JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J. 1. The question which is supposed to arise in the present case is whether or not a pleader is entitled to be heard under the following circumstances:— 2. A certain decree obtained in the Bombay Presidency was sent for execution to Mirzapur. 3. The judgment-debtor, who is the present applicant, produced a receipt and alleged that the decree had been obtained against him in Bombay by the fraud of the decree-holder. Thereupon the District Judge issued a notice to the decree-holder to show cause why he should not be prosecuted. The decree-holder then appeared and some evidence was recorded. The Judge was told the next day that the parties had compromised the case. The learned Judge was of opinion that there was ground for thinking the receipt produced by the judgment-debtor to be forgery and he then proceeded to take action under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section is as follows:— “When any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court is of opinion that there is ground for inquiring into any offence referred to in section 195 and committed before it or brought under notice in the course of a judicial proceeding, such court, after making any preliminary enquiry that may be necessary, may send the case for inquiry or trial to the nearest Magistrate of the first class, and may send the accused in custody, or take sufficient security for his appearance, before such Magistrate, etc.” 4. Up to the present time the learned District Judge has not either sent the case for enquiry or trial. He has merely proceeded to make the preliminary enquiry which he thinks necessary. Mr. Howard, who appeared as counsel for Ram Nihore, contended before the learned Judge that under the circumstances of the case he had no jurisdiction to enquire into the case under the provisions of section 476. The Judge's note is as follows:— Present—Mr. Howard for Ram Nihore and Ram Nihore in person. Mr. Howard represents that his client is thinking of applying to the Hon'ble High Court for transfer, and argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to enquire into the case under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after the parties filed a compromise. Order: I am not sure that Mr. Howard has any locus standi at this stage of the case in proceedings under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. Order: I am not sure that Mr. Howard has any locus standi at this stage of the case in proceedings under section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. The fact that the parties to the decree filed a compromise in satisfaction of the decree, does not in my opinion in any way affect the right of jurisdiction of the court to proceed with the enquiry under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. Mr. Howard says that Mr. Moir refused to hear him, but he admits that he took up the position that he was entitled to be heard as of right. I may mention in the first place that it does not definitely appear either in the affidavit filed in support of the application or in the order that Mr. Moir refused to hear Mr. Howard. In support of the right which Mr. Howard says his client had, he quotes section 340 of the Code of criminal Procedure. That section provides that “every person accused before any Criminal Court may of right be defended by a pleader.” It is quite clear that the applicant was not, at the time the learned Judge was proceeding to make the enquiry, a person accused before a Criminal Court. Even if we assume that he was an accused person the court that was making the preliminary enquiry was not a Criminal Court, but a Civil Court. 6. Mr. Howard next quotes Order III, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That rule is as follows:— “Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such court may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf. Provided that any such appearance shall, if the court so directs, be made by the party in person.” 7. It seems to me extremely doubtful that in the facts of the case there was any appearance, application or act or to any court within the meaning of this rule. I am, however, extremely reluctant to give a decision upon a question which I do not think has actually arisen and without a very full argument upon the question involved. It seems to me extremely doubtful that in the facts of the case there was any appearance, application or act or to any court within the meaning of this rule. I am, however, extremely reluctant to give a decision upon a question which I do not think has actually arisen and without a very full argument upon the question involved. Apart, however, from the right of a pleader to be heard, it is, I think, a very general practice to hear pleaders on behalf of persons in civil or criminal matters. The court is willing, as a rule, to get the help and assistance of legal gentlemen as amici curiae if in no other capacity, e.g., section 440, Criminal Procedure Code, provides that no party has any right to be heard either personally or by pleader before any court when excercising powers of revision. In the High Court the Judges make a practice of hearing pleaders in revision, but at the same time professional gentlemen ought to be extremely careful that this privilege is not abused. In the present case I am quite certain that Mr. Moir would have been glad to hear Mr. Howard as an amicus curve if question of right had not been pressed. Under all the circumstances of the case I do not think that I ought to make any order in revision at this stage of the proceedings. The application is accordingly rejected.