JUDGMENT Harington, J. - In this case 35 persons appeal against the decision of the learned Additional Sessions Judge of Dacca convicting them under sec. 121A of the Indian Penal Code and against the sentences varying from transportation for life to rigorous imprisonment for three years passed on them on that conviction. In the lower Court 44 persons were placed upon their trial: of these 8 were acquitted; one of those convicted has not appealed and is said to have become insane. The remainder are the Appellants before us. Stated as shortly as possible, the case for the Crown is that the first Appellant, Pulin Behari Das, founded an association known as the Dacca Anushilan Samity, that that association had branches or similar associations affiliated to it throughout Eastern Bengal, that the object for which the association was formed was for the purpose of bringing about a revolution by force of arms and depriving the King of the sovereignty of British India, that the Appellants were the members of the association and that they had agreed amongst themselves to promote the revolutionary object with which the association was formed : that having associated themselves for this purpose they have committed an offence under sec. 121A of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Of the Appellants some admit and some deny their connection with the Dacca Anushilan Samity. Those who admit their connection contend that the object with which the Dacca Anushilan Samity was formed was not merely an innocent object but that it was a laudable one, viz., that of improving the physical and mental condition of the Bengali race. They contend that the other societies which the prosecution says were affiliated to the Dacca Anushilan Samity were in fact independent societies and had no revolutionary or unlawful object in view. 3. The assessors who have delivered their opinions at some length disagree with the Judge in thinking that the object of the Samity was revolutionary: one assessor has considered the question as to which of the Appellants are connected with the society. When the appeal was called on the learned Counsel for the Appellants took certain preliminary objections which may be properly disposed of before the facts of the case are dealt with. He contended first that there was no complaint within the meaning of secs. When the appeal was called on the learned Counsel for the Appellants took certain preliminary objections which may be properly disposed of before the facts of the case are dealt with. He contended first that there was no complaint within the meaning of secs. 4 and 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that therefore the proceedings were void ab initio because the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate them. In the second place he contended that if there was a complaint it was not lawfully authorised under sec. 196, Criminal Procedure Code. His third point was that there had been misjoinder of charges. 4. The third point may be very briefly disposed of. The prisoners were charged under secs. 121A, 122 and 123 of the Indian Penal Code, It was argued that a charge under sec. 123 could not be legally joined with one under sec. 121A. I do not agree with that contention. The charge under sec. 121A is that of conspiring to wage war against the King and to deprive him of the sovereignty of British India and overawe by means of criminal force or show of criminal force the Government of India. Now in furtherance of that conspiracy the persons engaged there in may actively conspire or they may collect arms or they may conceal the existence of their conspiracy from the authorities. All these acts, if done, are in furtherance of the one transaction and therefore may clearly be charged against these persons under sec. 235 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the prisoners may be tried at one trial for all these offences. But had there been any doubt at all in reference to this matter it would have been set at rest by the decision of this Court in the case of Barindra Kumar Ghose v. King Emperor 14 C.W.N. 1114 : s.c. I.L.R 37 Cal. 467 (1910) in which this point was raised and decided adversely to the contention of the Appellants. 5. The first point, namely, that there was no complaint on which the Magistrate was entitled to issue process was very strongly pressed upon us. The word "complaint" as defined in sec. 467 (1910) in which this point was raised and decided adversely to the contention of the Appellants. 5. The first point, namely, that there was no complaint on which the Magistrate was entitled to issue process was very strongly pressed upon us. The word "complaint" as defined in sec. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code is an allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Code that some persons whether known or unknown have committed an offence: and under sec. 190 a Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such an offence. Then comes sec. 196 which provides that in certain cases, inter alia, charges under secs. 121A, 122 and 123 of the Indian Penal Code, unless the complaint is made by order of or under authority from the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government or some officer empowered by the Governor-General in Council in that behalf, the Magistrate shall not take cognizance of it. Next comes Chapter 16 prescribing what the Magistrate is to do on taking cognizance and what he is to do before he is entitled to dismiss the complaint; and then follows Chapter 17 dealing with the commencement of proceedings. The first section of the latter Chapter, namely sec. 204, provides that if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground, the process must be issued. I pause here to observe that it is not open to the Appellants to contend that the Magistrate exercised jurisdiction vested in him under sec. 204 wrongfully or issued a process on an insufficient complaint. To make the whole proceeding void ab initio it is necessary for them to show that there was no complaint before the Magistrate and the Magistrate had no other course but to refuse issue of process on the ground that he had no jurisdiction under the law to issue such a process. It is not enough to say that the materials which the Magistrate had before him were meagre or even insufficient for if the Magistrate had jurisdiction to issue process the trial would be perfectly regular even if the Magistrate had exercised that jurisdiction on insufficient materials. It is not enough to say that the materials which the Magistrate had before him were meagre or even insufficient for if the Magistrate had jurisdiction to issue process the trial would be perfectly regular even if the Magistrate had exercised that jurisdiction on insufficient materials. The materials which the Magistrate had before him consisted of a sanction authorising one Babu Mon Mohan Chakravarty to prefer a complaint against 47 persons for offences under secs. , 121A122 and 123 of the Indian Penal Code, and a petition of complaint signed by Mon Mohan Chakravarty who said that he had reason to believe that the 47 persons had amongst themselves and together with other persons known or unknown conspired to wage war against His Majesty the King and to deprive His Majesty of the sovereignty of British India, and they had collected arms and had otherwise prepared to wage war with the intention of either waging war or being prepared to wage war against the King and had further concealed that intent to facilitate the design to wage war against the King. There is also an examination of Mon Mohan Chakravarty in which he proved that he had been directed and authorised by the Local Government to prefer a petition of complaint against these 47 persons and identified the signature of the Secretary which appeared on the sanction. Besides these documents there was another sanction and a petition of complaint relating to seven other persons and a third sanction and a petition of complaint with regard to another individual. Similarly there was an examination of Mon Mohan Chakravarty on solemn affirmation in which he proved these two sanctions and complaints. The last two petitions of complaint recited the first sanction and complaint and stated that the complainant had received sanction to prosecute other persons complained against for the same offences. It has been urged that on those materials the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to do anything and ought to have refused to issue any process at all. Amongst the cases cited by the Appellants was that of Emperor v. Lalit Mohan 15 C.W.N. 98 (1910). 6. But that was a case in which the name of the prisoner had been omitted possibly by accident from the complaint made before the Magistrate. Amongst the cases cited by the Appellants was that of Emperor v. Lalit Mohan 15 C.W.N. 98 (1910). 6. But that was a case in which the name of the prisoner had been omitted possibly by accident from the complaint made before the Magistrate. It was there held and quite rightly held that there was no complaint before the Magistrate in respect of the person whose name has been omitted and it was held that the fact that his name appeared in the sanction was not sufficient to give the Magistrate jurisdiction when there was no allegation before him that the person whose name was in the sanction had done anything at all. That case is quite distinguishable from the present one, because in that case the materials which the Magistrate had before him did not speak of any offence having been committed by that one particular person. In this case the question is whether on the materials before him the Magistrate had or had not jurisdiction to act. 7. In my opinion he had jurisdiction and I think that on the materials he had before him it cannot be said that there was no allegation that the persons against whom process was asked had committed an offence. The Appellants did not take any steps to set aside the Magistrate's order on the ground that on the face of it the materials on which it was made were insufficient. They have proceeded to trial, the point is not one which affects the fairness of the trial in any way. It is not open to them now to object to the issue of process unless they can show that there was no power to issue it ; and that they have failed to show. 8. The second contention on the part of the Appellants is that the complaint was not lawfully authorised : It says the sanction was too vague, and that even if not too vague it was granted by an officer who had no power to grant it. This contention was founded on an objection which in my opinion is not open to the Appellants. It is conceded that a sanction was given by the Local Government under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This was in form a proper sanction. There is nothing in the contention that it was too vague. This contention was founded on an objection which in my opinion is not open to the Appellants. It is conceded that a sanction was given by the Local Government under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This was in form a proper sanction. There is nothing in the contention that it was too vague. But it is argued that the statutory powers under which the Lieutenant-Governorship of Eastern Bengal and Assam was created did not enable the Government of India to create a new Province comprising the territory which was included in the old province of Bengal. As at present advised I am not prepared to say that the powers of the Government are limited as the learned Counsel contends. But I purposely forbear discussing the statutes or dealing with the arguments, because, in my opinion, the question is one which we cannot go into, as it is not a ground for interfering with the decision in the case. The fact that the sanction was given by the Local Government under sec. 196 is not disputed. That the Local Government is and has been for years the de facto Government of the Province, is admitted. The Appellants do not seek to challenge the granting of the sanction nor the appointment of the officer by whom the sanction was granted. But they contend that the Government of India had no power to create the Local Government. All acts therefore done by the Local Government, inter alia the granting of sanction, are bad. The argument of the learned Counsel cannot be limited to the power of the Local Government to grant sanction under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If the Local Government cannot grant a sanction because the Governor-General in Council has no power to create a Local Government capable of granting sanction, then it follows that the Local Government cannot exercise any of the other functions of the Government; it cannot appoint Judges or Magistrates and the Magistrates who were duly appointed by the Local Government had no power to commit, and the Judge deriving his authority from the same source had no power to try the case. It is to be observed that this point was not taken on any motion before this Court, and it only comes to this Court after the trial is over and the judgment given. It is to be observed that this point was not taken on any motion before this Court, and it only comes to this Court after the trial is over and the judgment given. On the face of them, the proceedings are perfectly regular. The point is not one which under the ancient practice in English Courts would have been raised by a writ of error. It, in no way, touches the fairness of the trial or the merits of the case. No authority has been cited to support the proposition that it is open to a prisoner who has been convicted to dispute the right of the de facto Government to exercise the powers of Government. Although the industry of Counsel has failed to produce any case bearing on this point--it does appear that in the time of the Protectorate an attempt was made to question the right of the de facto Government to levy duties in a motion for a habeas corpus on behalf of one Coney who was imprisoned for non-payment of them. The contention was of course at once overruled : and the case does not appear to have found its way into any of the authorised reports. In the absence of any authority to the contrary, I am prepared to hold that this question is not open in an appeal preferred by the prisoner against his conviction : and that a person who has been convicted is not entitled to question in appeal the right of the de facto Government of the Province to exercise any of those powers which a Government may lawfully exercise. 9. I now proceed to deal with the facts of the case. It is not disputed on behalf of the Appellants that in fact a society known as the Dacca Anushilan Samity was established. It has been proved and has not been contested that the persons, who entered that society were bound by vows to observe the most stringent rules of discipline. Although the fact that the society was established is admitted, there is a dispute between the prosecution and the defence as to the time when it came into existence. It has been proved and has not been contested that the persons, who entered that society were bound by vows to observe the most stringent rules of discipline. Although the fact that the society was established is admitted, there is a dispute between the prosecution and the defence as to the time when it came into existence. The contention of the Crown is that the Partition of Bengal in October 1905 gave rise to considerable feeling of discontent amongst the Hindu inhabitants of the newly formed Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and that this feeling of discontent was utilised by certain persons who desired to bring about a revolution for the purpose of fomenting discontent against the Government and for the purpose of introducing into the Province the design of subverting the Government by force. It is alleged that one Bepin Chandra Pal and P. Mitter came to Dacca shortly after the Partition had been accomplished : they that made speeches calculated to stir up the indignation of the audience and then called on the persons who were present to take a vow to sacrifice their lives for their country. Amongst those who responded to this call was Pulin Behari Dass. Subsequently he established, it is said, in Dacca a National School for the benefit of some boys who had been expelled from the Collegiate School for some misbehaviour with regard to the Partition. The National School was eventually established next door to the house at 50 Wari where Pulin resided, and there it is said that Pulin came to instruct the youths in martial exercises with lathis, swords and daggers with the object of forming the association which afterwards became known as the Dacca Anushilan Samity. Shortly after it was started in other places in the Province and during the years 1906-07 the movement spread. There was an affray between some Hindus and Mahomedans at 50 Wari in November 1907 in respect of which Pulin and some members of the association were convicted. In 1908 the owner of 50 Wari gave Pulin notice to vacate the premises. The Samity then moved to 452 South Maisundi which is also known as "Bhuter Bari." Pulin occupied the house immediately behind it. On the 10th August 1908 the Samity premises were searched with respect to some suspected offence under the Arms Act. In 1908 the owner of 50 Wari gave Pulin notice to vacate the premises. The Samity then moved to 452 South Maisundi which is also known as "Bhuter Bari." Pulin occupied the house immediately behind it. On the 10th August 1908 the Samity premises were searched with respect to some suspected offence under the Arms Act. On the 5th November another search was made which is stated to have been confined to certain documents which a boy said to have been kidnapped had alleged were to be found on the walls. On the 15th November a thorough search of the premises was made and vast numbers of documents and books were seized, amongst which were many documents of a revolutionary character. In December 1908, Pulin was deported and the Samity was declared to be an illegal institution; and from that time the Samity ostensibly ceased to exist. Between the months of June 1908 and September 1910 a number of serious crimes were committed. There were four very serious cases of dacoity, two accompanied by murder. There were two cases of simple murder, and there were cases of offences under the Arms Act and under the Explosives Act. The prosecution allege that these offences were committed by members of the Dacca Anushilan Samity or its affiliated associations in furtherance of the design of subverting the British Government. The Appellants contend that the crimes to which I have referred have no connection whatever with the Samity. They do not content themselves with saying that the evidence has not established that the Samity was for unlawful purposes. They go further and say that it was formed for the physical improvement of the people of Bengal and the actual stimulus which brought about the formation of the society was the oppression which the Hindus in Eastern Bengal suffered at the hands of the Mahomedans during the years 1906-07. A considerable amount of evidence has been dealt with for the purpose of establishing the allegation of the Appellants that there were in fact disturbances between the Mahomedans and the Hindus in the month of March 1907 when the Nawab went to Comilla. All these disturbances (riots at Comilla and Jamalpur) combined to raise in the minds of the Hindus a considerable apprehension of ill-treatment by the Mahomedans. All these disturbances (riots at Comilla and Jamalpur) combined to raise in the minds of the Hindus a considerable apprehension of ill-treatment by the Mahomedans. It is contended on the evidence that there was introduced into the minds of the Hindus a belief that they would not receive the assistance and protection which they were entitled to expect from the authorities, and that in this state of apprehension and panic in which they were, they collected and formed associations for the purpose of encouraging lathi play in order that they might be in a position to hold their own in case of an apprehended attack by the Mahomedans. Notwithstanding the very great mass of evidence which is gone into and the care with which it has been discussed by the learned Judge in the Court below, I cannot help thinking that it is really very much beside the point. Whether the Samity was started solely in consequence of the efforts of the revolutionary party to utilise the discontent created by the Partition for the furtherance of their object or whether the fact that disturbances took place in Eastern Bengal and Assam was the occasion of the formation of the Samity does not really seem to me to touch the point. The real question at issue is, what was the object of the Samity at the time when the premises were searched. Was it as Pulin says in his statement, an association of which the chief object was to establish the nationality of the Bengalis and to secure their physical and mental improvement, or, behind all this, was there the ulterior object of overthrowing by force the Government of India, a purpose to which this establishment of the nationality of Bengalis and their mental and physical improvements could be advantageously utilised. To my mind the object of the society is to be ascertained not only by an examination of the evidence of those persons who have been members of it but by careful examination of the documents admittedly appertaining to the society, such as its rules, its vows and the documents found in the possession of the society and its members and by an examination of the oral testimony as to what is done by the persons who belong to the society. 10. The evidence on this branch of the case consists, first of documentary evidence, secondly of oral testimony. 10. The evidence on this branch of the case consists, first of documentary evidence, secondly of oral testimony. The documentary evidence can be divided into two classes of documents: first, those documents which have been described as official documents of the Samity and, secondly, books and papers belonging either to the Samity library or to the members of the association. The oral testimony consists, first, of evidence of witnesses who belonged to the Samity and have given information with regard to it; and, secondly, of witnesses who speak to alleged acts. These are said to have been committed by the members of the Samity in pursuance of the object which it sought to attain. 11. The most important evidence is that which is to be found in the documents which admittedly belong to the Samity. These documents are :--the Unity leaflet, the Paridarsak, the Adya and Antya vows, the first and second special vows, a series of rules which appears in a document headed notification, duties of secretaries, another document, which is described as a copy of the rules, the village notes and the paper inviting opinions as to the proposal to divide Bengal into divisions forming central Samitis to superintend the branch Samitis. 12. The Unity, leaflet which was found at the search of the Samity premises is of the nature of an essay by Pulin inculcating the importance of obedience to the leader. It shows how impossible it is to be saved from pending dangers and mishaps, if there be a lack of unity of force and if each individual is guided in his action by his own independent opinion. It is impossible according to this leaflet to secure national and social freedom unless the individual freedom is surrendered in the hands of the leaders. And it commends that whoever the leader might be his order might be carried out with a spirit of reverence and without cavil. 13. The next document, Paridarsak, is one of great importance. It is written by Pulin and several copies of it have been found. It is headed "To proceed to work after reading this work 5 times with attention." It is an essay on the formation of a Samity and indicates what in the writer's views is necessary for this purpose. 13. The next document, Paridarsak, is one of great importance. It is written by Pulin and several copies of it have been found. It is headed "To proceed to work after reading this work 5 times with attention." It is an essay on the formation of a Samity and indicates what in the writer's views is necessary for this purpose. It begins by pointing out that "the attention of the people of the locality must be gradually drawn towards our object." It points out the necessity of unity and obedience to one leader, of vows, and of hard and fast rules without which at no time a powerful body or military organisation can be formed, that it should be ascertained whether any new Samity has been formed without the writer's knowledge and arrangement should be made for its supervision, that it should be ascertained whether members who are playing in a Samity have taken prescribed vows, that if any member of the Samity included in the writer's has been teaching plays to any one who has not taken vows, an attempt must be made to remedy this, that steps must be taken against faction which comes into existence against the Samity, that if any one by deception learns play without taking vows, arrangement should be made for complete destruction of his knowledge. Enquiry is to be made in villages as to whether the work is being carried out; important information is to be sent to the secretary of the Samity not by post but by special messenger : the Samity is to have no open relation with the popular and outward swadeshi, as it is against its principle to mix up in quarrels, dispute or litigation. Unless, it says, the foreigners and the foreign King are driven out, it is impossible altogether to drive out foreign goods. It is proper for each individual member to use swadeshi goods as much as is possible. The writer then goes on to discuss why Musalmans are not admitted into the Samity. In his view they are untrustworthy. Unless, it says, the foreigners and the foreign King are driven out, it is impossible altogether to drive out foreign goods. It is proper for each individual member to use swadeshi goods as much as is possible. The writer then goes on to discuss why Musalmans are not admitted into the Samity. In his view they are untrustworthy. He says "when entire Musalman race is against us, it will not be particularly profitable to us if one or two Musalmans join our band." Then there is a remarkable passage in these words: "If it so happens that all Musalmans grow violent against the Hindus, or if they join with the English, and if the parents and relatives of the Musalmans who have joined our band stand against us, then what course will all these Musalman members adopt is a question to be considered by both sides." And it goes on to say "it will not be of any good to us if two or four Musalman students come and play lathi with us and then go away; they will simply go away with a knowledge of some of our secret mantras. But if these Musalmans who are in sympathy with us can make their society fall in with our views and can, above all, make arrangements for the entire prevention of cow-killing, then it is possible for all parties to secure benefit and welfare in all respects." It contemplates that the Musalmans would become submissive to the Hindus and while pointing out that it is improper to court their friendship, it concludes by saying that "in no circumstance would it be proper to show hostile feeling against or to deal unjustly with the Musalmans as a nation." 14. Following this document come the vows. The adya or preliminary vow binds the person who takes it never to separate himself from the Samity, to warn the authorities if there is anything antagonistic in the Samity, to resolve to work out the welfare of the country, to absolute obedience to the authority and not to teach the art of lathi play to any one who is not a member of the Samity. The next vow, the antya, binds the members of the Samity not to divulge any internal matter of the Samity to any one or to discuss this matter unnecessarily. The next vow, the antya, binds the members of the Samity not to divulge any internal matter of the Samity to any one or to discuss this matter unnecessarily. The member is to be absolutely obedient and to inform if there be any conspiracy against the Samity. And he will not teach the subjects in which he receives instructions in the Samity after he is bound by an oath, to any one except those persons who are also bound by an oath. By the first of the two bishesh or special vows, a member in the most solemn way vows that he will not leave the circle till the object is fulfilled, and he will discard all ties of family affection, he will avoid all sexual indulgence whether natural or unnatural, and he imprecates on himself a solemn curse if he does not keep this vow. Under the second special vow, a member swears that he will stake his life to do the work of the circle and for the development of the Samity, and will do the utmost injury in his power to every opponent of the Samity, that he would never discuss the secrets with anybody, that he will not argue about them even with those who are included in the circle. That he will carry out commands in a steady manner preserving secrecy of mantras, that he will conceal nothing from the leader, that he will engage in the practice of religion and mete out punishment to those who are opposed to it: and he will imprecate a solemn curse on himself if he fails to observe this vow. 15. The next document which is headed notification provides for the domestic discipline within the walls of the Samity. It provides for doing all the domestic work, for the care of the property, for issue of books in the library, for setting of a night watch and for matters solely concerned with the maintenance of strict discipline within the walls. 16. Then comes the document headed the Duties of the Secretaries. It provides for doing all the domestic work, for the care of the property, for issue of books in the library, for setting of a night watch and for matters solely concerned with the maintenance of strict discipline within the walls. 16. Then comes the document headed the Duties of the Secretaries. They are to be present and to see to the attendance of the members, to see that every new member is bound by vows to observe the rules of the Samity, to examine his antecedents to see that no non-Hindu is admitted, to enable members to change one akhra for another, to compel the members to observe the rules, and in cases of serious wrongs to report to the chief secretary. Delinquents are to be punished but not to be allowed to leave the Samity. There is to be a meeting every Sunday. The spirit of patriotism is to be excited. Routine work is to be carried out. Arrangement is to be made for exercise, for teaching drill and forming habits of enduring hardships. The members are to be divided in batches and each such batch is to be placed under a captain and teacher. Both sets of vows are to be hung up in the akhra. Leaders are to be responsible for education and attendance of the members of their batch. Every chief instructor must supervise the teachings of smaller batches and teach the leaders. Those who have taken only the adya vow are to be taught up to a certain point in the big and smaller lathi play, and instruction to be given in all branches to those who have taken all the vows. Boys under 12 years of age are described as external limbs of the Samity, They are to receive certain teaching. There are to be subscriptions of rice. The accounts are to be rendered to the chief secretary. The secretaries are empowered to select members as their assistants and assign different duties to them and to appoint men to do their duties in their absence. 17. There is another document headed copy of Rules. Under the first rule every member of a circle is to take the vow of the Samity and also the special vow of the circle. 17. There is another document headed copy of Rules. Under the first rule every member of a circle is to take the vow of the Samity and also the special vow of the circle. There is to be a chief superintendent at the students' mess under whom there will be teachers of lathi play, persons having the custody of the property of the Samity--persons who are absent will be punished. An absentee must be brought back even by the use of force. Prayers are to be said. The members are to be always present and are only entitled to leave with the permission of the authorities. Every member is to learn the vows, the duties of a manager, the Paridarsaka play books and the regulations. Money obtained is to be the common property of the members. No unnecessary letters are to be written to the friends and relations. All letters for or from the members must be shown to the leaders of the circle. Members who absent themselves without permission are to be debarred from the privileges of the Samity. Then follow some rules directed to taking care of the property of the Samity. The rules then go on to say that no member should be allowed to make arrangement for the food and board in the Samity for any guest or relation without previous sanction of the chief. The members are to report any misconduct on the part of the other members as to quarrelling or talking; and matters concerning the Samity are not to be discussed even amongst the members themselves. The rule ends up with the provision that those who wish to go out on their own business or to become worldly men on reasonable grounds shall have to pay the expense at the rate of Rs. 12 a month for the period during which they were in the circle. 18. These constitute the official documents of the Samity. It only needs the very brief summary that I have given of the contents of these documents to show that a Samity formed in accordance with them would consist of a number of men trained in the strictest discipline, bound to obey without question the orders of their leader, and bound by the most solemn vow to keep absolutely secret the affairs of the Samity. It is to be observed that in neither the vows nor in the rules is the object of the Samity definitely stated. For the Crown it is contended that the rules and vows show that the Samity had the many characteristics of a secret revolutionary society, e.g., secrecy, absolute obedience to leaders and strict discipline for some secret object, which are, at any rate, sufficient to rouse suspicion as to what that object was. And the object, according to the prosecution, is disclosed in the Paridarsak in which, they say, Pulin has allowed his real aim to slip out. The two passages which, the Crown says, betray the object which the rules and the vows conceal, are, first, the one referring to the driving out the foreign King and, secondly, the passage referring to the possibility of the Musalmans joining the English. These passages, they say, unless satisfacrorily explained, indicate that the great object which is referred to in other parts of the Paridarsak was the object of subverting the Government by force and expelling the English from India. 19. Further they contend that the document inviting opinions as to the formation of Samitis shows a design to spread the bodies far and wide through the Province and to honeycomb the Province with societies aiming at this end. The explanation which has been given in the course of the argument as to the formation of the Samity is two-fold. First, it is said that it is a means of enabling the Hindus to get a training in the lathi play and to become sufficiently strong and well disciplined to crush the Mahomedans. Now, in favour of this contention, there is evidence that there were undoubtedly in the year 1907 some disturbances between the Hindus and the Mahomedans. And it is not at all unlikely that the facts that there were riots and that there was some excitement amongst the Hindus in the Province with respect to them enabled Pulin to get persons to learn lathi play. But that the object of the Samity was solely for the purpose of providing an effective body of Hindus to defeat the Mahomedans seems to me quite inconsistent with the object as disclosed in Paridarsak. If the association was to be a purely anti-Mahomedan Association, Pulin would never have discussed the question as to why the Mahomedans were not permitted to join. If the association was to be a purely anti-Mahomedan Association, Pulin would never have discussed the question as to why the Mahomedans were not permitted to join. Such an idea would be impossible and absurd if the association was directed against the Mahomedans. Then at the end of the Paridarsak after discussing this question there occurs a passage to the effect that in no circumstance would it be proper to show hostile feeling against or to deal unjustly with the Mahomedans as a nation. This sentiment is quite inconsistent with the Samity being aimed against the Mahomedans. That it was aimed against somebody is quite clear; and if it was not against the Mahomedans, against whom was it aimed? The prosecution says it was against the English. Their contention is supported by the speculation of the writer of the Paridarsak as to the possibility of the Mahomedans joining with the English. 20. Then there is another explanation which has been given by Pulin of the object for which the Samity was formed. He says that it was formed to establish the nationality of the Bengalis and to secure their mental and physical improvement. But if this was true, no reasonable explanation is forthcoming as to the secrecy which the members were sworn to maintain. No object would have been more attractive to the more enthusiastic of the young men of Bengal. So far from there being any reason to conceal such an object the publication of it far and wide would have assisted its course and would have brought into the association all those who aspired to attain so laudable an object. 21. The difficulty which meets those who have to explain the official documents of the Samity lies in this : If absolute obedience and secrecy are explained by saying that the association was formed for the purpose of fighting and beating the Mahomedans and for that purpose it was necessary to keep it secret, then it is inconsistent with that part of the Paridarsak which discusses the relation between the Samity and the Mahomedans. And if on the other hand it is said that the object was that of doing good to the Bengali race then secrecy and stringent need of the vows remain unexplained. There is another species of document appertaining to the Samity which should be noticed --viz., Village notes. 22. And if on the other hand it is said that the object was that of doing good to the Bengali race then secrecy and stringent need of the vows remain unexplained. There is another species of document appertaining to the Samity which should be noticed --viz., Village notes. 22. This document is a printed form : it contains in print 21 points as to which intelligence is to be obtained : it has besides a table in print with spaces for the entry of information on various heads. 23. Some copies filled in have been produced. The matters on which information is obtained relate to the inhabitants-- fairs--produce--roads and water-course--secrecy, enthusiasm or otherwise of the Samity members and other matters. 24. The Crown say that these notes summarise information which would be undoubtedly useful to those who had it in the event of a rebellion : and contend that their inspections were made under the directions of the Samity for that purpose--and to enable the net-work of Samitis to be spread through the country. 25. The Appellants on the other hand contend that the object of these notes was to enable the Samity to see where it could do good to persons residing in villages by improving roads, water-supply and such like. This explanation is not supported by any evidence that the Simity ever did any work for the material well-being of any village. 26. All that can be said is that it shows the Samity were busy collecting information about the country. The object was, I think, to enable them to extend the Samity throughout the country and to keep a check on those which had been already established. 27. Besides the official documents, there was on the premises of the Samity a library. A great deal has been said in the course of the argument for the Crown as to the nature of the books found in that library. A very large proportion of them appear from what has been said on the other side to have been books of harmless character which throw no light whatever on the aims and objects of the Samity. There were, however, other books which are said to have been calculated to excite hatred against the English. As to these we express no opinion, because we have not read them. There were, however, other books which are said to have been calculated to excite hatred against the English. As to these we express no opinion, because we have not read them. But even if they had the effect which the Crown contends, even then it has very little to do with the case, because the utmost that can be said is that the person in whose library they were, approved of literature of that nature. And even that assumption would not in all cases be a just one. But there were copies of two frankly revolutionary works, namely, the Modern Art of War and the Mookti Kon Pathe. Besides these, there were found very revolutionary poems written in the hands of one who is said to have been a member of the Samity, but has not been arrested. There were printed poems violently revolutionary dedicated to Pulin and a large number of documents expressing the bitterest hostility against the English and urging their destruction, and some poems directed to exaltation of Khudiram and Prafulla, the persons who murdered the English ladies at Mozufferpore. Now the inference to be drawn from the presence of these documents in the Samity, to my mind, is that the members of the Samity were imbued with the sentiment these documents express, that is, they were extremely hostile to the Government now carried on and were desirous of putting an end to it by force of arms. 28. The oral testimony directed in showing the object of the Samity is to be found in the deposition of witnesses Nos. 2, 3 and 39. Hemendra, who joined the Satipara Samity, before joining was told that the object was to drive out the British. He afterwards joined the Dacca Anushilan Samity and was there for about twenty days. Daring that time Pulin Das lectured on how to drive out the English. His brother Nagendra came to Dacca in 1907 and joined the Anushilan Samity in August of that year. He was advised to join by his cousin who said that a Samity was being formed for the purpose of driving out the English. He deposed that the members of the Samity said that they should follow the example of Sivaji and commit theft and dacoity and collect money and weapons. He was advised to join by his cousin who said that a Samity was being formed for the purpose of driving out the English. He deposed that the members of the Samity said that they should follow the example of Sivaji and commit theft and dacoity and collect money and weapons. The other witness Upendra said that he was taken to the Samity at 50 Wari, that he took vows and some of those who were there explained to him how good is to be done to India ; they were to collect arms and to be united and pointed out that the Feringees would not stand before the 30 crores of Indians. 29. This oral evidence is open to the observation that it comes from persons who either have been members of the Samity or else have joined it for the purpose of betraying its secrets. Evidence of this sort must be very carefully scrutinised. Much weight cannot be attached to it unless it is corroborated by other circumstances. 30. But in this case I have no doubt that generally speaking the evidence is true because much of it relating to lathi play, to taking vows, to the individuals who belonged to the Samity, is expressly admitted in the cases of many of the Appellants. It becomes necessary to consider whether that part which relates to the objects of the Samity is to be believed, and to test this the documentary evidence has to be considered. 31. The result of the vows and rules is to show that an association has been formed for the purpose of furthering an object which is not stated. 32. The members of the association are bound by the strictest vows to maintain inviolable secrecy : to submit absolutely to their leaders, to undergo a training of a quasi-military character. On the premises of the association are found books and writings advocating a revolution by force, and stirring up hatred against those who govern. 33. If the case stood there the inference that the object of the society was--in the absence of any satisfactory explanation--a revolutionary one, would in my opinion be justified. 34. An explanation might be given and the inference might be displaced: but the facts I have stated would be quite enough to throw on the members the onus of explaining the object of their society. 35. 34. An explanation might be given and the inference might be displaced: but the facts I have stated would be quite enough to throw on the members the onus of explaining the object of their society. 35. In this case there are the explanations of Pulin on one side, on the other the evidence of the witnesses. Palin's statements of the objects are shown to be irreconcilable with his own official document, the Paridarsak: the statements of the witnesses as to the Samity's object are directly in accord with the Paridarsak and are in agreement with those particular passages, which in my opinion are susceptible of no explanation other than that the object of the society was revolution. 36. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has vigorously, contended that Pulin has been strongly influenced by Bankim Babu's writings, and that in forming a society in which the members exercised their religion, underwent training in physical culture and submitted to discipline, he was carrying out in practice the theories of Bankim Babu. 37. To my mind, the question whether Pulin was inspired by the writings of Bankim is of the smallest importance. 38. Assuming that Bankim's theories, if followed out in practice, would produce a body of men, warlike and vigorous, but under strict discipline, devoted to their leader, bound under the most sacred vows to obey his orders, and never to divulge his secrets, then it follows that a body of men would be produced who in the event of the stirring calls to war and revolution in the literature found in the Samity being translated into action, would be most useful in the attainment of victory. 39. Now, besides the documents, other matters relied on by the Crown in support of the conviction are certain alleged overt acts. Between the 2nd June 1908 and the 6th September 1910 no fewer than ten serious cases occurred. These were, Barrah dacoity, Satipara boat theft, Naria dacoity, the murder of Sukumar, the murder of Priya Mohan, Rajendrapore train case, Dariarpore dacoity; there were finds of arms at Adabari and in a grocer's shop at Dacca and a find of bombs at Munshigunge. These cases, says the Crown, are due to the activity of the members of the Samity. Now some of these cases can very shortly be disposed of. 40. These cases, says the Crown, are due to the activity of the members of the Samity. Now some of these cases can very shortly be disposed of. 40. [On the evidence his Lordship came to the conclusion that the connection of the Dacca Anushilan Samity had not been established with any of these cases except the Naria dacoity with regard to which his Lordship found that the dacoits or some of them were members of that Samity]. 41. The result of the oral and documentary evidence is to show that the Dacca Anushilan Samity was formed having for its ostensible object the improvement of Bengali youth by the promotion of discipline and physical exercise--but that behind this ostensible and open object, there was a secret object known to those in positions of importance and authority but not necessarily confided to the younger and less dependable members. That secret object was to bring about a revolution and subvert the Government by force and to this end the Samity followed the lines laid down in the Mukti Kon Pathe both in the system on which it was founded, and, in one case at least, in the nature of the crime against property which its members committed. 42. This concludes the general aspect of the case; it remains now to deal with the cases of the particular Appellants. 43. In dealing with the individuals, it is to be observed that they fall into three distinct classes; (i) those who are alleged to be members of the Dacca Anushilan Samity; (ii) those who are members of other Samitis said to be branches of the Dacca Anushilan Samity; and (iii) those who are only connected with the Dacca Anushilan Samity through some overt act. 44. The last class only contains two persons, Benode and Jadu, whose sole connection with the Dacca Anushilan Samity rests on their participation in the Satipara boat theft case. But for reasons which we have given we are of opinion that it is not established that that crime was connected with the Samity, and if this is not established it is conceded that the case against these two Appellants must fail. The conviction must, therefore, be set aside and they must be acquitted. 45. But for reasons which we have given we are of opinion that it is not established that that crime was connected with the Samity, and if this is not established it is conceded that the case against these two Appellants must fail. The conviction must, therefore, be set aside and they must be acquitted. 45. The great difficulty that there is in dealing with the individual Appellants arises from the fact that it does not follow that because they are members of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, they are acquainted with the real object which is so carefully concealed in the rules and vows. 46. It is true that Hemendra says that those who took the adya vow were cognisant of the revolutionary object of the Samity. I am, however, not satisfied that this is true. The adya vow does not contain that vow of secrecy which is to be found in the antya and bisesh vows, and it is entremely unlikely that so serious a matter as the revolutionary object of the conspiracy would be confided to any persons who were not solemnly bound to secrecy. The rules show that persons who had only taken the adya vow did not know as much as those who took the subsequent vows. This induces me to believe that while lathi play and physical exercise would be held out as the ostensible object to persons who when they joined were not known to be persons of strong revolutionary desires, the true object would only be disclosed when they had taken more serious vows or were known to be persons of pronounced revolutionary ideas. 47. It is unnecessary to discuss the evidence with respect to Pulin or Ashutosh Das Gupta. The former is the founder of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, the latter was his chief lieutenant and was the person who was next in authority to Pulin. 48. It was conceded in the argument that the convictions of these two persons hung on the question whether the Dacca Anushilan Samity was a revolutionary society or not: if it was, the conviction of these two persons must stand. 49. There is another Appellant Jyotirmoy who is in much the same position as Pulin and Ashutosh as far as the evidence of his connection with the society is concerned. 49. There is another Appellant Jyotirmoy who is in much the same position as Pulin and Ashutosh as far as the evidence of his connection with the society is concerned. Against him, there was not only a great deal of oral evidence to shew that he was a prominent player of lathi at the Samity, of his presence when the Samity premises were searched, of his close association with Pulin, but there was also a great deal of documentary evidence which has been discussed in detail by the learned Judge. Jyotirmoy was a man who wrote a most beautiful hand--there can never be a moment's doubt as to the documents which he has written. 50. Not only are there the adya and antya vows, but there are seditious poems, copies of the duties of secretaries, duties of Paridarsaks and other writings, which shew that Jyotirmoy was an important member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity. No one who had written out the Paridarsak and other official documents of the Samity could for a moment be supposed to be ignorant of the aims and objects of Pulin. 51. The conviction of these three persons was undoubtedly right and their appeals must be dismissed. 52. [As regards the other accused, his Lordship found that the accused Abani was a member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity but he was not satisfied that he had attained sufficient importance in the Samity to be entrusted with the knowledge of the object which lay beyond the lathi play and the physical exercise. His Lordship therefore reversed his conviction and allowed his appeal. The conviction of the accused Akhoy was set aside on similar grounds. 53. With regard to Aswini Kumar Ghose his Lordship found that it had not been established without doubt that he was a member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, and that his conviction therefore should be set aside and his appeal allowed. With regard to Bankim Chandra Roy, his Lordship found that the evidence established that he was a man of revolutionary opinions, that he had taken the vows of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, and was in close and intimate association with some of the conspirators, and dismissed his appeal. 54. The appeal of Bhupati Mohan Sen was dismissed by his Lordship upon similar considerations. 55. 54. The appeal of Bhupati Mohan Sen was dismissed by his Lordship upon similar considerations. 55. In the absence of reliable evidence to show how deeply Dinesh Chandra Guha was in the secrets of the Samity his appeal was allowed, but with regard to the appeal of Gopal Chandra Sen, his Lordship held that it would not be safe to presume on the evidence that he was admitted into the secrets of the Samity, and his conviction was set aside. 56. With regard to Gopiballav his Lordship found that he was a member of the Samity and one of sufficient importance to be fully cognisant of the secret object of the Samity. 57. As to Gurudyal his Lordship held that he was a member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, and a member of importance. He was an older man than the other Appellants and there could be no doubt that filling the position he did, he knew all about the secret objects of the Samity. 58. With regard to the accused Poresh, Hem Chandra, Saroda and Sukendra it was proved that these four persons were members of the Jnan Bikashini Sabha which is shortly referred to as the J.B.S. at Madhyapara, and they would be connected with the Dacca Samity if it only were found that the Jnan Bikashini Sabha was a branch of that association. 59. On the evidence, however, his Lordship held that the connection of the Jnan Bikashini Sabha with the Dacca Anushilan Samity was not established and he allowed the appeal of these four Appellants. 60. With regard to the accused Khirode his Lordship found that he was a member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity and was a person of strongly revolutionary feelings and his Lordship observed : "As in the other cases, where a person has displayed in his writings violent revolutionary ideas, and is a member of a society the ultimate object of which is revolution, the only conclusion that can be come to is that he was a party to the revolutionary object of the Samity." His appeal was accordingly dismissed and upon similar considerations the appeal of Nishi Bhusan Mitra was also dismissed. 61. With regard to Radica Bhusan Roy his Lordship found, inter alia, that he was a person of position in the Samity and knew the object for which this Samity was formed. His appeal was accordingly dismissed. 62. 61. With regard to Radica Bhusan Roy his Lordship found, inter alia, that he was a person of position in the Samity and knew the object for which this Samity was formed. His appeal was accordingly dismissed. 62. With regard to Nishi Kanta Choudhuri his Lordship found that there was evidence that Nishi had been appointed an Inspector by the Habiganj Central Samity but in his Lordship's opinion the Habiganj Samity was not shown to have been connected with the Dacca Anushilan Samity. His appeal was accordingly allowed as also that of Nitai Chand Banikya with regard to whom his Lordship after discussing evidence found that he was in fact a member of the Samity but that he was not connected with any of the revolutionary writings. The evidence in his Lordship's view was not sufficient to justify the inference that he had those revolutionary desires which would lead to the inference that he knew of the ultimate design of the Samity--or that he was in a position of such importance in the Samity as to make it certain that he must have known the true objects. 63. His Lordship affirmed the conviction of Promode, who was the brother of Pulin, upon the finding that he was in Pulin's confidence and fully cognisant of the object for which the Samity was established. 64. Profulla was found to have been a member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, to have attained a high grade in the Samity, and to have consequently been cognisant of the object for which the Samity was formed. 65. His appeal was therefore dismissed. 66. With regard to Radhica Banerjee his Lordship found that the fact that he invited one member (Sukumar) to join, without any evidence to show that he himself was either a person of consequence in the Samity for a long time or a person of violent revolutionary tendency, would not be sufficient to hold that he was a member of importance and knew the secrets of the Samity. 67. Surendra Mohan Ghose was found to be a member of the Samity, but in the absence of some evidence to show that he was a person of revolutionary ideas, his Lordship set aside his conviction and allowed his appeal. 68. Surendra Chandra Roy also was found to be a member of the Samity. 67. Surendra Mohan Ghose was found to be a member of the Samity, but in the absence of some evidence to show that he was a person of revolutionary ideas, his Lordship set aside his conviction and allowed his appeal. 68. Surendra Chandra Roy also was found to be a member of the Samity. But in his Lordship's opinion though his case was one which fell very near the line, he was not connected with seditious writings. His appeal was accordingly allowed and his conviction set aside. 69. Suresh Chandra Sen's connection with the Samity was not found to have been established and his appeal also was allowed. 70. Sachindra Mohan Banerjee also was acquitted for a similar reason. 71. As regards Santipada, who admitted he was a member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, his Lordship had no doubt that he was a party to the design that Pulin had in his mind and his appeal was dismissed. 72. As to Manikya, though he was found to have been a member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, it was not satisfactorily established that his position in the Samity was such that he must have known the serious object which Pulin had set before himself. His appeal was therefore allowed. 73. With regard to Jogesh Raut also his Lordship was not satisfied that he held a position of importance in the Samity, or was acquainted with Pulin's real object and his appeal too was allowed. 74. With regard to Charu Chandra Sen, his Lordship observed that his case was one of some difficulty, but he did not feel convinced that the Appellant and the Charu whose name appeared in the Samity documents were the same man, and under the circumstances his appeal was allowed. 75. With regard to Nripendra Mohan Gupta his Lordship observed that as in the other cases where a man was shewn to be a person of revolutionary desires, and to be a member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, the only inference that could be drawn was that he was acquainted with and agreed to the revolutionary object which the Samity had in view. He had no doubt his conviction was right. His appeal was accordingly dismissed. 76. His Lordship concluded his judgment as follows.] 77. There only remains to be considered the question of sentence. He had no doubt his conviction was right. His appeal was accordingly dismissed. 76. His Lordship concluded his judgment as follows.] 77. There only remains to be considered the question of sentence. The learned Judge has passed sentence of a severity which is only justified on his finding that the overt acts were traced to the Dacca Anushilan Samity: inasmuch as we have come to the conclusion that the cases other than the Naria dacoity have not been connected with the Samity, we feel bound to make a considerable reduction in the sentences. 78. In passing the sentences we do take into consideration the fact that the Appellants have been in custody for the greater part of two years and we direct that the sentences we are about to pass take effect from to-day. 79. Pulin the leader: transportation for seven years. 80. Ashutosh Das Gupta, Jyotirmoy: 6 years' transportation. 81. Bankim Chandra Roy, Gurudoyal Das : 5 years' rigorous imprisonment, 82. Profulla Chandra Sen-Gupta, Radhika Bhusan Roy, Khirode Chandra Guha. Santipada Mukherjee, Bhupati Mohan Sen-Gupta : 3 years' rigorous imprisonment. 83. Nripendra Mohan Sen-Gupta, Nishi Bhusan Mittra, Gopi Ballav Chuckerbutty, Promode Behari Das: 2 years' rigorous imprisonment. 84. The remaining Appellants are acquitted and discharged. Mookerjee, J. 85. This is an Appeal on behalf of 35 persons who have been convicted under sec. 121A of the Indian Penal Code. Originally 45 persons were prosecuted, of whom one was discharged by the committing Magistrate, and 8 others have been acquitted by the Sessions Judge. Of the remaining 36 persons, one is said to have become insane and has not appealed to this Court. We are, therefore, concerned with the cases of the remaining accused persons only. On their behalf, the judgment of the Sessions Judge has been assailed not only as contrary to the weight of the evidence on the record, but also as bad on four grounds of law, each of which, it has been contended, is sufficient to vitiate the convictions. These grounds must obviously be considered in the first place, and they have been formulated by the learned Counsel for the Appellants in the following form; namely, first, that the proceedings are bad because they were not upon complaint made by order of or under authority from the Local Government within the meaning of sec. These grounds must obviously be considered in the first place, and they have been formulated by the learned Counsel for the Appellants in the following form; namely, first, that the proceedings are bad because they were not upon complaint made by order of or under authority from the Local Government within the meaning of sec. 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; secondly, that assuming that there was a sanction by the Local Government, the sanction was bad for vagueness, inasmuch as the particular complaints were not authorised thereby; thirdly, that the complaints themselves were not complaints of facts within the meaning of sec. 190 (1) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and could not form the foundation for the initiation of any valid criminal proceedings; and, fourthly, that the trial was vitiated by the misjoinder of charges contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. 86. In support of the first ground, it has been argued that before a Court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under sec. 121A of the Indian Penal Code, the essential pre-requisite is a complaint made by order of or under authority from the Governor-General in Council, the Local Government, or some officer empowered by the Governor-General in Council in this behalf. In the case before us, the complaint was not made under authority from, or by an officer empowered by, the Governor-General in Council; the complaint purported to have been made by order of the Local Government. Now, the expression 'Local Government' as defined in sec. 3 (29) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, means the person authorised by law to administer executive Government in the part of British India in which the Act containing the expression operates. It has been argued that the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam, by whose order the complaint was made, was not the person authorised by law to administer executive Government in that pare of British India, because the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was irregularly constituted and the Lieutenant-Governor himself as such was irregularly appointed. In other words, if the contention of the Appellants is well-founded, the only person competent to authorise a complaint under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code was the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. In other words, if the contention of the Appellants is well-founded, the only person competent to authorise a complaint under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code was the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The argument of the Appellants also involves by necessary implication the position that the Court of Session was irregularly constituted because the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and Assam who acted in this behalf was not the Local Government within the meaning of sec. 9 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The line of reasoning by which this position has been sought to be supported has been lucidly and concisely stated in the following manner See the articles on this question in 8 C.W.N. exxix and 9 C.W.N. cclxvi.--ED by the learned Counsel for the Appellants. He has argued that the procedure embodied in Proclamation 2832 of the 1st September 1905 for the constitution of the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was ultta vires and that the result achieved by means of the Proclamation could have been validly attained only by Parliamentary legislation, in view of the provisions of 3 and 4 Will. IV C. 85, 5 and 6 Will. IV C. 52; 16 and 17 Vict. C. 95; 17 and 18 Vict. C. 77; 24 and 25 Vict. C. 67; and 28 and 29 Vict. C. 17. Sec. 38 of 3 and 4 Will. IV C. 85 provides that the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, is to be divided into two Presidencies, namely, Bangal and Agra; sec. 56 provides that the executive Government of the Presidencies is to be administered by the Governor in Council of the Presidencies of Fort William in Bengal, Fort St. George in Madras, Bombay and Agra respectively. The Statute 5 and 6 Will. IV C. 52 gives powers to the Court of Directors to suspend the execution of these provisions so far as they relate to the creation of the Government of Agra, and during such suspension, gives powers to the Governor-General in Council to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor for the North-Western Provinces. Under sec. 15 of 16 and 17 Vict. C. 95 the suspension is continued, and the appointments and arrangements made with regard to the North-Western Provinces are kept in force. It is worthy of note that Parliamentary legislation was thus deemed necessary to create a Lieutenant-Governorship out of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal. Under sec. 15 of 16 and 17 Vict. C. 95 the suspension is continued, and the appointments and arrangements made with regard to the North-Western Provinces are kept in force. It is worthy of note that Parliamentary legislation was thus deemed necessary to create a Lieutenant-Governorship out of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal. Sec. 16 of 16 and 17 Vict. C. 95, provides that a separate Governor shall be appointed for the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal as in Madras and Bombay, as provided by 3 and 4 Will. IV C. 85; but it is laid down that pending such appointment, it would be lawful for the Court of Directors to authorise the Governor-General of India to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor for the Presidency. Sec. 17 provides that the Directors may create one Presidency and authorise the Governor-General in Council to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor. The section provides at the same time that the arrangements hereinbefore authorised would be continued for the territory now and heretofore under the Presidency of Fort William. Statute 17 and 18 Vict. C. 77 transferred to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal the power formerly exercised by the Governor-General in Council in respect of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, leaving to the latter a residue of powers in respect of territories not so transferred. Sec. 3 of the same Statute gives powers to the Governor-General to take territories under his direct authority and management and to provide for their administration. With reference to these provisions, it has been argued by the learned Counsel for the Appellants, that neither the Governor-General in Council nor the Secretary of State for India in Council can create a new Lieutenant-Governorship or divide the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal without special Parliamentary legislation. Reliance has also been placed on secs.22, 46 and 47 of 24 and 25 Vict. C. 67, and with reference to the two latter provisions it has been contended that sec. 46 applies only to territories not forming part of the Presidency at the time of its creation; and this view has been sought to be supported by reference to the terms of secs. 4 and 5 of 28 and 29 Vict. C. 17. C. 67, and with reference to the two latter provisions it has been contended that sec. 46 applies only to territories not forming part of the Presidency at the time of its creation; and this view has been sought to be supported by reference to the terms of secs. 4 and 5 of 28 and 29 Vict. C. 17. The question thus raised as to the legality of the redistribution of territory and the creation of the Lieutenant-Governorship of Eastern Bengal and Assam by Proclamation and without Parliamentary legislation, is not free from difficulty, and, in my opinion, there is some apparent force in the contention of the Appellants that the language of the Statutes has been strained and their provisions applied in a manner not contemplated by the framers thereof. But it is not necessary to pronounce a final opinion upon the legality of the procedure adopted for the Constitution of the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam and for the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor of the Province so constituted, because in my view the question does not arise in the present proceedings. The complaint in the case before us was made under authority from and by order of the de facto Local Government and was sufficient for the validity of the proceedings. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has contended upon the authority of the decisions in Queen v. Burah ILR 3 Cal. 63 (1871) and Hari v. Secretary of State for India ILR 27 Bom. 424 (1903) that it is competent to the Court to examine the legality of the procedure adopted for the creation of the Province; this position may be conceded to be sound (Cf. Dicey on the Law of the Constitution, pp. 96-98); but the true question which requires examination is, whether the sanction by the de facto Local Government is or is not sufficient for the validity of the trial. 87. It is well-settled that the acts of one who although not the de jure holder of a legal office was actually in possession of it under some colour of title or under such conditions as indicated the acquiescence of the public in his actions, could not be collaterally impeached in any proceeding to which such person was not a party, Parker v. Kett 1 Lord Raymond 658; 12 Mod. 467, R. v. Bedford Level Corporation 6 East 359 (1805). 467, R. v. Bedford Level Corporation 6 East 359 (1805). The view, however, has sometimes been maintained that there can be no de facto officer where there is no office de jure. Norton v. Shelby County 118 U.S. 425 (1886). But the contrary opinion has been maintained upon weighty reasons; it has been held that an unconstitutional law establishing an office may, until such law has been declared unconstitutional, be regarded as conferring colour of title, and that the incumbent of such an office should be treated as a de facto officer. The two fundamental pre-requisites to the existence of a de facto officer are, first, the possession of the office and the performance of the duties attached to it; and, secondly, colour of title, that is apparent right to the office and acquiescence in the possession of it by the public. The proposition that the official acts of public officers, in an office created by an unconstitutional procedure, performed before its unconstitutional character has been declared by an authoritative decision, cannot be collaterally attacked, is illustrated by more than one decision to be found in the books. In Clarke v. Commonwealth 29 Pa. 129, the prisoner had been convicted of murder in a Court, the Judge of which was exercising functions in a county attached to his district subsequent to his election, and his contention on appeal was that the Act of the legislature by which such addition of territory was attempted to be made was unconstitutional. But the Court held that the question could not be raised collaterally, that the Judge was a Judge de facto and, as against all but the Commonwealth, a Judge de jure; and the murderer was hanged. In Campbells. Commonwealth 96 Pa. 344, the prisoners had been convicted of arson for burning a dwelling-house and other buildings. Two Associate-Judges sat with the President Judge and participated in the trial and sentence. The validity of their title to the office and hence of the composition of the Court was questioned in appeal on the ground that they had been elected to their office unconstitutionally. Two Associate-Judges sat with the President Judge and participated in the trial and sentence. The validity of their title to the office and hence of the composition of the Court was questioned in appeal on the ground that they had been elected to their office unconstitutionally. It was held that they were Judges de facto and as against all parties but the Commonwealth they were Judges de jure, and having at least a colour of title to their offices, their title thereto could not be questioned in any other form than by quo-warranto at the instance of the Commonwealth. The result was that the burners of the dwelling-houses went to the penitentiary for eight years, though at a subsequent term the Associate-Judges were ousted in an action in quo-wartanto brought by the Attorney-General. Of like import is the decision in Coile v. Commonwealth 104 Pa. 117, and the murderer was executed. [See also State v. Carroll 38 Conn. 449; 9 Am Rep. 409 (1871), State v. Gardener 53 Ohio St. R. 145; 31 L.R.A. 660 (1896), King v. Pliladelphia 154 Pa. 160; 31 L.R.A. 141 (1893)]. A somewhat similar attempt was made in this country in Queen v. Gangaram ILR 16 All. 136 (1894), where the appointment of Mr. Justice Burkitt as a Judge of the Allahabad High Court was unsuccessfully questioned; the decision, however, is practically valueless in view of the pronouncement by the Judicial Committee in Bulwant Singh v. Rani Kishori ILR 20 All. 267 : s.c. L.R. 25 I.A. 54 (1891), that the learned Judge had been validly appointed to his office. 88. The doctrine that the acts of officers de facto performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third persons and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding as if they were the acts of officers de jure, dates as far back as the Year-Books, and it stands confirmed, without any qualification or exception, by a long line of adjudications. Viner says "acts done by an officer de facto and not de jure are good, for the law favours one in a reputed authority" (Abridgment, Tit. Officers and Offices G. 4). Viner says "acts done by an officer de facto and not de jure are good, for the law favours one in a reputed authority" (Abridgment, Tit. Officers and Offices G. 4). In face the question for determination in cases involving the application of the de facto doctrine, is not, as a rule, whether the challenged acts, assuming the officer to be de facto, as such are valid, but whether the person whose title is questioned is or was really a de facto officer. 89. The earliest case on record I have been able to trace is to be found in the Year-Books under the name of the Abbe de Fountaine decided in 1431 (1431, Year-BDoks, 9 H 6 Fol. 32). The action was on a bond given by one who illegally held the office of Abbot of the Convent of Fontaine, for supplies furnished to the Convent. The office was elective, and though the unlawful holder had obtained only a minority of the votes, yet he had procured himself to be inducted by the ordinary, and had taken possession of the Abbacy. Subsequently, however, the duly elected Abbot displaced him and was in turn inducted into office. The action was brought against the latter on the bond of his predecessor, and he pleaded the invalidity of the same on the ground that it had been given by one who never was the lawful Abbot of the Convent. The Court overruled this contention and considered the bond valid, because given by the person who at the time was in fact the Abbot. It is remarkable that the language used by Chief Justice Babington plainly indicates that the principles of the de facto doctrine were even then not entirely new. From this period the de facto doctrine rapidly spread in England, and became firmly established, as is clear from a long series of decisions dealing with its various features and expanding its principles to meet the requirements of divers circumstances and different times. We may briefly state that these cases illustrate the following position : first, that a parson presented by an usurping patron who was wholly without authority to present was a good parson de facto (Abbey of Fontaine Y.B. 9 H. 6 Fol. We may briefly state that these cases illustrate the following position : first, that a parson presented by an usurping patron who was wholly without authority to present was a good parson de facto (Abbey of Fontaine Y.B. 9 H. 6 Fol. 32); secondly, that a clerk of a Lord of the manor holding a manorial Court without any authority whatever and deriving colour only from his known relation to the Lord of the manor as a simple clerk, was a good officer de facto, Knowles v. Luce Moore 109; thirdly, so of the servant of a steward holding a manorial Court without authority from the steward or the law [Lord Dacre's case 1 Leonard 288 (1553)]; fourthly, so of the deputy of a deputy to whom authority could not be delegated [Leak v. Howel Croke Eliz. 533 (1598)]; fifthly, so of the steward of a manor appointed not by the Lord who alone had the power to appoint, but by county officers who had no authority whatever to appoint [Harris v. Jays Croke Eliz. 699 (1599)]; sixthly, a reaffirmation of the doctrine by Lord Holt that the deputy of a deputy has sufficient colour to make him a de facto officer [Parker v. Rett 1 Lord Raymond 658; 12 Mod. 467], which is not inconsistent with the decision in Rex v. Lide Andrews 163 (1738), very incorrectly reported in Strange 1090; and, seventhly, the adoption of Lord Holt's definition that an officer de facto is none other than he who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, although he is not such in point of law, by Lord Ellenborough in Rex v. Bedford Level 6 East 356 (1805). Amongst later decisions in which the existence of the de facto doctrine as a well-settled rule of law is fully acknowledged may be mentioned : Marigate v. Hannam 3 B. & Ald. 266; 22 R.R. 378 (1819), R. v. Herefordshire 1 Chitty 700 (1819), R. v. Slythe 6 B. and C. 240; 30 R.R. 312 (1827), De Grave v. Monmouth 4 C. and P. 111 (1830), R. v. Dolgelly 8 A. and E. 561 (1838), Penney v. Slade 5 Bing. N.C. 319 (1839) R. v. St. 266; 22 R.R. 378 (1819), R. v. Herefordshire 1 Chitty 700 (1819), R. v. Slythe 6 B. and C. 240; 30 R.R. 312 (1827), De Grave v. Monmouth 4 C. and P. 111 (1830), R. v. Dolgelly 8 A. and E. 561 (1838), Penney v. Slade 5 Bing. N.C. 319 (1839) R. v. St. Clement 12 A. and E. 177 (1840), R. v. Mayor of Cambridge 12 A. and E. 702 (1840), R. v. Cheshire 4 Jurist 484 (1840), Scadding v. Lorant 3 H.L.C. 418 affirming 13 Q.B. 706 (1851), Lancaster v. Heaton 8 E. and B. 952 (1858), Waterloo v. Cull 1 E1. and E1. 213 (1858), Mahony v. East Holroyd L.R. 7 H.L. 899; I.R. 9 C.L. 306 (1875). 90. The application of this doctrine of de facto officers admits of illustration from well-known historical events. The de facto doctrine received a solemn recognition from an Act of Parliament passed in 1461. This was after the House of York had reasserted its title to the Crown of England and succeeded in establishing it in the person of Edward IV. The Statute Edward IV c. I. declared that the previous Henrys of Lancaster were usurpers, but to avoid great public mischief, also declared them kings de facto; the de facto doctrine was carried so far with respect to the English Crown that treasons committed under Henry VI, not in aid of the lawful claimant, were punished under Edward IV. It is further stated in Bacon's Abridgement (Prerogative A) that "it had been settled that all Judicial Acts done by Henry VI while he was King and also all pardons of felony and charters of designation granted by him are valid." The history of England affords another memorable instance of the application of the de facto doctrine. On the death of Charles I, Charles II immediately became King of England de jure and the years of the reign of Charles II are to this day counted from the death of Charles I; yet there was an interval of 11 years between the death of Charles I and the restoration of Charles II, during the greater part of which, under the Protector, a Government maintaining order and able to enforce its authority existed. Sir Mathew Hale, though he never formally recognized the Government of Cromwell, sat as a Judge of the Common Bench, as the Court of King's Bench was called in Cromwell's time, administering the plenary jurisdiction of the Court, in the adjudication of cases involving title to properly as well as those affecting civil liberty. At the Restoration, he sat in the same Court as Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench. His explanation is well-known and was to the effect that the public business must go on and justice be administered alike under de facto and de jure Governments. (See Life of Sir Matthew Hale by Bishop Burnett and also by Dr. Williams). For other illustrations of a similar character reference may be made to the cases of Bank of North America v. McColl 4 Binn. 371 (1812), where the question arose as to the validity of judicial proceedings in the Saint Domingo Courts not constituted by authority of the French Government, and King v. McDonough 8 Peter 308 (1834), where the question arose as to the validity of the judgment of a Spanish Court rendered in Louisiana after the cession of that country to the American Union but before the formal surrender. To the same effect is the decision in Horn v. Lockhart 17 Wallace 570 (1873) where the question was raised as to the validity of the decisions of the Courts of the Confederate States of America during the War of Secession. The position is thus now firmly settled in England, in the United States and in Canada, that the title of de facto judicial officers is not collaterally assailable. Hippsley v. Lucker 2 Lev. 184 (1677), People v. Sassoville 29 California 480 (1866), O'Neil v. Attorney-General 26 Canada Sup. Court. 122; 1 Canada Cr. Cas. 303 (1896), Speeres v. Speeres 28 O.R. 188 (1896), Parker v. Parker 8 Pa. 428(1840). See also the case of Sir Edward Coke, who, though only a de facto member of Parliament in 1626, was granted privilege against a suit in Chancery commenced against him by the Lady Cleare 1 Douglas Elec. Cas. 425, 444 (1626). 91. It is not necessary for our present purposes to investigate exhaustively all the qualifications or limitations subject to which the de facto doctrine has to be applied. Cas. 425, 444 (1626). 91. It is not necessary for our present purposes to investigate exhaustively all the qualifications or limitations subject to which the de facto doctrine has to be applied. The substance of the matter is that the de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the public and the individual where those interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large. Indeed, if any individual or body of individuals were permitted at his or their pleasure to collaterally challenge the authority of and to refuse obedience to the Government of the State and the numerous functionaries through whom it exercised its various powers, on the ground of irregular existence, or defective title, insubordination and disorder of the worst kind would be encouraged. For the good order and peace of society their authority must be upheld until in some regular mode their title is directly investigated and determined. [See the observations in Scadding v. Lorant 3 H.L.C. 418 (1851) and Norton v. Shelby County 118 U.S. 3. 425 (1886)]. In the matter now before us, the sanction under sec 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code was granted by the de facto Local Government and the cognizance of the case has been taken by the de facto Sessions Judge. In my opinion, it is not open to the Appellants to question collaterally the legality of the conviction upon the allegation that the Local Government was irregularly constituted and the Sessions Judge irregularly appointed. The first ground upon which the legality of the trial is assailed must consequently be overruled. 92. In so far as the second ground is concerned, it has been contended that the sanction under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code is vague, because it does not sanction the specific complaint preferred before the Magistrate and that consequently it amounts in substance to a delegation of the authority vested in the Local Government. In support of this view, reliance has been placed upon the decision in Barindra Kumar Ghose v. King-Emperor 14 C.W.N. 1114 : s.c. ILR 37 Cal. 467 (1910). In support of this view, reliance has been placed upon the decision in Barindra Kumar Ghose v. King-Emperor 14 C.W.N. 1114 : s.c. ILR 37 Cal. 467 (1910). In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention. In the case relied upon, sanction was granted for prosecution for offences under four sections specified and any other section of the Indian Penal Code which might be found applicable to the case. There was consequently a plain delegation of the controlling power and discretion vested in the Local Government. In the case before us, the persons to be prosecuted are named and the sections under which they are alleged to have committed offences as also the period of their activity are specified. The mere circumstance that these persons are not described as members of the revolutionary society, the existence whereof was sought to be established at the trial, does not affect the validity of the sanction. The second ground, therefore, cannot be supported. 93. In so far as the third objection is concerned, it has been argued by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the conditions requisite for the initiation of a valid criminal proceeding are exhaustively enumerated in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 190; that cls. (b) and (c) have no application to the present case; and that the requirement of cl. (a) was not fulfilled inasmuch as what purported to be the complaint was not a complaint of the facts which constituted the alleged offence. Our attention has been invited to the definition of the term "complaint" embodied in sec. 4 (1) (b) of the Code, as the allegation, made orally or in writing, to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person whether known or unknown, has committed an offence. Reliance has also been placed upon the provisions of secs.200, 202 and 203 of the Code to show that when a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on complaint, he has to examine the complainant upon oath, to satisfy himself as to the truth of the complaint, to make an enquiry into the case or direct a local investigation for this purpose if necessary, and then to determine whether he will dismiss the complaint for reasons to be recorded or issue process against the accused. It has been argued that in order to enable the Magistrate to exercise his judgment in this matter, it is essential that the complaint should be a complaint of the facts which constitute the offence, and that in the case before us, this condition has not been fulfilled. The complaints do not set out the facts. I shall take as an illustration the first of the three complaints on the record dated the 29th July 1910. The petition of complaint is headed as a complaint of offences under secs. 121A, 122, 123, Indian Penal Code, and then proceeds as follows: "Your Petitioner has reasons to believe that the persons named in the Government order, dated the 26th July 1910, which is hereunto annexed, have amongst themselves and together with other persons known or unknown, conspired to wage war against His Majesty the King and to deprive His Majesty of the sovereignty of British India, and they have collected arms and have otherwise prepared to wage war with the intention of either waging war or being prepared to wage war against the King, and have further concealed with intent to facilitate a design to wage war against the King and have threby committed offences punishable under secs. 121A, 122 and 123, Indian Penal Code." It will be observed that no facts are set forth in the so-called complaint, but the words of the successive sections of the Code are literally copied out. In fact, the complainant might merely have stated that he complained that the persons named had committed offences punishable under secs. 121A, 122 and 123, Indian Penal Code. In my opinion, a complaint of this description constitutes a merely colourable compliance with the previsions of the Statute. That substantial compliance with the statutory requirements may be secured without the least practical difficulty is clear from the form of the complaint in the case of Emperor v. Nani Gopal 15 C.W.N. 593 (1911), which was produced before this Court, and which showed how a tolerably full statement of the concrete facts may be incorporated in the complaint so as to enable the Magistrate to discharge his judicial functions under secs. 203 and 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and in the event of the issue of process under the latter section, to furnish indication to the accused of the outlines of the case for the prosecution. 203 and 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and in the event of the issue of process under the latter section, to furnish indication to the accused of the outlines of the case for the prosecution. The view I take is founded not merely on the language of the Code [Queen v. Sham Lal ILR 14 Cal. 707, 716 (1887)], but also on well-recognised principles which lie at the foundation of Criminal jurisprudence. It is well-settled that in accordance with the general rule in criminal prosecutions an indictment or information for conspiracy must contain a statement of the facts relied upon as constituting the offence, in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, Rex v. Jones 4 B. & Ad. 345 (1832), Rex v. King 7 Q.B. 782 (795) (1844). I am not unmindful of the view sometimes taken that where conspiracy is made a statutory offence, if the Statute sets out fully and without uncertainty or ambiguity the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished, a charge in the language of the Statute is sufficient, R. v. Rollands 17 Q.B. 671; 5 Cox. C.C. 466; 2 D. & H.C.C. 364 (1851). But it is indisputable that if the Statute employs broad and comprehensive language descriptive of the general nature of the offence denounced, the complaint should embody a particular statement of the facts and circumstances. R, v. Peck 9 A. & E. 686 (1839), Pettibone v. United States 148 U.S. 197; McClain on Criminal Law, Vol. II, sec. 984; Bishop on New Criminal Law, Vol. II, sec. 202 ; Bishop on New Criminal Procedure, Vol. II, sec. 217. If the contrary view were maintained, we might as well hold that because sanction has been accorded under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate need not exercise his judgment at all--a position clearly not intended by the legislature. In my opinion, therefore, the complaint in this case was not a complaint of facts as contemplated by sec. 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The question thus arises, how far, if at all, the validity of the proceedings has been affected by this defective nature of the complaint. On behalf of the Appellants, it has been contended that there was no complaint in the eye of the law and consequently the proceedings were without jurisdiction. 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The question thus arises, how far, if at all, the validity of the proceedings has been affected by this defective nature of the complaint. On behalf of the Appellants, it has been contended that there was no complaint in the eye of the law and consequently the proceedings were without jurisdiction. In support of this proposition, reference has been made to the cases of Umer Ali v. Safer Ali ILR 13 Cal. 334 (1886), Baidyanath v. Muspratt ILR 14 Cal, 141 (1886), In re Subras Ram Chandra Ranchoddas 954 (1898), Rungachari v. Emperor 2 Weir 241 (1902), Emperor v. Lalit Mohan 15 C.W.N. 98 (1910), Barindra Kumar v. Emperor 14 C.W.N. 1114 : s.c. ILR 37 Cal. 467 (1910), Sham Khan v. Queen P.R. Cr. 16 (1890), Apurbo Krishna v. Emperor ILR 35 Cal. 141 (1907), Lokenath v. Sanyasi Charan ILR 30 Cal. 923 (1903), Haladhar v. Sub-Inspector 9 C.W.N. 199 (1904), Chamru Shahu v. Emperor 11 C.W.N. 170 (1906), Kesri v. Mahomed Buksh ILR 18 All. 221 (1896), Abdul Kadir v. Emperor 5 M.L.T. 162 (1908), Empress v. Alim Mondal 11 C.L.R. 55 (1882) and Subramania v. Emperor 5 C.W.N. 866 : s.c. ILR 25 Mad. 61; L.R. 28 I.A. 257 (1901). This position has been contested on behalf of the Respondent and it has been argued on the authority of the decisions in Chidambaram v. Emperor ILR 32 Mad. 3 (1908), and Swami Dyal v. Emperor 7 Cr.L.J. Rep. 353 (1907), that the defect, if any, may be deemed to have been cured by sec. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Upon examination of the decisions to which reference has been made at the bar, it appears that not one of them is precisely in point; but one rule is deducible therefrom, viz., that if the Court has acted without jurisdiction, the legality of the proceedings cannot be sustained. Now, it is plain that in the case of Barindra Kumar v. Emperor 14 C.W.N. 1114 : s.c. ILR 37 Cal. 467 (1910), where the order under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, did not mention sec. Now, it is plain that in the case of Barindra Kumar v. Emperor 14 C.W.N. 1114 : s.c. ILR 37 Cal. 467 (1910), where the order under sec. 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, did not mention sec. 121 of the Indian Penal Code, as also in the case of Emperor v. Lalit Mohan 15 C.W.N. 98 (1910), where the complainant omitted to name an accused person in his petition of complaint, the defect went to the root of the matter and made it impossible for the Court to hold a valid trial for the offence not specified or of the accused person not mentioned. Again, where, as in the case of Chamru Sahu v. Emperor 11 C.W.N. 170 (1906), the validity of the complaint is successfully questioned before this Court before the trial, the obvious course to adopt is to quash the proceedings as framed. In the case before us, however, the sufficiency or legality of the complaint, has not been brought up to this Court for consideration before the completion of the trial in the subordinate Courts. On the basis of the complaint, the enquiry proceeded before the Magistrate, and after commitment by him the Sessions Judge has elaborately tried the case with the aid of assessors. Under these circumstances it is plainly no longer competent to the accused to invite this Court to set aside the convictions on the ground that the complaint was materially defective. A case of this description is, I think, completely covered by cl. (a) of sec. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is no foundation for any possible suggestion that the essentially defective nature of the complaint has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. The essence of the argument for the Appellants is that the complaint must embody a statement of facts, so as to enable the Magistrate to form an opinion whether he should take action under sec. 203 or sec. 204 of the Code. But that stage has been long since passed, and the Court is now called upon to decide, not whether the complaint should have been thrown out or acted upon, but whether the voluminous evidence on the record justifies the convictions and sentences. The view I take is supported by the ob servations in the cases of Swami Dyal v. Emperor 7 Cr.L.J. Rep. 353 (1907) and Chidambaram v. Emperor ILR 32 Mad. The view I take is supported by the ob servations in the cases of Swami Dyal v. Emperor 7 Cr.L.J. Rep. 353 (1907) and Chidambaram v. Emperor ILR 32 Mad. 3(1908), though I do not adopt all that is said in these cases; in so far as the second case accepts the decision in Queen v. Balgangadhar Tilak ILR 22 Bom. 112 (1897), it cannot be reconciled with the decision in Barindra Kumar v. Emperor 14 C.W.N 1114 : s.c. ILR 37 Cal. 467 (1910); but that does not affect the point now under consideration. My conclusion, therefore, is that although the complaint is not in conformity with the requirements of sec. 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and although, the accused might have, possibly with success, applied to this Court to quash the proceedings at the appropriate stage, the convictions cannot now be assailed on this ground. 94. In support of the fourth ground, it has been contended that the trial is vitiated by misjoinder of charges inasmuch as a charge under sec. 121A was coupled with a charge under sec. 123 of the Indian Penal Code. The contention in substance is that the same person cannot be guilty of offences under both the sections, and in support of this view reliance has been placed upon the decision in Queen v. Raj Kumar Banerjee I Ind. Jur. O.S. 105 (1862) where it was ruled that the illegal concealment by act or omission contemplated by sec. 120 of the Indian Penal Code has reference to the existence of a design on the part of some third person other than the person who commits the offence. It has further been argued that if there was a misjoinder of charges, the trial has been altogether vitiated, because conducted in a manner not contemplated by law, and in support of this proposition, reliance has been placed upon the cases of Queen v. Chandi Singh ILR 14 Cal. 395 (1887), and Subramania Iyer v. Emperor 5 C.W.N. 806 : s.c. I.L. R. 25 Mad. 61; L.R. 28 I.A. 257 (1901), which must be taken to have overruled the decision of the Full Bench in Abdul Rahaman v. Queen ILR 27 Cal. 839 (1900). In my opinion, there is no substance in the contention that the trial is vitiated by misjoinder of charges. 61; L.R. 28 I.A. 257 (1901), which must be taken to have overruled the decision of the Full Bench in Abdul Rahaman v. Queen ILR 27 Cal. 839 (1900). In my opinion, there is no substance in the contention that the trial is vitiated by misjoinder of charges. In the first place, it is clear that the decision in Barindra Kumar v. Emperor 14 C.W.N. 1114: s.c. ILR 37 Cal. 467 at p. 493 (1910) is opposed to the contention of the Appellants. In the second place, it is manifest that the same person may be guilty of offences under sec. 121A as well as sec. 123 of the Indian Penal Code; for instance, a person may bring himself within the latter section by concealment of the existence of a design to wage war against the King, and may immediately afterwards join in the conspiracy to wage war against the King and thereby bring himself within the scope of sec. 121A. It is reasonably plain therefore, that even if secs. 234 to 238 of the Criminal Procedure Code are of no assistance to the prosecution, because, as explained in Budhai Sheikh v. Emperor ILR 33 Cal. 292 (1905), they are limited to the case of a single accused person while sec. 239applies to the joint trial of more than one person, yet the interpretation we put upon sec. 121A and sec. 123 of the Indian Penal Code shows that the trial is not open to objection on the ground of misjoinder of charges. See Janki v. Emperor 11 C.L.J. 182 (1909), which is not really in conflict with Bishum Bunwar v. Empress 1 C.W.N. 35 (1896) and In re Balgangadhar Tilak ILR 33 Bom. 221 (1908). In the second place, it is plain that the offences charged were committed in the same transaction within the meaning of sec. 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But I must further add that the objection as to the joinder of charges proves wholly unsubstantial, also from another point of view. It appears that as soon as the objection was taken on this ground before the Court of Sessions, application was made on behalf of the Crown for leave to withdraw the charges under secs. 122 and 123 of the Indian Penal Code. It appears that as soon as the objection was taken on this ground before the Court of Sessions, application was made on behalf of the Crown for leave to withdraw the charges under secs. 122 and 123 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judge, however, felt constrained to refuse this application in view of the decision in Empress v. Pareshulla 7 C.L.R. 143 (1880), as also of the circumstance that there is no express provision in the Code which authorises the withdrawal of a charge in the events which have happened. The result was that the charges remained nominally unaltered; but the prosecution directed the evidence towards the proof of the charge under sec. 121A alone. In my opinion, the application for withdrawal of the charges to which exception had been taken ought to have been allowed and the Court had inherent power to make the appropriate order. Criminal Courts, no less than civil Courts, exist for the administration of justice, and Courts of both descriptions have inherent power to mould the procedure, subject to the statutory provisions applicable to the matter in hand, to enable them to discharge their functions as Courts of Justice. From every point of view, therefore, the objection as to misjoinder of charges is unfounded and must be overruled. 95. I shall now proceed to examine the merits of the appeal. The case for the prosecution is that the Dacca Anushilan Samity of which many of the Appellants were members was a revolutionary society the object of which was ultimately to deprive the King-Emperor of the sovereignty of British India or at any rate of a part thereof. The theory of the prosecution is that the Partition of Bengal which came into force on the 16th October 1905 exasperated the Hindu inhabitants of the province and especially of the newly constituted Province of Eastern Bengal. Political agitation was vigorously carried on in various parts of the country. On behalf of the Crown, it is asserted in substance that the Dacca Anushilan Samity was formed for purposes of revolution, though its ostensible object was to encourage physical exercise. The case for the defence, on the other hand, is that the ostensible was the real object of the Samity, and that its founder and promoters entertained no secret or sinister purpose. The case for the defence, on the other hand, is that the ostensible was the real object of the Samity, and that its founder and promoters entertained no secret or sinister purpose. In fact, it is asserted on behalf of the defence that the effect of the agitation which followed the Partition of Bengal was not merely to cause complete estrangement between Hindus and Mahomedans, but also to create a feeling of active hostility of the Mahomedans towards the Hindus which exhibited itself in what has been described as various acts of insult and oppression. The defence urged that the position of the Hindus became so insecure that Pulin Behari Das, who was himself an expert lalhi player, at the instance of the leading people of the town of Dacca, started this Samity on the 6th March 1907 for the physical improvement and ultimate regeneration of the Bengali race. It is further asserted that the idea of the Samity was borrowed from the well known work Anushilan or "culture" by the celebrated Bengali novelist. Babu Bankim Chandra Chatterjee. The substantial question in controversy consequently is what was the true character of the Dacca Anushilan Samity; was it, as the prosecution alleges, a revolutionary society the funds of which were obtained by dacoity and the object of which was to be attained by means of bombs and arms; or was it, as the accused assert, a society for not merely a harmless but also a praiseworthy purpose, namely, the physical and moral improvement of the Bengali race, but the object whereof has been grievously misrepresented by untrustworthy police officers and unscrupulous spies. In the Court below, a considerable mass of evidence was adduced to establish the precise time when the society was formed and it appears to have been assumed that if the society was established towards the end of 1905, immediately after the Partition of Bengal, as the prosecution asserts, its object must have been revolutionary, while if it was really founded on the 6th March 1907, immediately after and in view of the serious disturbances at Comilla, Jamalpur, and in other places, its purpose must have been laudable. But it is manifest that neither of these assumptions may be well founded. But it is manifest that neither of these assumptions may be well founded. The precise point of time when the Samity was instituted, if it can be ascertained, may possibly indicate the ostensible purpose of its establishment; but it is by no means conclusive as to its true character. It is obvious that a society of this description could hardly have been founded, much less successfully extended through various districts, unless the antecedent events and surrounding circumstances had prepared the way there for. It is, therefore, not very material to consider whether the organization was started on the 6th March 1907, as the defence assert, or more than a year earlier as the prosecution alleges. It is plain beyond controversy that at or about the time to which we are referring, considerable ill-feeling existed between Hindus and Mahomedans, and the evidence further points to the conclusion that in Jamalpur and possibly in other places also, infuriated Mahomedan mobs had, to some extent, got beyond the effective control of the authorities entrusted with the duty of keeping the peace. There was thus a widespread panic among Hindus that they might be insulted or outraged by Mahomedans with impunity, and also a belief that the authorities were either unable or unwilling to afford them adequate protection. It is not necessary for the purposes of the present case to investigate whether and how far this panic was well-founded; nor is it pertinent to the present enquiry to determine who were to blame for the highly strained feeling between the Hindus and the Mahomedans. I am concerned only with the fact, firmly established by the evidence, that there was widespread panic amongst the Hindus and that means of self-protection were deemed necessary by men of intelligence and respectability. Under such circumstances, the formation of a society avowedly for the development of physical culture and the rapid extension thereof in different districts is by no means a matter for surprise. That Pulin Behari Das was himself an expert lathi player is clear on the evidence and he is said to have learnt the tricks of the art from a master named Murtuza and to have developed the system to a considerable extent. That Pulin Behari Das was himself an expert lathi player is clear on the evidence and he is said to have learnt the tricks of the art from a master named Murtuza and to have developed the system to a considerable extent. That lathi play by itself is perfectly harmless has not been disputed, and as was pointed out by the learned Chief Justice in a recent case, lathi play standing alone cannot be treated as evidence of a conspiracy to wage war. To attach sinister significance to the mere association in play or pastimes of those that live in the same village or attend the same school, would be dangerous, specially when these exercises were undertaken with a complete absence of secrecy and rather with a courting of publicity, Emperor v. Nani Gopal Gupta 15 C.W.N. 593 at p. 620 (1911) I propose, therefore, to leave the evidence of lathi play alone, and to endeavour to determine the object, of the society from the official documents and from the evidence of its activities. 96. On behalf of the Crown, upon whom rests the burden of establishing the alleged conspiracy, reliance has been placed upon two classes of documentary evidence. In the first class, are comprised what have been called the official documents of the Samity. In the second class, are included documents found in the Samity premises at the searches of the 10th August, 5th November and 15th November 1908, as also documents proved to have been written by individual accused persons or found to have been in their possession at the time of various other searches. In addition to the effect of these documents, we have been invited by the Crown to consider the evidence of numerous (sic) acts as indicative of the true nature of the society, manifested by the activity of the members thereof. 97. In so far as the official documents are concerned, they have been classified under seven heads (1) vows, (2) rules for the conduct of members, (3) the Paridarsak, an essay by Pulin Behari Das which sets forth the nature of the society, (4) Sampadaker kartobya, or duties of the secretary, (5) village notes, (6) notice for organising Samitis, (7) unity leaflet and independence leaflet. 98. 98. As regards the vows, it is necessary to state at the outset that it was an essential pre-requisite for the admission of an adult member into the society that he should take a vow. The vows were four in number, and were of gradually increasing degrees of solemnity. They were known as the adya pratijna or initial vow; the antya pratijna or final vow; the pratham bishesh or the first special vow and the divitiya bishesh or the second special vow. An elaborate argument has been addressed to the Court by the learned Counsel for the Appellants as to the order in which the vows were administered. But in my opinion the contention, ingeniously put forward, that the first special vow was administered first, completely failed. The internal evidence is conclusive that the vows were administered in the order I have named them. The initial and the final vows were meant for all ordinary members, the initial to be taken at the time of admission into the Santity and the final, after the novice had reached a certain stage of culture or attainment. The two special vows were intended only for the members of the inner circle; and amongst them also there was obviously a gradation. The initial vow is harmless. The member undertakes never to separate himself from the Samity, to be loyal to its interests, to keep his own character immaculate, to carry out the orders of the authorities without question, to be diligent in gymnastics and drill, to keep secret from all non-members the art of self-defence, and to work out the welfare of the country and gradually of the world. The final vow opens with a declaration that no internal matters whatever of the Samity were to be divulged to anyone; nor were they to be even discussed unnecessarily. The member who took his final vow undertook to carry out unquestioningly the orders of the parichalak or the head of the Samity, to keep him informed of his own whereabouts wherever he might be, to inform the chief of the existence of conspiracies against the Samity and under his orders to remedy them, to return to duty whenever the President might command, to consider no kind of work as humiliating, to cultivate self-abnegation and self-sacrifice and to keep secret from all persons not equally bound by oath the instructions that he had received. The first special vow is couched in more solemn language, and the member undertakes to remain attached to the circle till its object has been fulfilled, to sever the tie of affection for parents and relations, for hearth and home, to render absolute obedience to the leader in the work of the circle, and to give up vicious habits of all descriptions. The second special vow is couched in still more solemn language, and the member undertakes to stake his life and all that he possesses to accomplish the work of the circle, called the circle for the enhancement of good sense, to keep the inner secrets inviolate, and never to discuss or mention them, to carry out commands without question, to preserve the secrecy of mantras, to conceal nothing from the leader, never to deceive the leader by untruth, to be engaged always in the practice of religion, and finally to mete out just punishment to those antagonistic to it. With reference to these vows, it has been argued on behalf of the Crown that they plainly indicate that the society had a secret object which was not to be mentioned, not even needlessly discussed. In answer to this contention, it has been argued on behalf of the defence that the object of the society was physical improvement of the race, to be attained by stick play and dagger play, and that this object is fairly obvious from the vows themselves. I am not at all impressed with the suggested explanation. It may be conceded that the members of the Samity might well be anxious to keep secret from their Mahomedan opponents the details of the elaborate system of lathi play invented or perfected by their leader. But this does not carry us appreciably nearer to what is described as the internal secrets or the internal matters which were no: only not to be divulged but not even discussed. The other provisions, to preserve the secrecy of mantras, to guard the society against conspirators, and finally to mete out just punishments to all antagonists, do seem remarkable in what, it is contended, was a perfectly innocuous society with legitimate aims and aspirations. The other provisions, to preserve the secrecy of mantras, to guard the society against conspirators, and finally to mete out just punishments to all antagonists, do seem remarkable in what, it is contended, was a perfectly innocuous society with legitimate aims and aspirations. Stress need not be laid upon the provision which implies complete severance from home and family and unquestioning submission to a leader, but it is plain that vows of this special and remarkable character do not by any means seem needful for, even if they be assumed to be consistent with, the purposes of a society of the harmless character suggested by the defence. The true object of the society, however, is to be determined not merely from the contents of the vows but also from the other documents which we shall presently examine. 99. When we return to the rules for the conduct of members, we find the same remarkable provision for the preservation of an unnamed secret. With this end in view, all unnecessary discussion even amongst the members themselves was strictly prohibited. They were not even to write letters to their friends and relations without the permission of the leader, and all letters for and from the members were to be shown to him. Members were also to cut themselves off completely from their relations and friends, and if they obtained any money from them, it was to be regarded as the common property of the Samity and the circle. Each member was also required to take both the sets of the vows of the Samity, i.e., the initial and the final as also the special vows of the circle. Every member was further expected to get by heart the vows, the duties of a manager, the paridarsak, the lathi play book and the regulations. Finally, every member was bound to bring to the notice of the chief whatever drawback he might notice in any of the other members, and if the concealment of the fault of the member by another should be detected, both of them were to be punished. These rules plainly indicate that the members were to be subject to the absolute control of the head of the Samity and that all possible precautions were to be taken for the preservation of an undisclosed secret. 100. The third official document which requires examination is the paridarsak or the visitor. These rules plainly indicate that the members were to be subject to the absolute control of the head of the Samity and that all possible precautions were to be taken for the preservation of an undisclosed secret. 100. The third official document which requires examination is the paridarsak or the visitor. This is an elaborate statement of the method to be pursued for the establishment of new Samitis in new places. The visitor who was to be entrusted with this responsible duty, was furnished with a series of plausible and captivating arguments to be used by him for inducing people to inaugurate societies. To take one illustration, people who might object to take vows were to be told that otherwise only an undisciplined body would be formed. But we need only confine our attention to the more striking passages of this remarkable document; in the first place all factions were to be avoided, and strenuous effort was to be made to have the different Samitis under a central authority. If the object of the movement was merely to improve physical culture and to afford self-protection against the Mahomedans, it is difficult to appreciate why a central association with its branches spread over the whole Province was essential. It was a fundamental part of the scheme that no associations were to be tolerated even for the purposes of promotion of physical development, unless they consented to be affiliated to the parent association and adopted its vows, rules and methods of work. In the second place, strict measures were to be adopted to prevent any entrance into the society by persons who had not taken the vows and yet by deception attempted to learn lathi play. Such a person when detected, was to be pressed to take the vows and if he refused, arrangements were to be made for the complete destruction of his knowledge. This provision has an undoubtedly sinister look, and I am not much impressed with the interpretation suggested by the learned Counsel for the Appellants. In the third place, there is a lengthy discussion as to why Musalmans should not be admitted as members of the society. As the avowed object of the society is assumed by the accused to have been self-protection of the Hindus against the Mahomedans, it is difficult to appreciate how any occasion could really arise for the consideration of this question. As the avowed object of the society is assumed by the accused to have been self-protection of the Hindus against the Mahomedans, it is difficult to appreciate how any occasion could really arise for the consideration of this question. At the same time, there is a significant sentence that it would not be proper to show hostile feelings against or to deal unjustly with the Musalmans as a nation. This document taken as a whole clearly indicates, in my opinion, that systematic effort was to be made to have a net-work of Samitis throughout the length and breadth of the land, that independent Samitis even for physical culture were not to be tolerated, that any attempt to learn the secrets of the society without a vow was to be frustrated by complete destruction of knowledge, and that Mahomedans were to be excluded from the Samiti, but no hostile feelings were to be shown towards them as a nation. I have not referred to a somewhat, ambiguous sentence which appears only in one copy of this document and which might be interpreted to mean that foreign kings were to be driven out. The learned Judge has treated the passage as capable of a harmless meaning and I shall not consequently draw from it any adverse inference. The same remark, however, does not apply to the passage where reference is made to a possible combination between the British Government and the Mahomedans; this is only consistent with the theory of a revolutionary conflict between the members of the Samity and their followers on the one hand, and the established Government of the country on the other. 101. The next document which requires consideration is known as the sampadaker kartabya or duties of the secretary, and describes in minute detail the steps to be taken by the secretary of every Samity for its maintenance and improvement. Promotion of physical exercise was a prominent object; but complete instruction was to be imparted only to those who had taken both sets of vows in full; steps were to be taken for the collection of handfuls of rice as alms and attempt was to be made to secure pecuniary help. But the accounts were to be rendered every week to the Chief Secretary of the central Samity and were to be open to inspection by visitors appointed by him. But the accounts were to be rendered every week to the Chief Secretary of the central Samity and were to be open to inspection by visitors appointed by him. All changes in organisation or personnel were to be promptly reported to the Chief Secretary. A register was to be kept of members of the Samity with full details as to antecedents and previous connection, if any, with affiliated Samitis. Provision was also made for the punishment of delinquent members; but in no circumstance were they to be allowed to leave the Samity. Effective enquiries were to be made as to the existence of conspiracies against the Samity, and steps were to be taken for the remedy thereof. There was finally a noticeable rule that those who were under 12 years of age and were incapable of understanding the spirit of the vows were to be designated as the external limbs of the Samity; such boys were only to have the vows read out to them and were to be made to observe them. They were to be taught only certain defined exercises while those who have taken the initial vow were to have no other lessons imparted to them than specified courses in play with big and small sticks and also daggers. These rules emphasise the importance of the vows and also indicate the complete subordination of branch associations to the leader of the central Samity. The rules also indicate that although members were to be punished for their delinquencies, every effort was to be made to retain them within the folds of the society; expulsion of persons already initiated into the secrets of the society was obviously inconsistent with the preservation of the secrecy of its aims and objects. 102. The fifth document which requires consideration is what has been described as the village note. The society was to send out inspectors to every village throughout the length and breadth of the Province and information was to be collected and entered under various heads about all conceivable topics relating to each village and its condition. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has contended that the information sought to be collected was of a perfectly harmless character. This may be conceded. But the question obviously arises, what was the object with which all this statistical information was to be collected on an extensive scale. The learned Counsel for the Appellants has contended that the information sought to be collected was of a perfectly harmless character. This may be conceded. But the question obviously arises, what was the object with which all this statistical information was to be collected on an extensive scale. It was unquestionably needless for the purposes of the physical improvement of the Bengali race : but it would indubitably be of great assistance if a revolution was to be ultimately achieved or even if (sic) were to be committed to procure funds for a revolutionary society. It is worthy of remark that to each village note was to be attached a map to indicate the roads and rivers, meadows and canals, houses and gardens, and the specimens on the record indicate fairly with what minuteness the information had been collected and depicted on the map. In my opinion, although the village note by itself may be a harmless document, it furnishes some indication of the ultimate ends of the society; and the defence has not been able to suggest even a plausible explanation of the purpose for which the information contained in a document of this character might be needed for the accomplishment of the objects of a society for the physical and moral improvement of the Bengali race. 103. The sixth paper which requires examination is the form of notice for the organisation of new Samitis. This was issued publicly, and opinion was invited as to the best method for the establishment and maintenance of Samitis all over the country. The document, however, makes it plain that the object of Pulin Behari Das was to divide the whole of Bengal into divisions and sub-divisions and to have branch associations at every place of any note or importance. 104. The last document to which attention need be directed is what has been described as the unity leaflet or the independence leaflet. This was printed and circulated publicly. It may be described as full of patriotic sentiments. But its central idea is that there is no possibility of unity unless subordination to one leader is accepted. The object of Pulin Behari Das plainly was to be this leader, a leader into whose hands, as he puts it, individual freedom was to be totally surrendered in order that national and social freedom might be achieved. But its central idea is that there is no possibility of unity unless subordination to one leader is accepted. The object of Pulin Behari Das plainly was to be this leader, a leader into whose hands, as he puts it, individual freedom was to be totally surrendered in order that national and social freedom might be achieved. The full significance of this may be appreciated when taken in conjunction with the passage in the Paridarsaka where reference is made to the career of Napoleon. 105. These then are the official documents of the Samity, and their significance is by no means difficult to ascertain. The Samity had undoubtedly for one of its objects the improvement of physical culture of the Bengali race. But there was a secret object which was not only not to be disclosed but was not even to be discussed amongst the members themselves. Pulin Behari Das was to be the leader of the Samity, to whose orders unquestioning obedience was to be rendered by all the members. The members themselves were to be admitted to the fraternity only after they had taken the most solemn vows in the presence of an image of the goddess Kali. Secrecy was to be maintained by every possible device; if any outsider, who had not taken the oath and who refused to do so, by deception, obtained entrance into the society, his knowledge was to be destroyed; members who had taken the oath and presumably had been initiated into the secrets were, inspite of their delinquencies, to be retained in the folds of the society. This organisation was ultimately to spread over the whole of Bengal; the condition of every village and town was to be minutely examined and recorded and detailed geographical information was to be embodied in a series of maps. Independent Samitis were not to be tolerated, much less encouraged. Every branch association was not merely, to be affiliated to the central Samity, but was to be in complete subordination thereto, even in matters financial. The object of Pulin Behari Das was plainly to create an imperium in imperio with himself as the leader. This view receives considerable support from the other documentary evidence which we shall now proceed to examine. 106. The object of Pulin Behari Das was plainly to create an imperium in imperio with himself as the leader. This view receives considerable support from the other documentary evidence which we shall now proceed to examine. 106. The non-official documents may be classified under two heads : namely, first, those that were found at the premises of the Samity in Dacca; and, secondly, those that were found in the possession of individual accused persons when their residences were searched. Before I deal with these documents, I may observe that in order to make them admissible, one of three conditions will have to be satisfied, viz., first, a document may be proved to be in the handwriting of an accused person by comparison with an admitted or proved specimen of his handwriting, in the light of the testimony of expert witnesses, as explained in Barindra v. Emperor 14 C.W.N. 1114 : s.c. ILR 37 Cal. 467 at p. 504 (1910), and R. v. Haivey 11 Cox. C.C. 546 (1869); secondly, a document may be proved to be in the possession of an accused person, as in Queen v. Malhari ILR 6 Bom. 731 (1882), Emperor v. Hari 6 Bom. L.R. 887 (1904) and Jogjiban v. King-Emperor 13 C.W.N. 861, (892) (1909); or, thirdly, a document may be admissible as falling within the scope of sec. 10 of the Indian Evidence Act. Tested in the light of these principles, what is the result of the non-official documents? As regards the first class of documents, reliance was placed in the Court below upon books which formed the library of the Samity. The collection was of a miscellaneous character and consisted of over a thousand volumes. Many of the books were such as are usually read by boys and young men in schools and colleges; but there were some books characterised by the prosecution as objectionable books, indicative of the mental tendency and aspiration of the members of the Samity, I feel bound to record my opinion that a great deal of misapplied ingenuity was wasted on behalf of the Crown in a fruitless effort to condemn as objectionable, literary, historical and religious books to which no reasonable exception could be taken by any unbiased person. An effort was also made to invite the Court to form an opinion as to the true tendency of books from transitions of isolated passages. An effort was also made to invite the Court to form an opinion as to the true tendency of books from transitions of isolated passages. If a book, however, be tested in this fashion, it is obvious that an erroneous estimate may easily be formed of the true import and value of some of the noblest writings in any language. It is a truism that books must be judged as a whole. But apart from this, the mere circumstance that a book of an objectionable character is present in the library of an individual or of an association, does not necessarily justify the inference that the teachings of the book are approved and adopted by persons who have access to it. I shall not, therefore, repeat the unsatisfactory effort which was made in the Court below to Judge of the mental tendencies of the members of the Samity, by versions of isolated passages from books in the library. It is admitted however on behalf of the defence that there were two books in the library of a distinctly revolutionary character, namely, the Mukti Kon Pathe or "Which Way is Salvation," a collection of articles reprinted from the notorious seditious newspaper Jugantar, and, secondly, the Bartaman Rananity or "modern art of war," a treatise on arms and ammunitions intended obviously to be used by promoters of the revolutionist propaganda. But it is to be borne in mind that these books were at the time sold publicly, and till they were recently suppressed, were widely circulated throughout the country. The former had been published on the 15th January 1907, reprinted on the 23rd February 1908, and reviewed in the Calcutta Gazette on the 26th August 1908; the latter had been published on the 24th September 1907 and similarly reviewed on the 10th June 1908; they were not proclaimed till the 5th May 1910. The mere circumstance, therefore, that they were in the library of the Samity and were now and then read by some of the members--as a matter of fact they were taken out by members on much fewer occasions than many other books--would not conclusively show that the object of the society was revolutionary, Emperor v. Nani Gopal Gupta, 15 C.W.N. 593 at p. 618 (1911). Amongst other documents found in the Samity premises we have what may be described as a considerable quantity of seditious literature, essays and songs, many of them proved to be in the handwriting of one or other of the members. These indicate plainly violent hatred and animosity towards the British Government, and contain inspiriting calls to arms for the subversion by force of British rule and for the destruction of the "oppressor." Many of them contain appreciation in highflown language of anarchical outrages by notorious murderers. The presence of seditious literature of this description written by members of the Samity, is an important element, furnishing a clue to their tendencies and designs, R. v. Watson 2 Starkie 116, 147; 32 Howell St. Tr. 354; East on Pleas of the Crown 119 (1817), though we must distinguish between disaffection and conspiracy, that is, as Hartngton, J., puts it in Barindra v. Emperor 14 C.W.N. 1114 at p. 1214; s.c. ILR 37 Cal. 467 (1910) between those whose minds have been poisoned by pernicious literature and imbued with a hatred towards the British, and those who have gone a step further and have become parties to an agreement to destroy that Government. It is thus more important to consider what the members of the Samity wrote than what they read, and still more vital to find out what they did than what they read and wrote. And this brings me to the consideration of the overt acts imputed by the prosecution to the Samity and relied upon as concrete manifestations of the object of the society. 107. The overt acts upon which reliance is placed may be tabulated as follows in order of date :-- 1. Barrah docoity (2nd June 1908). 2. Satipara boat-theft case (14th August 1908). 3. Naria dacoity (30th October 1908). 4. Murder of Sukumar (13th November 1908). 5. Murder of Priya Mohan (2nd June 1909). 6. Rajendrapur train dacoity (11th October 1909). 7. The Agartala incident (24th November 1909). 8. Find of arms at Adabari (12th December 1909). 9. Find of arms at the shop of Mohim Modi (30th July 1910). 10. Find of bombs at Munshigunge (5th September 1910). 108. Murder of Sukumar (13th November 1908). 5. Murder of Priya Mohan (2nd June 1909). 6. Rajendrapur train dacoity (11th October 1909). 7. The Agartala incident (24th November 1909). 8. Find of arms at Adabari (12th December 1909). 9. Find of arms at the shop of Mohim Modi (30th July 1910). 10. Find of bombs at Munshigunge (5th September 1910). 108. Several other incidents were mentioned as overt acts, such as the Victoria Park Stabbing Case on the 5th August 1907, the Wari Affray Case on the 17th November 1907, the find of arms at Kalma in April 1909, the Dariapur dacoity on the 16th October 1909, and the Rajnagur dacoity in November 1909. No serious effort, however, was made to connect these acts with the alleged revolutionary object of the Samity, and they turned out to be either not connected with the society at all or connected only with individual members in their private capacity. I shall, therefore, confine my attention to an examination of the ten incidents I have mentioned. 109. [With regard to the two first-named incidents his Lordship held that the evidence did not establish their connection with the Dacca Anushilan Samity. With regard to the Naria dacoity his Lordship after a consideration of the evidence concluded as follows :] After an anxious consideration of the evidence on this part of the case, I must hold that the prosecution has established a prima facie case that the Samity or some of its members were connected with the dacoity, and that the defence have failed to rebut it. I may add that I do not feel impressed by the argument that as proceedings taken against some of the members of the Samity, such as Santipada and Ashutosh, for participation in the dacoity were dropped, and as the evidence is not sufficient to bring home, the offence against any individual member, a charge of conspiracy cannot be maintained. The cases relied upon in support of this proposition, Emperor v. Nani Gopal 15 C. W. N. 593 at 606 (1911), R. v. Rowlands 17 Q. B. 671 ; 5 Cox. C. C. 436, 497 ; 2 D. and H C. C. 364 (1851) and R. v. Boulton 12 Cox. The cases relied upon in support of this proposition, Emperor v. Nani Gopal 15 C. W. N. 593 at 606 (1911), R. v. Rowlands 17 Q. B. 671 ; 5 Cox. C. C. 436, 497 ; 2 D. and H C. C. 364 (1851) and R. v. Boulton 12 Cox. C. C. 87 (92) (1871), do not lay down any inflexible rule of law, and the case before us illustrates how convincing evidence may be available to show that a set of persons had conspired to commit a crime, though it may be impossible to identify any individual of that set as the person who carried out the object of the conspiracy and actually committed the crime. This only illustrates the truth of the elementary doctrine that the criminality of the conspiracy is distinct from and independent of the criminality of the overt acts, R. v. Button 3 Cox. C. C. 229 (1848), R. v. Thompson 16 Q. B. 832 (1851), R. v. Kohn 4 F. and F. 68 (1864), R. v. Whitechurch 24 Q. B. D. 420 (1890). 110. [As regards the murder of Sukumar, his Lordship was unable to hold on the evidence, that the Samity or any member thereof was connected with this murder. His Lordship then continued as follows :] These are all the incidents before the deportation of Pulin Behari Das which took place on the 14th December 1908. The society was declared illegal the next day, and suppressed. Pulin Behari Das continued to be a State prisoner till the 13th February 1910 when he was released. 111. But the case for the prosecution is that although the leader had been deported and the Samity suppressed, the combined activities of its members were silently and secretly continued. 112. [As regards the murder of Priya Mohon for which the accused Surendra Mohan Ghose had already been tried and acquitted, his Lordship observed as follows :--] It is now sought to be made out that the crime was committed by the Samity in furtherance of its aims and objects. Of this there is no evidence. In so far as the accused Surendra Mohan Ghose is concerned, it cannot be disputed that the judgment of not guilty fully establishes his innocence. R. v. Plummer [1902] 2 K.B. 339, Emperor v. Noni Gopal 15 C. W. N. 593 (1911). Of this there is no evidence. In so far as the accused Surendra Mohan Ghose is concerned, it cannot be disputed that the judgment of not guilty fully establishes his innocence. R. v. Plummer [1902] 2 K.B. 339, Emperor v. Noni Gopal 15 C. W. N. 593 (1911). In so far as the other accused are concerned, I am unable to hold that there is any evidence to connect them with the crime nor is there any evidence to connect the Samity as a body with the incident. 113. [His Lordship also found that the prosecution had failed to connect the Samity with the Rajendrapur train dacoity. With regard to the next incident, known as the Agariala incident, it appears that on the 24th November 1909 three youths dressed as sanyasis were noticed at Agartala where the Lieutenant-Governor was to proceed on the occasion of the installation of the Maharaja of Tipperah. The incident aroused suspicion, but nothing incriminating was found on the person or in the possession of the youths who were arrested ; and his Lordship held that the evidence did not justify the imputation of any sinister significance to this incident. With regard to the find of arms at Adabari on the 12th December 1909, his Lordship held that even if it were assumed that the arms were actually found on the spot mentioned, the evidence of identification was by no means conclusive. Continuing his Lordship said :] Besides, as Abani was prosecuted and acquitted, in so far as he is concerned, I must hold upon the authority of the decision in Emperor v. Noni Gopal Gupta 15 C. W. N. 593 (1911) that the incident cannot be used against him, and there was no evidence to connect the other accused of the Samity as a whole therewith. 114. [His Lordship accordingly held that the arms alleged to have been discovered at Adabari were not shown to have belonged to or to have been in the possession of the Samity or of any of its members. Regarding the next incident, viz., the find of arms at the shop of a grocer by name Mohim on the 30th July 1910, his Lordship said :] 115. Regarding the next incident, viz., the find of arms at the shop of a grocer by name Mohim on the 30th July 1910, his Lordship said :] 115. It will be observed that this incident took place after the commencement of the present prosecution, and it has been contended with reference to this find as also the next following one, that they were not admissible in evidence on the authority of the ruling in R. v. Hardy 24 Howell St. Tr. 718. This contention is, in my opinion, too broadly formulated and is really not supported by the case mentioned. When persons have been taken into custody and are in a condition which makes it impossible for them to act in aid or furtherance of the conspiracy, that is, when so far as they are concerned, the conspiracy has come to an end, it may be contended that acts of persons who were members of the conspiracy and who are still free to act in pursuance thereof, are not admissible as against them ; these acts, indeed, can no longer be deemed the acts of co-conspirators. The incident now before us is of a different description. No doubt, the discovery of the arms was made after the arrest of the accused. But the case for the prosecution is that the arms belonged to the Samity and were deposited in the place where they were found many months earlier when the activities of the Samity were in full operation. I am, therefore, of opinion that the evidence is admissible and must be scrutinised The view I take is supported by the case of R. v. Watson 2 Starkie 116 at p. 137 ; 32 Howell St. Tr. 354 ; East on Pleas of the Crown (1817), where reliance was unsuccessfully placed upon the dictum in R. v. Hardy 24 Howell St. Tr. 718. See also the illustration to sec. 10 of the Indian Evidence Act. The prosecution seek to connect the arms with the Samity, because along with them was found one of their official papers. It is clear, however, that the particular paper was not, as was supposed at one stage, a wrapper for the arms, but was used by the grocer for the purpose of recording his sale accounts. The prosecution seek to connect the arms with the Samity, because along with them was found one of their official papers. It is clear, however, that the particular paper was not, as was supposed at one stage, a wrapper for the arms, but was used by the grocer for the purpose of recording his sale accounts. The society had, as a matter of fact, been proclaimed illegal about 20 months earlier, and the premises which were near the shop of the grocer had been abandoned and cleared out. The explanation is suggested by the defence that when the Samity was dissolved after the deportation of its leader and the premises were vacated their papers might have been thrown into the street and could have been picked up by any passer by. This seems plausible. At any rate, there is no satisfactory evidence to connect the society with these arms and I must add that the oral testimony is by no means convincing. 116. The last incident which is sought to be connected with the Samity as an overt act is the find of bombs in the house of one Lalit Chandra Chowdhury at Munshigunge on the 5th September 1910 some weeks after the commencement of the present prosecution. Lalit Chandra was prosecuted before the Sessions Judge of Dacca and convicted. That conviction was affirmed by this Court [Lalit v. Emperor I. L. R. 39 Cal. 119 (1911)]. He is not on his trial for conspiracy and the prosecution have, therefore, to establish, in his absence, that he was a member of the alleged conspiracy. The only connecting link between the accused in the bomb case and the Samity, is a letter written by one L. Chowdhury to Pulin Behari Das on the 9th September 1908. This letter has not been proved to have been written by Lalit Chowdhury who was convicted in the bomb case. The letter shows on the face of it that the writer was not known to Pulin. There is nothing to show that the letter was received and acted upon. [R. v. Boulton 12 Cox. C. C. 95 (1871)]. Indeed there is nothing to show that Pulin ever sent a reply to the letter. The letter shows on the face of it that the writer was not known to Pulin. There is nothing to show that the letter was received and acted upon. [R. v. Boulton 12 Cox. C. C. 95 (1871)]. Indeed there is nothing to show that Pulin ever sent a reply to the letter. Under these circumstances, I find it impossible to hold that Lalit Chowdhury was at the time the bombs were in his possession, a member of the Dacca Anushilan Samity, or of any conspiracy of which the Appellants were members. 117. Upon a review, then, of the entire evidence as to each of the alleged overt acts, it is plain that the only one which has been prima facie connected with the Samity is the dacoity committed at Naria on the 30th October 1908. There may be suspicious circumstances in connection with some of the other incidents but none of them has been linked with the Samity by legal evidence upon which alone a Court can be invited to rest its conclusions. 118. I may add that I have not placed any reliance upon oral testimony as to the secret object of the Samity. Evidence of witnesses like Hemendra, Nagendra, and Upendra, who started as accomplices and ended as police spies do not favourably impress me. Assertions by witnesses of this type that they were informed by members of the Samity, that their ultimate object was the overthrow of the British Government, can hardly be tested by means of cross-examination, and cannot be accepted without independent corroboration in every important detail. It has been argued, however, by the learned Counsel for the Crown that the testimony of these witnesses does not require corroboration as they were spies, and reference has been made to the decision in Emperor v. Chaturbhuj Sahu 15 C.W.N. 171 (1910). I am not prepared to accept this contention as well-founded. There is a clear distinction between persons who enter a conspiracy for the sole purpose of detecting and betraying it, and others who concur fully in the criminal designs for a time and join in their accomplishment, till, from alarm or from some other cause, they turn upon their former associates and give information against them. These latter persons, as Maule, J., points out in R. v. Mullins 3 Cox C. C. 526 (1848), may be truly called accomplices. These latter persons, as Maule, J., points out in R. v. Mullins 3 Cox C. C. 526 (1848), may be truly called accomplices. There is not on the part of such persons an original purpose of discovering the secret designs of the conspirators and of disclosing them for the benefit of the public, which is the vital element in this class of cases, as mentioned by Lord Ellenborough, in R. v. Despard 28 Howell St. Tr. 429 (1803). The distinction appears to have been overlooked in Queen v. Shunker Ranchhoddas 428 (1888), which was based upon the comprehensive statement of the rule in Taylor on Evidence, sec. 971. The distinction is clearly brought forward by Wigmore in his work on Evidence, sec. 2060: "When the witness has made himself an agent for the prosecution before associating with the wrong-doers or before the actual perpetration of the offence, he is not an accomplice ; but he may be, if he extends no aid to the prosecution until after the offence is committed. A mere detective or decoy is not therefore an accomplice, nor an original confederate who betrays before the crime was committed : yet an accessory after the fact would be, if he had before betrayal rendered himself liable as such." This distinction is of fundamental importance in the case of conspiracies, because as Brett, J. A., observed in R. v. Aspinal 2 Q. B. D. 48 at 58 (1876), "the crime of conspiracy is completely committed, if it is committed at all, the moment two or more have agreed they will do, at once or at some future time, certain things ; it is not necessary in order to complete the offence that any one thing should be done beyond the agreement ; the conspirators may repent and stop, or may have no opportunity, or may be prevented, or may fail ; nevertheless, the crime is complete, it was completed when they agreed." Now, if the testimony of the witnesses in this case is believed, it is clear that they were members of the conspiracy; they were accomplices and continued to be confederates after the crime had been committed. The fact that, out of fear or repentance, they subsequently transformed themselves into spies and informers does not, in my view, render corroboration unnecessary, and the corroboration which is needed is of the same extent and character as in the case of accomplices. Apart from the documents I have mentioned, there is no such corroboration. But there is no reason why the documents themselves should not be treated as primary evidence indicative of the true object of the society and I have preferred to deal with them as such. 119. The question now arises, what legitimate inference may be drawn from the evidence we have examined as to the true character of the Samity. The organisation, as we have already stated, had for one of its objects,--possibly the object which was most prominently announced and intended to attract members from all classes of the Hindu community--the improvement, physical and moral, of the Bengali race. At the same time, the Samity had a jealously guarded secret, and every effort was made to preserve it inviolate. The members were bound by solemn oaths of secrecy and willingly subjected themselves to semi-military discipline. The Samity was to be the central institution to which societies with the same object and scope were to be affiliated in all parts of the country. The leader was entitled to complete and unquestioned supremacy and control, and every effort was to be made to prevent the growth of rival institutions even for the promotion of physical culture, the avowed object of the Samity. Many of the members of this association, so far as can be gathered from what they wrote, entertained feelings of the bitterest hostility towards the British Government, and in one instance, namely at Naria, a dacoity was committed by persons who must have been closely connected with the Samity. We have further a description of the daily life of the members resident at the premises of the Samity. There is no room for controversy that, in addition to gymnastics, drill and other forms of physical exercise, there was a systematic discussion of the objects of the society as set forth in the Paridarsak. All these plainly indicate to my mind that the Samity was a revolutionary society. There is no room for controversy that, in addition to gymnastics, drill and other forms of physical exercise, there was a systematic discussion of the objects of the society as set forth in the Paridarsak. All these plainly indicate to my mind that the Samity was a revolutionary society. I must add that I was not impressed with the effort made at the Bar on the side of the Appellants that the main features of the Samity were borrowed from the work on Anushilan or Culture by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee ; nor was I much impressed by the similar effort made on behalf of the Crown to show that the promoters of the society had imitated with profit the plan of work outlined in the Mukti Kon Pathe. As I have already stated, it is of little importance to trace the source from which inspiration was drawn ; the vital point is to determine, what the members of the Samity themselves wrote and how they acted ; judged from their methods of work and from the nature of their proved act, there is no room for doubt that their ultimate object was revolutionary. It must be remembered that direct proof can scarcely be afforded of a conspiracy. No doubt, if in a prosecution for conspiracy, the Crown is able to produce a witness, not a co-conspirator, who can testify directly to the fact of combination, the case is easy of proof. But as Earl, J., well says in R. v. Duffield 5 Cox. C. C. 404, 434 (1851), it does not happen once in a thousand times that anybody comes before the Jury to say "I was present at the time when these parties did conspire together and when they agreed to carry out their unlawful purpose." Hence, the Courts have consistently held that the prosecution is not obliged to prove that the persons accused actually met and laid their heads together and after a formal consultation came to an express agreement to do evil. On the contrary, if the facts as proved are such that the Jury as reasonable men can say there was a common design and the prisoners were acting in concert to do what is wrong, that is evidence from which the Jury may suppose that a conspiracy was actually formed. R. v. Brown 7 Cox. C. C. 442(1858). On the contrary, if the facts as proved are such that the Jury as reasonable men can say there was a common design and the prisoners were acting in concert to do what is wrong, that is evidence from which the Jury may suppose that a conspiracy was actually formed. R. v. Brown 7 Cox. C. C. 442(1858). It is from this point of view that the overt acts may properly be looked to as evidence of the existence of a concerted intention ; indeed, the conspiracy is usually closely bound up with the overt acts, because in many cases it is only by means of the overt acts that the existence of the conspiracy can be made out. But the criminality of the conspiracy is independent of the criminality of the overt acts, as is expressly laid down in the explanation to sec. 121A of the Indian Penal Code. Heymann v. R. L. R. 8 Q. B. 102 ; 12 Cox. C. C. 383 (1873), O'Connell v. R. 11 Cl. and F. 155; 1 Cox. C. C. 413 (1844), R. v. Duffield 5 Cox. C. C. 404, 434 (1851). In the case before us, although the prosecution has failed to connect with the Samity most of the overt acts imputed to the association, and although the direct oral evidence of a conspiracy is entirely untrustworthy as the uncorroborated testimony of co-conspirators, yet the conspiracy must be taken to have been established from the contents of the vows and the other official documents of the Samity as also from the method of work and activity of the members. 120. The question next requires consideration, what was the extent of the activities of the Samity. The prosecution has asserted and sought to prove that it had branches in numerous places which were all animated by the same revolutionary purpose. This attempt has in my opinion failed to a considerable extent. The mere fact that the members of an association have adopted the same system of lathi play as was organised by Pulin Behari Das obviously does not prove that the association was a branch of the Dacca Anushilan Samity. This attempt has in my opinion failed to a considerable extent. The mere fact that the members of an association have adopted the same system of lathi play as was organised by Pulin Behari Das obviously does not prove that the association was a branch of the Dacca Anushilan Samity. Lathi play, as is abundantly clear from the evidence, was in vogue in various parts of Bengal, and it became popular by reason of the feeling of panic which pervaded large sections of the Hindu, community in Eastern Bengal shortly after the Partition. In order to connect any Samity with the Dacca Institution, it has to be established that there was an agreement, which is the gist of conspiracy, between the members of the parent society and the alleged branch. Such inference may be justified by the surrounding circumstances, for instance, upon proof that the branch Samity rendered pecuniary help to the central association and accepted a position of absolute subordination thereto as contemplated by the rules. No such evidence has been adduced in the present case. [After reviewing the evidence adduced in this connection his Lordship found as follows :]-- 121. My conclusion, therefore, is that the Madhyapara Samity has not been proved to be a branch of the Dacca Anushilan Samity. The prosecution has failed to prove that, in the language of Lord Campbell in R. v. Brown 7 Cox. C. C. 442 at p. 445 (1858), the one Simity had with the other "a joint design, a joint combination" [see also R. v. Barry 4 F. and F. 389 at p. 399 (1865), Mulcahy v. R. L. R. 3 H. L. 306 at p. 316 1868), R. v. Banks 12 Cox C. C. 393 at p. 399 (1873)] I have arrived at a similar conclusion as regards the Brati Samity at Narayangauj. In fact, the letter from the "Captain" to the accused Aswini who was the secretary to the Brati Samity is consistent only with the view that the one Samity was not a branch of the other, but that the two had members in common. The same inference is irresistible in respect of the Serajganj Bandhab Samity, the Sonamayi Samity and the Habiganj Samity. The same inference is irresistible in respect of the Serajganj Bandhab Samity, the Sonamayi Samity and the Habiganj Samity. They were obviously independent Samitis, and although they might have imitated the plan of lathi play as developed by Pulin Behari Das, there is nothing to show that these were branches of the Dacca Samity and that the members thereof were associated with the conspiracy of which Pulin Behari Das was the leader and the moving spirit. It is not necessary, however, to examine in detail the activities of these Samitis, because we are concerned with them only in relation to individual accused persons whose cases will require separate examination. 122. I shall now proceed to consider the evidence against individual accused persons. But, in the examination of the evidence, it is useful to remember that, as laid down in R. v. Gill 2 B. and Ald. 204 (1818), combination is the gist of the offence of conspiracy ; nothing, however, turns up on the word "Conspiracy ;" R. v. Murphy 8 C. and P. 297 at p. 310 (1837); as Lord Campbell puts it in R. v. Hamp 6 Cox. C. C. 167 at p. 173 (1852) "Conspire is nothing, agreement is the thing." It is, of course, not necessary to establish by direct evidence that the accused persons did enter into such agreement. Barindra Kumar Ghose v. Emperor 14 C. W. N. 1114 : s.c. I. L. R. 37 Cal. 467 (1910). As Coleridge, J., said to the Jury in R. v. Murphy 8 C. and P. 297 at p. 310 (1837), "if you find that these two persons pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part of an act and the other another part of the same act, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the object which they were pursuing, you will be at liberty to draw the conclusion that they have been engaged in a conspiracy to effect the object." To the same purpose was the instruction of Erle, J., in R. v. Duffield 5 Cox. C. C. 404 at p. 434 (1851): "if you see several men taking several steps, all tending towards one obvious purpose, and you see them through a continued portion of time, taking steps that lead to an end, why, it is for you to say whether these persons had not combined together to bring about that end, which their conduct so obviously appears adapted to effectuate." To the same effect is the dictum of Gross, J., in R. v. Brissac 4 East 166 at p. 169 (1803): "conspiracy is a matter of inference deduced from certain criminal acts of the parties accused done in pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them and which hardly ever are confined to one place." It is from this point of view that letters passing between the accused may be offered to prove or disprove the conspiracy. R. v. Banks 12 Cox. C. C. 392 (1873) and R. v. Whitehead 1 C. and P. 67 (1824). In this connection, I must advert for a moment to the contention of the learned Counsel of the Appellants that before a document in the possession of any of the accused persons can be used in evidence against the others, it must be completely established by independent evidence that they were co-conspirators. This argument is too broadly formulated and is negatived by sec. 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides that where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it. It is clear, therefore, that for the admission of such evidence, what has to be established is that there is reasonable ground to believe in the existence of a conspiracy among such persons. See Queen Caroline's case 2 B. and B. 302 (1820), R. v. Jacobs 1 Cox. C. C 173 (1845), R. v. Duffield 5 Cox C. C. 404 (1851); Russell on Crimes, 7th Ed., Vol. I, p. 192. See Queen Caroline's case 2 B. and B. 302 (1820), R. v. Jacobs 1 Cox. C. C 173 (1845), R. v. Duffield 5 Cox C. C. 404 (1851); Russell on Crimes, 7th Ed., Vol. I, p. 192. The reason for this doctrine is plain. The criminality of the conspiracy lies in the concerted intention, and once reasonable grounds are made out for belief in the existence of the conspiracy amongst the accused, the acts of each conspirator in furtherance of its object are evidence against each of the others; and this, whether such acts were done before or after his entry into the combination, in his presence, or in his absence. Blunt's case 1 Howell St. Tr. 410 at p. 412 (1600). As Coleridge, J., well says in R. v. Murphy 8 C. and P. 297 at 3(sic)0 (1837), "it is not necessary that it should be proved that these Defendants met to concert the scheme, nor is it necessary that they should have originated it. If a conspiracy be already formed and a person joins it afterwards, he is equally guilty." As Sir Robert Wright puts it in his monograph on Criminal Conspiracies (p. 70), "there can be no doubt but that a person may involve himself in the guilt of a conspiracy by his mere assent to and encouragement of the, design, although nothing may have been assigned or intended to be executed by him personally. If he joins a conspiracy already formed, he cannot in general be affected by what has been already done, except in so far as this may, in conjunction with more specific proof, indicate the nature of the purpose in which he joined ; though a different rule may apply in treason, and perhaps in a conspiracy in pursuance of which a felony has been committed. If he quits a conspiracy, there is no reason to suppose that he is in general affected by any act done after he has severed himself from it, except in so far as that act may have been done in execution of the design as it stood when he was a party to it." Hence, as soon as it is shown with regard to an individual accused that he was in privity with the combination and its object and had adopted the acts already performed, he as a conspirator becomes bound by the antecedent and the consequent acts of his co-conspirators; R. v. Read 6 Cox C. C. 134 (1852), R. v. Stensoh 12 Cox. C. C. 111 (1871). To sum up, it cannot be maintained that by this principle conspirators are subjected to punishment for offences committed by their fellows ; since the crime lies in the concerted intention to be gathered from the acts done, such acts preceding the entry of a particular person into the combination are evidence to show the nature of the concert to which he becomes a party, and the subsequent acts of the other members indicate further the character of the common design in which all are presumed to be equally concerned. (Wright on Conspiracies, p. 71 ; O'keefe v. Walsh 2 I. R. 681 (1903). In the light of the principles explained, I shall now examine the evidence against each individual accused. 123. The Appellants fall into two well marked classes, in the first of which are comprised those who deny all connection with the Dacca Anushilan Samity, while in the second are Comprised those who admit Connection with the society, inclusive of those who, though in the society, deny that they had advanced far enough to be entrusted with its secrets. 124. Amongst members of the first class, the most prominent is the group of the seven accused connected with Madhyapara. Of these, four, namely, Sukhendrakumar Sen Gupta, Paresh Chandra Sen Gupta, Hem Chandra Sen Gupta and Sarada Charan Datta Gupta are not shown to have been directly connected with the Dacca Anushilan Samity. 124. Amongst members of the first class, the most prominent is the group of the seven accused connected with Madhyapara. Of these, four, namely, Sukhendrakumar Sen Gupta, Paresh Chandra Sen Gupta, Hem Chandra Sen Gupta and Sarada Charan Datta Gupta are not shown to have been directly connected with the Dacca Anushilan Samity. They were members of the Madhyapara Sabha and it is fairly patent from the proceedings of the association that their minds were deeply imbued with seditious ideas; but as they are in no way connected with the Dacca Anushilan Samity, and as the Sabha of which they were members has not been proved to be a branch, they cannot be convicted on the charge of the particular conspiracy brought against them. [Emperor v. Noni Gopal 15 C. W. N. 593 (1911)]. In my opinion, their convictions cannot be sustained. 125. [With regard to the other accused also his Lordship agreed with Harington, J. In dealing with the case of Nitai Chand Saha his Lordship observed :]-- 126. In his confession in the Arms Act case on the 31st July 1910, he stated that he was a member of the Samity. On the nth August 1910, he retracted the confession but adhered to his statement that he was a member of the Samity. I am not unmindful of the criticism based on the cases of Amir Khan v. King-Emperor 7 C. W. N. 457 (1902) and Emperor v. Tripura I. L. R. 37 Cal. 618 (1910), that a confession made after apparently needless remands and long police custody must be jealously scrutinised. Nor am I unmindful of the criticism based on the case of King-Emperor v. Annya 3 Bom. L. R. 438 (1901) that the evidential value of the statement of a co-accused before he has been sentenced is open to serious question. But in the present case the effect of the police custody, the length of which is not very satisfactorily explained, was, so far as the particular question now before me is concerned, only to confirm the initial confession. Under these circumstances, although on the authority of the case of Emperor v. Abani 15 C. W. N. 25 (1910) the retracted confession is valueless against the other accused, the statement of Nitai in his confession of the 31st July 1910 that he was a member of the Samity is good evidence against him. Under these circumstances, although on the authority of the case of Emperor v. Abani 15 C. W. N. 25 (1910) the retracted confession is valueless against the other accused, the statement of Nitai in his confession of the 31st July 1910 that he was a member of the Samity is good evidence against him. We take it, therefore, that he was a member of the Samity. But the question still remains, what was his status. There is nothing to show that he resided in the premises or acted as Paridarsak. If he had filled any position of trust or importance, one would have expected to meet with his name in the Police reports, and his name would have been included in the sanction first granted. He is further not shown to have taken any vows ; nor is he connected in any way with revolutionary literature. The fact of his conviction in the Arms Act Case is also clearly no evidence of participation in the conspiracy. Emperor v. Nani Gopal Gupta 15 C. W. N. 593 (1911). On the whole, therefore, although Netai upon his own statement was a member of the Samity, he is not proved to have been a member of the conspiracy and his conviction cannot be supported. 127. [His Lordship concluded his judgment as follows :]-- 128. My conclusion, therefore, is that the convictions and the sentences must be set aside in the case of the following 21 accused persons : Dinesh Chandra Guha, Manikya Chandra Guha, Sukhendra Kumar Sen Gupta, Paresh Chandra Sen Gupta, Abani Mohan Ganguli, Akshaya Kumar Datta, Jogesh Chandra Rauth, Surendra Mohon Ghose, Surendra Chandra Ray, Gopal Chandra Ghose, Suresh Chandra Sen Gupta, Hem Chandra Sen Gupta, Charu Chandra Sen, Aswini Kumar Ghose, Binod Behari Chakrabartti, Sarada Charan Dutta Gupta, Nishikanta Ray Bose Chowdhuri, Jadu nath Das, Nitai Chand Shaha Banikya, Radhika Mohan Banerjee and Sachindra Mohan Banerjee. 129. The convictions must be affirmed as regards the following 14 accused persons :-- Pulin Behari Das, Ashutosh Das Gupta, Jyotirmoy Ray, Bhupati Mohan Sen Gupta, Prafulla Chandra Sen Gupta, Nishi Bhusan Mittra, Guru Doyal Das, Nripendra Mohan Sen Gupta, Gopi Ballav Chakrabarti, Bankim Chandra Ray, Santipada Mukerjee, Radhika Bhusan Ray, Promode Behari Das and Kshirode Chandra Guha. 130. The question next arises as to the sentences appropriate for the accused whose convictions are affirmed. 130. The question next arises as to the sentences appropriate for the accused whose convictions are affirmed. Here the elements to be taken into consideration are not only the gravity of the offence but also the extent to which the conspiracy had been carried on, the nature of the only overt work associated with the society, the time that has elapsed since the society was suppressed and the length of the period during which the accused have been in custody. A distinction must also be made between the leaders of the movement, three of them men of mature years and of some education and experience, and the others, less important members of the conspiracy, most of them young men in the prime of life misguided into dangerous tracks by their elders who might be expected to have known better. In view of all these circumstances, I hold that the justice of the case would be met by the following sentences. 131. [The sentences were the same as passed by Harington, J.] Caspersz, J. 132. The reasons upon which I would base my judgment in this appeal are substantially those which have been given in the judgments just delivered. My conclusions are that the points of law raised on behalf of the Appellants must be overruled ; that the Dacca Anushilan Samity was a revolutionary society; that, of the overt acts imputed to the Samity, the Naria dacoity is the only case indisputably proved to have been the work of that society, four others (the Munshigunge and Adabari cases and the murders of Sukumar and Priya Mohan) being cases of suspicion only: and that fourteen of the Appellants, and no more, must be convicted on the evidence on the record. The cases of two of the Appellants, Charu Chandra Sen and Surendra Chandra Ray, are very near the line, but I am not prepared to differ as to their acquittal. Having regard to the findings arrived at in this Court, I, also, accept the modifications of the sentences passed upon the Appellants whose convictions are now affirmed. I, therefore, agree in the orders proposed by my learned colleagues.