Judgement Appeal from a decree of the above Court (March 27, 1907) modifying a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Lucknow (March 30, 1906). The suit was brought on April 1, 1905, praying for a declaration that all the property comprised in three deeds of endowment dated respectively December 4, 1886, March 7, 1898, and November 13, 1902, was waqfnama. The appellants sued as trustees under the said deeds and prayed for possession. The Sub ordinate Judge dismissed the suit as regards all the property to which it related. The Judicial Commissioner affirmed this decree as regards the property comprised in the deed of November 13, 1902, but allowed the appeal and granted the appellants a decree as regards the property comprised in two earlier deeds. The respondents did not cross-appeal, but the appellants submitted that the third deed of endowment should also be upheld. With regard to the deed of November 13, 1902, the Subordinate Judge found that " its intelligent execution by her has not been proved. In my opinion the document is not such as should be given effect to. Proof of a mere formal execution by an illiterate pardanishin in favour of her mukhtar is wholly insufficient." He also found that " no change was brought about in revenue records to shew a change in the nature of the possession." The Judicial Commissioner found that "it has not been proved that when Mehdi Begam executed the waqfnama she understood its provisions or its effect upon her interests." He also found that " Mehdi Begam was an illiterate pardanashin woman separated from her husband under circumstances which are stated in Sideman Kadr v. Mehdi Begam Surrey a. (( 1893) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 144 ; S. C. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 135.) The effect of the deed of 1902 if valid appears to have been to strip her of almost all her property, for it left her in possession of some movable property not shewn to have been of any great value and a wasika and pension which brought her in less than Rs.40 per mensem. The deed was registered not at her house where she lived with her brother but at the Rouza. The deed was registered not at her house where she lived with her brother but at the Rouza. Under these circumstances any one who relies upon the deed must prove that she understood its effect upon her position and probably also that she had independent advice.” Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Ross, for the appellants, contended that the evidence proved the intelligent and effective execution of the deed of November 13, 1902, by Mehdi Begam, especially in the absence of any rebutting evidence by the respondents. They referred to Tacoordeen Tewarry v. Nawab Syed Ali Hossein Khan (( 1874) L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 192.), Ashgar Ali v. Delroos Banoo Begum (( 1877) I. L. R. 3 Calc. 324, 328.), Sudisht Lal v. Sheobarat Koer (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 39.), Mahomed Buksh Khan v. Hosseini Bibi (( 1888) L. R. 15 Ind. Ap. 81, 83.), Hakim Muhammad Ikramuddin v. Najiban (( 1898) L. R. 25 Ind. Ap. 137, 141.), and Shambati Koeri v. Jago Bibi. (L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 127.) De Gruyther, K.C., and Cowell, for the respondent Basti Begam, widow of Abid Husain, the first defendant and heir of Mehdi Begam, contended that the onus was on the appellants strictly to prove their case and that they had failed to discharge it. Reference was made to Shambati Koeri v. Jago Bibi. (L, R. 29 Ind. Ap. 127, 130.) There was no evidence of either explanation of the deed or of Mehdi Begams understanding of the transaction. The effect of the concurrent findings to that effect was conclusive see Karappanan Servai v. Srinivasan Chetti (( 1901) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 38.), Allen v. Quebec Warehouse Co. (( 1886) 12 App. Cas. 101, 104.), Ram Anugra Narain Singh v. Chowdhry Hanuman Sahai(( 1902) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 41.), and Act XIV. of 1882, s. 596. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Oudh, dated March 27, 1907, modifying a decree of the Sub ordinate Judge of Lucknow, dated March 30, 1906. The suit was brought on April 1, 1905. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Oudh, dated March 27, 1907, modifying a decree of the Sub ordinate Judge of Lucknow, dated March 30, 1906. The suit was brought on April 1, 1905. It prayed for a declaration that all the property comprised in three deeds ox endowment was waqf, that is to say, was endowed property, and the plaintiffs (the present appellants) as trustees under these deeds prayed for possession. The claim in short was, as stated, a " claim for possession of waqf property by right of trusteeship." The claim of the appellants was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge in its entirety. Upon appeal, the Appellate Court upheld this decree with respect to the property comprised in one of the three deeds of endowment, namely, that of November 13, 1902, and reversed it with respect to the property included in the other two deeds. That is to say the endowments under these two deeds were held good. The only question raised in the present appeal has reference to the last endowment, namely, that constituted by the deed of 1902. The preceding deeds, one dated in 1886 and one in 1898, were somewhat limited in their character, and the defendants contention under which these deeds were attacked is not now further insisted on. Many years ago a tomb, or, more properly speaking,—as their Lordships are informed—a mausoleum, was erected in the city of Lucknow by one Madad Ali, now dead ; and in 1886 he made a waqf of certain property for the upkeep of the mausoleum and the performance of religious observances in connection therewith. By the deed of endowment Mehdi Begam was appointed one of two trustees, and upon the death of her co-trustee in 1899 she con tinued to manage the property alone. In March, 1898, she executed a document whereby she purported to add to the endowment, and she appointed the first plaintiff and her brother, the first defendant, to be trustees of the original and added property. There appears to be no doubt that Mehdi Begam was much interested in the mausoleum and in its endowment, its upkeep, and its services. In March, 1898, she executed a document whereby she purported to add to the endowment, and she appointed the first plaintiff and her brother, the first defendant, to be trustees of the original and added property. There appears to be no doubt that Mehdi Begam was much interested in the mausoleum and in its endowment, its upkeep, and its services. She died on February 4, 1903, having on the previous 13th day of November executed another deed—that with regard to which the parties are now in contention. Mehdi Begam was a pardanishin woman; she was separated from her husband, she was unable to read or write, and she was possessed at the date of the deed which is questioned of a fortune of about Rs.50.000. It is not disputed that, in the ordinary case of a deed granted by a pardanishin lady, it rests upon those founding upon the document to establish that she understood its effect and that the deed was intelligently and properly executed by her. The waqf is undoubtedly of a comprehensive character. It proceeds upon the following narrative—" Whereas this world is unstable and no reliance can be placed on this borrowed life, and after death there remains no trace either of soul or body, and whosoever has come to this world from non-existence will be completely annihilated one day, according to the proverb all that lies over it is mortal ; but through good and charitable deeds, or from ones male issue, if he is good and obedient, the continuance of ones names is possible. I, the declarant, have no issue of any kind from whom I may hope for the endurance of my name, consequently it seems proper to incline myself to the performance of good deeds. " The deed thereupon proceeds to endow " With possession in the name of the undermentioned places in my lifetime in connection with the Rouza and for its maintenance, stability, and expenses, and also for sending people to Karbala and other holy places, as detailed below, my personal, moveable and immoveable property, as specified hereafter, valued at Rs.50,000." She constituted herself as mutawalli, that is, as the manager of the religious endowment, and she appointed her brother and her general agent as trustees. Among the succeeding clauses the following appears to be important—" That the trustees shall in my lifetime, as well as after my death, continue to manage the under mentioned things just like myself, and the carrying out of the undermentioned things and of the above conditions shall also be binding and incumbent on me, as it is incumbent according to the Imamia law. And for my livelihood my wasika and pension are sufficient." That pension amounted, as is admitted, to somewhere under Rs.40 per month. Power is given for collection of the income of all property conveyed, such collection to rest only in the general agent, who wa3 one of the trustees. The document may be described shortly as an inter vivos conveyance, taking effect de praesenti and stripping the lady of all her possessions, except to the extent of the reservation made to herself of her pension of Rs.40 per month. It appears to their Lordships that the deed accordingly is of a character justifying a strict and careful application of the rule operating for the protection of pardanishin women and demanding affirmative proof on the subject of their intelligent understanding and execution of deeds attributed to them. This view is strengthened by the marked contrast which exists between this document of 1902 and the previous deed of endowment; of 1898, which was limited in its scope, was purely testamentary, and expressly reserved powers of management of all the affairs of the endowed property to the lady herself, with power of amending and cancelling the endowment. "According to the principles which have always guided the Courts in dealing with sales or gifts made by ladies in such a position (pardanishin ladies), the strongest and most satisfactory proof ought to be given by the person who claims under a sale or gift from them, that the transaction was a real and bona fide one and fully understood by the lady whose property is dealt with." This is the language of Sir Montague Smith in Tacoordeen Tewarry v. Nawab Syed Ali Hossein Khan { L. R. 1 Ind. Ap. 206,), and is still the law. In the words of Sir Andrew Scoble in Shambati Koeri v. Jago Bibi(L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. Ap. 206,), and is still the law. In the words of Sir Andrew Scoble in Shambati Koeri v. Jago Bibi(L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 131.), " It is a well-known rule of this Committee that in the case of deeds and powers executed by pardanashin ladies, it is requisite that those who rely upon them should satisfy the Court that they have been explained to and understood by those who executed them." Accordingly, the one and only question in this case is The burden of proof being thus placed, has it been discharged by the party upon whom it rests ? In their Lordships opinion, Mr. De Gruyther was justified in founding upon the concurrent findings in fact of the Courts below. The Subordinate Judge, having heard the evidence, says " It does not satisfy me that Mehdi Begam intelligently understood the deed on which she was placing her seal, and knew at the time its effect upon her rights as owner of the property comprised in the deed." It is unnecessary to go into the details as to the alleged execution of the document in the zenana, as to whether certain witnesses knew the voice of the executant, as to whether the deed in point of fact was read, or was read in circumstances giving any indication of its appreciation by the grantor. The finding of the Subordinate Judge is as stated. In the judgment passed by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh the opinion expressed was as follows " It has not been proved that when Mehdi Begam executed the waqfnama she understood its provisions or its effect upon her interests." By s. 596 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV-of 1882) it is specifically provided as follows with reference to appeals to His Majesty the King in Council " Where the decree appealed from affirms a decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such decree, the appeal must involve some substantial question of law." Their Lordships put to the learned counsel for the appellants what question of law was here involved, and it was replied that, while the findings of fact were concurrent, the judgment of the Subordinate Judge shewed that he had misdirected himself. It turned out that this was rested upon the ground that in the course of a long judgment certain materials for arriving at a conclusion had not been set out in the narrative which the judgment contains. These materials were of the most elementary character; and their Lordships are of opinion that there is no ground for the suggestion that the Subordinate Judge had not taken them into account. It would be to misconstrue entirely the provisions as to concurrent findings in fact if the judges of India were to have impliedly the duty laid upon them of making their narrative of the circumstances minutely and completely exhaustive, under the penalty that, if they failed to do so, the absence from their mind of elementary considerations might be presumed. The Courts below accordingly having concurrently found that the facts which it lay upon the appellants to establish were not proved, it appears to their Lordships that this is to all intents and purposes a concurrent finding on a matter of fact, and that accordingly such a finding cannot be disturbed. The rule so clearly laid down by Lord Macnaghten in Karuppanan Servai v. Srimvasan Chetti(L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 38.) should be followed. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.