JUDGMENT Sir John Stanley, Knight, C.J. and Banerji, J. - In this suit the plaintiffs seek a decree for possession of certain property usufructuarily mortgaged to them on the 15th December, 1896. It appears from the evidence, and it is not disputed, that from the 15th of December, 1896, until the 14th of December, 1908, the day on which this suit was instituted, the plaintiffs never applied for mutation of names in their favour, nor did they take any step whatever to obtain possession from the defendants, and it is admitted in the plaint that they never gob possession. The defence set up was that no consideration for the mortgage passed. Both the lower courts dismissed the plaintiffs' suit holding that no consideration for the mortgage was proved. The lower appellate court did not place any reliance upon the oral evidence adduced on either side, but finding that no steps were taken by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession for a period of 12 years all but one day, drew the inference from this that no consideration had passed. The fact that no step was taken by the plaintiffs for so long a period raises the presumption that the plaintiffs did not consider during this long period that they were entitled to possession. We think that such an inference is under the circumstances not unreasonable, and that the courts below were justified under the circumstances in throwing upon the plaintiffs the burden of proving as a fact that consideration did pass. The case is very similar to that of Mahabir Prasad Vs. Achobandil Kuari, (1886) ILR (All) 641 The suit in that case was for possession of land alleged to have been purchased under a registered deed of sale. The defendant vendor admitted the execution and registration of the deed but denied receipt of consideration. The deed was dated January, 1886, and the suit was not instituted until the year 1894, that is, after the lapse of eight years. It was found that the vendor had been in possession during the whole of that period. The plaintiffs produced no evidence in proof of payment of consideration. The deed was dated January, 1886, and the suit was not instituted until the year 1894, that is, after the lapse of eight years. It was found that the vendor had been in possession during the whole of that period. The plaintiffs produced no evidence in proof of payment of consideration. It was held by Old field and Tyrrell, JJ., that, although under ordinary circumstances the party to a deed duly executed and registered, who alleges nonpayment of consideration is bound to prove his allegation, the fact that the plaintiff and his predecessor had silently submitted to the withholding of possession for upwards of eight years, combined with the continuous possession of the vendor, favoured the allegation of the latter that possession had been withheld because of the non-payment of consideration, and raised such a counter-presumption as to make it incumbent on the plaintiff to give evidence that consideration had in fact passed. We are not aware that this decision has been the subject of adverse comment, and a number of years have passed since the ruling was made. "We think that the view taken by the learned judges in that case is a reasonable one. The circumstances of this case are somewhat stronger, for here we have a mortgage executed so far back as the 15th of December, 1896, and no steps whatsoever have been taken for the obtaining of possession of the property by the mortgagees until the last day of limitation, namely, the 14th of December, 1908, a period of 12 years. The learned judge of this court relied upon the ruling in Mahabir Prasad Rai v. Bishan Dayal Weekly Notes, 1904, p. 163. The facts of that case are unlike those in the present case. There, there was no withholding of possession for a length of time as in this case. We cannot concur in the decision of our learned brother and must allow the appeal. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree of this court and restore the decree of the lower appellate court with cists in all courts.