JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for accounts. The Defendant admittedly managed the property during the Plaintiff's minority. The property belonged to the Plaintiff's father, Panchanon, and his brother, Bhanu. The latter died before Panchanon and his mother, Matangini, inherited his property. Panchanon died in 1298 and Matangini in 1313. The suit has been decreed and the Defendant appeals. The first point taken is that the Court below should have come to a finding on the point whether accounts had been rendered and accepted. In the view we take of the case this plea could only have reference to the property of Matangini. But the question whether, as between Matangini and the Defendant, there was in respect of any year an account stated and settled which should not now be disturbed, is a question which may now be dealt with when the accounts are taken and a remand is not necessary. The findings of the Subordinate Judge, which have not been displaced by the District Judge, indicate that no practical advantage would be gained by a remand. 2. Secondly, it is urged that the learned District Judge should have admitted evidence of a mukhtearnama said to have been executed in 1300 by Plaintiff's mother, to show that the Defendant was the agent of the Plaintiff's mother, and not of the Plaintiff. It is said that it was not put in the first Court because the Defendant did not think it would be denied. But no explanation is given why it was not filed with the appeal. Then the Plaintiff would have been prepared to meet it. A subsequent mukhtearnama of 1307 is believed by the District Judge to have been executed by Khiroda Sundari in ignorance, under the influence of the Defendant. The production of this earlier mukhtearnama therefore at the last moment, when the appeal was being heard, looks very like an attempt to take the Plaintiff by surprise and we think that the learned District Judge rightly refused to admit it. 3. Finally, it is argued that the Defendant is not bound to account to the present Plaintiff for his management of Matangini's property, because the profit of the property must be regarded as stridhan. But this contention also cannot be sustained. It is not raised by anybody who would be the heir of Matangini's stridhan. 3. Finally, it is argued that the Defendant is not bound to account to the present Plaintiff for his management of Matangini's property, because the profit of the property must be regarded as stridhan. But this contention also cannot be sustained. It is not raised by anybody who would be the heir of Matangini's stridhan. It was decided in the case of Isri Dut v. Hansbutti I. L. R. 10 Cal. 324 (1883) that a widow's savings are not her stridhan. If she has made no attempt to dispose of them in her lifetime, there is no dispute but that they follow the estate from which they arose. But it is argued that this rule does not apply to profits which have not reached the widow's hands at all, but that in such a case it must be held that she cannot have formed any intention to unite them to the original estate and they must therefore be regarded as stridhan. We cannot accept this contention. It would be unreasonable that a widow should be presumed to unite her money to the parent estate when she takes no action with regard to such money while in enjoyment of it, and that she would be presumed to intend to sever it from the parent estate when she takes no action while waiting for it. Reliance is placed on the case of Soorjeemoney v. Denobundoo 9 Moo. I. A. 123 (1862) and Revett Carnac v. Jusbai I. L. R. 10 Bom. 428 (1886). But their Lordships of the Privy Council have, as was pointed out in Paddo Monee v. Dwarka Nath 25 W.R. 335 (1876), shown some disposition to recede from the former ruling, in which the point now in question seems not to have been fully argued before them, and in any case the facts of the case were altogether different from those of the present suit. As to the Bombay case, that referred to a comparatively small sum of money which the learned Judges did not regard as savings at all, considering that there were outstanding debts to be paid. Moreover, we are not satisfied that in this case Matangini can properly be said to have been kept out of possession of this money. Her agent's possession was her possession. Moreover, we are not satisfied that in this case Matangini can properly be said to have been kept out of possession of this money. Her agent's possession was her possession. Presumably Matangini obtained enough to live on from him, and we do not see why there should be any difference in character between the money which she received and that which still remained in his hands. Her intentions presumably were the same with regard to both. We think, therefore, that the decisions of the learned District Judge is right and dismiss the appeal with costs.