JUDGMENT Sir John Stanley, Knight, C.J. and Banerji, J. - This is an appeal from an order of remand passed under order XLI, rule 23, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit was one for a declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to retain possession of certain immovable property, and in the alternative, if they were found not to be in possession, that possession may be delivered to them. The property exceeds Rs. 100 in value. It belonged to one Gulzari Lal. Upon his death his daughter, Musammat Sujan, succeeded to it. On her death in. 1907, the plaintiffs applied for mutation of names in their favour, as did also the father of the defendants. A compromise was entered into between the parties on the 8th of February, 1908, whereby it was agreed that portion of the property should pass into the hands of the father of the defendants and the remaining portion into the hands of the plaintiffs. The father of the defendants subsequently repudiated this compromise. An application was made to the Revenue Court for mutation, and that court ignoring the compromise ordered mutation in favour of the defendant's father. Hence the present suit. 2. In their claim the plaintiffs alleged that Musammat Sujan, the daughter of Gulzari, was the last owner of the property and was the plaintiff's cousin by family relationship and was in possession of the property as daughter in a Hindu family and had a life-interest in it. A reference was then made to her death and in the second paragraph of the plaint the plaintiffs say that On the death of Musammat Sujan a dispute arose between the plaintiffs and the father of the defendants, and that an application for mutation of names was presented on behalf of both parties in the Revenue Court; that the plaintiffs alone claimed the whole property of Gulzari on the one hand and the father of the defendants alone claimed the whole property on the other hand. Then reference is made to the compromise to which we have referred. The compromise was tendered in evidence in the first court, but it was rejected on the ground that not being registered and the property being of the value of Rs. Then reference is made to the compromise to which we have referred. The compromise was tendered in evidence in the first court, but it was rejected on the ground that not being registered and the property being of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards, it was not admissible in evidence; and holding that the plaintiff's suit was based upon this compromise alone that court dismissed the plaintiff's claim in toto, without giving the plaintiffs an opportunity of establishing their title to the property or portion of it as the reversionary heirs of Gulzari. 3. An appeal was preferred to the lower appellate court. That court held that the compromise was admissible in evidence, notwithstanding the fact that it was not registered. The learned Judge says:--"I find that the compromise petition in suit did not require to be registered and was admissible in evidence," and that "the lower court improperly held that the test was whether the compromise was incorporated in the decree, and that this was not the test of admissibility." That court accordingly remanded the suit to the court of first instance for determination on the merits. This appeal was then preferred. 4. As regards the admissibility in evidence of the compromise the learned District Judge was, in our opinion, entirely in error. Neither the compromise, nor any terms of the compromise, was embodied in any decree or order, and to admit such a compromise in evidence is entirely in contravention of the provisions of the Registration Act. If authority were needed for this, it is to be found in the Full Bench case of Sadar-Ud-Din Ahmad and Others Vs. Chajju and Others, (1909) ILR (All) 13 There it was held by a Full Bench, of which both of us were members, that a compromise entered into between the parties to mutation proceedings before a Court of Revenue which purported to modify the conditions of a preexisting mortgage upon the basis of which mutation was sought, could not be allowed to take effect in opposition Co the distinct terms of a registered instrument of mortgage. In the subsequent case of Kashi Kunbi v. Sumer Kunbi (1909) I.L.R., 32 All., 206 a Bench of this Court, of which one of us was also a member, held in a case in which the parties to a suit filed a compromise, which, in addition to setting forth the rights of the parties as to the property in suit, went on to provide that if either party sold his share of the property, the other party should have a right to pre-empt, and in which the decree based on the compromise was silent as to the right of pre-emption, that the compromise required registration, and not being registered, could not be used to support a suit for preemption. In the judgment in that case the authorities are dealt with. In that case some of the terms of the compromise were embodied in a decree, but the provision as to pre-emption was nowhere mentioned in the decree. In the present case no portion of the compromise is embodied in any decree or order. On the contrary, the order of mutation entirely ignored the petition of compromise. Clearly, therefore, this petition was not admissible in evidence to prove the agreement set out in it. The lower appellate court was, we think, justified in remanding the suit, but not upon the ground on which it was remanded. The court of first instance ought under the circumstances to have heard the case upon the merits and tried the question of title set up by the respective parties irrespective of the compromise. 5. For these reasons the order of remand of the court below was rightly passed and the court of first instance must try the question of title set up by the respective parties. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, but under the circumstances the costs will abide the event.