Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (April 17, 1905) reversing a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Aligarh (November 5, 1902). The respondent Faiz-un-nisa on September 27, 1889, executed a deed which purported to be one of sale of the property in suit in favour of her three children, aged sixteen, eight, and seven, two of whom were appellants. Mutation of names was effected in their favour, but the respondent remained in possession. In 1895 the appellants began to deal with the property the subject of the-deed as their own. It was alleged that the property was worth Rs.60,000 at the time of sale. The vendor admitted receipt thereof in the deed, but the appellants admitted that it had never been paid. In 1901 the respondent sued her three children and their transferees for a declaration that the deed was of no effect against her and for possession with mesne profits of the property fictitiously conveyed, or in the alternative for payment of the Rs.60,000. The principal defendants pleaded, among other things, that (See Whitley Stok ess note on this section in 2 Anglo-Indian Codes? at p. 903.) the plaintiff did not intend to take the purchase-money mentioned in the deed of sale; (2.) the suit was barred by time; and (3.) the plaintiff was estopped from setting up her claim by her conduct. The other defendants pleaded that they were bona fide transferees for value from ostensible owners. Law Rep. 38 Ind. App. 85 ( 1910- 1911) Hanif-Un-Nisa V. Faiz-Un-Nisa 35 The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. He held that natural love was the real consideration for the deed, which therefore was not fictitious but " a real conveyance by which ownership with possession was transferred." He also held that the respondent was estopped from claiming any relief against the transferees. The plaintiff submitted to that portion of the decree which concerned the transferees, and the High Court on her appeal from the rest of the decree gave her a decree for Rs.60,000 with interest from the date of the decree, the amount thereof to be a charge on the property in the hands of her three children. The plaintiff submitted to that portion of the decree which concerned the transferees, and the High Court on her appeal from the rest of the decree gave her a decree for Rs.60,000 with interest from the date of the decree, the amount thereof to be a charge on the property in the hands of her three children. The High Court held that the defendants were precluded by s. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act from giving parol evidence for the purpose of shewing that the deed of sale was in reality intended by the plaintiff to be a deed of gift. They referred to certain reported cases (see report of their judgment in I.L. R. 27 Allah. 612) and to Balkishen Das v. Legge (1) and said " In view of this clear statement of the law, it is unnecessary for us to consider the decisions to which we have been referred. The question before us is not one, in regard to the admissibility of evidence to shew that a recital of fact in a conveyance or contract is erroneous, but of evidence to vary a deed the language of which is plain and unambiguous." Raikes, for the appellants, contended that the deed, though in form a deed of sale, was on the evidence clearly shewn to have been intended to operate as a deed of gift, and that a suit for the recovery of the consideration must be dismissed. He submitted that the High Court was wrong in rejecting extrinsic evidence to shew the intention of the parties and in its application of the case of Balkishen Das v. Legge. (( 1899) L. R. 27 Ind. Ap. 58,) It was not rendered inadmissible by s. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act and it was most material. De Gruyther, K.C., and Dube, for the respondents, contended that by s. 92 evidence could not be given to vary the effect of a deed when its intention was clearly expressed. If the evidence was held to be admissible they submitted that the case should be remanded to the High Court for a decision thereon. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. Their Lordships think the decree appealed from cannot be sustained. If the evidence was held to be admissible they submitted that the case should be remanded to the High Court for a decision thereon. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. Their Lordships think the decree appealed from cannot be sustained. They are of opinion that the proper course will be to remit the case to the High Court to be dealt with on the evidence, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The costs of the further hearing will be costs in the cause. As the appellants have been successful upon the point of law, they will have their costs of the appeal incurred in England.