JUDGMENT Woodroffe, J. - This is a suit for an order directing the registration of a document. The Munsif held, for the reasons stated in his judgment, that the suit was not maintainable, and that, if it was maintainable, it was barred by limitation, in that the suit was not brought within 30 days from the date of the dismissal of the Plaintiff's appeal by the Registrar. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge, on appeal, disagreed with the Munsif, in holding that the suit was maintainable, but held that the suit was barred, in that sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, which contains a proviso in the case where the Court is closed when (as here) the period of limitation expires, had no application to suits under the Registration Act. It is, no doubt, the general rule that a general enactment is not ordinarily presumed to be intended to interfere with a special Act ; and sec. 6 of the Limitation Act provides that "when, by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India, a period of limitation is specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed." We are not here concerned with the wider question, whether sec. 6 is limited in its operation only to prevent the time within which a suit should be brought from being affected and whether it excludes the application of other provisions of the Limitation Act, such as those relating to the computation of the period of limitation. Nor are we concerned with other Acts of the Legislature, nor with other sections of the Limitation Act. The actual question before us (which is the only one which calls for decision) is whether sec. 6 of the Limitation Act excludes the application of sec. 5 of the same Act to suits brought under sec. 77 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). It has been held to be the general rule that where the parties are prevented from doing a thing in Court on a particular day, not by any act of their own, but by the act of the Court itself, they are entitled to do it at the first subsequent opportunity. See Peary Mohun v. Anunda Churn I. L. R. 18 Cal. 631 (1891). And parties will not be called upon to do that which is impossible. See Peary Mohun v. Anunda Churn I. L. R. 18 Cal. 631 (1891). And parties will not be called upon to do that which is impossible. The Legislature under the Registration Act has given a period of 30 days in which to bring a suit; and it is not reasonable to suppose that that period is to be cut down to 29 days. There is, moreover, direct authority of this Court in favour of the Appellant's contention, to be found in the case of Nijabutoolla v. Wazir Ali I. L. R. 8 Cal 910 (1882), where it was held that the provisions of sec. 5 of the Limitation Act apply to suits under sec. 77 of the Registration Act. It was there held that sec. 5 had a general application to all suits, notwithstanding anything contained in sec. 6. This decision is not affected by the other decisions to which we have been referred relating to other Acts or other sections of the Limitation Act: for as pointed out in the case of Girija Nath v. Patani Bibee I. L. R. 17 Cal. 266 (1889), sec. 6 is not in conflict with sec. 5. There the High Court pointed out that so far as sec. 5 is concerned, the decisions then cited before it did not conflict with sec. 6, because those decisions did not extend the period of limitation. All that they did was to prevent the period of limitation from being curtailed by the closing of the Court ; and the days on which the Court was closed must be considered as nonexistent (dies non) and therefore they are not counted when the dies non happen to be days on which the period of limitation expires. There is no decision in this Court which holds that sec. 5 is not applicable to suits under the Registration Act ; and we must therefore hold that the suit is not barred by limitation. 3. It was then argued that, even if that were so, the question is not to be regarded as one relating to a rule of limitation, but as one affecting the right itself, and that as the right to bring a suit is a statutory right, which depends on the terms of sec. 3. It was then argued that, even if that were so, the question is not to be regarded as one relating to a rule of limitation, but as one affecting the right itself, and that as the right to bring a suit is a statutory right, which depends on the terms of sec. 77 of the Registration Act, no right, in fact, accrues upon which a suit may be instituted, if in fact more than 30 days have expired, as stated in sec. 77. The first answer to this is, I think, the decision to which I have referred in Nijabutoolla v. Wazir Ali I. L. R. 8 Cal 910 (1882), where the matter was dealt with as a question of limitation. But, apart from this, I think that on a consideration of sec. 77 itself such contention fails. The object of the Legislature was that a person should have 30 days. Thirty days were given him for the purpose of doing something ; and that something was the institution of the suit. But the intention was that he should be in a position to institute the suit on any one of these 30 days, there being nothing to oblige him to bring the suit at any time before the actual expiration of the period of 30 days. The objection on this ground therefore fails. 4. An argument has then been addressed to us upon the question of the maintainability of the suit. The learned pleader on behalf of the Respondent has sought to support the judgment on the ground which has been decided against him in the lower Appellate Court. It is true that that Court has held that the suit was maintainable ; but in holding this it appears to have proceeded on the ground that the 30 days after the making of the order are to be 30 days from the date of the communication of the order, and that therefore the Plaintiff had a right to sue under sec. 77 of the Registration Act. The authority relied upon is that in the case of Abdul Ali v. Mirja Khan I. L. R. 28 Bom. 8 (1903). It is not necessary to go into the question of law upon this point. 77 of the Registration Act. The authority relied upon is that in the case of Abdul Ali v. Mirja Khan I. L. R. 28 Bom. 8 (1903). It is not necessary to go into the question of law upon this point. But, assuming that the law is correctly stated in the judgment under appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge has assumed, without any evidence, that the suit was brought within 30 days of the communication of the order, and that the order was not known to the Plaintiff on the date upon which it was made. Now, there is no evidence at all upon this point, as no evidence was, having regard to the findings of the lower Court, taken at all. In fact, it has been urged by the Respondent, that that question was not one which properly arose in the suit, having regard to the pleadings : for, as the Munsif points out in his judgment, want of knowledge of the order of dismissal had not been pleaded, which alone, in his opinion, could save limitation on the authority of the ruling in Abdul Ali v. Mirja Khan I. L. R. 28 Bom. 8 (1903). Although the Appellant has relied on the statements made in para. 4 of the plaint, it is very doubtful whether such a contention can be taken to be implied or can be extracted from any statement therein appearing. The point, however, appears to have been taken before the Munsif, and it was one of the grounds of appeal to the Subordinate Judge. And, as the question is a technical one, and, at the most, the Plaintiff was one day out of time, I think that we should in this case give the Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt we have upon this matter, and enable him to give evidence upon this point, so that if he establishes it, the merits of the case may be enquired into. 5. There is one point which, in this connection, should be cleared up. In para. 4 of the plaint the Plaintiff says that he started for Katwa on the 15th, which was the last day of the period of limitation, but that when he reached the Sub-Registrar's office at that place, he found that the Sub-Registrar had left his office after finishing the registration work of the day. In para. 4 of the plaint the Plaintiff says that he started for Katwa on the 15th, which was the last day of the period of limitation, but that when he reached the Sub-Registrar's office at that place, he found that the Sub-Registrar had left his office after finishing the registration work of the day. He does not state (and he should state) at what hour he reached the Registry office. An enquiry must be made as to what the office hours of the Sub-Registrar are. 6. On these grounds I would set aside the decree under appeal and would remand the case to the lower Appellate Court in order that the question as to when the order of the Sub-Registrar was communicated to the Plaintiff may be determined, and when, therefore, the last day of the period of 30 days expired. If it is found that the Plaintiff presented himself at the Registry office, or presented the document within the prescribed 30 days, having regard to the decision in Abdul Ali v. Mirja Khan I. L. R. 28 Bom. 8 (1903) and to the provisions of sec. 26 of the Registration Act, the Court will proceed to decide the suit on the merits. If the period of 30 days has been exceeded, then the suit is to be dismissed. The costs of this appeal will abide the result. Teunon, J. I agree.