JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This appeal is directed against an order made by the Court below by which the value of the property directed to be sold under the decree has been assessed at a certain figure according to the statement of the decree-holder. A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that the order is not one under sec. 47 of the Code of 1908, that it is not a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Code and is consequently not appealable as such. In support of this view, reliance has been placed upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the Case of Sivagami Achi v. Subrahmania Ayyar I. L. R. 27 Mad. 259 (1903). 2. In support of the appeal, reliance has been placed, on the other hand, upon the case of Sivasami Naickar v. Ratnasami Naickar I. L. R. 23 Mad. 568 (1900), Ramessur Proshad Singh v. Rai Sham Krissen (1901) 8 C. W. N. 257 and Ganga Prasad V. Raj Coomar Singh I. L. R. 30 Cal. 617 (1903). 3. In our opinion the decision of the question whether the order in controversy is a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Code must depend upon its nature and contents. The learned Vakil for the Appellant has contended that every judicial order made in the course of execution proceedings is an order under sec. 47 of the Code and is consequently appealable as a decree. In view of the decision of this Court in the case of Behary Lal Pundit v. Kedar Nath Mullick I. L. R. 18 Cal. 169 (1891) this position cannot possibly be maintained. It was there pointed out that an interlocutory order in the course of the execution proceedings which decides, for instance, a point of law arising incidentally or otherwise, is not a decree within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Code of 1882. It is reasonably plain from the terms of sec. 2 that an order to be a decree must conclusively determine the rights of the parties. If any other view were adopted, the result would be that an appeal would be preferred against every order in the course of execution proceedings ; in other words, proceedings in execution could be arrested at every stage by an appeal on behalf of the judgment-debtor. If any other view were adopted, the result would be that an appeal would be preferred against every order in the course of execution proceedings ; in other words, proceedings in execution could be arrested at every stage by an appeal on behalf of the judgment-debtor. This could hardly have been contemplated by the framers of the Code. It has also been suggested by the learned Vakil for the Appellant that if this order is not now set aside, he may be prejudiced later on, in the event of an application to set aside the execution sale on the ground of material irregularity and substantial injury. In our opinion, this apprehension is entirely groundless. The order does not involve a judicial adjudication of the value of the properties which would be binding upon the parties in any subsequent proceeding. The application of the judgment-debtor for time was refused and the Court proceeded to assess the value of the property according to the statement of the decree-holder. The decree-holder with full notice of the assertion of the judgment-debtor that the true value of the property is very much higher than what has been mentioned in the sale-proclamation, proceeds to sell it at his risk, and if after the sale any question arises as to the true value of the property it must be determined in the proceedings under r. 90, Or. 21 of the Code. We may observe that the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Sivasami Naickar v. Ratnasami Naickar I. L. R. 23 Mad. 568 (1900), which was followed by this Court in the case of Ramessur Proshad Singh v. Rai Sham Krissen 8 C. W. N. 257 (1901), has been overruled in the case of Sivagami Achi v. Subrahmania Ayyar I. L. R. 27 Mad. 259 (1903), where the learned Judges of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court also dissented from the decision of this Court in Ganga Prasad v. Raj Coomar Singh I. L. R. 30 Cal. 617 (1903). We are inclined to hold that the view taken in Sivagami Achi v. Subrahmania Ayyar I. L. R. 27 Mad. 259 (1903) gives effect to the true intention of the Legislature. In this view, it is not necessary to consider the question raised in the cases of Kashi Persad Singh v. Jamuna Pershad Singh I. L. R. 31 Cal. We are inclined to hold that the view taken in Sivagami Achi v. Subrahmania Ayyar I. L. R. 27 Mad. 259 (1903) gives effect to the true intention of the Legislature. In this view, it is not necessary to consider the question raised in the cases of Kashi Persad Singh v. Jamuna Pershad Singh I. L. R. 31 Cal. 922 (1904) and Saurendra Mohan Tagore v. Hirruk Chand 12 C. W. N. 542 (1907), namely, to what extent is it obligatory upon the executing Court to hold an investigation into the value of the property sought to be sold by the decree-holder. But it may be observed that the observations of the Judicial Committee in the case of Saadatmand Khan v. Phul Kuar I. L. R. 20 All. 412 (1898) indicate that an elaborate investigation is not necessary. The decree-holder runs a risk if he puts in a valuation which is manifestly erroneous ; if it is established later on, that the judgment-debtor has suffered substantial injury by reason of such under-valuation, the sale is liable to be set aside under the provisions of the Code. 4. We may further point out that if the contention of the Appellant prevails, whereas there would be only one appeal under the Code from a decision upon the question of valuation in the course of proceedings for reversal of the sale under Rule 90 of Or. 21, there would be a first and a second appeal against an order for assessment of valuation antecedent to the sale. This could hardly have been intended by the Legislature. 5. The result, therefore, is that the preliminary objection is allowed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing-fee at three gold mohurs. Let the record be sent down at once.