JUDGMENT 1. We are invited in this Rule to set aside an order made under r. 60 of Or. XXI of the Code of 1908. The circumstances under which the order in question has been made are not in controversy. On the 21st July 1910, the Petitioner before us applied for execution of a decree for money which she had obtained on the 19th March 1910. The properties of the judgment-debtor were duly attached on the 1st August 1910. The proclamation subsequently issued was returned unserved, and the Court directed the decree-holder to take necessary steps within five days from the 22nd November. No steps were taken, and on the 30th November the Court dismissed the application for execution for default. On the 12th December 1910, the judgment-debtor transferred the properties which had been previously attached by the decree-holder to one Madhabandaram. On the 23rd January 1911, the decree-holder obtained a review of the order of the 30th November 1910, and the execution proceeding was revived. The decree-holder took steps to have the sale proclaimed for the 20th March 1911 The assignee thereupon preferred a claim under r. 51 of Or. XXV of the Code. He contended that there was no valid attachment in force when he took the assignment, and that the subsequent revival of the execution proceeding could not in law operate as a revival of the attachment to the prejudice of his rights. The Court found on the evidence that the claimant was a bond fide purchaser for value without notice, and that the contract with him for the sale of the property had been made on the 8th June 1910, long before the decree-holder applied for execution of his decree. In this view the Subordinate Judge allowed the claim under r. 60 of Or. XXI. We are now invited to discharge this order as made without jurisdiction, because it is contended that the properties were under attachment on the date of the assignment. The question raised is one of some novelty and not altogether free from difficulty mainly because the framers of the Code have omitted to provide for the contingency which has happened. R. 57 of Or. The question raised is one of some novelty and not altogether free from difficulty mainly because the framers of the Code have omitted to provide for the contingency which has happened. R. 57 of Or. XXI of the Code of 1908-- we quote only so much of the rule as is applicable to this case--provides that where any property has been attached in execution of a decree, but by reason of the decree-holder's default the Court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall dismiss the application ; upon the dismissal of such application the attachment shall cease. In the case before us the Court held on the 30th November 1910 that there had been default on the part of the decree-holder and dismissed the application under r. 57. There upon the attachment ceased in terms of the Rule. Consequently when the assignment was made in favour of the claimant on the 12th December 1910, there was no subsisting attachment in force; but it is contended on behalf of the decree-holder that when the order of dismissal for default was set aside on review on the 23rd January 1911, the parties were restored to the position they occupied before the execution proceeding was dismissed ; in other words, the contention is that the effect of the revival of the execution proceeding was to revive the attachment automatically. It may be assumed that this would be the result in so far as the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor were concerned. But the question still remains whether the revival of the execution proceeding operates as a revival of the attachment so as to prejudice the right of strangers who have in the interval acquired, as here, a title to the property. In our opinion the question ought to be answered in the negative. At the time when the assignment was made there was no attachment in force. The assignee consequently acquired a good title in no way subject to the claim of the decree-holder. It is difficult to appreciate upon what principle his position may be deemed to be affected by a subsequent reversal of the order by a superior Court or by a cancellation thereof on review by the Court that had made it. The assignee consequently acquired a good title in no way subject to the claim of the decree-holder. It is difficult to appreciate upon what principle his position may be deemed to be affected by a subsequent reversal of the order by a superior Court or by a cancellation thereof on review by the Court that had made it. The principle recognised by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Zainul-abdin v. Mahomed Ashgar L. R. 15 I. A. 12 (1887) militates against this view. Numerous other instances will be found collected in the judgment of this Court in Janukdhari Lal v. Gossain Lal Bhaiya I. L. R. 37 Cal, 107 : s. c. 11 C. L. J. 254 ; 13 C. W. N. 710 (1909), in which the reversal of a judicial order has been taken to leave unaffected the rights of bona fide purchasers who have acquired title on the assumption that such orders were valid in law. Although in the case before us the assignment was by act of parties the same doctrine may well be applied. Here the Court had made an order for the dissolution of attachment : that order was in force at the date of the assignment to the claimant and was cancelled only after his title had been perfected. Reference may be made in this connection to the cases of Chetiattil v. Kumhi I. L. R. 29 Mad. 175 (1905) and Sasirama Kumari v. Meherban Khan 18 C. L. J. 243 (1911). In the former of these cases an attachment was issued after an ex parte decree had been set aside on the basis of an application made apparently when the decree was in force. The decree was subsequently restored after trial on the merits. It was ruled that this could not validate the attachment so as to prejudice an assignee of the attached property. In the second case an attachment had been effected before judgment and it was dissolved upon dismissal of the suit by the original Court. Upon appeal the dismissal was set aside and a decree made in favour of the Plaintiff. It was ruled that the reversal of the decree of the primary Court did not operate to revive the attachment to the prejudice of an assignee who had acquired a good title during the pendency of the appeal when no attachment was in operation. Upon appeal the dismissal was set aside and a decree made in favour of the Plaintiff. It was ruled that the reversal of the decree of the primary Court did not operate to revive the attachment to the prejudice of an assignee who had acquired a good title during the pendency of the appeal when no attachment was in operation. The true object of an attachment is to place the property in the custody of the Court so as to make it available for the realization of the fruits of the decree. If by reason of the dismissal of the suit or of the default of the decree-holder the Court dissolves the attachment, the property ceases to be in the custody of the Court. Upon reversal of the decree, or upon cancellation of the order of dismissal for default, the decree-holder may no doubt ask the Court to take the property back into its custody : but in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, we cannot hold that the Court can do so with retrospective effect so as to prejudice a title that may have been acquired in the interval when the property was admittedly not in the custody of the Court. As is pointed out in the case of Sasirama Kumari v. Meherban Khan 13 C. L. J. 243 at p. 249 (1911), the question has been much debated in the Courts of the United States, and though there has been some divergence of judicial opinion the preponderance of decisions is against the revival of attachments with retrospective operation to the detriment of titles acquired in the interval. (Drake on Attachment, Ch. XVI). In some States the difficulty of the situation has been met by legislation, and conditions have been prescribed upon fulfillment of which an attachment, notwithstanding dismissal of the suit, may remain in suspense, and its uninterrupted operation restored upon reversal of the judgment. But in this country, as we have already stated, there is no legislative provision on the subject, and the plain meaning of r. 57 of Or. XXI is that upon dismissal of the application for execution by reason of default of the decree-holder the attachment ceases. We cannot hold that the attachment remains in suspense pending the result of the possible appeal or application for review. XXI is that upon dismissal of the application for execution by reason of default of the decree-holder the attachment ceases. We cannot hold that the attachment remains in suspense pending the result of the possible appeal or application for review. It has been suggested that this view may result in hardship to the decree-holder in cases where an erroneous order of dismissal for default has been made by the Court, but that is obviously a matter for the Legislature to consider. We may add that if the view we take may result in hardship to the decree-holder in some instances, the contrary view put forward by the learned Vakil for the Petitioner may equally lead to injustice to an assignee for value who has in the interval acquired title on the faith that the order of the Court has been properly made. We are, therefore, of opinion that there was no attachment in force when the claimant in this case took an assignment of the property which has been properly released under r. 60. 2. We may add that it was argued that if there was no attachment in force, a claim or an objection could not be preferred under r. 58. This position is no doubt technically correct, Sasirama v. Meherban 13 C. L. J. 243 (1911), but there is no substance in it. As there is no attachment in force the decree-holder ought strictly to be called upon to attach the property. As soon as he proceeds to do so, the claimant will be at liberty to apply under r. 58, and then the Court will be called upon to determine whether the assignment was real, that is whether the assignee was in possession on his own behalf or that of the judgment-debtor. This matter has already been investigated and found against the decree-holder. It would be an idle formality to call upon the parties and the Court to repeat the steps already taken. The result, therefore, is that this Rule is discharged with cost. We assess the hearing-fee at one gold mohur.