Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (July 31, 1905) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum (March 4, 1902). The question decided was as to the nature and extent of the interest acquired by the respondents in mouza Bansra under a lease dated June 26, 1872. The appellant thakurs contended that the mouza was the endowed property of certain idols and that the said lease was granted by Nilmoni Singh, at that time the shebait of the idols, to one Narayan Ghose and the respondent Ram Kani Ghose, who on the same day executed in favour of the said Nilmoni Singh a kabuliyat, the principal provisions of which are as follows "It being notified according to the custom of your kachari that 1 debottar mouzah Bansra, in lot Bansra, within pergunnah Kasaipar, district and sub-district Manbhum, at Purulia, appertaining to your raj, Chakla Panchakote, would be settled in putni, we appeared in the kachari and made a bid at public auction, and signed in the bid-sheet to take settlement of the said lot for an annual rent ofRs.181, and for a bonus of an equal amount of Rs.181. On your accepting the said amount of bonus, which was deposited by us in your rajdhani kachari, we do execute this kabuliyat. We shall take possession of the Law Rep. 38 Ind. App. 76 ( 1910- 1911) Sri Sri Ishwar Shyam Chand Jiu V. Ram Kanai Ghose 28 lot from the present year, and shall pay the aforesaid rent year after year month by month and kist by kist according to the schedule, and take proper receipts. If we make default in payment of a kist, we shall pay the same, together with interest according to law..... You shall be entitled to realize the arrears by putting the said lot to sale in one or more auctions every year, under Act VIII. of 1859, or any other laws that are now in force or shall be introduced in future. No objection to that on our part will hold good. If the arrears together with interest be not realized in full by such sale, then we shall pay the balance from our own pocket. of 1859, or any other laws that are now in force or shall be introduced in future. No objection to that on our part will hold good. If the arrears together with interest be not realized in full by such sale, then we shall pay the balance from our own pocket. If we do not pay, the same will be realized from our persons and properties—movable and immovable." Nilmoni Singh died in 1898, and was succeeded by his son Hari Narayan Singh as the Raja of Chakla Panchakote and the shebait of the thakurs. The appellants and the said raja shebait sued in 1901 for a declaration that the mouza in suit was debottar property, alleged that the lease under which the defendants held was invalid, being beyond the powers of the shebait to grant, and prayed for the delivery of possession of the said mouza Bansra to Hari Narayan Singh as the shebait. The respondents Ram Kanai Ghose and Balaram Ghose filed a joint written statement of defence and pleaded (1.) that the suit was barred by limitation and (2.) that the mouza in suit " is one of the debottar properties but is treated as mal." The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. He found that the mouza Bansra formed part of the debottar property of the family thakurs and that the profits derived from it were used for the purpose of debsheba; that the grant of the putni lease was injurious to the thakurs and was not binding on the successors of the former shebait under the circumstances of the case; and that the suit was not barred by limitation. In appeal the High Court dismissed the suit. It found that the mouza was not debottar as alleged, and held that it was therefore unnecessary to decide the point of limitation. It subsequently granted a review on fresh evidence, new and important, being brought to its notice. It then held that the suit was barred by limitation and therefore it was unnecessary to decide as to the effect of the further evidence. De Gruyther, K.C., and Parikh, for the appellants, contended that the additional evidence adduced in the High Court shewed conclusively that the mouza was debottar as alleged. Reference was made to Hunters Statistical Account of Bengal, vol. 17, p. 323 (Manbhum). De Gruyther, K.C., and Parikh, for the appellants, contended that the additional evidence adduced in the High Court shewed conclusively that the mouza was debottar as alleged. Reference was made to Hunters Statistical Account of Bengal, vol. 17, p. 323 (Manbhum). Upon the point of limitation they con tended that the suit was not barred by art. 134 of Sched. II. of Act XV. of 1877. The word "purchaser" in that article meant the purchaser out and out of an absolute title. The grant of such a title would be a breach of trust by the shebait. It would also be ultra vires so far at least as it purported to pass more than his life interest. It was not binding on his successors. The case was concluded by Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo (( 1869) 13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 270.) and Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi (L. R. 36 Ind. Ap. 148, 165.), which latter case decided that a mokurari lease did not transfer title to the extent which enabled the lessee to claim the benefit of art. 134 as being a purchaser within its meaning. Reference was made to a report of the latter case in the High Court. (( 1906) 33 Calc. 511, 528.) The respondents did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. This appeal was heard ex parte. Law Rep. 38 Ind. App. 76 ( 1910- 1911) Sri Sri Ishwar Shyam Chand Jiu V. Ram Kanai Ghose 29 This suit was brought by the Raja of Panchakote as shebait of some thakurs or family idols to recover possession of a mouza alleged to be debottar and dedicated to the service of the idols. It had been alienated more than twelve years before the institution of the suit by the plaintiffs predecessor in title, who granted a mokurari lease of the property in consideration of a fixed rent and the payment of a fine equal to the amount of two years rent. The defence was twofold (1.) that the property was not really debottar; and (2.) that the suit was barred by art. 134 of the Limitation Act. The Subordinate Judge of Manbhum decided both points in favour of the plaintiff. The case was heard twice on appeal by the High Court. The defence was twofold (1.) that the property was not really debottar; and (2.) that the suit was barred by art. 134 of the Limitation Act. The Subordinate Judge of Manbhum decided both points in favour of the plaintiff. The case was heard twice on appeal by the High Court. On the first hearing the learned judges came to the conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that the property was really debottar. They dismissed the suit on that ground, saying that it was not necessary to discuss the question of limitation. The appeal was heard again on review upon the discovery of new and important evidence. On that occasion the learned judges held that art. 134 was a bar to the suit, and that it was not necessary therefore to consider the further evidence offered as to the character of the property. On considering the additional evidence brought before the High Court on review, their Lordships are satisfied that the property was really debottar. The only question remaining depends on the law of limitation. On this point attention has been called to the case of Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi, decided by this Board in July, 1909, and reported in L. R. 36 Ind. Ap. 148. It is impossible to distinguish that case from the present. Whatever might have been the inclination of their opinion if the matter had been res integra, it seems to their Lordships that they would not be justified in reviewing on an ex parte application the considered judgment of the Board delivered after full argument. They will, therefore, simply follow the decision in Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi. They do so with the less hesitation because the language of the article under discussion in that case and in this has been altered by subsequent legislation. Their Lordships will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be allowed. There will be no order as to costs either of the hearing of the suit in the Courts below or of this appeal, except that the respondents must repay to the appellants the costs paid under the decree of the High Court.