Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (February 2, 1907) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Ghazipar (September 24, 1904). The three first appellants, as managing members of a joint Hindu family and of a joint family business named " Manorath Bhagat Dhana 11 am," sued on June 3, 1904, to recover from the respondents the balance with interest of an account stated on August 9, 1901. The three respondents pleaded that at the time of the debt alleged by the plaintiffs the family was joint, but all the members of the family of the plaintiffs had not joined in the suit; that it was necessary to join them, especially when a dispute was going on among the members of the family; and that the suit should be dismissed for non-joinder of necessary parties. Thereafter the plaintiffs applied to the Court on August 22, 1904, to have the other members of the family added as parties, and by an order dated September 8, 1904, the persons numbered 4 to 12 in the amended plaint were brought on the record as plaintiffs, and two members of the family were added as defendants. On September 21, 1904, the said three respondents pleaded that the whole claim of the plaintiffs was barred by time, because some of the plaintiffs were made parties to the suit after the expiry of the period of limitation. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit, holding that the original plaintiffs were the managing members of the joint family, and, as such, were entitled to institute the suit in their own names alone, on behalf of themselves and the other members of the family. In this view it was not necessary, in his opinion, that all the members of the family should be made parties to the suit, or that it should be brought on behalf of all of them. The parties added as plaintiffs by the order of September 8, 1904, made on the application dated August 22, 1904, were, in fact, unnecessary parties to whom the provisions of the Limitation Act (s. 22, Act XV. of 1877) did not apply. The parties added as plaintiffs by the order of September 8, 1904, made on the application dated August 22, 1904, were, in fact, unnecessary parties to whom the provisions of the Limitation Act (s. 22, Act XV. of 1877) did not apply. The High Court considered that if the question had been an open one there was a good deal to be said in favour of the view taken by the first Court, but it appeared to them that it was concluded by authority, and that the managers alone could not maintain the suit. The material portion of their judgment is as follows— " The Subordinate Judge is in error in saying that the business was carried on in the names of the three original plaintiffs. It was carried on in the name of the plaintiffs firm. The evidence of Kishun Parshad, Muhammad Sulaiman, and Amjad Ali Khan, coupled with the plaintiffs own statement in the plaint, shews this. If the question had been an open one there is a good deal to be said in favour of the view taken by the Court below, but it appears to us that it is concluded by authority. In the case of Kattusheri Kamna v. Vallotil Narayanan (( 1881) I. L. R. 3 Madr. 234.) it was held by Turner C.J. and Kindersley J. that unless where by a special provision of law co-owners are permitted to sue through some or one of their members, all co-owners must join in a suit to recover their property. Co-owners may agree that their property shall be managed and legal proceedings conducted by some or one of their number, but they cannot invest such person or persons with the competency to sue in his own name on their behalf, or if sued to represent them. Sargent C.J. adopted this statement of the law in the case of Balkrishna v. the Municipality of Mahad. (( 1885) I. L. R. 10 Bomb. 32.) In the case of Ramsebuk v. Ram Lall Koondoo (( 1881) I. L. R 6 Calc. 815.), two of the sons out of a joint Mitakshara family, consisting of a father and three sons, and the widow and sons of a deceased son and carrying on business in partnership sued on a hathchitta for recovery of the amount payable thereunder. 815.), two of the sons out of a joint Mitakshara family, consisting of a father and three sons, and the widow and sons of a deceased son and carrying on business in partnership sued on a hathchitta for recovery of the amount payable thereunder. When the suit came on for hearing an objection was taken that all the parties who ought to sue were not on the record. Thereupon, on the application of the original plaintiffs, the names of the father and the third son were added, and the plaintiffs were described as surviving partners of the deceased son. At the time these additional persons were made parties the suit was, as regards them, barred by limitation. It was held that inasmuch as the original plaintiffs could only enforce their claim in conjunction with the added plaintiffs, and the added plaintiffs were barred by s. 22 of the Limitation Act, the claim of the original plaintiffs was also barred. Garth C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, in the course of it observed When a joint family, or any members of it, carry on a trade in partnership and contract with the outside public in the course of that trade, they have no greater privilege than any other traders. If they are really partners they must be bound by the same rules of law for enforcing their contracts in Courts of law as any other partner ship. A similar decision was arrived at by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kalidas Kevaldas v. Nathu Bhagvan. (( 1883) I. L. R. 7 Bomb. 217.) The same question was considered in the case of Imam-ud-din v. Liladhar. (( 1892) I. L. R 14 Allah. 524.) In that case a suit was brought upon two hundis by one only of two members of a firm. The defendants in their written statement, as here, raised the objection that all necessary parties were not joined as plaintiffs. Upon that the other partner applied to be made a co-plaintiff and the Court acceded to the application. At the time when he was made a co-plaintiff the suit was barred by limitation and the Subordinate Judge on that account dismissed it. On appeal the District Judge allowed the appeal on the ground that the defendants did not raise the plea of non-joinder at the earliest possible period. At the time when he was made a co-plaintiff the suit was barred by limitation and the Subordinate Judge on that account dismissed it. On appeal the District Judge allowed the appeal on the ground that the defendants did not raise the plea of non-joinder at the earliest possible period. On second appeal Edge C.J. and Tyrrell J., after a review of the authorities, set aside the order of the District Judge and affirmed the decree of the Court of first instance, holding that all the surviving partners of the firm should have been plaintiffs in the suit, and further that where a judge acting under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure adds a person as a necessary plaintiff after the period of limitation for a suit by him alone, or with others, has expired, s. 22 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, would clearly apply to the right of suit of the person so added and the suit could not be maintained without him. In Madras it had been held that the proposition that the manager of a Hindu family can sue without joining those interested with him is one which cannot be supported Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti (( 1894) I. L. R. 18 Madr. 33.) ; Angamuthu Pillai v. Kolanda Vein Filial. (( 1899) I. L. R. 23 Madr. 190.) " Mr. Mayne in his work on Hindu Law, in dealing with this question, says at pp. 368 and 369 of the sixth edition, A necessary consequence of the corporate character of the family holding is that wherever any transaction affects that property all the members must be privy to it, and whatever is done must be done for the benefit of all, and not of any single individual. For instance, a single member cannot sue or proceed by way of execution to recover a particular portion of the family property for himself whether his claims be preferred against a stranger who is asserted to be wrongfully in possession or against his coparceners. If the former, all the members must join and the suit must be brought to recover the whole property for the benefit of all; and later on, one member cannot sue by himself without joining or asking the consent of the others and making the defect good by joining the others as defendants. If the former, all the members must join and the suit must be brought to recover the whole property for the benefit of all; and later on, one member cannot sue by himself without joining or asking the consent of the others and making the defect good by joining the others as defendants. If from any cause, such as lapse of time, the other members cannot be joined as plaintiffs, the whole suit will fail. " Our decision in the case of Pateshri Partap Narain Singh v. Rudra Narain Singh (( 1904) I. L. R. 26 Allah. 528.), which has been relied on by Mr. Sundar Lal, does not help the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. That decision was based upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. The objection raised as to non-joinder of parties was not pressed by the defendants, and it was only on appeal that we pointed out the defect in this respect and amended it. We observed in our judgment that if the question had been raised at the trial the plaintiff would no doubt have obtained, in good time, the consent of his brother to his name being added to the array of parties to the proceedings." De Gruyther, K,C, and Dube, for the appellants, contended hat as the contracts of loan and the mutual business transactions had all along been carried on between the three plaintiffs only on the one side and the three principal defendants on the other, the said plaintiffs were alone competent to bring this suit. They alone were parties to the statement of account and promise to pay made on August 9, 1901, and it was unnecessary to join the other members of the family as co-plaintiffs merely because they were parties interested. The three plaintiffs were the only necessary plaintiffs, whether regarded as the managers of the business or as the managing members of the joint Hindu family. The co-plaintiffs were added to meet the objections of the defendants and not as being necessary to the right constitution of the suit. After referring to Act XV. of 1877, s. 22, and to arts. 57, 59, 64, 85, 115, and 120, they cited Pragi Lal v. Maxwell (( 1885) I. L. R.7 Allah. 284, 287.) and Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmal Shriram. (( 1892) I. L. R. 17 Bomb. After referring to Act XV. of 1877, s. 22, and to arts. 57, 59, 64, 85, 115, and 120, they cited Pragi Lal v. Maxwell (( 1885) I. L. R.7 Allah. 284, 287.) and Kasturchand Bahiravdas v. Sagarmal Shriram. (( 1892) I. L. R. 17 Bomb. 413.) Reference was also made to Narayan Gop Habbu v. Pandurang Gann(( 1881) I. L. R. 5 Bomb. 685.) ; Gan Savant Bal Savant v. Narayan Dhond Savant (( 1883) I. L. R. 7 Bomb. 467.); Ramayya v. Venkataratnam (( 1893) I. L. R. 17 Madr. 122, 126.); Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti (I. L. R. 18 Madr. 33.); and Arunachala Pillai v. Vythialinga Mudaliyar. (( 1882) I. L. R. 6 Madr. 27.) Ross, for the respondents, contended that the managing members of a joint Hindu family carrying on a joint family business are not entitled to maintain a suit in their own names against debtors of the family without joining with them in the suit either as plaintiffs or defendants all the other members of the family. He relied upon Hari Gopal v. Gokaldas Kushabashet (( 1887) 1. L. R, 12 Bomb. 108.) and Angamuthu Filial v. Kolanda Vein Pillai (I. L. R. 23 Madr. 190, 194.) ; and. see Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., pp.379, 381, Ramsebuk v. Bam Lall Koondoo (I. L. R. 6 Cale. 815, 825.) and Kalidas Kevaldas v. Nathu Bhagvan. (I. L. R. 7 Bomb. 217, 220.) sr The suit was barred by s. 22 of Act XV. of 1877. The appellants were not heard in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBSON. The question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the suit is barred by the Indian Limitation Act of 1877. There is no doubt that, when first brought, it was well within the statutory period of three years, but it is contended by the respondents that it was not then brought by all the proper and necessary plaintiffs, and that afterwards, when the record was amended in that respect, the statutory time had expired. The suit was commenced by the first three plaintiffs on the record. The suit was commenced by the first three plaintiffs on the record. They are the managing members of an undivided Hindu joint family governed by the Mitakshara law, and, as such managing members, they carry on the business of money-lenders together at Hanumanganj in the district of Ballia, as a firm, under the name and style of Manorath Bhagat Dhana Ram. The other members of the joint family do not participate in the management of that business or " shop," as it is called, and the loan transactions out of which the claim arises were negotiated and concluded by the members of the said firm alone, with the first three defendants, who are also members of another undivided Hindu family. The accounts between the parties began in 1895, and balances were periodically agreed between them until August 9, 1901, when the last balance was struck and the period of limitation began to run. On that date the defendants duly acknowledged the correctness of the balance then appearing in the plaintiffs books, and executed a sarkhat or agreement admitting it to be due and payable by them. It is found by the learned Subordinate Judge that this agreement was made between the defendants and the first three plaintiffs, who accordingly brought their action for the balance in question on June 3, 1904. The defendants objected that all the members of the family to which the plaintiffs belonged ought to be joined with them as plaintiffs. On August 22, 1904, the original plaintiffs, while denying that the other 3 members of the family were necessary parties, and alleging themselves to be the proprietors and managers of the firm, yet, with a view to removing the defendants objection for what it was worth, prayed for leave to add the other members of the family as plaintiffs. Leave was accordingly given, and the amendment was made on September 8, 1904. By this time the three years allowed by Act XV. of 1877, Second Schedule, art. 64, had expired, and it became necessary to determine whether or not the additional plaintiffs were really necessary parties, because, if not, the suit had always been properly constituted, and the time under the statute stopped running on June 3, 1904, within the three years. The learned Subordinate Judge of Ghazipar decided in favour of the plaintiffs, but the High Court for the North Western Provinces reversed his judgment. The learned Subordinate Judge of Ghazipar decided in favour of the plaintiffs, but the High Court for the North Western Provinces reversed his judgment. Their Lordships are of opinion that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge ought to be restored. The Indian decisions as to the powers of the managing members of an undivided Hindu joint family are somewhat conflicting. It is, however, clear that where a business like money-lending has to be carried on in the interests of the family as a whole, the managing members may properly be entrusted with the power of making contracts, giving receipts, and compromising or discharging claims ordinarily incidental to the business. Without a general power of that sort, it would be impossible for the business to be carried on at all, and there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the first three plaintiffs here were in fact entrusted with, and regularly exercised, such a power in regard to this money-lending business. He finds in broad terms that all the business relating to the shop had been carried on in the names of the first three plaintiffs only, and that all lawsuits relating to the shop, or the family, had also been instituted in their names alone. Is there any principle of law, or any custom applicable to a case like this, according to which the managing members of a Hindu joint family entrusted with the management of a business must be held incompetent to enforce at law the ordinary business contracts they are entitled to make or discharge in their own names? The defendant is, of course, entitled to insist on all the persons with whom he expressly contracted being made parties to the suit, and that was done in the action as originally framed in this case. There were no other parties to the contract of August 9, 1901, than the respondents and the first three plaintiffs. The respondents are demanding, however, that persons who are incompetent to interfere in the business of the contract, or to give a receipt under it, and are merely interested in its profits, shall be treated as parties necessary to its enforcement. The High Court thought there was much to be said in favour of the view taken by the Court below, but considered the matter concluded by authority. The High Court thought there was much to be said in favour of the view taken by the Court below, but considered the matter concluded by authority. They cited the case of Kattusheri Kanna v. Vallotil Narayanan (I. L. R. 3 Madr. 234.), which was a case turning on the co-ownership of land. The co-owners were an association of individuals of which only some brought the action while others supported the defendants. Turner C.J. held that all the co-owners in such a case must join, and that they could not invest the managers of their property with the right to sue in their own names or in a representative capacity. Their Lordships think that this proposition thus broadly stated as to co-ownership cannot be applied to the managing members of a business carried on for an undivided Hindu joint family. It was not so applied in the later case of Arunachala Pillai v. Vythialinga Mudaliyar (I. L. R. 6 Madr. 27.), where it was stated that the managing member of an undivided Hindu family suing as such is entitled to bring a suit to establish a right belonging to the family without making the other members of the family parties to the suit. Stress was Laid by the High Court on the judgment in Ramsebuk v. Ram Lall Koondoo. (I. L. R. 6 Calc. 815.) In that case a business was carried on for the benefit of a Mitakshara family by a firm consisting of four members of the family. The action in question was brought by two only of the partners, and the other two were not added until after the period of limitation had expired. The Court held that the plaintiffs must fail because all the co-contractors had not been added as plaintiffs. Garth C.J. says (I. L. R. 6 Calc. The action in question was brought by two only of the partners, and the other two were not added until after the period of limitation had expired. The Court held that the plaintiffs must fail because all the co-contractors had not been added as plaintiffs. Garth C.J. says (I. L. R. 6 Calc. at p. 824.) " If in this case it had been found in the Court below as a fact that the B contract was made between the defendant and the two original plaintiffs only there would be no difficulty in deciding in their favour, because the joinder of the other two plaintiffs would only have been a misjoinder which, by s. 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is never now fatal to a suit." Again (Ibid, at p. 825.) the learned Chief Justice says " The lower Court has found in this case, that all the four plaintiffs were partners in the concern, and that the defendants contracted with all jointly." It is to be observed that there were other members of the family who had an equal family interest in the profits of the business, but it was not suggested that they should be joined as plaintiffs or that they were to be treated as partners in the firm of managing members. In the present case, however, the defendants were originally sued by all the partners or persons with whom they had made their contract, and therefore they cannot avail themselves of Ramsebuks Case (I. L. R. 6 Calc. 815.) as an authority in their favour. The same observations apply to the case of Imam-ud-din v. Liladhar. (1. L. R. 14 Allah. 524.) There the decision simply was that, except in the case of an assignment by the other surviving partner, it is not competent to one only of tw7o or more surviving partners to sue for a debt due to the firm. The decision in the case of Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti (I. L. R. 18 Madr. 33.), cited by the respondents, may be supported on the ground that the single plaintiff in that case was not shewn to be the managing member of the family or to be the only partner or proprietor of the business with which the litigation was concerned. 33.), cited by the respondents, may be supported on the ground that the single plaintiff in that case was not shewn to be the managing member of the family or to be the only partner or proprietor of the business with which the litigation was concerned. Their Lordships think, however, that the proposition there Lald down to the effect that the manager cannot sue without joining all those interested with him, if literally construed, goes too far. In the opinion of their Lordships, the original plaintiffs in this case were entitled, as the sole managers of the family business, to make, in their own names, the contracts which gave rise to the claim, and they properly sued on such contracts without joining the other members of the family. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, that the decree of the High Court should be reversed with costs, and that of the Subordinate Judge restored. The respondents will pay the costs of the appeal.