JUDGMENT 1. The subject-matter of the litigation which has given rise to this appeal consists of a tract of land described in the plaint as covering about 120 bighas but found subsequently on measurement to cover about 200 bighas. The case for the Plaintiff is that the disputed land is comprised in Mouzah Alilaipur whereas the case for the Defendants is that it is part of their property Bul Pabla. The Courts below have concurrently dismissed the suit on the ground that the Plaintiff has failed to establish his title as well as possession within 12 years of the commencement of the suit. The decision of the District Judge has been assailed before us on behalf of the Plaintiff substantially on two grounds, namely, first, that the question of title has been erroneously decided by reason of the reception of evidence which is inadmissible in law, and, secondly, that the question of limitation has been erroneously decided because the evidence has not been examined from the point of view of the nature of the land. 2. In so far as the first branch of the contention of the Appellant is concerned, it may be stated at the outset that the Plaintiff relied mainly on the thak map of 1856 whereas the Defendants relied upon the map prepared in 1865 under the supervision of the Deputy Collector, Babu Brahmo Nath Sen. The Plaintiff contended before the District Judge that the map of 1865 was not admissible in evidence against him 5 but this objection was overruled on the ground that the map on the face of it showed that it was prepared in 1865 and was consequently admissible under sec. 90 of the Indian Evidence Act. In our opinion this position cannot possibly be maintained. Sec. 90 of the Indian Evidence Act only shows that the map was prepared at the time at which it purports to have been made by the officer whose signature it bears, but it does not establish the accuracy of the map. But in the Court below as also in this Court it has been contended that the map is a public map, as was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna I. L. R. 27 Cal. 943 (1900) and by this Court in the case of Sital Chandra Ghatak v. Mohendra Kumar Mitra (Reg. 943 (1900) and by this Court in the case of Sital Chandra Ghatak v. Mohendra Kumar Mitra (Reg. Appeals 37 and 57 of 1907 by Woodroffe and Richardson, JJ., dated 12th July 1910. Unreported). In answer to this contention it has been argued on behalf of the Plaintiff that these judgments cannot be used against him for the purpose of establishing that the map is a public map the accuracy of which may be presumed under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. In our opinion this position is incontestable. The question whether the map is a public document within the meaning of sec. 74 of the Indian Evidence Act is prima facie a question of fact and the mere circumstance that the map in question was treated as a public map in some earlier litigation to which the Plaintiff was not a party does not bind the Plaintiff. It turns out, however, upon an examination of the proceedings in the case of Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna I. L. R. 27 Cal. 943 (1900) that the map in question was not treated as a public map. It appears that at the time of that litigation the surveyor, Mahim Chandra Bose, was dead and consequently two persons of the names of Sital Chandra Mitra and Munshi Mazhuruddin Mahomed who had been present at the time the map was prepared were examined to explain the circumstances of its preparation. It further appears from a passage in the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that the map was not treated as a public map and it was expressly sated that the evidence of conduct of the parties made it clear that it was entitled to no less than the degree of authority which attaches to Government surveys generally. It has been explained to us that in the earlier litigation, the conduct of the parties to which reference is made in the judgment of the Judicial Committee consisted in the circumstance that the map was mentioned in a certain lease which was apparently binding upon the parties. In the case before us, the map is not mentioned in the lease. It is therefore impossible to hold that the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna I. L. R. 27 Cal. In the case before us, the map is not mentioned in the lease. It is therefore impossible to hold that the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna I. L. R. 27 Cal. 943 (1900) and of this Court in Sital Chandra Ghatak v. Mohendra Kumar Mitra (Reg. Appeals 37 and 57 of 1907 by Woodroffe and Richardson, JJ., dated 12th July 1910. Unreported) proves conclusively against the Plaintiff that the map is a public map. On the other hand, it is fairly clear that the map is a private document. It appears to have been prepared at the instance of the Collector who was in charge of the Syedpur Trust Estate because he was dissatisfied with thak map of 1856. We have not been informed whether any steps were taken for the correction of the thak map, in the manner provided for that purpose, by an appeal to the superior revenue authorities. If such proceedings had been taken the result would undoubtedly have been indicated on the thak map itself. Consequently the true position appears to be that we have on the one hand the thak map and on the other the map of 1865 which was prepared at the instance of the Collector in his capacity as the holder of the Syedpur Trust Estate. Consequently the map must be treated as a private document; and if it is treated as a private document there can be no question that its accuracy has to be established, because, it has been laid down by a series of decisions of this Court that sec. 83 of the Indian Evidence Act has no application to maps prepared by an officer of Government while he is in charge of properties as a private proprietor. In support of this position reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in the cases of Junmajoy Mallik v. Dwarka Nath Mytee I. L. R. 5 Cal. 287 (1879), Ram Chunder Sao v. Bunseedhar Naik I. L. R. 9 Cal. 741 (1883) Kanta Prosad v. Jagat Chandra Dutt I. L. R. 23 Cal. 335 (1895) and the observation in the case of Dinomoni Chowdhurani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhurani I. L. R. 29 Cal. 187 (1901). The contrary view adopted in the case of Taruck. 287 (1879), Ram Chunder Sao v. Bunseedhar Naik I. L. R. 9 Cal. 741 (1883) Kanta Prosad v. Jagat Chandra Dutt I. L. R. 23 Cal. 335 (1895) and the observation in the case of Dinomoni Chowdhurani v. Brojo Mohini Chowdhurani I. L. R. 29 Cal. 187 (1901). The contrary view adopted in the case of Taruck. Nath Mookerjee v, Mohendra Nath Ghose (13 W. R. 56 (1870)) which was decided in 1870 before the Indian Evidence Act was passed cannot in view of the later decisions be treated as good law. Consequently before the Defendants can be allowed to use the map against the Plaintiff, they must be called upon to establish its accuracy. But even if its accuracy is established other circumstances have to be taken into consideration which may affect its evidentiary value. The learned Vakil for the Appellant has contended upon the authority of the case of Kerr v. Nuzzer Mahomed 2 W. R. 28 P.O. (1864) and Kanta Prasad v. Jagat Chandra Dutt I. L. R. 23 Cal. 335 (1895) that a map prepared for one purpose cannot be used for a totally different purpose, a purpose wholly irrelevant to the subject of dispute in the earlier litigation. The Courts below do not appear to have considered the evidentiary value of the map from this point of view. It cannot be disputed as pointed out by this Court in the cases of Moni Roy v. Rajbunsee Koer 25 W. R. 393 (1876) and Ranajit Sinha v. Basanta Kumar Ghose 9 C. L. J. 597 (1908) that even though the boundaries between two villages may have been demarcated as between two contesting parties with regard to one portion of estate, if an attempt is made in a subsequent litigation between the same parties to use the map with regard to another portion of the boundaries, the matter requires careful scrutiny. If therefore this map is duly proved and is ultimately used as evidence against the Plaintiff, the Court must consider how far the boundaries in so far as the lands now in dispute are concerned, were in view when the map was prepared. If it is established that the portion of the boundary now in dispute was also directly in dispute at the time when the map was prepared, the map would be of considerable value ; otherwise its evidentiary value would be diminished. If it is established that the portion of the boundary now in dispute was also directly in dispute at the time when the map was prepared, the map would be of considerable value ; otherwise its evidentiary value would be diminished. The learned Vakil for the Appellant has further contended that the map is not signed either by the owners or the tenants of the adjoining lands and that unless it is established that the map was prepared, if not with the assent, at least with the knowledge of the proprietors of the neighbouring lands affected by the demarcation, its evidentiary value would be very little. This contention is supported by the cases of Omrita Lal Chowdhry v. Kalee Pershad Shaha 25 W. R. 179 (1876), The Collector of Rajshahye v. Doorga Soondaree Debia 2 W. R. 210 (1865) and Nobo Coomar v. Gobind Chunder 9 C. L. R. 305 (1881). The mere recital on the face of the map that other persons had notice of the proceedings would not by any means be conclusive specially in the absence of the signature, such as is usual on the maps, by the holders of the neighbouring land. Consequently if the map is used in evidence this circumstance also must be borne in mind. The learned Vakil for the Appellant has further contended that the map of 1865 appears to be based on the chitta of 1234 and as that chitta itself was prepared by guess, the evidentiary value of the map cannot exceed that of the chitta. The Courts below do not appear to have considered the matter from this point of view, which has obviously to be taken into consideration if the map is to be used in evidence against the Plaintiff. In answer to this contention of the Appellant, it has been argued by the learned Vakils for the Respondents that no objection ought to be allowed to be taken to the admissibility of the map as such objection was not taken in the Courts below. We are unable to hold that objection was not raised to the reception of the map in evidence, although it is quite possible that the objection was not formulated with the precision with which it has been taken in this Court. We are unable to hold that objection was not raised to the reception of the map in evidence, although it is quite possible that the objection was not formulated with the precision with which it has been taken in this Court. No doubt, if objection has not been taken to the admissibility of a map which would be admissible if certain requirements were fulfilled, the objection cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage, as laid down in the cases of Girindra Chandra Ganguly v. Rajendra Nath Chatterjee 1 C. W. N. 531 (1897), Ganga Narain Choudhry v. Radhika Mohun Roy 21 W. R. 115(1873) and Madhabi Sundari v. Gaganendra Nath Tagore 9 C. W.N. 111 (1904). These cases, however, are clearly distinguishable ; and the substantial objection which has been raised in this Court was taken undoubtedly before the District Judge, if not also before the Court of first instance. It has further been contended by the learned Vakils for the Respondent that even if the map is not admissible under sec. 83 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is admissible under secs. 13 and 14 of the Act, as laid down by this Court in the case of Junmajoy Mullik v. Dwarka Nath Mytee I. L. R. 5 Cal. 287 (1879). This argument, however, even if it is assumed to be correct, is of no assistance to the Respondents. If the map is used in evidence under secs. 13 and 14 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is evidence merely of an assertion of the title which is now put forward by the Defendants so far back as 1865; but the map has been used by the learned District Judge as showing clearly that the thak map is incorrect ; and for that purpose it is essential to establish that the map itself is correct. 3. It has finally been suggested by the learned Vakils for the Respondents that the learned District Judge has given an independent reason for the rejection of the thak map and that consequently apart from the map of 1865 the Plaintiff cannot possibly succeed. Our attention has been invited to a solitary passage in the judgment of the learned District Judge in which he observes that thak maps go upon possession, but here the land was all jungle and there was no visible physical possession. Our attention has been invited to a solitary passage in the judgment of the learned District Judge in which he observes that thak maps go upon possession, but here the land was all jungle and there was no visible physical possession. Now it may be conceded that, as was pointed in the case of Joytara Dassi v. Mahomed Mobarruk I. L. R. 8 Cal. 975 (1882), the evidentiary value of thak maps would be affected by the condition of the land at the time the survey was made. But obviously the thak map cannot be ignored upon a general allegation that the land at the time was jungle. It is conceivable that the land in dispute was not jungle at the time and was quite capable of survey at the time. Consequently if the learned District Judge based his judgment merely upon the observation upon which reliance is placed, it would be necessary to direct a further enquiry into the matter. It has been suggested as a last resort by the learned Vakils for "the Respondent that the map was prepared at the instance of the common superior landlord of both the parties and that consequently it may be used in evidence by either party against the other. This contention does not appear to have been raised in either of the Courts below and we have no evidence on the record to show that the title under which the Plaintiff claims was created subsequent to the survey of 1865. It is obvious that if his title is antecedent to 1865, the map could not be used against him on the ground suggested. We must therefore hold upon the first branch of the case for the Appellant that the decision of the District Judge upon the question of title cannot be supported. In so far as the second branch of the case for the Appellant is concerned, reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Mirza Shamsher Bahadur v. Munshi Kunj Behari Lal 7 C. L. J. 414 : s c 12 C. W. N. 273 (1907). In our opinion the decision of the District Judge upon the question of limitation also cannot be supported. In the first place his decision upon the question of possession is inextricably mixed up with the decision of title which as we have said cannot be supported. In our opinion the decision of the District Judge upon the question of limitation also cannot be supported. In the first place his decision upon the question of possession is inextricably mixed up with the decision of title which as we have said cannot be supported. In the second place, the learned District Judge does not appear to have considered the nature of the land. It is clear upon the evidence that up to at least 1874, the land was covered with jungle. It has been stated to us that according to the evidence, even on the side of the Defendants themselves, portions of the land were brought under cultivation within 12 years of the commencement of the suit. Consequently the claim of the Plaintiff cannot be treated as barred by limitation in respect of such lands. It is further clear that if the thak map goes on possession, the evidence of possession must be considered from an entirely different point of view and in the case of jungle lands possession prima facie is with the person whose title is established. We are of opinion that the case must go back not merely for the decision of the question of title but also for reconsideration of the question of limitation. The result therefore is that this appeal is allowed, the decision of the District Judge set aside and the case remanded to him for re-consideration. The Defendants will have opportunity to prove the map of 1865 and the District Judge will for that purpose give necessary direction for the reception of evidence by the Court of first instance. The Plaintiff will have opportunity to rebut any new evidence that may be adduced by the Defendants. New evidence will not be admissible in so far as the question of possession is concerned. The costs of this appeal will abide the result.