JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal on behalf of the Plaintiff in a suit for ejectment and recovery of rent and damages. The case for the Plaintiff was that the land in dispute was let out to the Defendant on the 20th July 1896 for a term of three years, that after the expiration of the term of the tenancy, the Defendant was allowed to hold over, that on the 12th October 1905 the Plaintiff served upon the Defendant a notice to quit the land on the 14th April 1906, that in spite of the service of such notice the Defendant continued in occupation and that consequently on the 4th December 1906 the Plaintiff commenced this action to eject the Defendant as a trespasser. He further claimed rent for the year 1312, that is up to the date on which the Defendant was asked to vacate the premises, and damages for use and occupation thereafter. The Defendant resisted the claim substantially on the ground that his tenancy was not terminable and that as a matter of law it had not been validly terminated by the steps taken by the Plaintiff. The Court of first instance found that the Defendant was not shown to be a raiyat in respect of other lands in the same village, that he had not acquired a right of occupancy in the land in dispute which had been taken by him for purposes of homestead and had been used by him as such and that consequently his tenancy in respect of this land was terminable and had been terminated by the notice to quit served upon him. In this view the Court of first instance decreed the suit both as regards the prayer for ejectment and the claim for rent and damages. 2. Upon appeal the learned Subordinate Judge has reversed this decree. He has held that the combined effect of secs. 21 and 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is to confer upon the Defendant the status of an occupancy raiyat in respect of the land in suit and that consequently he is not liable to be ejected. In this view the Subordinate Judge has dismissed the suit. He has held that the combined effect of secs. 21 and 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is to confer upon the Defendant the status of an occupancy raiyat in respect of the land in suit and that consequently he is not liable to be ejected. In this view the Subordinate Judge has dismissed the suit. 3.The Plaintiff has now appealed to this Court and on his behalf it has been contended that the Defendant has not acquired a right of occupancy in the land in suit, that the Subordinate Judge has overlooked material evidence on the question of the occupation by the Defendant of other lands in the village as a raiyat, and finally, that in any event the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for rent up to the date of the institution of the suit. 4. In our opinion, in so far as the claim for ejectment is concerned, the Plaintiff cannot possibly succeed. But before we deal with the question of the status of the Defendant, it is necessary to advert for a moment to the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the Defendant is a raiyat in respect of other lands in the village. That finding has been attacked on behalf of the Appellant on the ground that the Subordinate Judge has erroneously stated that the Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to rebut that on the side of the Defendant to prove that he holds other lands in the village under different proprietors and that he has acquired a right of occupancy in those lands. No doubt the expression used by the learned Subordinate Judge is open to criticism, but we are unable to hold that he has overlooked the evidence mentioned in the judgment of the Court of first instance. We must therefore proceed on the assumption that the Defendant has been rightly found by the Subordinate Judge to be a raiyat in respect of other lands in the same village. In fact the Subordinate Judge has found that the Defendant has been a cultivating raiyat of other lands in the village for more than 25 or 30 years before the suit. In other words, he was a settled raiyat in respect of those lands at the time when the lease of the land now in dispute was granted to him. The question therefore arises whether sec. In other words, he was a settled raiyat in respect of those lands at the time when the lease of the land now in dispute was granted to him. The question therefore arises whether sec. 21 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, read with sec. 182 is sufficient to confer upon the Defendant the status of an occupancy raiyat in respect of the homestead land now in dispute. 5. Now sec. 182 provides that when a raiyat holds his homestead otherwise than as part of his holding as a raiyat, the incidents of his tenancy of the homestead shall be regulated by local custom or usage and subject to local custom or usage, by the provisions of the Act applicable to land held by a raiyat. In the case before us, no evidence has been adduced on behalf of either party to show that there is any local custom or usage applicable to the incidents of the tenancy in question. Consequently the incidents of the tenancy must be governed by the provisions of the Act applicable to land held by a raiyat. The learned Vakil for the Appellant has, however, contended that as the land now in dispute is not held under the same landlord as the land cultivated by the Defendant, sec. 182 has no application. This contention is opposed to the judgment of Mr. Justice Geidt in the case of Protap Chandra v. Biseswar Pramanik 9 C.W.N. 416 (1904) and to the decision of this Court in the case of Kripanath Chakraburti v. Sheikh Anu 4 C.L.J. 332 : S.C. 10 C.W.N. 44 (1906). The case last mentioned lays down that the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act are applicable to the homestead of a person who is a raiyat, although he is not a raiyat of the village in which the homestead land is situated and is not a raiyat of the same landlord as the landlord of the homestead land. It may be observed that this view is justified by the language used in sec. 182 and we see no reason to restrict the operation of that section by importing into it words not to be found therein. It may be observed that this view is justified by the language used in sec. 182 and we see no reason to restrict the operation of that section by importing into it words not to be found therein. Consequently we must hold that although the land in dispute is homestead land, as it is held by the Defendant who is a raiyat otherwise than as part of his holding as a raiyat, the incidents of his tenancy are in the absence of any local custom or usage, regulated by the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act applicable to land held by a raiyat. Prima facie, therefore, the provisions of sec. 21 are applicable. But the learned Vakil for the Appellant has contended that before sec. 21 can be applied, it must be shown that the land in suit has been held by the Defendant as a raiyat, because sub-sec. (1) of sec. 21 provides that every person who is a settled raiyat of a village within the meaning of sec. 20 shall have a right of occupancy in all land for the time being held by him as a raiyat in that village. The learned Vakil for the Appellant has conceded that his contention is opposed to the decision of Mr. Justice Rampini in the case of Munshi Golam Mowla v. Abdul Sowar 13 C.L.J. 255 (1893), but he has argued that in that decision sufficient weight was not attached to the qualifying words "held by him as a raiyat in that village." Upon the arguments which have been addressed to us we need not decide this question for the purposes of the case before us, and when it arises in a case where it really calls for decision, the matter may require further consideration. But we are of opinion that the Plaintiff must fail on another, ground. The suit is clearly barred under secs. 44 and 45 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Sec. 45 as it stood at the time of the institution of the suit, provides that a suit for ejectment on the ground of expiration of the term of a lease shall not be instituted against a non-occupancy raiyat unless notice to quit has been served on the raiyat not less than six months before the expiration of the term and shall not be instituted after six months from the expiration of the term. Now the Defendant has been found to be a raiyat. Even if it is assumed that he is not an occupancy raiyat in respect of the disputed land because as the learned Vakil for the Appellant contends, sec. 21 has no application to the land in suit, he is at least a non-occupancy raiyat. Hence, before the Defendant is ejected, the requirements of sec. 45 must be fulfilled. But it cannot be disputed that no notice to quit was served on the Defendant within six months before the expiration of the term; that is within six months before the 20th July 1899. Nor has the present suit been instituted within six months after the expiration of the term. It is obvious therefore that sec. 45 is a bar to the claim for eviction of the Defendant and the refusal of the Court below to make a decree for ejectment was correct. 6. In so far as the claim for rent is concerned the learned Vakil for the Respondent has conceded that the matter has been overlooked by the Subordinate Judge. We observe, however, that interest was claimed by the Plaintiff at the rate of 75 per cent. per annum under the terms of the lease. Under sec. 178, sub-sec. (3) cl. (g) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, nothing in any contract made between a landlord and a tenant after the passing of the Act, can affect the provisions of sec. 67 relating to interest payable on arrears of rent. Consequently the Plaintiff is not entitled to claim interest at a rate higher than 12 per cent. per annum. A decree therefore will be made in favour of the Plaintiff for the rent of the year 1312 and the first two instalments of 1313 with interest at 12 per cent. per annum. The result, therefore, is that the decree of the Court below in so far as it dismisses the claim for ejectment must be affirmed; but in so far as it dismisses the claim for rent and damages it must be reversed and in lieu thereof a decree will be made in favour of the Plaintiff as stated. The Plaintiff must pay the Defendant his costs in the Court of first instance and in the Court of Appeal below; but there will be no order for costs in this Court.