JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against an order by which the Court below has granted a succession certificate to the Respondent in respect of a portion of a debt alleged to be due to her from the Appellant as the debtor of his deceased wife. The Appellant, Mohamed Abdul Hossain, was married to a Mahomedan lady by name Barfan, the daughter of the Respondent, Sarifan. The amount of the dower is said to have been fixed at Rs. 41,000, and the whole of it was deferred. The lady died on the 24th January 1907, and thereupon the dower debt became recoverable by her heirs, i.e., her husband, her infant son, and her mother. The husband, it will be observed, was thus a creditor as well as a debtor. In 1909 the Respondent commenced an action against her son-in-law for recovery of Rs. 1,000. She alleged that her son-in-law was possessed of property worth not more than Rs 1,000, and that, although she was entitled to recover from him one-sixth of the dower debt, i.e. Rs. 6,833-5-4, it would be infructuous to sue him for this large amount. She, therefore, abandoned her claim in excess of Rs. 1,000, and limited the demand to the amount. On the 21st December 1909, she applied for a succession certificate to the extent of Rs. 1,000 only. The son-in-law who appeared to show cause objected to the grant of the certificate on two grounds, namely, first, that no certificate could be granted in respect of the share of the debt due to one of the heirs only and, secondly, that no certificate could be granted to the Petitioner, because she had not asked for a certificate even in respect of the entire share of the dower debt recoverable by her. The District Judge has overruled both these objections, and granted a certificate to the Petitioner as prayed. In the present appeal by the objector, the order of the District Judge has been assailed on the two grounds just mentioned, and reliance has been placed upon the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ghafur Khan v. Kalandari Begam I. L. R. 33 All. In the present appeal by the objector, the order of the District Judge has been assailed on the two grounds just mentioned, and reliance has been placed upon the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ghafur Khan v. Kalandari Begam I. L. R. 33 All. 327 (1910), in which it appears to have been ruled that no certificate could be granted to one of the heirs of a Mahomedan lady who had died leaving her dower debt unrealized for collection merely of a part of the dower debt of the deceased. The decision quoted appears at first sight to support the contention of the Appellant, but it is not stated whether the dower in that case was prompt or deferred ; at any rate, there are observations as to the true construction of sec. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act which do tend to assist the Appellant. It has been argued, however, by the learned Vakil for the Respondent that the decision is open to criticism and ought not to be treated as a correct exposition of the law. Sec. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889--we need quote only so much of it as is applicable to the case before us--provides that no Court shall pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, except on the production by the person so claiming of a certificate granted under the Act and having the debt specified therein. It has been contended on behalf of the Appellant that the section implies that one certificate is to be taken out for the payment of the whole debt due by the debtor of the deceased person, that if the deceased person; has left more than one heir, it is not competent for one of the them to apply for a certificate in respect of the share recoverable by him, and that much less can one heir apply for a certificate for a part of his share of the debt. In our opinion, this proposition is too broadly formulated, and if we were to give effect to it the scope of the section would be needlessly restricted. In our opinion, this proposition is too broadly formulated, and if we were to give effect to it the scope of the section would be needlessly restricted. It is to be observed that this section does not define the constitution of the suit for the recovery of the debt due from the debtor of the deceased person ; we are not now concerned with the question whether one of several heirs of the deceased creditor is competent to sue for his share of the debt alone or whether he is bound to sue for recovery of the entire debt payable to himself and his fellow heirs joining the latter as Defendants if they are not willing to join as co-Plaintiffs. Whatever the proper constitution of a suit of this description may be, a question which can hardly be answered independently of the nature of the debt, it is clear that the suit need not include a claim for the whole sum due to the deceased at the time of his death, for instance, a portion of the debt may have been amicably paid to the heirs jointly, or amounts paid to different heirs in proportion to their known shares in the inheritance ; in such a case it would be unmeaning to hold that the claim must include the whole of the amount due to the deceased creditor. To take another illustration, there is no reason why the heirs should not relinquish, if they so choose, a portion of the claim. If, therefore, a suit for the recovery of the debt need not include the whole of the sum due to the deceased at the time of his death, the question may very well be asked, on what principle can the view be maintained that the application for a certificate must include the whole of the amount due. A certificate is needed to afford protection to the party who pays the debt to the representatives of the deceased person ; but to facilitate the collection of debts on succession in this manner does not require that the certificate should cover the whole of the debt if the heirs do not seek to realise the whole. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept the construction placed upon sec. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept the construction placed upon sec. 4 of the Act by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in Ghafur Khan v. Kalandari Begam I. L. R. 33 All. 327 (1910). It cannot be disputed that the construction adopted may lead to complications and hardship which could never have been intended by the Legislature. To take one illustration, cases may arise where, as here, one of the creditors stands in such a relation to the debtor (son and father) that he may not be willing to sue at all to enforce his right. On what principle can the other creditor be compelled to take out a certificate for the entire debt ? He has admittedly no right to the whole of the debt, and he cannot, under sec. 6 (1) (d), state the right in which he claims the portion in excess of his share. Again he may be quite prepared to furnish security for his own share under sec. 9, but he may not be able, certainly not willing, to furnish security for the sum in excess of his own share which he is by no means anxious to recover by suit. Then, again, one of the creditors as here may be an infant, and he may have a much longer period allowed to him by law for the enforcement of his rights, than to the adult creditor. Why should the latter be compelled to take out a succession certificate in respect of the share of the debt claimable by the infant ? If he institutes a suit for this purpose, he may very well be met by the objection that the infant has a legal guardian who is competent to safeguard his rights. It would, therefore, be only reasonable to hold that a person in this situation is entitled to apply for a certificate for the amount which he seeks to recover. In fact, the argument which underlies the contrary view overlooks the fact that in proceedings for grant of the certificate we are not concerned with the frame of the suit in which the claim is to be asserted. We are concerned only with the representative character of the claimant, and by a summary investigation the Court has to determine whether that character has been established. We are concerned only with the representative character of the claimant, and by a summary investigation the Court has to determine whether that character has been established. The grant of the certificate does not constitute proof of the debt, nor does it determine the frame of the suit in which the claim has to be enforced. The certificate only renders unnecessary the trial of the question in the regular suit, whether the claimant is entitled to maintain it as the representative of the deceased. In view of these principles, there can be no room for controversy as to the validity of the order of the District Judge. 2. In the present case, upon the death of the lady, the dower debt due from the husband became payable to her heirs. The nature of the right of the heirs was explained by this Court in the case of Mahomed Ishaq v. Akramul Huq 6 C. L. J. 558 : s c 12 C. W. N. 84 (1907). It was there pointed out by Brett, J., that in the case of deferred dower, a right accruing to a single person from a covenant in her favour does not devolve on her death on two or more of her heirs in several shares ; it is not a case in which the cause of action which resided in one person, is by operation of law transferred to a number of parceners who constitute one heir. As the right to the deferred dower becomes enforceable on the death of the wife, the agreement must be taken to be one between the husband and the wife under which the former undertakes to pay over to the heirs of the latter the money which becomes due after her death. The inference is therefore irresistible that each of the heirs is entitled to sue in respect of his share of the dower debt; in reality, each has a distinct right enforceable by himself though all may jointly sue, because each obtains a share of the whole debt. This view is consistent with what has been recognised as the settled rule almost since the establishment of the British Courts in this country ; see, for instance, Ali Buksh v. Kaieem Beebee 1 Mac. S. D. Sel. Rep. This view is consistent with what has been recognised as the settled rule almost since the establishment of the British Courts in this country ; see, for instance, Ali Buksh v. Kaieem Beebee 1 Mac. S. D. Sel. Rep. 110 (1804) decided by the Bengal Sudder Court so far back as 1804, where, upon the death of a Mahomedan woman, one of her heirs was allowed to maintain an action for the recovery of her share only of the dower debt. In the case before us, the Petitioner has instituted such a suit ; she has further relinquished a considerable portion of her claim because she asserts that as the objector has properties worth only Rs. 1,000 it would be fruitless to obtain a decree against him for a larger sum. Is would, in our opinion, be as unreasonable to hold that she is bound to take out a succession certificate for the whole sum as to hold that she was bound to sue for recovery of the entire amount. It has been suggested, however, by the objector that if a decree is obtained in a suit so framed, the infant son who is entitled to a share of the dower debt may be prejudiced. But as already explained, we are not concerned at this stage with the suit for the recovery of the money. The guardian of the infant may, if he so chooses, apply for a succession certificate in respect of his share of the dower debt, and institute a suit on his behalf. But because he omits to do so for obvious reasons, the Petitioner cannot be deprived of her right to recover the money, neither can she be compelled to enforce not merely her own rights but also those of the infant. We may further point out that a certificate cannot in this case be granted for the whole of the dower debt. It is not disputed that the husband united in himself the character of debtor and creditor in respect of his share, therefore, the debt must be deemed to have been extinguished. To put the matter briefly, even if the dower debt was treated as a joint debt there has been a severance, and there is no good reason why in this contingency the interest of the different creditors may not be deemed to have been severed. To put the matter briefly, even if the dower debt was treated as a joint debt there has been a severance, and there is no good reason why in this contingency the interest of the different creditors may not be deemed to have been severed. The view we take is supported by the judgment of Chamier, J., in Akbar Khan v. Bilkisara Begum All. W. N. for 1901 p. 125, and of Aikman, J., in In re Indarman I. L. R. 18 All. 45 (1895), though that view is possibly inconsistent with the decision in Muhammad Ali Khan v. Puttan Bibi I. L. R. 19 All 129 (1886). We may add that it has not been disputed before us that a succession certificate is necessary in a case of this description, as laid down in Abdul Karim Khan v. Muqbul-un-nissa I. L. R. 20 All. 315 (1908), which dissented from the case of Nemdhari Roy v. Bissesari Kumari 2 C. W. N. 594 (1898) subsequently overruled by a Full Bench in Bancharam Mazumdar v. Adyanath Bhattacharjee I. L. R. 36 Cal. 936 : s.c. 13 C. W. N. 966 (1909). The result, therefore, is that the order of the District Judge is affirmed, and this appeal dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing-fee at one gold mohur.