce and the objections of the other female judgment-debtors have come to nothing, and it is doubtful if they have been seriously prosecuted at all. The Petitioner's share is only one-eighth, and if those interested in the other seven-eighths have either not contested the sale, or withdrawn from the contest, the fact raises a strong probability that the sale was not clandestine. It was advertised in the local newspapers. The learned Vakil for the Appellant argues that it is not proved that the paper was read in the village. But the question is whether the sale was fraudulently concealed; and if the decree-holder really intended that it should be concealed it does net seem likely that he would take the risk of advertising it in a paper, which, whether it is read in the villages or not, might very likely be read at Bankura, and seen by law agents and other persons interested in the village who might attend the Courts. 5. Finally an inference of concealment has been founded on the paucity of bidders. But it is not a matter of surprise that few people should be willing to bid for a property in which seven judgment-debtors, of whom three were women, were interested. In the circumstances there was a distinct probability that the sale would be attacked and the purchaser involved in litigation. But it is not a matter of surprise that few people should be willing to bid for a property in which seven judgment-debtors, of whom three were women, were interested. In the circumstances there was a distinct probability that the sale would be attacked and the purchaser involved in litigation. There were five bidders excluding the decree-holder's gomastha, who offered the second out of 28 bids for Satsagra and including two of the Defendants in the original suit and Shyama Sundaree, the mother and said to be the benamdar of a third. And 1 should be surprised to learn that that was an unusually small number at a mofussil execution sale. It is not shown that any of four besides the decree-holder was not an independent bidder. 6. It appears to me that all the undisputed circumstances of the case are wholly against the allegation that the sale was concealed, while the positive evidence that it was concealed is worthless. In these circumstances although the decree-holder has given plenty of evidence of the publication of the sale proclamation, I do not think it necessary to discuss that evidence, and would hold that the Petitioner has failed to prove the first ground of fraud set up by her. 7. The second ground is that the value of the property was under-stated in the sale proclamation. At the outset I may say that no case has gone the length of holding that an under-statement of value by itself is sufficient to justify an inference of fraud. If the other circumstances of the case justify the inference that the understatement was deliberately made as part of a scheme to obtain the property at a low price, the under-statement of value taken with those circumstances may perhaps justify a finding of fraud. But I know of no authority to the effect that such a finding can be based on the understatement of value. It would be very dangerous in my opinion to hold that an under-statement of value alone justifies the inference that it was deliberately made, with the intention of securing the property at a low price, and that that inference justified a finding of fraud, so that a finding of fraud could be based on an under-statement of value alone. If that were the law, few execution sales would be secure. If that were the law, few execution sales would be secure. But in the present case though the value has been under-estimated, I do not think that any dishonesty has been established. Here too the Petitioner's evidence seems to me quite worthless. She and her Karpardaz say generally that the property is worth Rs. 25,000. But all accounts and collection papers are withheld. The interest of her third witness in the property has recently been sold, though it may be remarked that he falsely denies it. This would have been the most direct evidence of the market value of the property. But this evidence also is not produced. The witnesses give vague and discrepant statements of the area of the property but the only witness who correlates this area to the value makes statements which, if believed, would show that the value is far more than even the Petitioner says. On the other hand, there is a road-cess statement which shows the property to be worth less than Rs. 100 a year. No doubt it is of little evidentiary value; but if the property is really worth Rs. 25,000, the statement exceeds, I think, the usual limits of inaccuracy. Then there is the fact that the property was mortgaged for less than Rs. 2,000. I do not believe that the owners would have given property worth Rs. 25,000 to secure an advance of Rs. 2,000. But what impresses me most is that the Defendants of the original suit who were interested in the property would not bid high for it. The property consists of two villages, Mohesdobra and Satsagra. They were valued by the decree-holder at Rs. 2,099 and Rs. 3,401. On the first day of the bidding the sums of Rs. 2,350 and Rs. 4,000 were offered. But Pitambar and Akhoy would bid nothing for Mohesdobra and only Rs. 1,900 and Rs. 2,300 for Satsagra. The next day no advance was made and on the 3rd day no bids were made by Pitambar and Akhoy while Shyama Sundaree, the mother and said to be the benamdar of Girish Chandra Khan, bid Rs. 3,000 for Mohesdobra and Rs. 5,600 for Satsagra. These figures certainly do not justify an inference that the decree-holder willfully and grossly under-stated the value. The villages were ultimately purchased by the decree-holder for Rs. 3,500 and Rs. 0,600 apparently about Rs. 3,000 for Mohesdobra and Rs. 5,600 for Satsagra. These figures certainly do not justify an inference that the decree-holder willfully and grossly under-stated the value. The villages were ultimately purchased by the decree-holder for Rs. 3,500 and Rs. 0,600 apparently about Rs. 100 in excess of the decretal amount. 8. The document on which the principal reliance is placed for the Appellant is the decree in the suit for damages. That suit was compromised on the terms that the receipt of Rs. 800 was acknowledged and the Defendants agreed to pay Rs. 859 more. But it seems to me that it would be quite unsafe to accept this a sure guide for valuing the property. The suit was for damages for taking the crops of the land and the damages must have been assessed on the value of the crops actually taken. Now clearly this value must fluctuate enormously from year to year. We know nothing of the character of the year in which these crops were grown. Assuming that the crops were average crops, a most unsafe assumption, I do not think a purchaser in the open market, much less an execution purchaser, would be willing to pay a price calculated on the value of the average crop. In such cases the possible losses are more vividly present to the mind than the possible profits. A tenant paying half the produce as rent would, I think, be very sorry to have his rent amounted to a fixed money rent calculated on the value of half the produce in an ordinary year; and a purchaser would probably be influenced by the same considerations. I do not think therefore that the compromise decree is a safe guide to follow in fixing the value. But even if it be followed, it does not follow that the decree-holder was guilty of fraud in entering a lower value in the sale proclamation. Much of the land was jungle and its value must have been in great measure a guess. He knew what the owners had been willing to mortgage it to him for, and if he under-estimated the increase in value since, his honesty need not be impugned. This estimate was doubtless too low, but corroborated as it is to a great extent by the first day's bidding, I cannot regard it as fraudulent. 9. The third ground is, in my opinion, quite untenable. This estimate was doubtless too low, but corroborated as it is to a great extent by the first day's bidding, I cannot regard it as fraudulent. 9. The third ground is, in my opinion, quite untenable. The sale proclamation describes the property with sufficient precision and the fact that the area and profits are not given is certainly not, to my mind, any indication of fraud. 10. Finally the question arises whether the application is barred by limitation. Now so far as the application is grounded on the suppression of the sale proclamation, I doubt whether any question of limitation can arise. Under sec 18 of the Act, when a person has by means of fraud been kept from the knowledge of his right to make an application limitation runs from the date of his knowledge. It may be open to doubt if this section applies to a case in which the fraud is antecedent to the accrual of the right and the decision in Puma Chandra Mandal v. Anukul Biswas I. L. R. 36 Cal 654 (1909). is rather in favour of the view that it does not so apply. But the case of Rahimbhoy Habibhoy v. C. A. Turner I. L B. 17 Bom. 341 (1892). is against this view and further lays down that in such a case the burden of proof is on the person guilty of the fraud to show when the injured party became aware of it. Here, if it be assumed that the sale was fraudulently suppressed, though the receipts given by the Petitioner's Karpardaz raise a strong suspicion in my mind that his employer must have been informed of the sale long before her application, yet I cannot find that her knowledge has been definitely proved. So that whatever law of limitation applies the application is in time. 11. But sec. 18 can, in my opinion, only apply to such fraud as amounts to concealment, and is intended to keep from the injured party the knowledge of her wrong or of its remedy. And the case of Rahimbhoy v. Turner I. L B. 17 Bom. 341 (1892). cannot be intended to apply to frauds of any other kind. So that, so far as the application is based on the alleged under-statement of value, which could not possibly affect in any way the knowledge of the Petitioner, sec. And the case of Rahimbhoy v. Turner I. L B. 17 Bom. 341 (1892). cannot be intended to apply to frauds of any other kind. So that, so far as the application is based on the alleged under-statement of value, which could not possibly affect in any way the knowledge of the Petitioner, sec. 18 would not, in my opinion, have any application and the question whether the matter comes under the Limitation Act of 1908 arises. In the view that I take of the case, namely, that the under-statement was not fraudulent the question does not arise, but it has been discussed at length and I think that I should notice it. The argument of the learned pleader for the Appellant is based on sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and is that the Petitioner has acquired a right to have the sale set aside which cannot be interfered with by the repeal of the Limitation Act, 1877, by that of 1908. After giving the best consideration I can to the question, I incline to the view that this contention is not sound. No doubt the Petitioner's right to have the sale set aside cannot be affected by the Limitation Act of 1908. But that is not the right which he obtained under the repealed Act of 1877. What he obtained under that Act was the privilege of exercising that right for three years and I doubt if that privilege is such as is contemplated by sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act. Reliance is placed on the cases of Kaurabai v. Isri Singh 7 All. L. J. 420 (1910). and Fasti Karim v. Annada Mohun Appeal from Order No. 84 of 1910. Since reported 15 C. W. N. 845 (1911). The first case is undoubtedly in the Appellant's favour. The second seems to me somewhat different. In that case the learned Judges were dealing, not with a supposed privilege to have a certain time for making an application, but with one to be entirely exempt from the operation of the law of limitation during minority. On the other hand, the case of Arayil Kali Atnma v. Pelappakkara Manakal 5 Ind. Cas. 420 (1910). and Thakamani Dasi v. Mohendra Nath 10 C. L. J. 463 (1909). are against the Appellant. I do not think it is necessary to quote cases prior to the General Clauses Act, 1897. On the other hand, the case of Arayil Kali Atnma v. Pelappakkara Manakal 5 Ind. Cas. 420 (1910). and Thakamani Dasi v. Mohendra Nath 10 C. L. J. 463 (1909). are against the Appellant. I do not think it is necessary to quote cases prior to the General Clauses Act, 1897. The balance of authority seems to me against the Appellant but as I have said it is not necessary for me, in the view I take of the case, to come to a decision on the point. 12. I would dismiss the appeal but as my learned brother entertains a doubt about the honesty of the sale, no order for costs will be passed. Teunon, J. 13. In this case the aggregate value of the properties to be sold was stated in the sale proclamation as Rs. 140 and the properties were eventually purchased by the decree-holder for the sum of Rs. 10,160. 14. From this and the evidence afforded by the compromise decree it is clear that in the sale proclamation the value was much under-stated. It then appears that at the sale a servant of the decree-holders and another person who is the gnomish of the decree-holder's cousin figured apparently as independent bidders. This latter circumstance and the understatement of value taken together to my mind afford matter of very grave suspicion but as my learned brother after a full consideration and discussion of the evidence agrees with the first Court in holding that fraud has not been made out, I am constrained though with great hesitation to agree in the conclusion at which he has arrived. 15. In this view I do not think that I need discuss the question of limitation. For the reasons given I agree in dismissing the appeal, but without costs.