Judgement Appeal from an award by the Chief Court (May 11, 1908) whereby the sum of Rs.1,325,720 was awarded to the appellants as compensation for certain lands in the Botatoung quarter of Rangoon which had been compulsorily acquired for public purposes under the Land Acquisition Act, I. of 1894. Under Part II. of that Act provision is made (1.) for the public notification of the fact that any lands are required for public purposes, (2.) for the ascertainment of the exact area of the lands so required, (3.) for an inquiry by the Collector of the district into the matter, and (4.) for an award by him of the compensation which should be allowed. Under Part III. of the same Act any person interested who has not accepted the award of the Collector may require the matter to be referred by the Collector to the Chief Court of original jurisdiction of the district; and in that event provision is made for the matter being inquired into by the Chief Court and for an award of compensation being made by the Chief Court by a writing signed by the judge, but so that (s, 25) the amount so awarded is not to be more than the amount claimed nor less than the amount previously awarded by the Collector. By s. 54 it is also Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 197 ( 1911- 1912) Rangoon Botatoung Company V. Collector, Rangoon 98 enacted that, subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals from original decrees, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the award or from any part of the award of the Court in any proceedings under the Act. The notification in this case related to the properties of three different owners, the appellants, one Sheik Kadir Buksh, and the British India Steam Navigation Company, Limited. The Collectors award was dated February 11, 1907, and was assented to by the last-mentioned company. The other two owners applied for a reference to the Chief Court, but only as to the question of the market value of their lands at the date of the notification. The Collectors award was dated February 11, 1907, and was assented to by the last-mentioned company. The other two owners applied for a reference to the Chief Court, but only as to the question of the market value of their lands at the date of the notification. The Chief Court, after a very elaborate examination of the facts and without deciding any question of law, decided that in each case the amount awarded by the Collector was in excess of the real value of the lands acquired, and accordingly dismissed both references with costs. This order was signed as an award of the Court by two judges pursuant to s. 26 of the Act. This appeal was brought to set it aside and to have the matter remitted to the said Court for a rehearing. The respondent objected that on the true construction of the Act, and especially of s. 54, no appeal lay. Bailhache, K.C., Sankey, K.C., and W. Arnold Jolly, for the appellants, contended that the appeal lay as of right. Sect. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act gave a right of appeal to the High Court subject to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in any proceedings under the Act. Reference was made to the Code of 1882, s. 595, and to the later Code of 1908, s. 109, and to Act I. of 1894, s. 18. The Chief Court of Lower Burma is in respect of appeals to His Majesty in Council in the same position as a High Court, and appeals have been disposed of by the Privy Council under the Land Acquisition Act. They referred to Ezra v. Secretary oj State for India (( 1905) L. R. 32 Ind. Ap. 93.) ; Secretary of State for India v. India General Steam Navigation and Ry. Co. (( 1909) L. R. 36 Ind. Ap. 200, 202) ; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth, Pilling & Co. ([ 1901] A. C. 373, 391 ; L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 121, 139,.) It was for the respondent to shew under those circumstances that the right of appeal so given and recognized had been taken away. Buckmaster, K.C., and Sargant, for the respondent, contended that the appeal did not lie. ([ 1901] A. C. 373, 391 ; L. R. 28 Ind. Ap. 121, 139,.) It was for the respondent to shew under those circumstances that the right of appeal so given and recognized had been taken away. Buckmaster, K.C., and Sargant, for the respondent, contended that the appeal did not lie. Under the Act of 1894 the decision appealed from was in name and in fact an award, and, unless there was special provision in the Act, it is not appealable to any greater extent than the award of any other tribunal of arbitration. Sect. 54 gives an appeal to the High Court which would be unnecessary if the decision were a decree and not merely an award. The difficulty of obtaining lay arbitrators led to the Court being appointed as the arbitrating authority, but the character of its decision is in no way changed from that of an award to that of a decree. No appeal therefore lay unless expressly given by the Act. Sect. 3, sub-s. (b) and (d), and ss. 4 and 11 of the Act were referred to; and also ss. 18, 21, 23, 24, 25,31, 51 and 52. The proceedings were those in a reference and not in a suit, and they terminated in an award from which only one appeal is given, while the further claim now put forward by the appellants is not conceded in terms and cannot be implied. Under s. 109 of the Code of 1908 the appeal must be from a decree or order, and that is the only provision by way of appeal. Reference was made to Sandback Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire By. Co. (( 1877) 3 Q. B. D. 1, 3.); Ex parte County Council of Kent and Councils of Dover and Sandwich ([ 1891] I Q. B. 72,3.), a case under s. 29 of the Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Viet. c. 41) ; In re Knight and Tabernacle Permanent Building Society ([ 1892] 2 Q. B. 613, 617.) ; and Burgess v. Morton. ([ 1896] A. C. 136, 141.) Bailhache, K.C., in reply. LORD MACNAGHTEN said that their Lordships were of opinion that the appeal was incompetent and would so report to His Majesty. The reasons for that decision would be given later. Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. ([ 1896] A. C. 136, 141.) Bailhache, K.C., in reply. LORD MACNAGHTEN said that their Lordships were of opinion that the appeal was incompetent and would so report to His Majesty. The reasons for that decision would be given later. Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 197 ( 1911- 1912) Rangoon Botatoung Company V. Collector, Rangoon 99 The reasons for the report were on July 16 delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. In this case a preliminary objection was taken to the appeal. Having heard the point fully argued, their Lordships came to the conclusion that the appeal was incompetent, and they intimated that on that ground they would humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. The appeal purported to be an appeal as of right from an award of the Chief Court of Lower Burma. Some land belonging to the appellants had been taken for public purposes under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In due course the Collector made his award. The appellants did not accept it. They were dissatisfied with the amount of the Collectors valuation. On that ground and on that ground only they demanded, as they were entitled to do, that the matter should be referred to the Court under the provisions of the Act. The expression " the Court " in the Act is defined as meaning "a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction." The reference was taken by two judges of the Chief Court. They sat as " the Court " and also as the High Court to which an appeal is given by the Act from the award of " the Court." The hearing of the reference occupied forty-five days. More than one hundred witnesses were examined. A vast mass of documents was put in, and the learned judges at the request of the parties viewed the premises. Then they made an exhaustive award dealing minutely with the evidence, and they held that the award of the Collector had given the appellants "all and probably more than the full market value of their property/ and so they dismissed the reference with costs. They were precluded by the Act; from awarding less than the amount awarded by the Collector. It was admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that it was incumbent upon them to shew that there was a statutory right of appeal. They were precluded by the Act; from awarding less than the amount awarded by the Collector. It was admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that it was incumbent upon them to shew that there was a statutory right of appeal. As Lord Bramwell, then Bramwell J.A,, observed in the case of Sandback Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire By. Co. (3 Q. B. D. 1.), "An appeal does not exist in the nature of things. A right of appeal from any decision of any tribunal must be given by express enactment." A special and limited appeal is given by the Land Acquisition Act from the award of "the Court " to the High Court. No further right of appeal is given. Nor can any such right be implied. The learned counsel for the appellants relied both on s. 53 and s. 54 of the Act. Sect. 53 enacts that, " save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the] Court under this Act." That enactment applies to an earlier stage in the proceedings and seems to have nothing to do with an appeal from the High Court. Sect. 54 is in the following terms — "54. Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to appeals from original decrees, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the award or from any part of the award of the Court in any proceedings under this Act," That section seems to carry the appellants no further. It only applies to proceedings in the course of an appeal to the High Court. Its force is exhausted when the appeal to the High Court is heard. Their Lordships cannot accept the argument or suggestion that when once the claimant is admitted to the High Court he has all the rights of an ordinary suitor, including the right to carry an award made in an arbitration as to the value of land taken for public purposes up to this Board as if it were a decree of the High Court made in the course of its ordinary jurisdiction. It is impossible to conceive anything more inconvenient than that a Court in this country should be called upon to review the determination of arbitrators as to the value of a piece of land in India—a mere question of fact—without the advantage of any local knowledge or the privilege, if it be a Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 197 ( 1911- 1912) Rangoon Botatoung Company V. Collector, Rangoon 100 privilege, of seeing the cloud of witnesses who engaged the attention of two judges of the Chief Court of Lower Burma for forty-five days,- or even the opportunity and the interest of viewing a property the value of which seems so extraordinarily difficult to discover.