JUDGMENT Knox Banerji and Karamat Husain, JJ. - This appeal arises out of a suit brought by Sri Rani Bed Saran Kuar, appellant before us, in which she asked for recovery of possession of mauza Jamvauwa and for a declaration of her proprietary right to the same. One of the pleas raised in defence was that the present suit was barred by reason of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It appears that prior to the institution of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen, a suit had been instituted in the court of the Assistant Collector, First Class, u/s 63 of the local Tenancy Act. The appellant was the plaintiff in that suit. The defendants were (3) Ramnath Prasad, who was the father of Ram Kinkin Deo and Harbans Deo, two of the present respondents, and also (4) Bhagat Deo, the third respondent before us. The appellant then sued for ejectment of the defendants on the ground that they were lessees, and that the lease under which they held would expire at the end of the then current agricultural year. 2. The defence was to the effect that the defendants were not lessees, but proprietors, and that the plaintiff had no title to the property in question. The Assistant Collector took upon himself to determine the question of title then in issue before him. We cannot help saying that the action of the Assistant Collector seems to us to have been inexpedient. He would have shown better discretion if he had required the defendants to institute a suit in the Civil Court for the determination of this question, which was particularly a question for the Civil Court to determine. Section 199 of the Local Tenancy Act, however, gave the Assistant Collector power to determine the question, and he determined it against the plaintiff, namely, the appellant before us. He held that the plaintiff had no title to the property in dispute. 3. The plaintiff might have carried this decision in appeal before the District Judge. Section 199 of the Local Tenancy Act, however, gave the Assistant Collector power to determine the question, and he determined it against the plaintiff, namely, the appellant before us. He held that the plaintiff had no title to the property in dispute. 3. The plaintiff might have carried this decision in appeal before the District Judge. Had she done so, it would have been within the power of the District Judge either to try the question of title himself, or, if he had not all the materials before him necessary for the determination of the question, to have framed issues with reference to that question, and have referred them for trial to any subordinate court of civil jurisdiction. That court might, for instance, have been the court of the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff, however, did not take any action in this direction, with the result that she has now to meet a decree against her which has become final. The decree was pronounced, it is true, by a Revenue Court, but by a Revenue Court which, as we have held in previous decisions, and as we now hold, is pro tanto a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction to decide the question of title. The rulings to which we refer will be found mentioned and considered in Bihari and Another Vs. Sheobalak, (1907) ILR (All) 601 4. To return to the suit out of which this appeal arises, the court of first instance held that the plaintiff's case was barred by the rule of res judicata. The lower appellate court also held that the suit of the plaintiff was barred against such of the defendants as were parties to the previous suit brought u/s 63 to which we have already referred. With this view of the lower appellate court we agree for the reasons stated above. So far as the present case is concerned the result is, that the appellant's claim must be held to be barred against the respondents to this appeal. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.