JUDGMENT Ralph Benson, J. 1. In this case fourteen persons were tried by a Special Bench of this Court, constituted under Section 6(b) of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 108, for an offence punishable under Section 121A, Indian Penal Code (conspiring to commit certain offences against the State), and also with abetting the murder of Mr. Ashe. The Special Bench acquitted all the accused on the latter charge. The majority of the Court (Sir Arnold White, C.J., and Ayling, J.,) convicted the first seven and the 14th accused of the offence charged under Section 121A and acquitted the remainder. The third Judge of the Special Bench (Sankaran Nair, J.,) convicted the 1st, 2nd, 6th and 14th accused and acquitted the remainder. The late Advocate-General has given a certificate under Clause 26 of the Amended Letters Patent of 1865 to the effect that the decision of the Court on certain specified points of law requires further consideration. The present Advocate-General, who, as Public Prosecutor, appeared for the Crown at the trial, raises a preliminary objection that the Letters Patent do not authorize the grant of a certificate in a case tried by a Special Bench appointed under the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908. His contention is that cases under the Act must be dealt with in accordance with the special procedure prescribed by the Act and that there is no provision in it for a review of judgment either on a certificate from the Advocate-General or otherwise. The Act, however, does not profess to lay down complete rules of procedure: the ordinary procedure has to be followed except in so far as it is modified by the Act: there is nothing in the Act to modify the ordinary procedure in this particular respect: Clause 26 of the Letters Patent gives power to the High Court on the Advocate-Generals certificate to review in every case mentioned in Clause 25 of the Letters Patent, i.e., in "any criminal trial before the Courts of original criminal jurisdiction which may be constituted by one or more of the Judges of the said High Court.", The present trial satisfies these conditions and is, therefore, open to review on a certificate granted by the Advocate-General. 2. The points of law which are certified as requiring further consideration are stated as follows in the certificate of the Advocate-General: 1. 2. The points of law which are certified as requiring further consideration are stated as follows in the certificate of the Advocate-General: 1. That in my judgment the opinion of the majority of the Court that the evidence of an accomplice need not be corroborated in material particulars, before it can be acted upon, and that it would be open to the Court to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice if the Court was satisfied that the evidence was true, requires to be further considered; and it requires to be farther considered whether Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, read with Section 114, illustration (b), does not merely intend to lay down that a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not illegal where the presumption of untrustworthiness attaching to the evidence of an accomplice is rebutted by special circumstances. 2. That in my judgment the opinion of the majority of the Court that the previous statements of an accomplice can legally amount to corroboration of the evidence given by him at the trial should be further considered. 3. That in my judgment the opinion of the majority of the Court that the statements made by P.W. No. 6 and P.W. No. 12 to P.W. No. 31 were made to an authority legally competent to investigate the facts within the meaning of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, should be further considered. 4. That in my judgment the opinion of the majority of the Court that the statements of P.W. No. 6 and P.W. No. 12 to P.W. No. 3 I were not rendered inadmissible by reason of the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, should be further considered. 5. That in my judgment the opinion of the learned Judges, that, while the statements made by a person to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation and taken down in writing may not be proved by the production of the writing, they may be proved by oral evidence requires to be further considered. 3. 5. That in my judgment the opinion of the learned Judges, that, while the statements made by a person to a Police Officer in the course of an investigation and taken down in writing may not be proved by the production of the writing, they may be proved by oral evidence requires to be further considered. 3. The facts of the case, so far as is necessary to understand the questions raised, may be briefly stated as follows: The accused are alleged by the prosecution t) have conspired at various places between January 1910 and 17th June 1911 with certain persons not now before the Court, viz., with one Vanchi Aiyar, who is proved to have shot himself on the 17th June 1911 immediately after murdering Mr. Ashe, (who was then District Magistrate of Tinnevelly), one Dharmaraja Aiyar, who is now dead, (the case for the Grown being that he committed suicide) and one Madasami who has absconded, and also with three others, Arumugam, Somasundaram and Ramaswami Aiyar, who were given a pardon under the visual conditions and taken as approvers and called as witnesses (Nos. 6, 12 and 16) for the prosecution in this case. The approvers have given evidence as to a certain treasonable society founded by the 1st accused, Nilakantam, of which they were all members. They have also given evidence of meetings of thesociety at Tenkasi and Tuticorin and elsewhere attended by the accused, and there is no question but that, if the accused were present at these meetings and took the "blood oath" as alleged by the approvers, they are guilty. The chief evidence against the accused is the evidence of the several approvers. They are admittedly accomplices. The questions of law that have been raised relate to the legal validity of an accomplices evidence, if uncorroborated, and to the admissibility and legal effect of certain statements made by two of the accomplices (Arumugam and Somasundaram) in this case prior to the trial. The following are the circumstances under which the statements were made.--Mr. Ashe was murdered for political reasons by. Vanchi Aiyar on the 17th June, and Vanchi immediately afterwards shot himself. When his house at Shenoottah was searched next day, (18th), certain letters were found which showed that Arumugam (P.W. No. 6) was in 3ommunication with him; soon the evening of the next day (19th) immediately after the arrival of Mr. Ashe was murdered for political reasons by. Vanchi Aiyar on the 17th June, and Vanchi immediately afterwards shot himself. When his house at Shenoottah was searched next day, (18th), certain letters were found which showed that Arumugam (P.W. No. 6) was in 3ommunication with him; soon the evening of the next day (19th) immediately after the arrival of Mr. Thomas, the Deputy Inspector-General of the Criminal Investigation Department, a party of Police was despatched to Tuticorin to search his house. The party was in charge of Mr. Johnson, Assistant Superintendent of Polios, a Gazetted Officer of three years standing, and of Veeraghava Aiyar (P.W. No. 3i), an Inspector of the C. I D, who had just arrived with Mr. Thomas from Madura. Having arrived at Tuticorin, the party surrounded the house of Arumu?am about two hours after midnight and sealed it with a view to search it after daybreak. Arumugam was awakened and told that his house would be searched in connection with the murder and he was asked if he knew anything about it. He then offered to tell all he knew, and his statement thereupon taken and recordedin thelnspectors note-book. On information given by Arumugam, the house of Somasundaram (P.W. No. 12) was searched the next day, and he in like manner made a statement to Veeraraghava Aiyar, which was recorded by him. Three days later, both the33 men made statements substantially to the same effect to Mr. Cox, the Magistrate, which he recorded under Section 154, Criminal Procedure Code. At the trial before the Special Bench, which began in the following September and went on for some months, Arumugam and Somasundaram were examined as witnesses for the prosecution and gave evidence, as already stated, involving not only their own guilt, but also the guilt of several of the accused whotook the "blood oath" at the treasonable meetings held at Teakasi and Tuticorin. In order to corroborate this evidence of the accomplices, given at the trial, the prosecution relied on the statements recorded by the Magistrate, Mr. Cox. They also called the Inspector, Veeraraghava Aiyar, to give evidence of the statements made to him by the accomplices. The defence objected to this evidence as inadmissible, but the majority of the Special Bench held that the Inspector might give oral evidence of the statements made to him, but could not use the writing in his note-book as evidence. Cox. They also called the Inspector, Veeraraghava Aiyar, to give evidence of the statements made to him by the accomplices. The defence objected to this evidence as inadmissible, but the majority of the Special Bench held that the Inspector might give oral evidence of the statements made to him, but could not use the writing in his note-book as evidence. The learned Judges of the Special Bench state in their judgments that the extent to which, and the conditions under which, the evidence of accomplices should be acted upon was the subject of much argument and contention before them, and their judgments show that they considered the various questions raised with the greatest care and came to their conclusions after a full examination not only of the codified law of India, but also of the case-law of the Courts in England and India relating to the questions raised. 4. I will now turn to the five points of law which the Advocate-General certifies should be further considered. 5. 4. I will now turn to the five points of law which the Advocate-General certifies should be further considered. 5. The fir ft is thus stated, "The opinion of the majority of the Court that the evidence of an accomplice need not be corroborated in material particulars before it can be acted upon, and that it would be open to the Court to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice if the Court was satisfied that the evidence was true, requires to be further considered; and it requires to be further considered whether Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, read with Section 114, illustration (b), does not merely intend to lay down that a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not illegal where the presumption of untrustworthiness attaching to the evidence of an accomplice is rebutted by special circumstances." The substantive provision of the Indian Code law is contained in Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which, in explicit terms, declares that "An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." But with this section, it is also necessary to bear in mind Section 114, which provides that, "The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being bad to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case." To assist the Courts in applying the general words of this section, various illustrations are appended to it. One of these relates to accomplices, and it is stated as follow: "The Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars. But the Court shall also have regard to such facts as the following, in considering whether such maxim does or does not apply to the particular case before them: A., a person of the highest character, is tried for causing a mans death by an act of negligence in arranging certain machinery. By a person of equally good character, who also took part in the arrangement, describes precisely what was done, and admits and explains the common carelessness of A. and himself." And again, "a crime is committed by several persons. By a person of equally good character, who also took part in the arrangement, describes precisely what was done, and admits and explains the common carelessness of A. and himself." And again, "a crime is committed by several persons. A., B. and C, three of the criminals, are captured on the spot and kept apart from each other. Each gives an account of the crime implicating D. and the accounts corroborate each other in such a manner as to render previous concert highly improbable." In my opinion, there is nothing in the illustration (b) to Section 114 which overrides, or renders nugatory, the plain and explicit declaration contained in Section 133, or which requires us to hold that the evidence of an accomplice must always, and in all circumstances, he regarded as unworthy of credit unless it is corroborated in material particulars, or which requires us to hold that it is not open to the Court to act on such evidence, even when the Court believes it to be perfectly true. The very terms of the illustration itself appear to be intended to guard against such an interpretation. The words are "the Court may presume" (not "the Court shall presume") "that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars." But it then adds a caution to show that the presumed unworthiness is not a rule of universal application. It styles the presumption "a maxim," not a rule of law, and says, "but the Court shall also have regard to certain facts in considering whether such maxim does or does not apply to the particular case before it." It then refers to the case of a person of the highest character giving evidence of an offence committed by the negligence of himself and another person of equally high character. The witness is an accomplice, and he is not corroborated in any particular, still less in material particulars, yet the Court should have regard to various circumstances, viz., the high character of the witness, and of the accused, and the nature of the offence alleged, and would be at liberty to refuse to draw any presumption against the credibility of the witness, even though his evidence stood alone and uncorroborated. 6. 6. Judges do, no doubt, ordinarily regard the evidence of accomplices with great suspicion, and rightly so, for reasons which are so manifest and so often stated that it is unnecessary to re-state them here, and Judges do ordinarily require corroboration in material particulars before they will act on the evidence of an accomplice, It is the duty of the Judge to explain to the Jury the taint and infirmity which ordinarily attach to the evidence of an accomplice, and to remind them that they may presume that his evidence is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars. But it is also his duty to refer to any circumstances or facts (such as those referred to in the illustrations to Section 114) which show that the presumption should not be drawn in the particular case or which rebut the presumption, if drawn, and he should instruct them that if, having scrutinised the evidence of the accomplice with care and caution, and having considered it in the light of the circumstances in which it was given, and all other circumstances, tending to show its truth or falsehood, they believe it to be true, they should act upon if, even though there may be no corroboration of it in the strict sense of the word, but that if they are not satisfied of its truth, they should refuse to act upon if. 7. This is, in effect, how the majority of the Special Bench have laid down the law. In. my opinion they have correctly stated the law as laid down in the Indian Evidence Act, and in the Indian and English cases quoted by them: Beg. v. Ramaswami Padayachi 1 M. 394; Ramasami Gounden v. Emperor 27 M. 271 at p. 290 : 14 M.L.J. 226 : 1 Cr. L.J. 641 per Bhashyam Iyengar, J., Queen-Empress v. Goberdhan 9 A. 528 at p. 554 per Edge, C.J. Reg. v. Boyes 9 Cox. C.C. 32 : 1 B. and S. 311 : 2 F. and F. 157 : 30 L.J.Q.B. 301 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 1158 : 5 L.T. 147 : 9 W.R. 690, per Cockbarn, C.J. Reg. Gallagher 15 Cox. C.C. 291 per Coleridge, C.J., and Rex v. Tate (1908) 2 K.B. 630 : 77 L.J.K.B. 1043 : 99 L.T. 620 : 72 J.P. 391 per Lord Alverstone, C.J. 8. (N.S.) 1158 : 5 L.T. 147 : 9 W.R. 690, per Cockbarn, C.J. Reg. Gallagher 15 Cox. C.C. 291 per Coleridge, C.J., and Rex v. Tate (1908) 2 K.B. 630 : 77 L.J.K.B. 1043 : 99 L.T. 620 : 72 J.P. 391 per Lord Alverstone, C.J. 8. The suggestion made in the latter part of the Advocate-Generals first point, if I understand it aright, is that the presumption of untrustworthiness must always, and in all circumstances, first be drawn, and the evidence cannot in any case be acted upon unless "special circumstances" are found which rebut the presumption. I think this way of stating the law is less accurate than that adopted by the majority of the Special Bench and might possibly mislead Juries by leading them to think that circumstances affecting their judgment should be technically divided into two classes, special and non-special or ordinary, and that unless a circumstance could be technically labelled "special" it should not be at all considered by them. Section 114 speaks simply of facts" not "special circumstances," and the caution attached to illustration (b) merely says the Court shall also have regard to such facts as the following "not special" facts or special", circumstances. Any fact which is admissible as evidence, and which is duly proved, may, in my opinion, be considered for what it is worth, without attempting to classify it as a "special" or non-special fact. In this connection however, it may be stated that the majority of the Special Bench do, in fact, refer to a number of what may well be called special circumstances, which powerfully influences their opinion as to the credibility of the accomplice witnesses. It is, therefore, difficult to understand what practical purpose was to be served in the present case by the further consideration of the first question raised by the certificate of the Advocate General. 9. In dealing with the first point in the Advocate-Generals certificate, Mr. Givindiraghava Iyar, on behalf of the accused, desired to argue that the view of the majority of the Special Bench as to what constitutes "material particulars" in illustration (b) to Section 114is incorrect. We, however, were unanimous in holding that no such question was raise in the certificate of the Advocate-General and that it was not open to the accuseds Pleader to argue any question of law not raised in the certificate. Mr. We, however, were unanimous in holding that no such question was raise in the certificate of the Advocate-General and that it was not open to the accuseds Pleader to argue any question of law not raised in the certificate. Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar contended that as soon as a certificate was granted in regard to any point of law, the whole case was opened up for consideration under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent. That Clause is as follows: "On its being certified by the said Advocate-General that, in his judgment, there is an error in the decision of a point or points of law decided by the Court of original criminal jurisdiction, or that a point or points of law, which has or have been decided by the said Court, should be further considered, the said High Court shall have full power and authority to review the case or such part of it as may be necessary, and finally determine such point or points of law, and thereupon to alter the sentence passed by the Court of original jurisdiction, and to pass such judgment and sentence as to the said High Court shall seem right." I do not think that these words can be held to open up the whole case as if on appeal, for Clause 25 enacts that there shall be no appeal. The grant of the certificate, no doubt, gives the Court "power and authority to review the case or so much of it as may be necessary," that is, in my opinion, "necessary" in order to determine the point or points of law raised. This is clear from the words and finally determine such point or points of law" which follow the word "necessary"; after the point or points of law have been finally determined, then, or to use the word in Clause 26 "thereupon", the Court may alter the sentence and pass such judgment and sentence as may seem right; and the Court may, of course, then go into the case so far as is necessary in order to enable it to do this correctly. When the case has reached that stage, then the Court has to be guided by Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act which enacts that "the improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision." This view is in accordance with the judgments of Beaman and Davar, JJ., in the case reported in Emperor v. Narayana Raghunath Patki 32 B. 111 : 9 Bom. L.R. 789 : 6 Cr. L.J. 164 : 2 M.L.T. 414 where the question is fully discussed. 10. Turning now to the second point in the Advocate Generals certificate, it is stated as follows: "In my judgment the opinion of the majority of the Court that the previous statements of an accomplice can legally amount to corroboration of the evidence given by him at the trial, should be further considered." There were two sets of previous statements of Arumugam and Somasundaram admitted at the trial, via., (1) their statements to Inspector Veeraraghava Aiyar and (2) their statements, four and three days respectively later, to the same effect to the Magistrate, Mr. Cox, recorded by him, under Section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. I think that the opinion of the majority of the Full Bench en the question of their admissibilty is right. The law on the subject is contained in Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which re-produces in a simplified form the provision in Section 31 of Act II of 1855 and enacts that, "In order, to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact, at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved." This section, which differs widely from the English law, expressly states that a former statement made by a witness may, if made under the conditions stated in the section, be proved in order to corroborate the evidence of the witness at, the trial. No exception is made in the section, or elsewhere in the Act, so as to exclude such former statements in the case of a witness who is an accomplice. It was contended in the argument that the general rule as to the admissibility of former statements laid down in Section 157 is limited, in the case of accomplices, by a special rule to be inferred from illustration (b) to Section 114. It may, however, be, doubted whether such a method of reasoning is not contrary to accepted canons of interpretation. It seems unreasonable to hold that the express rule of law stated in Section 157 can be limited by a maxim which is not of universal application. The validity of the suggested reasoning depends on an assumption that the Court must always, and in all circumstances, presume that an. accomplice is unworthy of credit, whereas we have seen in dealing with the first point certified by the Advocate-General that there may be circumstances in which the Court would be justified in not drawing the presumption. The illustration itself gives an instance of such a case. In such a case it is impossible to see any reason why the evidence of the accomplice witness should not be corrborated by a previous statement to the same extent and subject to the same conditions as in the case of a witness who was not an accomplice. I do not think that there is anything in the Indian Evidence Act to exclude the evidence of accomplices from the plain and express rule in Section 157, nor can it be suggested that "corroborate" is used in Section 157 in a different sense from that in which it is used in illustration (b) to Section 114. The former statement of an accomplice is, therefore, legally admissible to corroborate his testimony at the trial and the weight to be attached to it, or, in other words, how far it does really corrobotate the evidence given at the trial must vary with the facts of each case. No hard and fast rule, capable of mechanical application, can be laid down. In the great majority of cases, it would, no doubt, be found to be merely the repetition of tainted evidence affording no ground for believing it to be true, and, therefore, adding nothing whatever to its value. No hard and fast rule, capable of mechanical application, can be laid down. In the great majority of cases, it would, no doubt, be found to be merely the repetition of tainted evidence affording no ground for believing it to be true, and, therefore, adding nothing whatever to its value. On the other hand, if there was evidence, or even a suggestion, put forward by the defence that the evidence given by the witness at the trial was the result of recant influences brought to bear upon him, it would be most important to be able to prove that the witness had made statements to the same effect as his evidence at the trial long before the influ"nc3S relied on by the defence had been brought to bear upon him. For example, take the accomplice, Arumugam, in the present case. He gave evidence at the trial involving several other persons besides himself, and stating various particulars about the treasonable meetings which, they attended. If the prosecution proposed to corroborate that evidence by proof of a former statement made months after his arrest, and when the Police had collected their other evidence, and had, in fact, completed the scheme of the case to be proved against the accused, it is obvious that the former statement would add no strength to, would be no real corroboration at all of the evidence of the witness at the trial. But, is not the case very different when, as was found by the majority of the Special Bench, it appears that Arumugam first told the same story at a time, and under such circumstances, as to entirely negative the idea that it was either falsely concocted by himself or suggested to him by the Police; when it appears that the story told was not what the Police wanted at that time nor was such as was supported by the evidence then in their hands, nor was such as would have been concocted by Arumugam either of his own motion, or in consultation with Madasami or Somasundaram, if he was anxious to protect himself or them from prosecution for complicity with Vanchi Aiyar in the murder of Mr. Ashe, nor was such as Arumugams previous relations with the persons then named would render probable? Ashe, nor was such as Arumugams previous relations with the persons then named would render probable? Is it not unreasonable to say that those and similar matters referred to by the majority of the Special Bench ought not to have been considered in judging whether Arumugam was a truthful witness or not? So, too, if there was reason to think that owing to the lapse of time the memory of a witness at the time of the trial could not be wholly relied on, the fact that he had made a statement to the same effect when the facts were fresh in his memory would be highly relevant in corroboration of the evidence at the trial. The rule, then, would seem to be that, the former statements are legally admissible, and may be considered for what they are worth, but that the weight to be attached to them depends entirely on the facts of each case. The point raised in the Advocate-Generals certificate is whether such statements "can legally amount to corroboration of the evidence given at the trial." It is not clear whether this means "are legally admissible as corroboration" or whether it means "can legally amount to corroboration in material particulars within the meaning of illustration (b) to Section 114." If it means the former, I have stated the answer above. If it means the latter, I do not think that the question is one that arises in this case. 11. In the argument before us it was assumed by the Pleaders for the defence that Arumugam and Somasundarm were found by the majority of the Court to be unworthy of credit by reason of their being accomplices, and that it was, therefore, necessary to find that they were corroborated in material particulars within the meaning of Section 114, illustration (b), before their evidence could be relied on, and that the former statements made by them were used as such corroboration. I do not think that this is a correct view of the judgment of the majority of the Special Bench. I do not anywhere find that they arrived at the conclusion that the approvers were untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, they distinctly arrived at the conclusion that they were truthful witnesses. I do not think that this is a correct view of the judgment of the majority of the Special Bench. I do not anywhere find that they arrived at the conclusion that the approvers were untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, they distinctly arrived at the conclusion that they were truthful witnesses. In arriving at this conclusion, they state that they were influenced by the demeanour of the witnesses, and by the way in which they stood the test of cross-examination. They say that each of these witnesses "was subjected to the most rigorous and searching cross-examination at the hands of one after another of the ten learned Counsel and Vakils appearing for the defence for periods extending over two or three days" and that though the cross-examiners had the advantage of being able to compare their evidence at the trial with three prior statements, (viz., those made before Veeraraghava Aiyar, and before Mr. Cox, and before the Committing Magistrate), "the prolonged cross-examination did not succeed in breaking down the evidence of any of the three approvers," and they conclude by saying, "we do not consider that there is anything in the evidence of the witnesses inconsistent with its substantial truth." They had previously referred to the circumstances under which the approvers made their first statements, especially the intrinsic evidence of truthfulness to be derived from the very nature of the facts stated. They pointed out that the circumstances under which the statements were first made strongly negatived the idea that they were the result either of concoction by the witnesses themselves or of suggestion by the Police; that the story told was not what the Police wanted, and that the persons implicated were not those that would probably have been implicated if the Police had suggested the statements or wished to obtain evidence to fit in with the letters then in their hands. They also pointed out that the story told was not such as would have been concocted by Arumugam either by himself or in consultation with Madasami or Somasundaram in order to save themselves from prosecution for complicity with Yauchi Aiyar in the murder of Mr. Ashe. They also considered that the conduct of Arumugam in not destroying the highly seditious literature found in his house, and his previous relations with the persons accused as conspirators negatived the idea of the story having been concocted by the witnesses. Ashe. They also considered that the conduct of Arumugam in not destroying the highly seditious literature found in his house, and his previous relations with the persons accused as conspirators negatived the idea of the story having been concocted by the witnesses. In view of all the circumstances in which the statements were made and the inferences to be drawn from the nature of the statements and the conduct of the witnesses themselves, the majority of the Special Bench found it "impossible" to believe that the statements were "tutored" by the Police or concocted" by the witnesses themselves. If the evidence was not "tutored" by the Police or "concocted" by the witnesses themselves, there would be no reason for regarding it as other than truthful in the ordinary sense, that is, truthful so far as the witnesses themselves knew and believed, though, of course, the witnesses might make an unintentional mistake like any other honest witnesses. This view is not inconsistent with the fact that the majority of the Special Bench acquitted the 9th and 13|h accused, though they were apparently implicated by the approvers, Ramasami and Arumugam respectively. It will be seen that they were acquitted, not because the approvers were found to be intentionally giving false evidence against them, but because there was a doubt in each case as to whether the accused was the person really referred to by the approver as present at the meetings. It is clear, then, that the majority of the Special Bench, for reasons stated, came to the conclusion that the accomplice witnesses were truthful witnesses and were not unworthy of credit so as to require corroboration in material particulars, if that phrase is to be interpreted (as some of the cases do interpret it) as requiring that the corroboration should be by the evidence of independent witnesses. We have already seen, in dealing with the first point raised by the Advocate-General, that corroboration is not legally necessary if there are circumstances which lead the Court to the conclusion that the witness though an accomplice is a truthful witness. 12. We have already seen, in dealing with the first point raised by the Advocate-General, that corroboration is not legally necessary if there are circumstances which lead the Court to the conclusion that the witness though an accomplice is a truthful witness. 12. The question, then, "whether the previous statement of an accomplice can legally amount to corroboration in material particulars of the evidence given at the trial within the meaning of illustration (b) to Section 114" is one that is not expressly raised by the certificate of the Advocate-General, nor do I think that it is one which it is necessary to consider in order to decide the questions raised by him, or the correctness of the judgment of the majority of the Special Bench. I have already shown how the former statements have been used in their judgment to corroborate the evidence of the witnesses given at the trial, and I have expressed the opinion that they were admissible under Section 157 and were properly used. 13. If, however, it is necessary in this case to determine whether the phrase "material particulars" in illustration (b) to Section 114 is to be regarded as, in some sense, a technical expression implying corroboration by independent or untainted evidence, I am unable to go so far and to say that as a matter of law the previous statement of an accomplice can never amount to corroboration in material particulars. The Pleader for the defence relies on the cases reported in Reg. v. Malapa bin Kapana 11 B.H.C.R. 196 and Queen-Empress v. Bepin Biswas 10 C. 970. The Pleader for the defence relies on the cases reported in Reg. v. Malapa bin Kapana 11 B.H.C.R. 196 and Queen-Empress v. Bepin Biswas 10 C. 970. In the former, it was said, at page 197, that the previous statement of an accomplice "can scarcely be said to answer the purpose for which Juries are advised by Judges to require the evidence of an accomplice to be-confirmed." In the latter, the Judges refer with approval to the Bombay case, but add at page 974: "It is not necessary for us to consider whether the rule should be extended as far as to exclude a statement made before arrest, bat we have no doubt at all that the exact correspondence in details of several statements made by an approver in the course of a trial is not corroborative evidence, such as we ordinarily require to make it safe to convict any particular prisoner." It is clear that the Judges in that case did not lay down any such absolute rule as is now suggested by the Pleaders for the defence. If there are some circumstances in which a prior statement may amount to sufficient corroboration, we cannot say as a matter of law that a prior statement can never be corroboration in material particulars, though, no doubt, in the great majority of cases, it will be found that the prior statements do not add anything to the credibility of the evidence given at the trial. As I have already said, how far a prior statement does corroborate evidence given at the trial is a matter to be determined by the Jury for where there is no Jury, by the Judge), on a consideration of all the facts of the case including the time when, and the circumstances in which, the former statement was made, and the facts related in the statement considered in their relation to the knowledge of the speaker at that time and all the surrounding circumstances. 14. It may be added that very little light as to the application of Section 157 can be gained from a consideration of English cases since the English law has no rule similar to that in Section 157 and is generally unfavourable to the admission of former statements of a witness to corroborate his evidence at the trial, though permitting it in certain cases. 15. 15. The 3rd, 4th and 5th points certified by the Advocate-General relate to three objections that were taken to the admissibility of the statements made by the accomplices Arumugam and Somasundaram, to Veeraraghava Aiyar. It may be stated at once that the admissibility or inadmissibility of those statements cannot make any difference in the decision of the present case since the majority of the Special Bench who admitted the statements expressly say that they find it impossible to believe that the statements were either tutored or concocted, even if the witnesses statements to Veeraraghava Aiyar are discarded and if regard is paid only to their statements recorded, four and three days respectively later, to the same effect by Mr. Cox the Magistrate, under Section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, the admissibility of which is not, and cannot be, disputed. As, however, the questions are raised in the Advocate-Generals certificate and are of great general importance, I will state my opinion in regard to each of them. 16. The objection referred to in the fifth point depends on the construction of Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and may be very shortly dealt with. All the Judges of the Special Bench are agreed as to the proper construction of that section. The same construction was placed upon it in the recent, case of Fanindra Nath Baneriee v Emperor 36 C. 281 : 5 M.I.T. 97 : 13 C.W.N. 197 : 9 C.L.J. 199 : 6 Cr. L.J. 452 : 1 Ind. Cas. 970. The words of the Section are clear. I agree with the conclusion arrived at by all the Judges of the Special Bench, and for the reasons stated in their judgments. 17. The third point may also be shortly disposed of. The question is whether Veeraraghava Aiyar was an authority "legally competent", within the meaning of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, to investigate the facts in relation to which the former statements of Arumugam and Somasundaram were made, that is, the facts relating to the murder of Mr. Ashe. It was contended before us that the words "competent to investigate" must refer exclusively to the persons competent to hold the Police investigation into an alleged offence under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. But I do not think that this view is correct. Ashe. It was contended before us that the words "competent to investigate" must refer exclusively to the persons competent to hold the Police investigation into an alleged offence under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. But I do not think that this view is correct. The words in the Evidence Act are perfectly general, "competent to investigate the fact". Can it be supposed, for instance, that a statement made before a Civil Court relating to some fact, the existence of which the Court was legally competent to try, and otherwise relevant under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act in a subsequent criminal trial, could be shut out on the ground that the word "investigate" would not include a trial by a Civil Court? I take it that the answer must be in the negative. It is unfortunate that there was no adequate inquiry before the Special Bench as to how far Inspector Veeraraghava Aiyar was an authority legally competent to investigate the facts relating to the murder of Mr. Ashe. The Deputy In. spector-General of his Department, Mr. Thomas, was a witness, but he was never asked any question at all as to the Inspectors competency to investigate. The result is that we are obliged to deal with the case on very imperfect information as to the facts. On the whole, however, I am inclined to hold that the Inspector was legally competent to investigate the facts relating to Mr. Ashes murder. He was an Inspector of the Provincial Criminal Investigation Department, a branch of the Police, whose work is not confined to any particular district, but which was created "to assist in the investigation of crimes which are of such a special character that the local officers are unable to deal with them adequately without help." (G.O. No. 913, Judicial, dated 2nd July 1908). He was directed by the head of his own department (the Deputy Inspector-General) and by the local District Superintendent of Police to search certain houses, including the house of Arumugam at Tuticorin, in connection with Mr. Ashss murder. It is not contended that his deputation for this duty was other than legal or that he was not legally competent to conduct or take part in the searches. Ashss murder. It is not contended that his deputation for this duty was other than legal or that he was not legally competent to conduct or take part in the searches. I take it that conducting the searches was an integral part of the investigation, and legal competency to conduct the searches carried with it legal competency to do all things properly incidental to, and connected with, the searches, and included the listening to any statements relating to the murderer those who took part in it, made by the persons whose houses were being searched. I do not think that the words "investigate the fact" in Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act should be construed in a narrow sense so as to restrict competency to the Police officer who, under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, is charged with the investigation of an offence. I am, therefore, not prepared, on the evidence before me, to dissent from the view of the majority of the Special Bench that the Inspector was an officer legally competent to investigate the facts relating to Mr. Ashes murder within the meaning of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. A suggestion was thrown out that "the fact" in this case mu3t be the conspiracy, not the facts generally relating to the murder of Mr. Ashe, and it was argued that, in that view, the Inspector could not investigate it without the order of a Magistrate, as it (the conspiracy) is a non-cognizable offence. This argument, I think, proceeds on an incorrect view. The Inspector was engaged in and upon the investigation of facts relating to Mr. Ashes murder, and the statement was made to him by the person whose house was being searched and it wits made as a matter "relating" to the murder. It cannot be regarded as relating only to the conspiracy and not at all to the murder. 18. The Inspector was engaged in and upon the investigation of facts relating to Mr. Ashes murder, and the statement was made to him by the person whose house was being searched and it wits made as a matter "relating" to the murder. It cannot be regarded as relating only to the conspiracy and not at all to the murder. 18. It remains to notice the fourth point in the Advocate-Genegrals certificate which is as follows: "That in my judgment the opinion of the majority of the Court, that the statements of P.W. No. 6 and P.W. No. 12 to P.W. No. 31 were not rendered inadmissible by reason of the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, should be further considered." Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act states that "No confession made to a Police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." The words of Section 25 in their plain and ordinary meaning seem to me to render the statements made by the accomplices to the Police Inspector, Veeraraghava Aiyar, inadmissible. The statements are confessions: they were made to a Police officer and it is now sought to use them as against some of the accused in this case. The majority of the Special Bench point out that in Section 26, the confession, (when made not to a Police officer, but while in his custody), is expressly made inadmissible only as against the person who made it, but may be proved as against other persons and observes that as the "mischief" of the two sections is the same, Section 25 also should be understood as only excluding a confession made to a Police officer from being used as against the person making it. It is difficult to accept this view without putting too great a strain on the plain language of Section 25. It certainly is difficult to see any satisfactory reason why the scope of the two sections should be different, but that is hardly a sufficient reason for not construing each Section so as to give effect to its plain language. It seems to be especially undesirable to extend the language of Section 25 beyond its plain meaning when the effect of doing so might tend to encourage those corrupt practices of the Police in regard to working for confessions which it is the policy of the law to prevent. It seems to be especially undesirable to extend the language of Section 25 beyond its plain meaning when the effect of doing so might tend to encourage those corrupt practices of the Police in regard to working for confessions which it is the policy of the law to prevent. There is much force in the. observation of Batchelor, J., in the case reported in Emperor v. Hari Singh Ganpt Singh 12 Bom. L.R. 899 : 8 Ind. Cas. 022 : 11 Cr. L.J. 690 that a confession which is inadmissible against the person making it, ought a fortiori to be inadmissible against another person implicated by it. The case in Queen-Empress v. Tribhovan Manekchand 9 B. 131 cited by Mr. Napier for the prosecution, is hardly an authority for his contention, as the present question did pot arise in that case. The point that West, J. was enforcing was that Section 25 did not refer to the use of a confession in other than a criminal proceeding, that an inquiry under Section 523, Criminal Procedure Code, was not a criminal proceeding, and that a confession could, therefore, be used as an admission in an inquiry under that section. 19. Since writing the above, I have had the advantage of perusing the judgments which my learned brothers, Wallis and Miller, JJ., are about to pronounce on this question. I am much impressed by the force of the argument that may be drawn against my view from reasoning founded on the history of Sections 24 to 26 which were embodied first in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 and afterwards transferred without material alteration to the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, but I am still inclined, on the whole, to the opinion that effect must be given to the language of Section 25, and that it renders the statements of Arumugam and Somasundaram to Inspector Veeraraghava Aiyar inadmissible. 20. 20. But, as I have already pointed out, this can make no difference in the decision of this case, since the majority of the Special Bench expressly state that it is impossible to believe that the evidence of the 6th and 12th prosecution witnesses was either "tutored" by the Police or concocted by the witnesses themselves, even if the witnesses statements to Veeraraghava Aiyar are discarded and if regard is paid only to their statements made a few days later to the Magistrate, the admissibility of which is not, and cannot be, disputed. In other words, the learned Judges were prepared to act on the evidence of these witnesses as truthful, apart from any corroboration derived from their statements to the Inspector. In these circumstances, it is not open to us as a Court of review to go into the facts and consider whether the learned Judges ought or ought not to have arrived at that conclusion. 21. I would, therefore, dismiss the petitions that have been presented asking us to set aside the convictions of the accused. Wallis, J. 22. This was a case tried before three Judges of this Court, under Act XIV of 1908, and comes before us on a certificate of the then Advocate-General pursuant to Clause 26 of the Letters Patent that certain points of law which in his opinion were decided by the Judges, or, a majority of them, require to be further considered. Objection was taken at the outset by the officiating Advocate-General that Clause 26 does not apply to criminal trials before the High Court under Act XIV of 1908. Reference was made to Clause 24 conferring extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction on this Court and it was contended that the accused before the Court were not persons brought before it on charges preferred by the Advocate-General or by any Magistrate or other officer specially empowered by the Government in that behalf" so as to come within that clause, but were committed to this Court for trial by a Magistrate acting under the powers conferred upon him by Section 6 of Act XIV of 1908. Assuming that to be so, and that the jurisdiction of the Court does not arise under Clause 24 but under an Act of the Indian Legislature to which the provisions of the Letters Patent are subject, I am still of opinion that the objection fails, because Clauses 25 and 26 of the Letters Patent, as to points of law being reserved by the Court or certified by the Advocate General, are perfectly general in their terms and, in my opinion, apply equally to all criminal trials before this Court, whether in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction under Clauses 22 and 24 of the Letters Patent or of any future statutory original criminal jurisdiction that may be conferred upon it by a competent Legislature. Further, Act XIV of 1908, nowhere says that Clauses 25 and 26 of the Letters Patent are not to apply to trials under the Act and the presumption is strongly against any intention on the part of the Indian Legislature to modify by implication provisions of the Letters Patent issued under an Act of Parliament. I think, therefore, we were bound to hear and dispose of the application for review, however much our so doing may tend to defeat the object of this special legislation, which was to ensure the speedy trial of these cases, or may further interfere with the business of the Court by withdrawing five Judges from their ordinary duties. 23. The Advocate-Generals certificate has been granted under that part of Clause 26 which empowers him to certify that "a point or points of law which has or have been decided by the said Court shall be further considered." The certificate purports to have been granted upon certain representations made to the learned Advocate-General and does not show whether the written judgments of the Court were before him. They are before us and we have to satisfy ourselves, in the first place, as to what was actually decided by the majority or the fall Court as the case may be with reference to each of the points of law and as to whether the decision was erroneous. 24. They are before us and we have to satisfy ourselves, in the first place, as to what was actually decided by the majority or the fall Court as the case may be with reference to each of the points of law and as to whether the decision was erroneous. 24. The points before us arise on the construction of the Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, and, as the learned officiating Advocate-General has argued, it is undoubtedly our duty in construing that Act, which is in the nature of a Code, to follow the language of the sections of the Act, so far as they are clear, and, only in cases of ambiguity or obscurity, to fall back upon the English law upon which it was based. 25. The certificate as to the first point is as follows: That in my judgment the opinion of the majority of the Court that the evidence of an accomplice need not be corroborated in material particulars before it can be acted upon, and that it would be open to the Court to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice if the Court was satisfied that the evidence was true, requires to be further considered and it requires to be farther considered and it requires to be further considered, whether Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, read with Section 114, illustration (b), dose not merely intend to lay down that a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not illegal where the presumption of untrustworthiness attaching to the evidence of an accomplice is rebutted by special circumstances. 26. As to this, I am of opinion that the proposition that it would be open to the Co art to convict en the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice in the sense and in the terms in which it is stated in the judgment of the majority of the Judges is correct and does not amount to an error in law. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act authorises the Court to make certain presumptions of fact. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act authorises the Court to make certain presumptions of fact. Nine well known maxims are there given as illustrations of the section, the second of which is: "The Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars." They are all presumptions which may naturally arise, bat the Legislature by the use of the word "may" instead of "shall", both in the body of the section and in the illustrations, shows that the Court is not compelled to raise them but is to consider whether, in all the circumstances of the particular case, they should be raised. To make this clearer still, there is the additional provision: "But the Court shall also have regard to such facts as the following, in considering whether such maxims do or do not apply to the particular case before it", and then, as to each of these maxims, instances are given of facts in which the maxim is inapplicable, and, in the case of the maxim now in question, there are two such instances. Now, if Section 114 stood alone, I do not see how it could be said that it was not open to the Judges of fact in the particular case, whether Judge or Jury, to apply or not to apply any of these maxims, having regard to all the facts of the case before them; and this is expressly stated by the draftsman, the late Sir Fitzjames Stephen, in his Indian Evidence Act, at page 174: "Finally it declares in Section 114 that the Court may in all cases whatever draw from the facts before it whatever inferences it thinks just." But as regards the particular maxim, Section 114 does not stand alone, because Section 133 provides that "a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." If the law was so laid down in the Act, it was, I have no doubt, because it was the English Law as understood at the time and had been the law ever since the decision of Atwoods case 1 Lecah. C.C. 646 by the twelve Judges at the close of the 18th century and because the draftsman and the Legislature were not prepared with anything I o substitute for it. C.C. 646 by the twelve Judges at the close of the 18th century and because the draftsman and the Legislature were not prepared with anything I o substitute for it. They were not, of course, unaware of the well-established practice of the Courts in England and India according to which, to use the language of Sir Fitzjames Stepken in Article 121 of his Digest of the Law of Evidence, published in 1876, "when the only proof against a person charged with a criminal offence is the evidence of an accomplice, uncorroborated in any material particular, it is the duty of the Judge to warn the Jury that it is unsafe to convict any person upon such evidence, though they have a legal right to do so," The adoption of the practice in England may be traced in Reg. v. Wells (1829) 1 M. and M. 326; Rex. v. Noakes (1832) 6 C. & P. 326; Rex v. Addis (1884) 6 C. & P. 38; R. v. Webb (1834) 6 C. & P. 595; Rex v. Neal (1835) 7 G. & P. 168; Rex v. Moores (1836) 7 C & P. 270 and Reg. v. Farler (1837) 8 C. & P. 103 where it is said to deserve all the reverence of law. In these case?, the Judges told the Jury they ought not to convict on the evidence of accomplices, whether one or more, unless1 it was confirmed or corroborated not only as regards the offence generally but as regards the particular accused, but the decision was invariably left to the Jury; and in Rex. v. Mullins (1848) 7 St. Tr. (N.S.) 1110 : 3 Cox C.C. 526 Maule, J, pointed this out and observed that these directions to the Jury were not directions on points of law which the Jury were bound to adopt but observations respecting facts to assist the Jury in their endeavour to judge of the facts. Then in Reg. v. Stubbs Dears. C.C. 555 : 25 L.J.M.C. 16 : 1 Jar. (N.S.) 1115 : 4 W.R. 85 : 7 Cox. Then in Reg. v. Stubbs Dears. C.C. 555 : 25 L.J.M.C. 16 : 1 Jar. (N.S.) 1115 : 4 W.R. 85 : 7 Cox. C.C. 43 the Court of Crown Cases Reserved held that the omission of the Court to warn the Jury that they ought not to convict one of the accused, as to whom the evidence of the accomplices was not corroborated, was only a departure from the usual practice, which was again stated by the Judges, and did not involve any question of law on which the Court of Crown Cases Reserved could review the case under 11 and 12 Vict., C. 78. The law was laid down precisely in the same way by the Court of Queens Bench in Reg. v. Boyes 9 Cox. C.C. 32 : 1 B. and S. 311 : 2 F. and F. 157 : 30 L.J.Q.B. 301 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 1158 : 5 L.T. 147 : 9 W.R. 690 and by Lord Coleridge, L.C.J., sitting with Brett, M.R., and Grove, J., at the Central Criminal Court for the trial of Gallagher Reg. v. Gallagher 15 Cox. C.C. 291 and by Cave and Collins, JJ., in In re Meunier (1894) 2 Q.B. 415 : 63 L.J.M.C. 198 : 10 R. 400 : 71 L.T. 403 : 42 W.R. 637 : 18 Cox. C.C. 15. Under the larger powers now given by the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, the Court may now treat a failure to comply with the well established practice of directing Juries as to how the evidence of accomplices is to be regarded as having involved a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of Section 4, Rex v. Tate (1908) 2 K.B. 630 : 77 L.J.K.B. 1043 : 99 L.T. 620 : 72 J.P. 391 but this in no way affects the authority of the above decisions; nor are they affected by the fact stated by Sir Alfred Wills in his "Circumstantial Evidence," at page 365, that in one case Baron Bramwell and in another he himself withdrew the case from the Jury when there was no corroboration and directed an. acquittal. In India, at any rate, such a course would be a direction at variance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. 27. acquittal. In India, at any rate, such a course would be a direction at variance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. 27. As regards the practice in India, it has been observed that the danger of acting on the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices is even greater than in England; and before the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, it was held by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Elahee Bukshs case 5 W.R. 80 Cr. : B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 459, on a review of the English authorities, that a failure to direct the Jury in accordance with the practice was a misdirection on which the conviction could be set aside. With regard to the effect of the Indian Evidence Act or, the practice, I cannot altogether agree with the observation which has been sometimes made that the practice was embodied in Section 114, illustration (b). The Legislature might, of course, have enacted that no one should be convicted on the evidence of accomplices "unless corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused," as in 48 and 49 Vict., C. 69; but this would have been a serious departure from the law as previously understood both in England and in India and, in my opinion, the legislature were not prepared to go so far but were content with enacting the maxim as ordinarily applicable, whilst leaving it to be applied or not according to the circumstances of the particular case. They must, however, I think, have contemplated that the law as declared rather than newly enacted in the section would continue to be applied under the safegurd of the practice; and it is not, I think, surprising that the practice should have continued unaffected by the passing of the Act, as appears from the Indian cases which are fully reviewed in the judgment of Mr. Justice Sankaran Nair. The practice, it must be borne in mind, was one of advising the Jury not to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, leaving it to them whether to follow the advice or not, a liberty they undoubtedly possess under Section 114 read with Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act. The same degree of liberty must necessarily be reserved where the Court itself is the Judge of fact instead of the Jury. The same degree of liberty must necessarily be reserved where the Court itself is the Judge of fact instead of the Jury. In such a case, the Judge cannot be required, consistently with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, to direct himeslf not to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. All that he can be required to do is to exercise extreme caution in departing from such a well established rule of guidance. In such a case, the learned Judges constituting the majority lay it down that it is the duty of the Court to bear in mind that it is tainted evidence, to scrutinize it with the utmost care, accept it with the greatest caution, consider it in the light of the circumstances in which it is given, and in the light of all the other circumstances in the case of which evidence is legally admissible. Then, if you believe it, act on it, even if there is no corroboration in the strict sense of the word. This direction seems to me in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Reg. v. Ramaswami Padayachi 1 M. 394 and Ramasami Gounden v. Emperor 27 M. 271 at p. 290 : 14 M.L.J. 226 : 1 Cr. L.J. 641. If the alternative proposition as to special circumstances put forward in the certificate of the learned Advocate-General means more than this and involves an inquiry as matter of law in each case whether there are special circumstances entitling the Court to act on uncorroborated evidence I am unable to agree with it. I am of opinion that in the judgment of the majority on this point, there is no error of law entitling us to interfere under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent. 28. The second point is whether the previous statements of an accomplice can legally amount to corroboration of the evidence given by him at the trial. Reading the certificate with the judgment of the majority of the Court, it appears to me that the question for our consideration is whether such previous statements, if proved, can be regarded as amounting to corroboration of the accomplice in material particulars within the meaning of Section 114, illustration (b) of the Indian Evidence Act, as it is scarcely disputed that under Section 157 such statements are admissible in corroboration. I do not think that the Courts in England have ever attempted to define exhaustively what will amount to corroboration, a question which appears to be rather one of fact depending on a consideration of all the circumstances of the case. In India, the evidence of previous statements made in certain circumstances is admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act to corroborate, the testimony of the witness. It is, therefore, admissible evidence in corroboration of the evidence even of a witness who is an accomplice, and I am not prepared to say, as the Advocate-General wishes us to say, that the previous statements of an accomplice cannot legally amount to corroboration of the evidence given by him at the trial. I think that previous statements, admissible as corroboration under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, may or may not amount to sufficient corroboration and that whether they will be so or not, depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. That previous statements may in some cases amount to corroboration, where as in the present case, there are the previous statements of several accomplices was pointed out in Elahee BuksfSs case 5 W.R. 80 Cr. : B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 459, the leading Indian authority. Sir Barnes Peacock, at page 84, observed: "Bat if two or three persons should be apprehended at different places, at long distances from each other, and should each confess and give a similar account as to the persons associated with them in a particular dacoity, the statement of each, if made under such circumstances as not to raise a presumption of collusion, might be proved in corroboration of his evidence; such statement being admissible as corroborative evidence under Act II of 1855, Section 31", which is the same as Section 157 of the present Act. It is, in my opinion, clear that in the opinion of the learned Judge the previous statements of the accomplices in those circumstances would amount to sufficient corroboration of their evidence and this is also in accordance with the dictates of good sense. It is, in my opinion, clear that in the opinion of the learned Judge the previous statements of the accomplices in those circumstances would amount to sufficient corroboration of their evidence and this is also in accordance with the dictates of good sense. In England, previous statements of witnesses, whether accomplices or not, are not generally admissible in evidence; but when admissible in exceptional cases as in regard to assaults on women, they are admitted, it is now settled, as evidence of corroboration, Rex v. Osborne (1905) 1 K.B. 551 : 74 L.J.K.B. 311 : 92 L.T. 393 : 63 W.R. 494 : 69 S.V. 189 : 21 T.L.R. 288; and it is clear, from the recent decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Ellsom 76 J.P. 38 : 28 T.L.R. 1 that in the opinion of the Court such statements, if properly before the Court, may, when considered in the circumstances in which they were made, amount to strong corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice. Taken by itself the previous statement may, of course, be as tainted and untrustworthy as the evidence in the box and not supply any real corroboration; but, on the other hand, the circumstances in which it was made may afford strong corroboration of its truthfulness apart from the credibility of the accomplice, as in the case put by Sir. Barnes Peacock which has now been inserted as an illustration to Section 114(b) of the Indian Evidence Act "A crime is committed by several persons. A., B., and C, three of the criminals, are captured on the spot and kept apart from each other. Each gives an account of the crime implicating D. and the accounts corroborate each other in such a manner as to render previous concert highly improbable." In such a case, the previous statements not only corroborate each other but also the sworn statements in the box, and they are evidently regarded as confirming the tainted evidence of the accomplices and making it right to act on that evidence. It is true that they are given in the Section rather as facts rendering corroboration unnecessary than as amounting themselves to corroboration, but this, it appears to me, is a distinction which makes no real difference, as the Court is invited to believe the evidence and act upon it. It is true that they are given in the Section rather as facts rendering corroboration unnecessary than as amounting themselves to corroboration, but this, it appears to me, is a distinction which makes no real difference, as the Court is invited to believe the evidence and act upon it. The previous statements received and acted upon by the majority of the learned Judges in this case, both those made to the Inspector and those made to Mr. Cox, were in their opinion of this character and, in my opinion, the learned Judges were justified in receiving and acting upon them as corroboration. They have not, in my opinion, misdirected themselves at all in this respect, and, that being so, we have no authority, sitting here not as an Appellate Court, but as a Court of Error under the Lotters Patent, to call in question the conclusions they have arrived at on evidence properly before them. With regard to the decisions in Reg. v. Malapa bin Kapana 11 B.H.C.R. 196 and Queen-Empress v. Bepin Biswas 10 C. 970 I do not think they can be taken as laying down as matter of law that previous statements of accomplices cannot amount to sufficient corroboration of their testimony, and if they do, I think they go too far. A direction to that effect by a Sessions Judge was made the ground of an appeal against acquittal by the Bengal Government in 1898, Empress v. Bhairab Chunder Chuckerbutty 2 C.W.N. 702 but the case went off on another point. 29. The third point is whether the previous statements of the 6th and 12fch witnesses for the prosecution to Inspector Veeraraghava Aiyar, the 31st witness, were admissible as not made to an authority legally competent to investigate the fact within the meaning of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is not suggested that when the statements were made, the Inspector was competent to investigate the charge of conspiracy, a non-cognizable offence, on which the accused have been convicted, but it was contended for the prosecution but denied for the defence, that he was competent to investigate the murder of Mr. Ashe, and that it was in the due course of that investigation that these statements were elicited. Whether this would be sufficient depends on the construction of the words "legally competent to investigate the fact" in Section 157. Ashe, and that it was in the due course of that investigation that these statements were elicited. Whether this would be sufficient depends on the construction of the words "legally competent to investigate the fact" in Section 157. Sections 156 and 157 deal with the corroboration of witnesses as to relevant facts, and, reading the two sections together, I think Section 157 should be read thus, as if the words in brackets were there, "in order to corroborate the evidence of a witness (as to a relevant fact) any former statement made by the witness as to the same fact before any authority competent to investigate the fact may be proved." It seems to me that under the section the evidence of witnesses in the box as to relevant facts may be corroborated by proof of previous statements as to the same facts, if made before an authority legally competent to investigate such facts. It cannot, I think, be questioned that an Inspector investigating the murder of Mr. Ashe was legally competent and bound in the course of his investigation to elicit the statements now in question; and, this being so, I think the provisions of the section were so far satisfied, and that to make the previous statements admisssible it was not necessary that the Inspector should have been legally competent to investigate the conspiracy of which the accused have been convicted. As to whether the Inspector to whom the statements were made was, in fact, legally competent to investigate the murder of Mr. As to whether the Inspector to whom the statements were made was, in fact, legally competent to investigate the murder of Mr. Ashe, Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that any officer in charge of a Police station "may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try," and Section 551 provides that "Police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a Police station may exercise the same powers throughout the local area to which they are appointed as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station." The learned Judges forming the majority have found that there can be no question that the Inspector is a Police Officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a Police station, and also that as a member of the Provincial Department of Criminal Investigation, the "local area", within the meaning of Section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to which he was appointed, was the Presidency of Madras. The word Provincial is, undoubtedly, used as equivalent to the Presidency of Madras, which is one of the Provinces of British India; and it is a matter of common knowledge that the department was constituted in pursuance of recommendation 35 of the Police Commission, 1902-1903, which is as follows: "That there should be constituted in each Province a Criminal Investigation Department for the purpose of collecting and distributing information regarding organized crime, and to assist in the investigation of crimes when they are of such a special character as to render their assistance necessary." Such investigation would necessarily take place in any part of the Presidency in which these crimes should occur, and, in these circumstances, I think the Presidency may well be held to be the "local area" to which the seven Inspectors in the Department, on whom the work of investigation must necessarily fall, are appointed. The assassination of a Collector--a crime happily unprecedented in the history of the Presidency for over fifty years--was obviously a crime of such a special nature as to render the assistance of the department necessary. The Inspector in this case had come down with the head of his department in connection with this murder. The assassination of a Collector--a crime happily unprecedented in the history of the Presidency for over fifty years--was obviously a crime of such a special nature as to render the assistance of the department necessary. The Inspector in this case had come down with the head of his department in connection with this murder. I think his evidence and the G.O. No. 913, Judicial, dated 2nd July 1908, which has been put in, defining the relations between the officers of the Criminal Investigation Department and the ordinary Police officers in the various districts of the Presidency, was evidence sufficient to support the finding--though not perhaps so full as if this objection had been taken when the statements were tendered in evidence and had not been reserved for argument after the evidence for both sides had been closed. I do not think that these are matters which we should go into sitting here as a Court of Error under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent. I am also inclined to think that the word "investigate" in Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be read as limited to investigation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the Inspector had been brought down from Madras specially to investigate the murder of Mr. Ashe, and that he was not only legally competent but under a duty to investigate it and in the course of such investigation to record the statements now in question. In the result, I hold there is no ground for interference under this head. Ashe, and that he was not only legally competent but under a duty to investigate it and in the course of such investigation to record the statements now in question. In the result, I hold there is no ground for interference under this head. The two remaining points certified by the Advocate-General, whether confessions by an approver to a Police officer are not excluded both by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, may, I think, conveniently be dealt with together and the latter first, because, as pointed out in Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal 6 A. 509 these three sections (Sections 25 and, 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898), which were designed to guard against improper practices on the part of the Police in obtaining statements from witnesses and confessions from the accused, first made their appearance together as Sections 145 (now 162), 148 and 149 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861; and Sections 148 and 149 of that Code hate since been transferred without material alterations to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, where they appear as Sections 25 and 26; and as observed by Lord Blackburn in Mayor of Portsmouth v. Smith 10 A.C. 364 at pp. 371, 377 : 54 L.J.Q.B. 473 : 53 L.T. 394 : 49 J.P. 076: "Where a single section of an Act is introduced into another Act, it must be read in the sense which it bore in the original Act from which it is taken, and consequently it is perfectly legitimate to refer to all the rest of that Act in order to ascertain what the section meant, though those other sections are not incorporated in the new Act." This, it seems to me, is the proper method to apply even where, as here, the sections have been introduced into a measure of codification, and I am unable to attach much force to arguments depending on the position of Sections 25 and 26 in the Indian Evidence Act. As to whether the previous statements of the approvers to the Police were inadmissible under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as previous statements of witnesses to the Police, the Code of 1861, Section 145 (now Section 162) provided for the oral examination of witnesses by the Police and permitted these statements to be taken down in writing "provided that any statement so reduced into writing shall not be signed by the person making it, nor shall it be treated as part of the record or used as evidence." Such statements were, no doubt, usually taken down in writing, and there does not appear to have been any attempt made to give oral evidence of them to corroborate the witnesses under the Codes of 1861, 1872 or 1882, which in this respect were not materially different. By Act X of 1886 Section 6, Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was altered by inserting into the section the word "shall" as shown in brackets. "No statement, other than a dying declaration made by any person to a Police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it, or (shall) be used as evidence against the accused." As thus altered, the section appears to go still further and to make statements to the Police inadmissible whether they were taken down in writing or not. In 1898, an attempt was made by the prosecution to use the previous statement to the Police of an approver to corroborate him, but the statement was rejected as inadmissible under Section 162, Queen-Empress v. Bhairab Chunder Chuckerbutty 2 C.W.N. 702 and if the section, as it then was, had not been altered, there can be no doubt the statements now in question would have been inadmissible. In the Code of 1898, which came into force in 1899, the provisions of Section 163 were altered. In the Code of 1898, which came into force in 1899, the provisions of Section 163 were altered. The main alteration, as poi nted out in Dadan Gazi v. Emperor 33 C. 1023 : 10 C.W.N. 880 : 4 Cr.L.J. 79 was made for the purpose of setting at rest the controversy as to the circumstances in which the accused were entitled to have access to and make use of such previous statements of the witness to contradict them--a course the Police had endeavoured to prevent by taking them down in their diaries which are privileged, under Section 172. This was dealt with by a new proviso entitling the accused to require the Court to refer to such previous statements, and if the Court thinks it expedient in the interests of justice to direct copies to be given to the accused. But as against this concession to the accused, the body of the section was altered in such a way as to modify the absolute exclusion of such statements as evidence for the prosecution, contained in the Code of 1882 as modified in 1886. The present section runs thus: "No statement made by any person to a Police officer in the course of an investigation under the Chapter (XIV) shall, if taken down in writing, be signed by the person making it, nor shall such writing be used as evidence." Here it is only the writing that is excluded. The change of language must, I think, have been deliberate and I am constrained to agree with the decision of the learned Judges, and with Fanindra Nath Banerjee v. Emperor 36 C. 281 : 5 M.I.T. 97 : 13 C.W.N. 197 : 9 C.L.J. 199 : 6 Cr. L.J. 452 : 1 Ind. Cas. 970 and the judgment of Karamat Husain, J., in Rustam v. King-Emperor 7 A.L.J. 468 : 6 Ind. Cas. 101 : 11 Cr.L.J. 235 that oral evidence of such statements is not inadmissible. On this point, I am of opinion that there was no error in law. 30. L.J. 452 : 1 Ind. Cas. 970 and the judgment of Karamat Husain, J., in Rustam v. King-Emperor 7 A.L.J. 468 : 6 Ind. Cas. 101 : 11 Cr.L.J. 235 that oral evidence of such statements is not inadmissible. On this point, I am of opinion that there was no error in law. 30. Going back now to the fourth point whether the statements are inadmissible, not under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as previous statements of witnesses to the Police, but as confessions made to the Police under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides that "no confession made to a Police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence," the question is, does the section mean that no confession to a Police officer by an accused person is to be used against him, or that it is not to be used against others either? The next Section 26 relating to confessions made by accused persons in the custody of the Police unless in the immediate presence of a Magistrate renders them inadmissible as against such persons. The two learned Judges forming the majority see no reason why any difference should be made between the two sections, and read Section 25 as also relating to confessions made by a person accused of an offence to the Police, and as rendering such confessions inadmissible only as against them. Sankaran Nair, J. on the other hand, thinks that, confessions made to the Police may have been considered to require more stringent provisions than confessions made by accused persons when in Police custody to others. In accordance with the rule already stated, I proceed to consider the meaning and effect of these sections as first enacted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861: Section 145 of that Code (now Section 162), as already pointed out, provides that statements of witnesses to the Police, if reduced to writing, shall not be used as evidence. The following sections then deal with the confessions of accused persons to the Police in the course of investigations by the latter. Section 146 forbids the Police to offer any inducement by threat or promise to an accused person to make any disclosure or confession. The following sections then deal with the confessions of accused persons to the Police in the course of investigations by the latter. Section 146 forbids the Police to offer any inducement by threat or promise to an accused person to make any disclosure or confession. Section 147 forbids the Police to record any statement or any admission or confession of guilt which may be made before him by an accused person. Section 148 (now Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act) then provides that "no confession or admission of guilt made to a Police officer shall be used as evidence against a person accused of any offence," and Section 149 that "no confession or admission of guilt made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a Police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be used as evidence against such person." As I have already said, confession in these sections appears to mean confession by an accused person to the Police in the course of an investigation under the Chapter, and as before the passing of Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, confessions of accused persons could not be used against co-accused, such confessions could only be evidence against the accused persons making them, or to corroborate their evidence when they turned approvers by treating their confessions as previous statements made by the witnesses under Section 31 of Act II of 1855, since reproduced as Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 31. 31. Now it may be said, on the one hand, that as by Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861immediately preceding, the Legislature had made an exception in the general law regarding the use of previous statements as corroboration restricting the use in evidence of such previous statements if made to the Police, whether they amounted to confessions or not, and practically excluding them, it is not likely that they intended in Section 148 to introduce a farther exception as to the use of previous statements which amount to confessions; that, as observed by Miller, J., if any such fresh provision had been intended, it would have extended to exculpatory statements by accused persons as well as to confessions, and to confessions made by accused persons whilst in Police custody under Section 149 (now Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act) as well as to confessions to the Police themselves coming within Section 148 (now Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act). It may be said further that the language of Section 148 "no confession or admission of guile made to a Police officer, shall be used as evidence against a person accused of any offence" is susceptible of the meaning that no confession made by such a person to the Police should be used against him, and that in this respect the scope of the two Sections 148 and 149 is the same, although in the latter the draftsman dealing with more complicated provisions has expressed his intention with greater precision. These considerations appear to me to have considerable force in favour of a restrictive construction of the section. The result of such a construction, as already explained, would be that confessions regarded merely as previous statements to the Police were practically excluded as corroborative evidence down to 1885, and absolutely excluded from 1886 down to 1898, and only became admissible owing to the change in Section 162 of the Code of 1898. 32. On the other hand, as against this view, there is the fact that the terms of the prohibition in Section 148 of the Code of 1861 and now in Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act are perfectly general; and, as observed by Benson, J., a construction which renders statements, which are inadmissible against the persons making them, admissible against other persons is not one to be favoured. It is also perhaps worthy of note that confessions to the Police which come under Section 148 were forbidden to be recorded by Section 147, whereas there was no such prohibition as regards confessions made by persons in Police custody which come under Section 149. The question then is whether, giving due weight to all these considerations, as I have endeavoured to do, there is sufficient justification to require the Court to put a restrictive construction upon the section or to justify it in so doing. I have felt great doubt upon this point especially in view of the difference of opinion among the members of the Court; and, in these circumstances, I think the safer, as it is certainly the simpler, course is to read the words of the section in their natural meaning without putting any restrictive interpretation upon them, and so reading them I hold that these confessions were inadmissible even as corroborative evidence under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. I am, however, of opinion that the rejection of the statements made by the two approvers to the Inspector cannot affect the result of the trial. It has been held in a long catena of Indian cases that, in reviewing a case under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent, it is the duty of the Court, when it finds there has been a mis-reception of evidence, to apply the provisions of Section 167 of the Indian Evidenc3 Act, and not to reverse the conviction if shall appear to the Court that "independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision," the decision here being that of the original tribunal. Hitherto this jurisdiction under Clause 26 has only been exercised in Jury cases where, of course, no reasons were given for the verdict, and the Court of review was perforce bound to go into the evidence itself for the purpose of seeing whether or not the remaining evidence justified the decision of the Jury. In the present case under Section 11(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, the decision is that of the majority of the Court, and the reasons for that decision have been given in a most careful and elaborate judgment. In the present case under Section 11(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, the decision is that of the majority of the Court, and the reasons for that decision have been given in a most careful and elaborate judgment. Now, discarding the previous statements of the two approvers to the Inspector, we find that, within a few days after these statements, the approvers made statements to the same effect before a Magistrate, Mr. Cox, as to which no question of inadmissibility arises and the learned Judges have observed that, even if the statements to the Inspector are discarded and only those recorded by Mr. Cox are considered, they find it impossible to accept the defence theory that the approvers story was concocted or tutored, and, from a perusal of the judgment, it is perfectly plain that discording the statements to the Inspector, they accepted the evidence of the two approvers as generally truthful, and acted upon it as they were entitled to do. Here I may observe that the learned Judges had before them (he fact, which was properly in evidence, that before their statements to Mr. Cox, the approvers had made still earlier statements to the Inspector at a time and under circumstances which in their opinion negatived the concoction at that stage of such a story as (hey afterwards told to Mr. Cox and in the witness-box; and they were, I think, justified, in view of all the circumstances, in rejecting the suggestion of subsequent concoction in the interval between the two sets of statements, unless supported by a reference to the earlier statements which were available to the defence under the proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and would not, as we now know, have supported it. If, then, the Court had rejected the statements made to the Inspector and still convicted the accused, it would have been impossible forustosay that here was not sufficient evidence to justify their decision; and it appears to me to be equally impossible for us to say so, when in effect the learned Judges tell us that though considering the evidence admissible, they did not consider it necessary to base their decision upon it and were prepared to convict without it. 33. I, think, therefore the applications must be dismissed. Miller, J. 34. 33. I, think, therefore the applications must be dismissed. Miller, J. 34. On the preliminary question, I do not think I can usefully add anything to what has already been said. I agree with the opinions of Benson and Wallis, JJ. 35. On the first point in the Advocate-Generals certificate, I have a few words to say but, having had an opportunity of perusing the judgments written by some of my learned colleagues, I do not think it necessary for me, to discuss the decided cases bearing on the subject. On the effect of the decisions, I agree with what has just been read by Wallis, J. 36. I consider that the majority of the Special Bench have correctly laid down the law, and that it is not the law that special circumstances must be found to exist before an accomplices statement can be acted upon without corroboration. To hold so as a matter of law would, it seems to me, deprive the Court of the discretion given by Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act to raise or not to raise, the presumption--would in effect substitute the phrase "shall presume" for "may presume" in that section. 37. I do not dissent from the decisions which have held that ordinarily, as a matter of practice, a Court should not accept the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice as sufficient evidence to support a conviction, but it is impossible, consistently with the Indian Evidence Act, to hold that as a matter of law the presumption must be raised, and rebutted by special circumstances or by corroboration. 38. 38. I am not sure that the conclusion of Sankaran Nair, J., stated at page 61 of the printed judgments, differs materially from those of the other two learned Judges, but if he intended to lay it down as law that a conviction is illegal which is based upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, unless something which amounts in law to a "special circumstance" be found by the Judge or Jury then it seems to me he goes beyond the statement of the English law accepted from "Taylor on Evidence" by the L.C.J. in Rex v. Tate (1908) 2 K.B. 630 : 77 L.J.K.B. 1043 : 99 L.T. 620 : 72 J.P. 391 for that statement, so far as I am at present concerned with it, is only to the effect that the respect habitually paid by Juries to the advice of Judges has given rise to a settled practice not to convict upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice except in very special circumstances. Consequently, as I understand it, Judges are bound Joy law to advise Juries to adhere to this practice, but it does not follow that Juries are bound as a matter of law to do so. 39. In the present case, the majority of the Special Bench have given reasons for deeming the accomplices to be credible witnesses in the circumstances of the case, and Mr. Govinda Raghava Aiyar had consequently to argue that "special circumstances" are circumstances differing in quality from those which are ordinarily applied as tests of the credibility of witnesses on whom there rests no taint of complicity in the crime with which the accused is charged. 40. To accept this contention would, to my mind, be to introduce into the law on this subject an additional and entirely undesirable and unnecessary element of artificiality; the contention itself is perhaps an illustration of the danger of adopting the suggested rule as a rule of law. 41. I concur on the second point with the majority of the Special Bench, when they hold that the previous statements of accomplices are admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act to corroborate their testimony given at the trial. 42. 41. I concur on the second point with the majority of the Special Bench, when they hold that the previous statements of accomplices are admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act to corroborate their testimony given at the trial. 42. It was rot denied that such statements cannot, having regard to Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, be excluded if made in the circumstances set forth in the section, and inasmuch as the section expressly admits them in order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, it necessarily follows that they are legal corroboration of the evidence given at the trial. 43. The words of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be controlled by the illustrations to Section 114, a section which treats of presumptions which may be made: but the evidence admitted under Section 157 may be so far affected by the illustrations to Section 114 that the corroboration afforded by it might, conceivably, not be in law sufficient corroboration to justify the Court in acting on the evidence given at the trial. Consequently, I must take it, I think, that the Advocate-General suggests for our consideration the view that the phrase "corroborated in material particulars" in illustration (b) to Section 114, is a technical term connoting a corroboration different from that of Section 157, in fact a corroboration by independent or untainted evidence. I am unable to find reason to accept this view as a matter of law. The evidence, I conclude, is admissible as corroboration and whether it is sufficient or not to justify the Court in believing the evidence given at the trial is a question of the weight to be given to it and not a question of law. 44. I do not think that I can usefully add much to what has already been said upon this point by Wallis, J., whose judgment I have had an opportunity of reading: I concur entirely in his conclusions as to the law. 45. 44. I do not think that I can usefully add much to what has already been said upon this point by Wallis, J., whose judgment I have had an opportunity of reading: I concur entirely in his conclusions as to the law. 45. I may point out that the learned Judges in Queen-Empress v. Bepin Biswas 10 C. 970 declined to consider whether the rule should be "extended" to the case of previous statements made before arrest, and that Sankaran Nair, J, (at page 63) is prepared to hold that there might possibly be a difference where the previous statement of an accomplice is made at a time when there was no inducement to make a false statement and in circumstances which indicate that it is true. 46. But, if previous statements made under some circumstances are sufficient corroboration, then it seems to me very difficult to lay down as a matter of law the rule suggested by the Advocate General, simply because, in our opinion, such cases are fewer than those in which the previous statements are valueless. And there is no need for us to try to do so: the discretion given to Judges and Juries in weighing evidence is all that is required, and no rule is, in my opinion, wanted except to secure that Judges and Juries dealing with facts shall have fully before them the defects inherent in the evidence of accomplices and the tests which experience has shown to be the best aids in estimating its real value in the particular case. 47. I see danger and not safety in ruling out as inadmissible in the case of accomplice witnesses any tests of credibility which are available in the case of other witnesses, whether the test applied tends to confirm or to discredit the evidence. 48. The third point.--I do not think that our decision upon points 3, 4 and 5, can affect our judgment on the case, because it seems to me quite clear from their judgment that the Chief Justice and Ayling, J., were prepared to arrive at the conclusion at which they did arrive, whether the evidence of Veeraraghava Aiyar proving previous statements of the accomplices, Arumugam and Somasundaram, is admitted or rejected. It seems, therefore, to me really unnecessary to express any opinion upon these three points, but I follow my learned colleagues in doing so. 49. It seems, therefore, to me really unnecessary to express any opinion upon these three points, but I follow my learned colleagues in doing so. 49. So far as the third point is concerned, the decision of the majority is correct, if Inspector Veeraraghava Aiyar was legally competent to investigate the "fact" within the meaning of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act: that is for the most part a question of fact and the evidence bearing on this point was put before us at the hearing. It shows that the Inspector was deputed by Mr. Thomas to assist the Local Assistant Superintendent in making searches in Tuticorin--and it is not denied that, if deputed to investigate by Mr. Thomas, the Inspector would be legally competent to make the investigation for which he was deputed. In the absence of any statement by Mr. Thomas to the contrary, I consider that the deputation to assist in making the searches is equivalent to an authority to the Inspector to assist at an investigation: the making of searches is investigation, investigating within the meaning of that word in the Criminal Procedure Code, if that be necessary; the investigation in question was not the collection of evidence to determine who murdered the Collector of Tinnevelly; the assassin had killed himself and no investigation was wanted: the investigation was to collect evidence to establish a charge of abetment of the murder, to ascertain who were the instigators of the crime. The existence of the conspiracy alleged by Arumugam was relevant to the issues involved in that investigation and the statement of Arumugam was, therefore, relevant to that investigation, and it makes no difference that the conspiracy alleged by Arumugam has not been shown at the trial to have been a conspiracy of abettors of the particular murder in question. Whether "the fact" of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act be here the truth of the statement of Arumugam or the existence of a conspiracy to murder, Veeraraghava Aiyar was competent to investigate it, so far at any rate as he could do so in the course of his searches at Tuticorin. 50. Whether "the fact" of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act be here the truth of the statement of Arumugam or the existence of a conspiracy to murder, Veeraraghava Aiyar was competent to investigate it, so far at any rate as he could do so in the course of his searches at Tuticorin. 50. Of course, it is possible that his authority was only to guard the door or make or copy a list of papers or carry boxes or dig up floors, but I am not prepared to presume that that was what was expected of an officer of the rank of an Inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department. I, therefore, find nothing in the evidence put before us to require me to hold that the Chief Justice and Ayling, J., were in error on this point. 51. The fourth point: On this point, I am of opinion that there is no error of law in the judgment of the Chief Justice and Ayling, J. 52. I agree with those learned Judges that there is no difference in the object of Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act; that both are aimed at the same mischief: and I have not been satisfied that there is any substantial reason for attributing to the Legislature an intention to place 8: confession made to a Police officer on a different footing from one made by a person in the custody of the Police. Consequently, I approach the consideration of this question from the point of view that, as Section 26 applies only to the proof of a confession as against its maker, so it should be held that Section 25 has a similar scope unless we are bound by its language or for some other reason to give it a wider application. Now Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act were imported into the Indian Evidence Act from the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861, where they were placed among the provisions dealing with the powers of Police officers in making investigations into cases of alleged offences. Now Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act were imported into the Indian Evidence Act from the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861, where they were placed among the provisions dealing with the powers of Police officers in making investigations into cases of alleged offences. So far as I know, there was at that time, that is in 1861, no provision in the law of evidence, as administered in India, corresponding to Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872; and so there is no apparent reason why it should suggest itself to the framers of the Code that it was necessary to provide for the case of the use of a confession as against any person other than the person who made it. These sections of the Code of 1861 were not dealing with the question of witnesses in criminal trials or with a consideration of what might or might not be corroboration of the testimony of witnesses in such trials, and Sections 147, 148, 149 and 150 of that Code are clearly intended to render it, so far as possible, useless for Police officers to extract confessions from accused persons for use at their trial. They are not and could not be meant to prevent the taking of confessions by the Police in all circumstances, even as aids to investigation: Section 147 permits the Police officer to make a note for his own information of a confession made to him. 53. By Section 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861, a Police officer is prohibited from making a record of a confession, except for his own information, when the confession is made by "a person accused of any offence:" that it is to say, as 1 understand it, a person against whom there is a "case" which is being investigated under Section 135 {vide Section 144). Section 148 forbids the use of any confession made to a Police officer, as evidence against "a person accused of any offence": that is to say, or so it seems to me, the same person whose confession the Police officer in forbidden to record except for his own information. Then, Section 149 makes a similar prohibition of the use as evidence against the maker of a confession made by any person while he is in the custody of the Police. 54. Then, Section 149 makes a similar prohibition of the use as evidence against the maker of a confession made by any person while he is in the custody of the Police. 54. The case having been investigated, the person accused of any offence is put on his trial, the confessions made by him to the Police officer, or while in custody of the Police officer, are not to be used as evidence against him. 55. That, it seam3 to me, is the natural meaning of these provisions, and the only meaning appropriate to them, having regard to their position in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In short, they have nothing to do with the statements of witnesses. I am not at all pressed by the difference in language between Section 148 and Section 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861, because I think a careful examination of the two sections will show that, in order to express clearly, and at the same time correctly and elegantly, the particular position dealt with by Section 149, it may very well have been deemed necessary to depart from the brief and succinct diction of Section 148. I think then there can be very little doubt that in the Code of 1831, both these Section were intended to prevent the use as evidence against the maker of confessions made actually or in effect to Police officers. 56. Then, the sections are imported without material alteration of language, into the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, and I am unable to find any reason to give them a more extended meaning than they bore in the Code of 1861. For, prima facie, the law of evidence does not allow the use of a confession, which is a form of admission, as evidence against any person except the maker: Section 30 provides for a particular and exceptional case: and that being so, there seems no reason to suppose that the Legislature, in transferring Sections 148 and 149 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861 to the Indian Evidence Act, had any intention of extending their application. On the other hand, had there been any such intention, I should have expected to find an alteration in the language of Section 26 in the Indian Evidence Act, so as to extend that section to cases other than that of the maker of the confession. 57. On the other hand, had there been any such intention, I should have expected to find an alteration in the language of Section 26 in the Indian Evidence Act, so as to extend that section to cases other than that of the maker of the confession. 57. It has to be remembered, too, that the confession of a witness is not used as a confession at the trial of some one else: it is not used as an admission: it is put in to corroborate or to contradict the witness: and Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act was not, as I understand the matter, concerned with the statements of witnesses. If used for corrboration, the confession is put in to show that certain allegations against other persons, allegations made by the witness at the trial of those persons, were made by him at some earlier period at a time when, or under circumstances in which, it may be regarded as somewhat probable that he might have been telling the truth. And I am unable to sea that it i3 more dangerous to allow a witness to be corroborated by a self-incriminating statement made to a Police officer than by a self-exculpatory statement to the same officer. 58. On the other hand, Section 30 seems to indicate that in the view of the legislature, a man is less likely to make false accusations against others when he is incriminating himself as well as them. I agree, then, with the dictum of West, J., in Queen-Empress v. Tribhovan Manekchand 9 B. 131 and am of opinion that the Chief Justice and Ayling, J., were right as regards this point of the Advocate-Generals certificate. 59. I may add that I do not think the cases dealing with Section 30 have any great bearing on the question which I am discussing. It is true that the learned Judges in one case, Emperor v. Harisingh Ganpatsingh 12 Bom. L.R. 899 : 8 Ind. Cas. 022 : 11 Cr. L.J. 690 remark that their conclusion is confirmed by the language of Section 25, but it is impossible from this to draw the inference that they considered the question we have to deal with, while it is quite possible to arrive it their conclusion by reading Sections 30 and 25 together without affecting the present question in any way. 60. L.J. 690 remark that their conclusion is confirmed by the language of Section 25, but it is impossible from this to draw the inference that they considered the question we have to deal with, while it is quite possible to arrive it their conclusion by reading Sections 30 and 25 together without affecting the present question in any way. 60. Fifth point: On this point, I desire only to say that the language of the section and the history of the various amendments made from time to time constrain us to accept the law as kid down by the learned Judges of the Special Bench. 61. There is no ground on which we can interfere with the decision of the Special Bench and the petitions of the accused must be dismissed: and, as I have said, the same result is arrived at if I am wrong, and if the evidence of Veeraraghava Aiyar is excluded so far as it relates to the previous statements made by Arumugam and Somasundaram. Abdur Rahim, J. 62. Fourteen persons were tried on charges under Section 121A, Indian Penal Code, and Section 302, Indian Penal Code, read with Sections 109 and 111, by a Special Bench of three learned Judges (the Chief Justice, Sankaran Nair and Ay ling, JJ.) constituted under the provisions of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act (XIV of 1908), which provides for the speedy trial of certain offences. The trial was held without a Jury in accordance with Section 11 of the Act, and the Bench unanimously found that the charge under the latter sections of abetment of murder was not proved against any of the prisoners and acquitted them all under that head of the indictment. But upon the remaining count, viz., the charge of conspiring to wage war against the King-Emperor, the learned Judges did rot agree with respect to the case against all the accused: the Chief Justice and Ayling, J. came to the conclusion that the charge was substantiated against 9 out of the 14 persons tried but not against the rest, (i.e., the 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th accused) while Sankaran Nair, J. was of opinion that the Crown failed to establish the case not only against the five persons acquitted by the majority of the Bench but also against four other accused persons, (viz., those mentioned and the 3rd, 4th, 5th and the 7th). The Judges were unanimous in finding four of the prisoners guilty, namely, the 1st, 2nd, 6th and the 14th accused. Under Section 11 of the Act referred to, judgment was pronounced in accordance with the opinion of the majority and sentences were passed accordingly. 63. The case is now brought before us under Article 26 of the amended Letters Patent of this Court upon a certificate granted by the Advocate-General on a petition presented to him by the accused Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. The present Advocate-General, who appeared for the Crown, has taken the preliminary objection that Article 26 of the Letters Patent has no application to a case tried in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act and we have, therefore, no jurisdiction to review the case. That Article must be considered in connection with Articles 22, 23, 24, and 25. Article 22 defines the local limits of the ordinary original criminal jurisdiction which mainly coincides with the local limits of its ordinary civil jurisdiction and Article 23 empowers the High Court, in the exercise of such jurisdiction, to try all persons brought before it in due course of law. Then Article 24 declares that in addition to its ordinary original criminal jurisdiction, the High Court shall have extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction over all persons residing in places within the jurisdiction of any Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court--the prisoners here answer the description--and shall have authority to try at its discretion any such person brought before it on charges preferred by the Advocate-General or by any Magistrate or other officer especially empowered by the Government in this behalf. Article 25 next lays down that the accused has no right of appeal to the High Court from any sentence or order passed in any criminal trial before the Courts of original criminal jurisdiction which may be constituted by one or more Judges of the High Court but that it shall be at the discretion of any such Court to reserve any point or points of law for the opinion of the High Court. Article 26 provides that on such a point or points being so reserved or on its being certified by the Advocate-General that in his opinion there is an error in the decision of a point of law decided by the Court of original criminal jurisdiction or that a point of law which has been decided by the said Court shall be further considered, the said Court shall have full power and authority to review the case or such part of it as may be necessary and finally determine such point of law, and thereupon to alter the sentence passed by the Court of original jurisdiction and pass such judgment and sentence as to the High Court shall seem right. It is argued on behalf of the Crown that the Court of original criminal jurisdiction referred to in Articles 25 and 26 refers to the Court exercising the ordinary and extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction mentioned in Articles 22, 23 and 24 and that the trial in this case was not held in the exercise of either description of jurisdiction. I think there is force in 1 he first part of this argument as both Articles 25 and 26 speak of the Court of original criminal jurisdiction, apparently meaning the Court exercising the ordinary or extraordinary criminal jurisdiction of the High Court mentioned in Articles 22, 23 and 24. In fact, these articles confer such plenary jurisdiction on the High Court that it may well be inferred that it was not within the contemplation of the Letters Patent that the High Court should be called upon to exercise original criminal jurisdiction in any case not covered by these articles. It is, however, conceivable, though very unlikely, that the Indian Legislature may confer original criminal jurisdiction on the Madras High Court in cases which do not fall within the ambit of its ordinary or extraordinary jurisdiction. To these cases, Article 26 would not, perhaps, be applicable, but I have no hesitation in holding that the contention of the Advocate-General that the present is such a case is clearly untenable. The prisoners are all residents of the Madras Presidency and over them the Court would undoubtedly have jurisdiction under the first part of Article 24. It is, therefore, apparently not a case in which the High Court has no jurisdiction under the Letters Patent but derives its jurisdiction from a special statute. The prisoners are all residents of the Madras Presidency and over them the Court would undoubtedly have jurisdiction under the first part of Article 24. It is, therefore, apparently not a case in which the High Court has no jurisdiction under the Letters Patent but derives its jurisdiction from a special statute. Nor is there anything in the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act to suggest that the Legislature was conscious that it was conferring a jurisdiction on the High Court which it did not already possess. The Act proceeds on the assumption that the Magistrate who held the inquiry should commit the persons charged to the High Court to whose superintendence the Magistrate is subject (see Sections 3 and 5). It, no doubt, makes a radical change in the procedure to be pursued in the trial at the High Court by enacting that the trial shall not be by a jury and to this extent the change is, no doubt, one affecting the forum of trial. But it does not purport to affect the jurisdiction of the High Court as conferred upon it by the Letters Patent; it only regulates the manner of the exercise of its jurisdiction. That the question whether a trial should be held by a Judge and a Jury or otherwise is not to be treated as one relating to jurisdiction, is also amply indicated by the fact that it is not Articles 22, 23 and 24 of the Letters Patent, by which jurisdiction is given to this Court in criminal cases, that require that trials should be held by a Judge and a Jury; that matter is dealt with by Article 38 which regulates the procedure in trials. The argument; on which the Advocate-General lays the most emphasis, is that the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction can only try such person as are brought before it "on charges preferred by the Advocate-General"--which is not the case here "or by any Magistrate or other officer expressly empowered by the Government in that behalf," and that in this case the Magistrate who committed the accused for trial to the High Court could not be taken to have preferred the charges within the meaning of Article 24 as he did not derive his authority to do so from the Government but from the Legislature. It does not seem to me that there is any force in this contention. The Sub Divisional Magistrate of Tinnevelly who committed this case was undoubtedly appointed to his office by the Government and it was by virtue of that office that he took cognizance of the offence and preferred charges against the accused in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Then, the local Government under Section 2 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act directed that the provisions of that Act should apply to those proceedings, that is, among other matters, the Magistrate who had taken cognizance of the offence should send the accused to the High Court for trial upon charges to be framed by him. This is, therefore, clearly a casein which the Magistrate was "expressly empowered by the Government" to prefer the charges on which the accused were tried by the High Court, even giving a narrow and literal meaning to these words. But I may observe that the words expressly "empowered by the Government," were not in my opinion in tended to be used in a narrow sense. If the contention of the Advocate-General were well founded, there could be no doubt that when a European British subject is charged with an offence punishable with death or transportation for life and the District Magistrate inquires into it and commits the accused to the High Court under the provisions of Sections 443 and 447, Criminal Procedure Code, such Magistrate would not be deemed to be expressly "empowered by the Government" to prefer charges against the accused within the meaning of Article 24 of the Letters Patent, but I do not think the application of Article 26 to such a case has ever been or can be doubted. I may mention that in Queen Empress v. OHara 17 C. 642 which was a case of that nature, no such objection, so far as it appears from the report, was taken to the jurisdiction of the High Court to review the case under Article 26. 64. It has further been urged by the Advocate-General that the object of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act is to provide for the speedy trial of offences of a particular description and if Article 26 of the Letters Patent applied, this object would be frustrated. I do not think there is any force again in this argument. 64. It has further been urged by the Advocate-General that the object of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act is to provide for the speedy trial of offences of a particular description and if Article 26 of the Letters Patent applied, this object would be frustrated. I do not think there is any force again in this argument. The mode in which a speedy trial was to be secured is specified in the Act itself, namely, by providing that the inquiry by the Magistrate should be held in the absence of the accused who is not to be represented at all during the inquiry, that the commitment is to be to the High. Court instead of to the District Sessions Court so as to obviate an appeal, and the trial is not to be with a Jury. If, in addition, the Legislature wanted to enact that it would not be open to the Special Bench to obtain the opinion of the High Court on any question of law, however vital in its bearing on the trial, on which such Bench may entertain a doubt, or that it should not be within the power of the High Court to prevent a miscarriage of justice due to an erroneous decision on a point of law, however manifest, one would expect such a declaration to have been made in absolutely clear and unambiguous language. 65. I overrule the preliminary objection. 66. I purpose to consider the questions raised by the first two paragraphs of the certificate together. The first paragraph requires us to consider what the law is on the subject of an accomplices evidence and whether the law is correctly stated in the judgment of the majority of the Special Bench, and the second paragraph raises the question whether the majority of the Court are right in their view that the previous statements of an accomplice can be regarded as such corroboration of his evidence in Court as the law requires. 66. I may observe that these two grounds of the certificate are couched in absolutely general terms but it is clear that the intention of the Advocate General was not to raise mere abstract questions of law without reference to the circumstances of the case in which the view of law of the majority of the Special Bench, which we are asked to reconsider, was expressed and applied. I shall, therefore, briefly state the circumstances in which the various questions of law have arisen. So far as some of the prisoners are concerned, namely, those whom Sankaran Nair, J., alone has acquitted, the evidence of the Crown, apart from evidence relating to the general circumstances of the case, consisted principally of the testimony of three approvers, Arumugam, Somasundaram and Ramaswami; and the statements, which are said to have been wrongly admitted or used as corroborative evidence, are statements made by these men on several occasions before trial. In dealing with the question whether the way in which the learned Chief Justice and Ayling, J., approached the consideration of the evidence of these approvers, involves an error in law, one has to bear in mind the nature of the crime to which the approvers speak, the part which they themselves played in and the circumstances in which they have come forward to give evidence for the Crown. As unanimously found by the Special Bench, Nilakantam alias Brahmachari (1st accused), who had been engaged for some time in journalistic work of a more or less seditious character, set on foot early in April 1910 the conspiracy, the subject of the first count, for the purpose of overthrowing the British rule "by means of a simultaneous massacre of all Europeans on a day to be subsequently fixed". This plan, which was as original as it is startling in conception, was thought of, because all other methods which had been tried before by those who have been engaged in the criminal conspiracies against the Government, which have come to light in recent years in some parts of India, such as preaching, writing in newspapers and isolated assassinations, had failed. Nilakantam found some co-adjutors; according to the finding of the majority of the Bench, his confederates would be about twelve in number including the approvers, besides two or three more men who have not figured in the case, and in the view taken by Sankaran Nair, J., about seven. Of these, the accused Sankarakrishna Aiyar (accused No. 2), one Vanchi and the approver, Arumugam, appear to have been the most active adherents of Nilakantam. Of these, the accused Sankarakrishna Aiyar (accused No. 2), one Vanchi and the approver, Arumugam, appear to have been the most active adherents of Nilakantam. The evidence of conspiracy consists of the oaths taken by the conspirators at three distinct meetings--the first at a place called Tenkasi on the 10th April 1910, the second at Tuticorin in the middle of July and the third which was held at Punalur after the second meeting--to the effect that they would kill all white men on one and the same day when there was to be a general rising throughout the country and that they would sacrifice their lives and their properties in order to carry out the design. The oath was written on a piece of paper and all, who agreed to join the movement, pricked their thumbs and affixed their thumb impression in blood on the paper. The, papers are not forthcoming. But according to the approvers, Nilakantam, Sankarakrishnan, Madathukadai Chidambaram Pillai (accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3) and the approver Arumugam (6th Prosecution witness) took part in the proceedings of the first meeting, the 1st, 2ad, 4th and 5th accused and all the three approvers took the oath at the second meeting, and the accused Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14, Vanchi and five other men took the oath at the third meeting, which was held sometime in August 1910. Nothing, however, so far as it transpires in the evidence, seems to have been done to carry out the seditious design either in the shape of collecting arms or men or in any other way whatsoever. Having regard to the obscure and humble position in life of the conspirators, the absolute lack of any means at their command to carry out a plan which from its magnitude, no less from its character, would be regarded by most people as one impossible of achievement, I think the majority of the Court was justified, if I may be allowed to say so, in regarding the conspiracy as something contemptible, so far as the possibility of its leading to any result is concerned. In all probability, the idea would have died a natural death and would not even have been heard of except for an event which, in the language of the judgment of the majority of the Court, has little or no bearing on the charge of conspiracy. In all probability, the idea would have died a natural death and would not even have been heard of except for an event which, in the language of the judgment of the majority of the Court, has little or no bearing on the charge of conspiracy. Vanchi, who was an ardent follower of Nilakantams teachings, shot down Mr. Ashe, the Collector of Tinnevelly, on the 17th June 1911, and himself committed suicide on the spot. The motive of the murder was evidently political but, as pointed out in the judgments of the Special Bench, the offence was not committed in pursuance of the conspiracy with which the prisoners are charged; it was in fact an act done in direct violation of the plan decided upon at the meetings. The majority of the Bench obi serve-"The evidence as to the circumstances in which the murder was committed has very little, if any, bearing on the question whether the accused or any of them are guilty under Section 121A of the Indian Penal Code." 67. Nevertheless, the conspiracy charged against the prisoners is a grave offence against the State and the Legislature attaches to it the most serious penalties. The three approvers who admit having taken part in such a conspirarcy were permitted to give evidence against the prisoners, under pardon granted to them by the Magistrate under Section 337, Criminal Procedure Code, "on the condition of their making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within their knowledge relative to such offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof." These persons, if found not to have complied with the condition of pardon, whether by wilfully concealing any thing essential or by giving false evidence, may be tried for the very offence in respect of which the pardon was tendered or for any other offence of which they appear to have been guilty in connection with the same matter and the very statements made by them may be given as evidence against them when they are placed on their trial after the pardon has been forfeited. The approvers in this case are, therefore, men who were giving their evidence with halters round their necks, to use an expressive phrase which I believe, occurs in one of the numerous cases cited at the Bar on the subject of accomplices evidence. The approvers in this case are, therefore, men who were giving their evidence with halters round their necks, to use an expressive phrase which I believe, occurs in one of the numerous cases cited at the Bar on the subject of accomplices evidence. The probability that persons in their perilous position would attempt to purchase immunity for themselves by falsely implicating innocent men is so great, that, apart from any special rule of law that may or may not exist as to the necessity of requiring corroboration of accomplices evidence generally, it is obvious to ones common sense that the danger of acting upon such witnesses word alone against the accused persons must be grave indeed. I would not for my part hesitate in saying that a conviction founded on evidence of this character must be wrong as being based on absolutely unsafe materials unless there are to be found in the case the amplest guarantees of its truth derived from circumstances and evidence altogether independent of these witnesses statements. 68. The certificate of the Advocate-General in its first paragraph assumes that the majority of the Special Bench have in fact acted upon Arumugams and the other approvers evidence without any corroborative evidence; even if that were so, we should be powerless to interfere unless it was made out that in so acting or in the way they have dealt with that evidence, the learned Judges have committed an error in law. It is important at the outset to know in what light they have regarded the approvers evidence and what use they have made of it. As I read their judgment, they are of opinion that this evidence from its very nature must be received with caution and care, and that, though it was not correct to say, as contended for on behalf of the defence, that it was not open to them in law to act upon it, yet, they would not feel themselves safe in accepting such evidence in so far as it affected the prisoners without corroboration. There are passages in the judgment of the majority of the Bench which go to show that they were prepared to believe the general truth of the approvers story apart from any corroborative evidence, but none from which it can be reasonably inferred that they would have accepted that evidence alone as sufficient to prove the complicity of the prisoners. On the other hand, they attach the Utmost importance to certain previous statements of the approvers as corroborative of their evidence in Court and when they came to consider the case of the Crown against the accused persons individually, they take care to state whether the corroborative evidence, such as it is, implicates or does not implicate particular prisoners. As regards the law regarding accomplices evidence generally, the majority of the Special Court lay down that the law does not prohibit the conviction of an accused person on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but that at the same time in accepting such evidence, the Court must act with the greatest possible caution. These are their words: "In the case before us, we are Judge and Jury. We have to direct ourselves. The proper direction seems to us to be--consider the evidence of the approvers, always bear in mind that it is tainted evidence, scrutinise it with the utmost care, accept it with the greatest caution, consider it in the light of the circumstances in which it is given and in the light of all the other circumstances in the case of which evidence is legally admissible. Then, if you believe it, act on it even if there is no corroboration in the strict sense of the word. If you so not believe it, reject it." So far as these statements go, I do not think they can, in my opinion, be said to contain an erroneous proposition of law. I may observe, however, that the learned Judges undoubtedly lay emphasis on that aspect of the law according to which a conviction founded upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not illegal. But they do so apparently to meet the extreme arguments of the Pleaders on behalf of the accused to the contrary and not because they were prepared in the case before them to act upon such evidence. 69. But they do so apparently to meet the extreme arguments of the Pleaders on behalf of the accused to the contrary and not because they were prepared in the case before them to act upon such evidence. 69. The first question raised by the certificate is stated in these words: "That in my judgment the opinion of the majority of the Court that the evidence of an accomplice need not be corroborated in material particulars before it can be acted upon, and that it would be open to the Court to convict on the utcorroborted testimony of an accomplice if the Court was satisfied that the evidence was true, requires to be further considered; and it requires to be further considered whether Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, read with Section 114, illustration (b), does not merely intend to lay down that a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not illegal where the preemption of untrustworthines3 attaching to the evidence of an accomplice is rebutted by special circumstances." If we lake the two statements independently of each other and the first part of the paragraph to mean that the majority of the Bench were wrong in staling as a general proposition that the law permits of a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, then there can be no doubt that the Advocate-Generals objection is untenable and for this purpose it is sufficient to refer to the clear language of Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act. But I do not think that that is what the Advocate-General meant. Both parts of the first paragraph of the certificate must be read together and so read what the certificate really means is that the Judges statement that the law permitted of a conviction being based on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice is inaccurate inasmuch as it does not add the necessary qualification that, apart form any special circumstances, the Court ought to raise the presumption spoken of in Section 114, illustration (b), that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars, and, therefore, in ordinary cases the conviction would be illegal if based on such evidence. But, as I have pointed out, the learned Judges were of opinion that the evidence of an accomplice should prima facie be regarded with distrust, otherwise there would be no meaning in their saying that you must accept such evidence with caution. The certificate in this connection apparently proceeds upon a misconception of what is laid down by the learned Judges. In this view of the matter, it would have been unnecessary to go further into the first question but for the fact that, in my opinion, certain statements which were relied upon by the learned Judges as corroborative evidence justifying them in acting upon the evidence of the approvers as against the accused persons have been wrongly so used; and, it will thus be necessary to see whether we can hold that apart from any corrobrotion, this is a case in which there are circumstances which might make the general rule relating to the untrustworthiness of an accomplices evidence inapplicable. Besides, the whole question as to the proper scope of the law regarding the subject having been raised by the first ground of the certificate and elaborately discussed at the Bar, it is right that one should slate ones opinion in the matter. The literature on the subject of accomplices evidence is very large and one with which lawyers are quite familiar. The only point that has any novelty in this case t is whether this Court can interfere as a matter of law with a conviction founded upon the evidence of an accomplice in a trial held by a Judge without a Jury, where there is no corroboration of such evidence or if the evidence which the Court has relied on as corroborative is not such as to meet the requirements of the rule, and if so, in what circumstances. 70. The decisions on the subject of accomplices evidence in this country are to be found in cases tried by District and Sessions Judges with a Jury or Assessors or by a High Court Judge with a Jury. When a trial is by a Sessions Judge with the aid of Assessors, the High Court, as the Appellate Court, has plenary powers of review in order to arrive at a decision upon the evidence whether the conviction is right (see Sections 418 and 423, Criminal Procedure Code). When a trial is by a Sessions Judge with the aid of Assessors, the High Court, as the Appellate Court, has plenary powers of review in order to arrive at a decision upon the evidence whether the conviction is right (see Sections 418 and 423, Criminal Procedure Code). The Sessions Judge as a Court of Appeal is given similar unlimited powers of review over convictions by Magistrates in cases triable by the latter. When there has been an appeal to the Sessions Court from a conviction of a Magistrate and it has confirmed the conviction, and in certain cases of summary trial by a Magistrate in which the Legislature allows no appeal, the High Court has the power of revising the case (see Sections 435 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code). These powers are of a very wide character, though the usual practice of the High Court is not to interfere in such cases except where the decision in question involves an error in law which has contributed to a miscarriage of justice. In other eases the question whether a conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices can be regarded as erroneous in law may be of some practical importance though the fact that the High Court in any particular case did interfere in revision to set aside the conviction would not necessarily mean that it treated the question as one of law. When a case is tried by a Sessions Judge with the aid of a Jury, the prisoner can appeal to the High Court against the verdict only on a matter of law (see Section 418, Criminal Procedure Code); if the trial was held by a Judge of the High Court in the exercise of its original Criminal jurisdiction, then, as we have seen, the prisoner has no right of t appeal but if the trying Judge has reserved any point of law for the decision of the High Court or the Advocate-General has certified to an error in a decision of law, the High Court is entitled to decide that point of law and pass such judgment as the case may require. 71. 71. Now, whether the High Court exercises its powers as an Appellate Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Court, in cases tried by a Jury or as a Court of Error under Article 26 of the Letters Patent, in either case it can interfere only when the trial is vitiated by an error in law and there is no substantial difference in the conditions of interference in the two cases. In Queen-Empress v. OHara 17 C. 642 already referred to, a question was raised whether the words of Article 26 "an error in the decision of a point or points of law decided by the Court of original criminal jurisdiction" are to be understood in a strictly literal sense as being applicable only to cases in which certain questions of law have been expressly raised and decided at the trial, and it was held that the language was wide enough to extend to cases where what is complained of involves a violation of the law or a failure to give effect to the injunctions of law. There can be no doubt in my opinion that this interpretation of Article 26 is correct and it has not been contended otherwise in the present case. I have already said that the contention on behalf of the accused that a conviction is illegal merely because it is based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficiently answered by Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act. The law has never been otherwise either in India or in England, at least not for a very long time. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the law makes special provisions as regards the treatment of an accomplices evidence; the reception of that evidence stands on a different footing from the evidence of other witnesses. This, because of the fact that this class of witnesses are not only men of an infamous character but are induced to give their evidence by the expectation or hope that they would not be proceeded against for the crime which they are found to have committed if their story is believed as against the prisoners. The natural tendency of men in that position is to make out a case against the prisoner in order to save them-selves. The natural tendency of men in that position is to make out a case against the prisoner in order to save them-selves. Instead of trying them for the offence which they have committed, the State tenders a pardon to them in special cases with a view to obtain full information as to certain crimes which but for such evidence would not have come fully to light. But the law does not say that in such cases, because of the difficulty of detection, the Court may be satisfied with a lower degree of certainty in the evidence than in other cases. On the other hand, the rule of law that the guilt of an accused person must be established beyond all reasonable doubt applies with equal force in all cases, and the more serious the nature of the crime with which a person is charged, the more circumspect the Court must be as to the evidence it acts upon. These, indeed, are truisms of the criminal law of the land; it may nevertheless be useful sometimes to state them, lest they are forgotten. 72. In one part of the arguments of the learned Advocate General on behalf of the Crown, he seemed to contend, if I followed him aright, that inasmuch as the Legislature by Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act declares that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, it must necessarily follow that in no case where a conviction is based on such testimony by a tribunal of facts is such conviction liable to review by a superior authority whose powers of interference are limited to matters of law. There is an apparent fallacy in this argument which treats the declaration that "a conviction is not illegal merely because it is based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice", as equivalent to a declaration that a conviction based on such testimony must necessarily be regarded as legal. It is obvious that the one does not follow as a logical consequence from the other. Section 133 does not purport to deal exhaustively with the question as to whether or when convictions based on an accomplice is testimony are or are not liable to be set aside as a matter of law. It is obvious that the one does not follow as a logical consequence from the other. Section 133 does not purport to deal exhaustively with the question as to whether or when convictions based on an accomplice is testimony are or are not liable to be set aside as a matter of law. For instance, suppose the law imposes on a Judge certain duties as to directing the Jury in the matter of an accomplices evidence short of telling them that the law dues not permit of their acting on such evidence, would that be inconsistent with anything contained in Section 133? Clearly not. Then, if the Judge failed to give such directions, the provisions of this section would not prevent the question of propriety of a verdict given under these circumstances being treated as a point of law. Now, Section 133 must be considered along with Section 114, illustration (b), and the explanations to that illustration furnish an indication how consideration of the evidence of an accomplice should be approached by the tribunal which is asked to act upon it. Section 114 says, the Courts "may presume the existence of any fact which, it thinks, likely to have happened regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case"; in other words, it says that the Court may make certain natural presumptions, illustration (b) to Section 114 is an example of such natural presumption. It says that the Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Then the Legislature goes onto state: But the Court shall have regard to such facts as the following in considering whether such maxims do or do not apply" and cites two cases in explanation of illustration (b) suggesting, without expressly saying S3, that the maxim as to an accomplice being unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars might not apply to those cases. Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that wherever the phrase "may presume a fact" is used, it means that the Court may regard such fact as proved in law until it is disproved or may call for proof of it, contrary to "shall presume", when the Court shall regard the fact to be proved unless and until it is disproved. Presumptions of this class must, therefore, be regarded as presumptions of fact and not of law. The argument on behalf of the Crown, then, is that the question of drawing a presumption as to the untrustworthiness of an accomplices evidence is left to the discretion of the Court, and if the Court has erred in this respect, it would not be an error in law. Even if it be granted that the law leaves it to the discretion of the trying Court whether the presumption in question should or should not be raised in a particular case, it is undoubtedly a judicial discretion and it would not be correct to say that no improper exercise of such discretion can be set right as a matter of law. To my mind, it is quite clear from the nature of the cases cited in the illustrations that, except in the special circumstances, examples of which are attached to the section, the Legislature requires that the Court should make the natural presumptions referred to in the section. For in3tanca, there can be little doubt that in ordinary circumstances, the presumptions mentioned in illustrations (c) and (e), viz., that a bill of exchange accepted or endorsed was accepted for good consideration or that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed, should be made. Some indication to this effect is also furnished by the language in which the cases where the presumption may not be raised are introduced treating them as if they were exceptions to an ordinary rule. Whenever, therefore, the presumption is not raised or acted upon, it must appear that special circumstances existed in the case which either negatived the presumption or rebutted it. Whenever, therefore, the presumption is not raised or acted upon, it must appear that special circumstances existed in the case which either negatived the presumption or rebutted it. Now the first sub-illustration of illustration (b) of Section 114 is that of a case in which the presumption of untrustworthings, which would ordinarily arise from the moral character of an accomplice and the temptation he is under to save himself at the expense of the prisoner, is negatived by the supposition that the accomplice in question is a man of high and honourable character and any likelihood of his falsely implicating an innocent man in order to save himself is also negatived by that fact and by the nature of the offence to which he is speaking. The case cited as the 2nd sub-illustration shows that there need not be anything in the moral character of the accomplice and the nature of the crime, which he admits having committed, to negative the distrust to which his evidence would prima facie be subject and yet extraneous circumstances such as the fact that he and two others of his companions arrested immediately after the commission of the offence gave the same account of the occurrence implicating the accused under circumstances, which for all practical purposes precluded the chances of a previous concert, may be regarded as vouching for the truth of the accomplices evidence. The supposed facts of the two illustrations are such as to leave no room for any reasonable doubt as to the truth of the accomplices story in each case. There may, of course, be circumstances of a similar nature which would equally clearly negative the ordinary presumption against the reliability of an accomplices evidence and it is the function primarily of the trying Court to attach due weight to those circumstances. Further, the strength of the presumption, when it arises, must vary in different cases, having regard to the nature of the crime, the strength of the motive that may exist to tell a false story, and other similar circumstances. Further, the strength of the presumption, when it arises, must vary in different cases, having regard to the nature of the crime, the strength of the motive that may exist to tell a false story, and other similar circumstances. All this to my mind only shows what has been declared in so many words by Section 133 that the Legislature did not intend to lay down a hard and fast rule that in every case the accomplices testimony must be regarded as unworthy of credence, if not corroborated; but it does not follow, therefore, as argued on behalf of the Crown, that in no case where the Court refused to raise the presumption can it be said that it has erred in law. For instance, there can be no doubt that in ordinary cases an omission to raise the presumptions mentioned in illustrations (c) and (e) would be an error in law and justify a Court of second appeal in interfering with the decree of the lower Courts on that ground. The presumption as to the unreliability of an accomplices evidence is placed by the Legislature on the same footing. No doubt, there are cases and cases and while in doubtful cases the position contended for on behalf of the Crown may well be sound, there is nothing at least in the Indian Evidence Act or in reason that in other cases, in which there could be no two opinions that the presumption that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated applies in full force not being either negatived or rebutted, an omission to raise the obvious presumption should not be treated as an error in law. 73. On the other hand, as I have pointed out, the illustrations to Section 114 furnish an indication to the contrary. 74. Now, if the view which I have above indicated of the effect of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act be correct, there is no foundation whatever for the suggestion that these provisions are in any respect different from what is laid down in the rulings of the Indian Courts on the subject, either since the passing of the Indian Evidence Act or before it, or of the English Courts. Before the passing of the present Evidence Act, the question of accomplices evidence was dealt with in India by Section 28 of Act II of 1855 in these terms,--"Except in cases of treason, the direct, evidence of one witness, who is entitled to full credit, shall he sufficient for proof of any fact in any such Court or before any such person. Bat this provision shall not affect any rule or practice of any Court that requires corroborative evidence in support of the testimony of an accomplice." Then, it appears that at least in Bengal, there was some uncertainty in the decisions of the Courts on the question whether it was legal to convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice and the matter was referred in 1836 to a Full Bench of the Bengal High Court. In that case Elahee Bukshs case 5 W.R. 80 Cr. : B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 459, Sir Barnes Peacock in his well known judgment fully investigated the whole question relating to an accomplices evidence after an elaborate survey of the English and Indian authorities, and what he then laid down has not only been since followed as the law by all the Courts without question, but the Indian Legislature, when it came to pass the Indian Evidence Ac1, has embodied the important principles enunciated in that judgment in Section 113 and the illustration to Section 114 above referred to. In fact, at least one of these illustrations is bodily borrowed from the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock. It would be worse than idle on my part to refer again to the old English and Indian decisions discussed in the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock. His conclusions are that an accomplice, being a competent witness, a conviction founded upon the uncorroborated evidence of one or more accomplices alone is valid in law. Bat as a general rule there is danger in acting upon the evidence of an accomplice who is admitted to give evidence for the Crown for reasons already indicated and that this danger is at least as great here as in England. The danger, however, disappears if the grounds which give rise to the apprehension are found to be absent in any particular case and he cites a hypothetical case which is embodied as sub-illustration to illustration (b) to Section 114. The danger, however, disappears if the grounds which give rise to the apprehension are found to be absent in any particular case and he cites a hypothetical case which is embodied as sub-illustration to illustration (b) to Section 114. He further lays down that as a general rule it would be as unsafe to act upon the evidence of more than one accomplice as of one; otherwise two companions in guilt might get off by conspiring and falsely accusing two innocent persons. To this, there may be exceptions and then he cites a case which has apparently suggested the second sub-illustration to illustration (b) of Section 114. As regards the duty of the Judge in dealing with such evidence, he lay down, with reference to the provision? of the then Criminal Procedure Code, which in this respect are the same as Section 279 of the present Code, imposing upon the Judge the duty of summing up the evidence, and, also upon general principles relating to trials by Jury its are to be gathered from the decisions and practice of English Judges, that it is quite as necessary here, as in England, if not more so, that the evidence of accomplices should not be, left to a Jury without such directions and observations from the Judge as the circumstances of the case may require, that the giving of improper advice by the Judge or omission by him to give that advice, which the Judge, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, ought to give upon questions of fact or as to the degree of credit to be given to particular witnesses, is an error in law in the summing up. He then gives as an example an omission on the part of the Judge to tell the Jury that the accomplices were giving the evidence under a tender of pardon or to explain to them the position in which the witnesses were placed and the danger of acting upon the evidence unless they should find that it was corroborated. He then gives as an example an omission on the part of the Judge to tell the Jury that the accomplices were giving the evidence under a tender of pardon or to explain to them the position in which the witnesses were placed and the danger of acting upon the evidence unless they should find that it was corroborated. He goes even further and says that it is the duty of a Judge to advise the Jury not to believe the evidence of an accomplice unless he is confirmed and only so far as he is confirmed and a failure in that respect is an error in law and forms a good ground of appeal against a conviction founded on a verdict of guilty based upon such evidence alone. He also holds that it would be an error in the summing up to tell the Jury that the evidence of the accomplices was corroborated by evidence of a fact which did not amount to any corroboration at all. He finally lays down that, where there is an error in the summing up of the evidence, that would warrant the Court in setting aside the verdict of guilty, if the Court is satisfied that the prisoner was prejudiced by the error and that there has been a failure of justice. But the verdict and conviction ought not to be set aside, if the Court be of opinion that it was warranted by the evidence, and upon the evidence, they would have upheld the conviction on appeal, if the trial had been by the Judge with the aid of assessors instead of by a Jury. 75. In this Presidency, the ruling in Proceedings, dated 20th March 1863 4 M.H.C.R. App. VII, which was before the passing of the Indian Evidence ACJ of 1372, lays down that no rule of law prohibits a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but as a general rule of practice, it is unsafe to convict upon such evidence and it is the duty of a Judge to point-out the circumstances, if any, which would justify the Jury to rely upon such evidence. In Queen v. Nawab Jan 8 W.R. 19 Cr Kemp and Macpherson, JJ., set aside a verdict on the ground that the Judge did not, with sufficient emphasis, caution the Jury as to the danger of paying any respect to the testimony of the approver in the case, and wholly omitted to guide them as to what amounted to legal corroboration in some material circumstances, such circumstances connecting and identifying the prisoner with the offence. In Queen v. Nidheeram Bagdee 18 W.R. 45 Cr Couch, C.J., and Bayley, J., on the other hand, upheld a verdict of a Jury since the Judge had properly cautioned them on the point and as the Jury still found a verdict of guilty, there was no error in law. It is significant to note that the learned Judges thought that it was a proper case in which an appeal might be made to the Government. In Queen v. Nunhoo 9 W.R. 28 Cr. Kemp and Jackson, JJ., laid down that the evidence of an accomplice may be of itself evidence, but it should never be admitted as sufficient proof of guilt unless it is corroborated. In Bombay also in a case, Reg, v. Fatechand Vastachand 5 Bom. H.C.R. 85 Cr. it was laid down that it was the duty of the Judge to follow the ordinary rule and not to act upon the accomplices evidence without corroboration in a material part of it. 76. The first reported case of importance, decided after the coming into operation of the present Indian Evidence Act, is that of Queen v. Sadhu Mundul 21 W.R. 69 Cr. which was heard by Phear and Morris, JJ., on appeal from a conviction on a charge of murder in a trial by a Jury. The learned Judges considered the effect of the enactment and their conclusion was that Section 114, illustration (b), contained a Legislative declaration that, regard being had to the common course of natural events and human conduct, an accomplice is unworthy of credit so far as his testimony implicating another person is concerned, unless he is corroborated in material particulars in respect of the prisoner, but that, in exceptional cases, such as those mentioned in the sub-illustrations, the Court might give credit to the accomplices testimony against the accused, if it sees good reasons for doing so upon grounds other than the personal corroboration. They go on further to observe that it is the nature of an accomplices evidence that calls for corroboration even though such evidence was given in a process of careful examination or capable of being tested by cross examination. 77. The earliest decision of this Court under the Indian Evidence Act brought to our notice is in Reg. v. Ramasami Padayachi 1 M. 394 where Morgan, C.J., and Kindersley, J., laid down that it was not the law that the evidence of an accomplice was irreceivable in evidence without corroboration and that Sections 133 and 114, illustration (b), coincide with the rule in England. They state the rule to be that the tainted evidence of an accomplice should be carefully scanned and received with caution and may be treated as unworthy of credit, yet if the Jury or the Court, as the case may be, credits the evidence, a conviction proceeding upon it is not illegal. Some reliance was placed on this ruling on behalf of the Crown, as if it laid down the law differently from the other decisions, but I find nothing to support the suggestion. The judgment does not deal with the question in what cases the manner in which an accomplices evidence is dealt with by the Court, either in directions to the Jury or in laying down for its own guidance the principles for testing such evidence, may amount to an error in law. On the other hand, they say that the law on this point is the same as the law in England on the point. In Reg. v. Malapa bin Kapana 11 B.H.C.R. 196 Nanabhai Haridas and Larpent, JJ., in considering the question whether certain evidence can be considered corroborative evidence in the sense in which Judges require corroboration of an accomplices statement within the meaning of Section 114, illustration (b), they take it for granted that the rule is to require such corroboration. 78. As for the more recent decisions of this Presidency, Collins, C.J., and Muttuswami Aiyar, J., in Queen-Empress v. Arumuga 12 M. 196 laid down that a Judge should caution the Jury not to accept the evidence of an approver unless it is corroborated and the omission to do so would amount to a misdirection. 78. As for the more recent decisions of this Presidency, Collins, C.J., and Muttuswami Aiyar, J., in Queen-Empress v. Arumuga 12 M. 196 laid down that a Judge should caution the Jury not to accept the evidence of an approver unless it is corroborated and the omission to do so would amount to a misdirection. In King-Emperor v. Mohiuddeen Sahib 25 M. 143 Davies and Moore, JJ., held that the evidence of an accomplice ought to be corroborated in some material circumstance and in Emperor v. Edward William Smither 26 M. 1 Davies and Benson, JJ., state that an accurate statement of the law on the subject will be to say that, as a general rule, it is unsafe to act upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice but then may be especial circumstances in which it would not be unsafe to act upon such evidence. In Ramasami Gounden v. Emperor 27 M. 271 at p. 290 : 14 M.L.J. 226 : 1 Cr. L.J. 641 Subramania Aiyar, J., said that the Indian Law in this matter was borrowed from the English Law as held in Queen v. Elahee Buksh 5 W.R. 80 Cr. : B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 459; the Judge ought not to direct the Jury to acquit if the case against the prisoner rested mainly upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, but it was sufficient if the Judge advised the Jury not to convict upon such evidence as stated in Reg. v. Boyes 9 Cox. C.C. 32 : 1 B. and S. 311 : 2 F. and F. 157 : 30 L.J.Q.B. 301 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 1158 : 5 L.T. 147 : 9 W.R. 690. Boddam, J., however, would go further in holding that it would be the duty of the Judge in such a case to direct the Jury to acquit. The matter on being referred to Bashyam Aiyangar, J., he agreed with Subramania Aiyar, J. as to the proper scope of the law on the subject and pointed out that it was the duty of the Judge to explain to the Jury that it was not safe to convict upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice and, if there was no corroboration of the accomplice in a material particular, to draw their attention to the fact. The Judge ought also to add, he says, that a conviction upon such testimony is perfectly legal, and if a Jury, bearing in mind the caution, still believed the evidence, it would be their duty to convict. The learned Judge observes that the practice not to convict upon the evidence of an accomplice unless there is corroboration has been so hallowed by time as to be deserving of respect, and that in fact the rule of law as laid down by Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act is practically rendered nugatory by the rule of practice. In Queen-Empress v. Kunjun Menon and Sankunni 1 M.L.J. 397 a Full Bench of this Court consisting of Collins, C.J., Kernan, Muthuswami Aiyar, Parker, and Wilkinson, JJ., observe that it has now become a general rule of practice that the Judge ought to advise the Jury to acquit unless the evidence of the accomplice is corroborated ; and in a case In re Kuppan 5 M.L.T. 355 : 9 Cr. L.J. 308 : 1 Ind. Cas. 547. Benson and Miller, JJ., stated that it was a general rule of practice that it was not safe to convict upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. The recent rulings of the other High Courts are to the same effect. Birdwood and Jardine, JJ., in Queen-Empress v. Krishna Bhat 10 B. 319 say that Section 114, illustration (b), lays down the ordinary rule that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars and that it was an established rule of practice that the accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence as to the identity of every person he impeaches. Jardine and Bayley, JJ., in Queen-Empress v. Maganlal 14 B. 115 also enunciate the law to the same effect, saying that it is the established practice to require corroboration of an accomplices evidence and it is for those who want such evidence to be acted upon to allege reasons why the ordinary test of the evidence of accomplices should not be applied in a particular case. In King-Emperor v. Malhar 26 B. 193 Fulton and Crowe, JJ., while admitting the existence of the general rule, point out that all persons coming within the category of accomplices cannot be treated as on precisely the same footing. In King-Emperor v. Shrinivasa Krishna 7 Bom. In King-Emperor v. Malhar 26 B. 193 Fulton and Crowe, JJ., while admitting the existence of the general rule, point out that all persons coming within the category of accomplices cannot be treated as on precisely the same footing. In King-Emperor v. Shrinivasa Krishna 7 Bom. L.R. 969 Jenkins, C.J., and Russel, J., point out that the absolute rule of law on the subject of accomplices testimony is contained in Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act; there is further a rule of guidance which is embodied in Section 114, illustration (b), and that it would be an error of law to disregard the presumption indicated in the latter rule. In Calcutta, Rampini and Pratt, JJ, in Queen-Emprees v. Deodhar Singh 27 C. 144 point oat that the presumption stated in illustration (b) to Section 114 has become a rule of practica of almost universal application and in Karnala Prasad v. Sital Prasad 28 C. 339 Amir Ali and Pratt, JJ., observe that ordinarily speaking the evidence of an accomplice should be corroborated in material particulars and the practice, which has been laid down, has become, one may say, a part of the law itself. In Jamiruddi Masalli v. Emperor 29 C. 782 Prinsep and Stephen, JJ., observed that the Sessions Judge ought to havetoldtheJurythat though the law permits of a conviction being based upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, yet it was not the practice of our Courts to convict on such evidence. It was a misdirection to tell a Jury that the evidence of the accomplice was corroborated by a fact which did not amount to any corroboration at all. In Deo Nandan Pershad v. Emperor 33 C. 649 : 30 C.W.N. 669 : 3 Cr. L.J. 452 Brett and Stephen, JJ., recognise the rule of practice which lays down that it is generally wrong to convict upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice but they agree with the proposition stated in King-Emperor v. Malhar 26 B. 193 that, the rule does not apply in equal force to all persons coming technically within the category. In a recent important trial under the criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, for an offence under Section 1210 of the Indian Penal Code in the Calcutta High Court King-Emperor v. Noni Qopal Gupta 38 C. 559 : 10 Ind. Cas. 682 : 15 C.W.N. 693 : 12 Cr. In a recent important trial under the criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, for an offence under Section 1210 of the Indian Penal Code in the Calcutta High Court King-Emperor v. Noni Qopal Gupta 38 C. 559 : 10 Ind. Cas. 682 : 15 C.W.N. 693 : 12 Cr. L.J. 286 it was conceded before the Special Bench as a proposition which was not open to question that before the approvers testimony could be acted on, it must be corroborated in mateiial particulars and that the nature and extent of this corroboration was well settled; there must be corroboration not only as to the crime but also as to the identity of each one of the accused. The learned Judges observe that this is no technical rule but founded on long judicial experience. 79. In the Allahabad High Court, the law was fully considered by Straight arid Tyrell, JJ., in Queen-Empress v. Ram Saran 8 A. 306 and they held that the law in India as contained in the Indian Evidence Act is the same as in England, viz., that, though a conviction is not illegal, that is, rot unlawful, if it is based en accomplices testimony alone, experience teaches us that it is not safe to rely upon such evidence unless it is corroborated, and it is the practice of Judges both in England, and in India when sitting alone, to guard their minds carefully against the evidence of approvers. The corrobration, they observe, must extend to the identity of the accused persons. Straight, J., also points out that the tendency of late years in England is to apply the rule with great strictness, and, as I shall show, the practice of the Court of Criminal Appeal is to set aside a verdict of guilty if the Judge did not advise the Jury not to act upon the testimony of an accomplice. In Queen-Empress v. Gobardhan 9 A. 528 at p. 554 Edge, C.J., says that as a general rule it would be unsafe to convict an accused person on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice and a Judge should advise the Jury to that effect. It is, at the same time, not only open to the Jury but it is their duty, if they believe such evidence in spite of the caution to bring in a verdict of guilty. It is, at the same time, not only open to the Jury but it is their duty, if they believe such evidence in spite of the caution to bring in a verdict of guilty. In Abdul Karim v. King-Emperor 1 A.L.J. 110 : 1 Cr. L.J. 211 Banerji, J. observes that the evidence of an accomplice cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars, unless it is such that the Court can unhesitatingly believe it. 80. I wish to allude very briefly to the rulings in some English cases decided after the date of the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock in Elahee Buhshs case 5 W.R. 80 Cr. : B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 459 as the English decisions prior to that judgment are exhaustively dealt with there. In Reg. v. Cramp 14 Cox C.C. 390 Denman, J., observes that there is no doubt that the evidence of an accomplice requires corroboration. In Reg. v. Gallagher 15 Cox. C.C. 291 the Lord Chief Justice, Coleridge, in his direction to the Jury, observed, "If the Jury upon the evidence of the approver himself was perfectly satisfied that he was speaking the truth, there was no reason in point of law why on his evidence they should not act and find the accused guilty, but the danger of acting upon the uncorroborated statement of an approver was obvious and the wisdom of requiring that some corroborative evidence should be given before such statements are acted upon was perfectly apparent to any intelligent mind. The law was as be had stated and the practice was always to require corroboration." In In re Meunier (1894) 2 Q.B. 415 : 63 L.J.M.C. 198 : 10 R. 400 : 71 L.T. 403 : 42 W.R. 637 : 18 Cox. C.C. 15, where the question was whether the evidence of an accomplice if uncorroborated was sufficient to justify a committal for surrender to Prance, Cave, J., held that it was not the law that a prisoner must necessarily be acquitted in the absence of corroborative evidence and there was no power in the Court to withdraw a case from the Jury on that ground. In Rex v. Tote (1908) 2 K.B. 630 : 77 L.J.K.B. 1043 : 99 L.T. 620 : 72 J.P. 391 Lord Alverstone delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal, while pointing out that there was no definite rule of law that a person cannot be convicted upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice as stated by Cave, J., in In re Meunier (1894) 2 Q.B. 415 : 63 L.J.M.C. 198 : 10 R. 400 : 71 L.T. 403 : 42 W.R. 637 : 18 Cox. C.C. 15, observed that he ought to have added assuming that the Jury was cautioned in accordance with the ordinary practice and then cites the fallowing passage from Taylor on Evidence, 10th Edition, page 688, as containing a correct exposition of the law: "Judges,...in their discretion, generally advise a Jury not to convict a prisoner upon the testimony of an accomplice alone; and although the adoption of this practice will not be enforced by a Court of review, its omission will, in most cases, be deemed a neglect of duty on the part of a Judge. Considering, too, the respect which is always paid by the Jury to such advice from the Bench, it may be regarded as the settled course of practice not to convict a prisoner, excepting under very special circumstances." He also cites with approval a passage from Russel on Crimes, 6oh Edition, Volume III, page 646: "it may be observed that the practice in question has obtained so much sanction from legal authority that it deserves all the reverence of law, and a deviation from it in any particular case would be justly considered of questionable propriety." 81. In Rex v. Everest 73 J.P. 269 at p. 271 the Court of Criminal Appeal, (Darling, Bray and Lawrence, JJ.), laid down that a Judge should direct a Jury to acquit if the evidence against the accused is that of a person put forward as an accomplice and his evidence is not corroborated in some material particular, that is to say, in some particular that involves the guilt of the accused. In Rex v. John Warren 73 J.P. 359 : 25 T.L.R. 603 the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed a conviction on the ground that there was very little, if any, evidence of corroboration proper to go to the Jury and that the Judge did not adequately direct the Jury that they should acquit the appellant if the accomplices story was not corroborated in some material particular, that is, in some particular that involved the guilt of the accused. Channell, J, observed in his judgment: "The rule was very clear now about the evidence of an accomplice.--It must be corroborated in some material particular." It seems to me that in the last two cases the words "directing the Jury to acquit" should perhaps be understood in the sense of advising the Jury to that effect and not in the sense of withdrawing the case from the Jury. 82. It should be pointed out with reference to the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal in England that though under 7 Edw. VII, Chap. 23, Section 3, the prisoner is given an appeal as of right only on a question of law, the Appellate Court has the power in certain circumstances to review the verdict and conviction on a question of fact or of mixed law and fact. But they seem to lay down generally that it is the duty of the Judge to advise the Jury not to convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice and a failure to discharge that duty would, ipso facto, make the conviction liable to be set aside. The power of this Court to interfere under Article 26 of the Madras Letters Patent is, however, confined to matters of law and in this respect it is an alogons to the power which the Queens Bench as a Court of error has under 11 and 12 Vict., Cap. 78. On the question, therefore, what would amount to an error in law in dealing with the evidence of an accomplice, the decision of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved in Queen v. Stubbs 25 L.J. M.C. 16 : Dears C.C. 555 : 1 Jur. (S.S.,) 1115 : 4 W.R. 83 : 7 Cox. C.C. 48 is much relied on by the Counsel for the Crown. (S.S.,) 1115 : 4 W.R. 83 : 7 Cox. C.C. 48 is much relied on by the Counsel for the Crown. But all that is said there is that it is not a rule of law that an accomplice must be corroborated in material particulars but is only a rule of practice and a question of practice cannot be reserved for the opinion of that Court. In that case, the Judge had, in fact, cautioned the Jury as to the case of Stubbs where there was no corroboration and what the Court of Crown Cases Reserved held was that his failure to advise the Jury not to convict was an omission to observe a rule merely of practice. It is clear, however, that the tendency of the more recent English decisions is to invest the practice with the stringency of law; that in India also, an omission to advise the Jury in accordance with the practice would be an error in law, is the view of Sir Barnes Peacock and many other Judges as is apparent from the decisions I have referred to. 83. My conclusion is that it is well established law that, except in circumstances of an especial nature, it is the duty of the Court to raise the presumption that accomplices evidence is unworthy of credit as against the accused persons unless it is corroborated in material particulars and the failure of the Judge to direct the Jury to that effect is an error in law. It will none the less, in my opinion, be an error in law if the trial was held without a Jury and the Judge or the Magistrate misdirected himself on this point and treated an accomplices evidence like that of any other witness. I do not perceive any principle on which the two cases may be distinguished. The next proposition which is also well recognised is that, if there are any especial circumstances which would justify a disregard of this rule, those circumstances in a trial by a Jury must be clearly set out in the directions of the Judge, and the Appellate Court is entitled to consider as a matter of law whether those circumstances are such as to justify the exceptional treatment. If, in the opinion of the Appellate Court, the facts in this connection are such that they in no sense negative the danger of acting upon the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice but the Judge told the Jury otherwise, the verdict must be set aside as being due to an error in law; if the especial facts, however, are such as may reasonably be considered to take the case out of the rule, even though it is possible to hold a different view, the verdict cannot be interfered with by a Court of error. A similar rule would hold good in cases tried by a Judge alone. This is substantially how I stated the law recently in Vyasa Rao v. Emperor (1911) 1 M.W.N. 327 : 21 M.L.J. 283 : 10 M.L.T. 84 : 9 Ind. Cas. 897 : 112 Cr. L.J. 150. 84. As regard the nature of corroboration, the law is that corroboration must relate not only to the crime but also to the identity of the prisoner. The question whether it can be said as a matter of law that the view of the trying Judge as to whether certain evidence does or does not amount to corroboration within the meaning of the rule is also governed by the same principle as I have just indicated. But the evidence, given in Court by an accomplice, cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of another accomplice, though in exceptional circumstances, (such as the second sub-illustration to illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act), the accounts given of the crime by different accomplices may be taken as corroboration of the evidence in Court. But the evidence, given in Court by an accomplice, cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of another accomplice, though in exceptional circumstances, (such as the second sub-illustration to illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act), the accounts given of the crime by different accomplices may be taken as corroboration of the evidence in Court. On the other hand, if the contention of the Counsel for the Crown were well founded that, since the question whether the evidence of an accomplice is to be deemed to be untrustworthy unless it is corroborated in material particulars, cannot be determined without referring to the facts of the particular case in which the evidence is given, therefore, in no case, where a Judge of facts has acted upon such evidence, can it be said that in failing to raise such a presumption he has erred in law, however grossly palpable the facts may be which show the danger of acting upon such evidence alone, then all that has been said hitherto by learned Judges in England and India on the subject of accomplices evidence would have no meaning whatever. For it would logically follow from such an argument that the law imposes no especial duty on the Court in dealing with accomplices evidence and the general rule that an accomplices evidence should not be acted upon unless it is corroborated, the soundness of which, as Lord Chief Justice Coleridge puts it, is obvious to any intelligent mind, would lose all significance in law, if its disregard in any case cannot be set right as a matter of law, because in some cases of rare occurrence the rule may not be applicable. 85. This brings me to the second question propounded in the certificate. It is in these words That the opinion of the majority of the Court that the previous statements of an accomplice can legally amount to corroboration of the evidence given by him at the trial should be further considered. 86. 85. This brings me to the second question propounded in the certificate. It is in these words That the opinion of the majority of the Court that the previous statements of an accomplice can legally amount to corroboration of the evidence given by him at the trial should be further considered. 86. The answer to be deduced from the above discussion of the law is that, as a general rule, the previous statements of an accomplice do not legally amount to such corroboration as is required to rebut the presumption as to the unreliability of an accomplices evidence, but there may be cases in which the circumstances in which the previous statement was made, by precluding the possibility of the accused having been falsely named therein by the approver, would lend corroborative force to the accomplices evidence. The only direct decision on the point is a case Reg. v. Malapa bin Kapana 11 B.H.C.R. 196 where the rule is stated in unqualified terms and in Vyasa Rao v. Emperor (1911) 1 M.W.N. 327 : 21 M.L.J. 283 : 10 M.L.T. 84 : 9 Ind. Cas. 897 : 112 Cr. L.J. 150 in which the question arose before Ayling, J., and myself, whether evidence of a co-accomplice was sufficient corroboration within the meaning of the law, I expressed my agreement with what is laid down in the Bombay case. While I still adopt generally what is laid down in Reg. v. Malapa bin Kapana 11 B.H.C.R. 196 it seems to me, on further consideration, that, to be quite accurate, the rule must be seated subject to the qualification, which I have suggested, and I may point out that neither the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court nor I were called upon in the cases mentioned above to consider whether the rule was subject to any qualification. Having regard to the fact that the previous statement of an accomplice is admissible in evidence, as is assumed in the second ground of the certificate, and to the nature of the cases cited by the Legislature, which shows that corroboration may be furnished by previous statements of accomplices made in certain circumstances, it would be difficult to hold that the rule does not admit of exceptions. The previous statements mainly relied on by the majority of the Special Bench are those made by the approvers, Arurrmgam and Somasundaram, respectively to the. The previous statements mainly relied on by the majority of the Special Bench are those made by the approvers, Arurrmgam and Somasundaram, respectively to the. Police, the first, two days, and the second, three days, after the murder of Mr. Ashe and also to some extent on the statements made by them a few days afterwards to Mr. Cox, who made a local inquiry in the casa. As regards the statements to the Police officer, I am of opinion that they were wrongly admitted in evidence on the ground next mentioned in the certificate and it would not, therefore, be necessary to consider how far, if admissible, they could be taken as amounting to corroboration of the approvers evidence in Court. As regards the statements made to Mr. Cox, no objection can be taken to their admissibility but, so far as at present advised, I fail to see how it can be held to afford corroborative evidence within the meaning of the rule. They were made long after the last meeting at which the criminal oath was taken and several days after the approvers had been in the hands of the Police in connection with the murder of Mr. Ashe. The learned Judges, who formed the majority f the Special Court, do not find that these approvers did not make the statements to Mr. Cox in the hope of being pardoned, nor do they say that the circumstances in which the statements were made precluded the possibility of their acting in concert. On the other hand, it is found by Mr. Justice Sankaran Nair that the evidence points to the probability of their so acting. No doubt he learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Styling say that some of the accused allege hat they were strangers to Arumugam and Somasundaram and, therefore, their names should not have been mentioned by the approvers in less they participated in the conspiracy. Justice Sankaran Nair that the evidence points to the probability of their so acting. No doubt he learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Styling say that some of the accused allege hat they were strangers to Arumugam and Somasundaram and, therefore, their names should not have been mentioned by the approvers in less they participated in the conspiracy. That allegation has been found by the learned Judges to be untrue, but they do not find that in fact these accused came to be a known to the approvers only by reason of their being members of the criminal conspiracy: on the other hand, it is found in their judgment that there was an association called the Bharata Matha Association which, according to them, though of a seditious tendency, was not actually a criminal association and some of the accused at least were members of that association. The fact that the Police could not have concocted the earlier or the later statements of the approvers does not meet the difficulty. I am not prepared to hold upon the fasts, so far as they appear in the judgments of the Special Bench, that the statements to Mr. Cox would be such corroborative evidence as to minimise the danger of acting upon the testimony of the approvers. I may also observe that most of the considerations which I have indicated as applicable to the statements made to the Magistrate are also applicable to those made to the Police officer four days previously. 87. The objection taken in the third ground to the admissibility of the statements made by two of the approvers to the Inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department is, in my opinion, well founded. Those statements are admitted under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, not on the ground that they were made at the time when the fact of seditious conspiracy to which they relate took place, for the last act in connection with the seditious conspiracy spoken to by the approvers had taken place months before the making of the statements, bat on the ground that they were made to an "authority competent to investigate the fact." The statements were made in the course of an investigation in the case of the murder of Mr. Ashe. It is, moreover, the finding of the Special Bench that the murder of Mr. Ashe. It is, moreover, the finding of the Special Bench that the murder of Mr. Ashe was not in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy, the subject of the present trial, and the one had no real connection with the other. Now supposing that the officer of the Criminal Investigation Department--P.W. No. 31--had authority to inquire into the murder of Mr. Ashe he would have no authority to investigate the fact of a conspiracy dealt with under Section 121A of the Indian Penal Code which is a non-cognizable offence, without a Magistrates warrant (see Section 155, Criminal Procedure Code). Neither P.W. No. 31 nor Mr. Thomas had any such warrant. Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act says that the authority must be competent to investigate the fact, i.e., the fact to which the statement relates. Here the fact is the conspiracy and this fact, the officers concerned in the case had no authority to investigate at the time the statements were made. Bat it is said that the statements were made in the course of an investigation of an offence which was within the competency of the Police officers. I do not, however, see how that makes the language of Section 157 applicable. One would not, in my opinion, be justified in construing Section 157 in a loose general sense having regard to the fact that it permits a statement, made in the absence of a party to a proceeding which he had no means of testing, to be used in evidence against him. Such departure from the ordinary rule relating to judicial evidence must be confined within the strictest) limits. I may mention that it was argued by the Pleaders for the accused that the word "investigate" in Section 157 in the Indian Evidence Act is used in the technical sense of the Criminal Procedure Code. But this is clearly not so. The application of that section of the Indian Evidence Act is not confined to criminal cases and the word "investigate" is obviously used in its natural and popular meaning. 88. It is further urged in support of the third ground that Veeraraghava Iyer, P.W. No. 31, was not even competent to investigate the murder of Mr. Ashe. The question is dealt with in the judgment of the majority of the Special Bench at page 10, and by Mr. Justice Sankaran Nair at page 66. 88. It is further urged in support of the third ground that Veeraraghava Iyer, P.W. No. 31, was not even competent to investigate the murder of Mr. Ashe. The question is dealt with in the judgment of the majority of the Special Bench at page 10, and by Mr. Justice Sankaran Nair at page 66. The question is not free from difficulty, but after careful consideration of it, I am inclined to think that the weight of reasoning is decidedly in favour of the view taken by Mr. Justice Sankaran Nair. There is nothing, indeed, that I can usefully add to his arguments based on the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code on which the decision of the question depends. I may observe that Section 21 of the Police Act XXIV of 1859 throws no light inasmuch as the sections of that Act which defined the powers of a Police officer have been re-placed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Nor does the confidential Government Order (G.O. No. 913, Judicial, dated 2nd July 1908) adduced in evidence on behalf of the Crown make out that an Inspector of the Criminal Investigation Department is vested with the powers of investigation under the Code. The department was created to assist the ordinary Police force in the detection of certain crimes and neither that fact nor the fact that a member of the Criminal Investigation Department holds the rank of an Inspector would by itself entitle him to exercise the same powers within the Presidency of Madras as an officer in charge of a Police station has within the local limits of his station under Section 155, Criminal Procedure Code. 89. The fourth question raised by the certificate is whether previous statements of the two approvers, Arumugam and Somasundram, are not inadmissible in evidence against the accused persons by virtue of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. That section runs thus: "No confession made to a Police Officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." I agree with the contention of Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar that the words "a person" there, mean "any person" but the real point in connection with the applicability of the section to the statements of the approver is, what is the meaning in which the word "confession" is used in that section? Govindaraghava Aiyar that the words "a person" there, mean "any person" but the real point in connection with the applicability of the section to the statements of the approver is, what is the meaning in which the word "confession" is used in that section? It could not have been used in the wide and popular sense in which it is used in every day conversation as meaning an acknowledgment of some fault, for that would make the section ridiculous, and there can be little doubt that it is to be understood in the technical sense of the criminal law. This is apparent from the fact that the word is used in connection with criminal inquiries and trials in all the sections in which it occurs, namely, Sections 24 to 30. What then is that meaning? It is suggested that "confession" in criminal law means an admission of certain facts which constitute an offence or lead to an inference of guilt. Yes, but admission by whom? When the word is used in the technical sense of the criminal law, does it not always mean such an admission as above referred to when made by a person who is charged with the offence which is the subject-matter of the statement? That is at least how I have always understood the word. One does not talk of the confession of a witness except in a popular sense. If the word, as used in Section 25, be understood without reference to the question whether the person making it was ever tried or not for the offence to which he confesses, then it would follow that any statement by a witness to a Police officer which leads to an inference of guilt under the general provisions of any Act, however unconnected with the offence under inquiry, would be inadmissible by reason of this section. Suppose A, who does net possess the necessary license, sent his servant with a quantity of opium for sale and the servant returning after having sold the opium is robbed of the money, could it be said that in a trial of persons charged with the robbery the statement of the master made to a Police officer immediately after the occurrence that he had sent the servant to sell opium could not be received in evidence under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, because the witness statement would amount to a confession of an offence under the Excise Act? I think not. There could be no good reason for excluding such statement on the mere ground that it was made to a Police officer. The fact is, whether a statement is to be carted a confession or not, depends not merely upon the nature of the statement itself, but also on the use that is sought to be made of it. Whenever the evidentiary value of a statement as against the person making it is in question, it is then that it would be properly called an admission or confession according as the proceeding in which the question arises is of a civil or criminal nature, but not when it is intended to be used as evidence against a third parson. For it cannot be disputed that an admission or confession means a statement amounting to an acknowledgment of certain legal liability or of facts which give rise to such liability against the parson making the acknowledgment; then, how can such statement be called either admission or confession in a case where the only question for consideration is, how far the liability of a third person and not of the parson making the statement, is established thereby? Much stress is laid on the fact that in Section 25 confession is not expressly mentioned as of an accused person while it is so used in Section 24, but if the word has a well known meaning in the criminal law, as I think it has, then the argument has no force. I am fortified in the interpretation I have put on the word "confession" in Section 25 of the, Indian Evidence Act by the definition of "confession" given in Stephens Digest, Article 131, which was adopted by Mahmood, J., in Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal 6 A. 509. I am fortified in the interpretation I have put on the word "confession" in Section 25 of the, Indian Evidence Act by the definition of "confession" given in Stephens Digest, Article 131, which was adopted by Mahmood, J., in Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal 6 A. 509. On this point, therefore, I agree with the majority of the Full Bench. 90. The last ground of the certificate is that Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Coda, which lays down: "No statement made by any person to a Police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall, if taken down in writing, be signed by the person making it, nor shall such writing be used as evidence," forbids not only the use of the writing as evidence of the statement, but of the statement itself even if it is sought to be proved without the writing. But the contention is hopeless in face of the language of the Legislature. Supposing the statements made by the approvers were admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, could it be said that Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stands in the way? According to the ordinary rule of interpretation, the two enactments must be reconciled with each other if possible and if we confine the declaration of the Legislature in Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code to what is expressed there, it may well stand with Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. I, therefore, agree with the view of the Special Bench on this point which is also the view taken by Maclean, C.J., and Carnduff, J., in Fanindra Nath Bannerjee v. Emperor 36 C. 281 : 5 M.I.T. 97 : 13 C.W.N. 197 : 9 C.L.J. 199 : 6 Cr. L.J. 452 : 1 Ind. Cas. 970 and of Karamat Husain, J., in Rustom v. King-Emperor 7 A.L.J. 468 : 6 Ind. Cas. 101 : 11 Cr.L.J. 235. 91. The result of what I have said is that those prisoners, in my opinion, must be acquitted and discharged, whose convictions rest on the testimony of the approvers without any corroboration, independently of the previous statements of these witnesses made to the Police officer, Veeraraghava Aiyar, or to Mr. Cas. 101 : 11 Cr.L.J. 235. 91. The result of what I have said is that those prisoners, in my opinion, must be acquitted and discharged, whose convictions rest on the testimony of the approvers without any corroboration, independently of the previous statements of these witnesses made to the Police officer, Veeraraghava Aiyar, or to Mr. Cox, unless the learned Counsel for the Crown wishes to argue that there are facts and circumstances not mentioned in the judgment of the majority of the Special Bench, which, by themselves or if considered along with those noticed in the judgment of the Bench, take the case out of the general rule that an accomplice must be deemed unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars, or that there is evidence apart from that, relied on by the majority of the Special Court, which furnishes the necessary corroboration within the meaning of the rule as I have stated it. In that event, the case must be argued further, for, under Section 26 of the Letters Patent as I read it, a sentence is not to be set aside simply because there is an error of law involved in the direction of the Judge to the Jury or in the judgment of a Judge sitting without a Jury, if such error has not occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Sundara Aiyar, J. 92. Preliminary objection: With regard to the preliminary objection that the Advocate-General had no power in this case to make a certificate under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent, there can, in my opinion, be no doubt that it is unsustainable. The conviction of the accused was under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, XIV of 1908. That statute entitles the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government to direct that the special procedure prescribed therein should apply to the proceedings in respect of any offence of which a Magistrate has taken cognizance. According to the special procedure enacted by the Act, a Magistrate who arrives at the finding that the evidence adduced before him is sufficient to put the accused upon his trial for an offence specified in the Schedule to the Act should commit him for trial to the High Court. According to the special procedure enacted by the Act, a Magistrate who arrives at the finding that the evidence adduced before him is sufficient to put the accused upon his trial for an offence specified in the Schedule to the Act should commit him for trial to the High Court. Section 11 of the Act provides that "all persons sent for trial to the High Court under the Act shall be tried by a Special Bench of the Court composed of three Judges." Section 14 lays down that "the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall not apply to proceedings taken under this part, in so far as they are inconsistent with the special procedure prescribed in this part." 93. Mr. Napier contends that cases under the Act must be governed only by the special procedure laid down therein and that there is no provision in it for any review by this Court, either upon any reservation of a point or points of law by the Bench trying the case, or on a certificate by the Advocate-General that in his judgment there is an error in the decision of a point or points of law decided by the Special Bench, or that the point or points of law which has or have been decided by it should be further considered. But it is quite clear that; Act XIV of 1908 does not purport to lay down any complete rule of procedure and that the ordinary criminal procedure is applicable to proceedings under the Act, except so far as it is inconsistent with the special procedure prescribed in the Act. Obviously, certification by the Advocate-General under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent is not inconsistent with the special procedure prescribed in Act XIV of 19C8. 94. Mr. Napier next contends that the Advocate-Generals jurisdiction to make a certificate extends only to casts coming within the purview of Clauses 23 and 24 of the Letters Patent and that these Clauses do not include a case of conviction, on a committal to the High Court under Act XIV of 1908, by a mofussil Magistrate, of persons beyond the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court. I shall presently examine whether Clauses 23 and 24 would include such a case or not. I shall presently examine whether Clauses 23 and 24 would include such a case or not. But it is clear to my mind that, assuming they would not, Clause 26 is wide enough to cover the case. This Clause gives power to the High Court to review (on the Advocate-Generals certificate) in every case mentioned in Clause 25. The latter Clause refers to "any criminal trial before the Courts of original criminal jurisdiction which may be constituted by one or more Judges of the said High Court." There is no reference in the Clause to Clauses 23 and 24 and there is nothing in the words limiting its operation to the cases comprised in Clauses 23 and 24. There can be no doubt that a trial under Act XIV of 1908 is a trial before "a Court of original criminal jurisdiction" "constituted by one or more Judges of the said High Court." The committal under Act XIV of 1903 is to the High Court as such and a Court of three Judges of the High Court is constituted for the trial by the Chief Justice of the High Court acting under Section 14 of the High Courts Act, 24 and 25 Vict., Cap. 104. The fact that Act XIV of 1908 was passed long after the Letters Patent is no reason for holding that Clauses 25 and 26 do not apply to a trial before a Court of original criminal jurisdiction constituted by Judges of the High Court under that Act. They are clearly applicable to all original criminal trials by the High Court, whether under an Act existing at the time of the Letters Patent; or an Act passed subsequently. Clause 23 refers to the trial of persons within the local limits of the High Courts ordinary civil jurisdiction, and of other persons beyond its limits over whom the High Court had criminal jurisdiction at the date of the publication of the Letters Patent. Clause 23 refers to the trial of persons within the local limits of the High Courts ordinary civil jurisdiction, and of other persons beyond its limits over whom the High Court had criminal jurisdiction at the date of the publication of the Letters Patent. Clause 24 ordains that the High Court "shall hare extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction over all persons residing in places within the jurisdiction of any Court now subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and shall have authority to try at its discretion any such persons brought before it on charges preferred by the Advocate-General or by any Magistrate or other officer specially empowered by the Government in that behalf." It is admitted by Mr. Napier that the power in this section will extend to cases where the Magistrate or other special officer referred to therein prefers charges under authority which they possess under any law, whether existing at the time of the Letters Patent or coming into existence subsequently. There is no reason for not placing a similar construction on Clauses 25 and 26. This would be a sufficient ground for holding that the preliminary point must fail. 95. I am, however, also of opinion that it is not shown that Clauses 23 and 24 would not cover this case. Clause 24, as already mentioned, gives power to the High Court to try any person brought before it on charges preferred by any Magistrate or other special officer empowered by the Government in that behalf. For the decision of this case there are two points for consideration as to the meaning of this sentence. Does the expression "specially empowered" refer only to "other officer," or also to any Magistrate"? And, secondly, what is the meaning of the expression charges preferred by any Magistrate" or other officer specially empowered by the Government? The non-repetition of the word by" before the words "other officer" is relied on as showing that both the Magistrate and other officer referred to in the Clause should be persons specially empowered by Government. There is, no doubt, force in this argument, but it seems to me to be doubtful whether it is sound in this case. The powers of Magistrates are usually determined by general provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code or other statutory enactments. There is, no doubt, force in this argument, but it seems to me to be doubtful whether it is sound in this case. The powers of Magistrates are usually determined by general provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code or other statutory enactments. It does not appear that there was any provision of law at the time of the Letters Patent empowering the Government to give special authority to particular Magistrates to prefer a criminal charge. The non-repetition of the word "by" before "other officer" may be due to the fact that the Legislature intended to put the Advocate-General under one category and Magistrate and "other officer" under another and distinct category. After all, it would only be a matter of caution to repeat the word by" to show clearly that the qualification "specially empowered" did not apply to the noun before it. Then with respect to the expression charges preferred by, the contention on behalf of the Crown is that it means, as applied to a Magistrate, commitments made by him to the High Court. This is not the usual meaning of the expression. The preferring of a charge generally means the laying of a charge or complaint in order that it may be inquired into, and not a committal based on inquiry already made. This is certainly the meaning of the expression in this very sentence as applied to the Advocate-General. There is no apparent reason for giving it a different meaning in applying it to a Magistrate. The Clause seems to authorize the High Court to try a person brought before it on a charge preferred by any Magistrate having authority to prefer it (without being specially empowered to do so by Government). There is nothing in the Clause to show that the charge must be preferred directly to the High Court. Magistrates and other officers generally have no power to do so, though the Advocate-General has and always had. See Section 194, Criminal Procedure Code, and Cyclopedia of the Laws of England, Vol. I, under the heading Attorney-General, page 624, Second Edition. It is not shown that any Magistrates or other officer besides the Advocate-General had, at the date of the Letters Patent, the power in any case to prefer a charge directly to the High Court. See Section 194, Criminal Procedure Code, and Cyclopedia of the Laws of England, Vol. I, under the heading Attorney-General, page 624, Second Edition. It is not shown that any Magistrates or other officer besides the Advocate-General had, at the date of the Letters Patent, the power in any case to prefer a charge directly to the High Court. The Clause dues not seem to require more than that the charge in the case should have been preferred by a magistrate having legal authority to do so and that the accused in the case should also be brought before the Court in a lawful manner. The charge against the accused in this case was admittedly preferred by a Magistrate, Mr. Cox. The accused were admittedly brought before this Court in a lawful manner. 96. I am not, therefore, satisfied that Clause 24 does not apply to the cases. Butt it is un-necessary to decide this question, as it is clear to me, for the reasons already mentioned, that Clauses 25 and 26 are applicable to all cases of original criminal trials before the High Court under whatever provision of law that trial may be held. The first point: 97. Butt it is un-necessary to decide this question, as it is clear to me, for the reasons already mentioned, that Clauses 25 and 26 are applicable to all cases of original criminal trials before the High Court under whatever provision of law that trial may be held. The first point: 97. The first point that the Advocate-Generals certificate states should be further considered by the Court is the opinion of the majority of the Court "that the evidence of an accomplice need not be corroborated in material particulars before it can be acted upon, and that it would be open to the Court to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice if the Court was satisfied that the evidence was true." This would seem prima facie to be opposed to the very words of Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act which lays down in positive terms that "a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." The Advocate-Generals meaning, however, is explained by the further statement in the certificate that "it requires to be farther considered whether Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, read with Section 114, illustration (b), does not merely intend to lay down that a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not illegal where the presumption of untrustworthiness attaching to the evidence of an accomplice is rebutted by special circumstances." But, again, it is hardly possible to suppose that the Advocate-General meant to suggest that the presumption referred to is one which the Court is directed by law to make in all cases of the testimony of an accomplice and requiring to be rebutted by other evidence. For, that would be directly contrary to the definition of may presume" in Section 4 of the Act, according to which "whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court "may presume" a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it." The argument for the accused at the hearing was, and I take it the view suggested by the Advocate-General also was, that, notwithstanding the liberty given to the Court not to regard a fact referred to in Section 114 as not proved and to call for proof of it, the meaning and intention of the section must be taken to be that ordinarily the presumption referred to in illustration (b) to Section 114 must be made and that special circumstances must be found by the Court whenever it does not do so. It need hardly be observed that it is not strictly correct to express this meaning by saying that the presumption of untrustworthiness must be found to be rebutted by special circumstances. Understanding the certificate in the sense just mentioned, I may, before dealing with the question raised therein, observe that it is not clear to my mind why the learned Advocate-General considered it necessary to make a certificate on the paint in this case. The majority of the Special Bench--the learned Chief Justice and Ayling, J.,--no doubt, observe that it would be open to them to convict the accused on the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplices, even if it stood alone, if they were satisfied that that evidence was true and they do not expressly say that special reasons must exist for not presuming its Untrustworthiness. But the conviction is not based by them, as far as I am able to see on,--the testimony of the accomplices alone. After laying down the proposition of the law above mentioned, the learned Judges proceed to consider