Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (November 14, 1907) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Poona (December 7, 1904). The question decided was as to the impartiality, as alleged by the appellant, the defendant in the suit, of certain property consisting of villages, lands, houses, and cash allowance in the districts of Poona, Ahmednagar, and Sholapur, in the Presidency of Bombay. The respondent plaintiff and the appellant were half-brothers and the only surviving male representatives of the Nagpur branch of a family known as the Bhonle family, the history of which is sufficiently given in their Lordships judgment. Raghoji III., the last ruling Prince of Nagpur, died without issue on December 11, 1853. Thereupon the 1 Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 102 Nagpur State lapsed to the British Government and its. possessions were annexed. The Government further declared the Bombay estate the subject of appeal to have lapsed, though as a matter of grace a small portion was allowed to remain with the widows for their lives. In 1855 the widows adopted Janoji Bhonle—the father of the present litigants—as the son of the deceased Raghoji III,; but this adoption not having been officially sanctioned conferred no rights on him. After the Mutiny the Government of Bombay, while declining altogether to revive the Nagpur Raj, proposed to recognize Janoji to a limited extent, to confer on him the title of Raja Bahadur, and to release to him and his heirs the vatans, &c, situated in the Collectorates of Poona, Ahmednagar, and Sholapur, and in the Satara territory, being the Bombay estate of the late Raja, which had lapsed as stated. The Government of India on February 7, 1861, sanctioned this course and proposed that the title should be that of Raja of Deur. A sanad was issued on October 10, 1861, bestowing on Janoji and his heirs the title of Raja Bahadur of Deur and the Deur lands, or the lands of Deur, or the lands attached to Deur; which expression (it was contended) meant the whole of the Bombay estate of the late Raja. It was admitted that all the lands comprised in the sanad formed the special appanage of the Rajaship of Deur and were impartible, and that they were not restricted to the village of Deur. It was admitted that all the lands comprised in the sanad formed the special appanage of the Rajaship of Deur and were impartible, and that they were not restricted to the village of Deur. But it was contended on behalf of the respondent that they did not include more than the holdings in the district of Satara. On the death of the Raja in 1881 the Court of Wards managed all his possessions until the appellant came of age in 1898. In 1900 the respondent sued for a partition of the Bombay estate. The appellant pleaded that the whole of it was impartible by custom, also from the nature of its tenure, because it had been granted to his remote ancestor with the title of Sena Saheb Subha on his appointment to high military office and had been inherited as impartible property attached to that office and title and liable by family usage to the rule of primogeniture ; and because under the British grant it had been attached to the new title. The Subordinate Judge decreed in favour of the appellant so far as concerned the lands in the district of Satara, which he held constituted the entire appanage of the appellants title of Raja, but in favour of the respondent for partition of the other properties in question. He was of opinion that according to the original tenure, as well as to the terms of the new grant made by the British Government, those properties were both heritable and divisible. He said " There is nothing in the foregoing history of the property and the family drawn out from the old records to indicate that the properties in the districts of Poona, Ahmednagar, and Sholapur were ever indivisible saranjams and descendible only to the eldest son of the last holder by rule of primogeniture. It is true that some of these villages have been referred to as jagirs in the old records alluded to above; but that fact per se is not sufficient to make them impartible, more especially as the British Government, in regranting them, has expressly made them not only heritable, but also divisible, inasmuch as in the resolution releasing this property the Government of India distinctly declared that all possessions are to be continued hereditarily to Janoji and his heirs without further inquiry. The resolution contemplates continuance to Janojis heirs (mark the word heirs in plural) and not to the eldest son as the representative or the head of the family. The use of the plural heirs indicates that it was the intention of Government that these properties should descend to all the sons of Janoji, and the same intention was made clear even after the death of Janoji in Exh. 37." Dealing further with the contention that the estate was impartible before 1853, the Subordinate Judge considered that, as against the appellants plea, weight should be attached to the following circumstances, namely, that the territories of the Nagpur State had been divided on three different occasions, and the conduct of the appellant in allowing a partition of the estate in other parts of India militated against his present plea. And as to the effect of the British grant the Subordinate Judge held that the property in the Poona, Ahmednagar, and Sholapur districts in question in the suit did not form part of the appanage of the Raja Bahadur of Deur. 1 Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 103 The High Court held on the construction of the earlier documents that the villages in question were held before 1853 as jagirs, and were therefore impartible, and further held that the decision of the Judicial Committee in Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat(1) and other authorities established a presumption that being jagirs they were not hereditary holdings. " We do not think," they added, " that the circumstance that the grant was generally or even usually continued to the senior living male of the family is of itself adequate to rebut the presumption." On the other hand they considered that since the regrant of 1861 the villages were clearly hereditary. They further held that, as to such of the holdings as constituted under the regrant" an appanage of the Rajaship," it was clear that they remained impartible as before and descended as such by the rule of primogeniture. But as to the Poona, Sholapur, and Ahmednagar giants the High Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge that they were part of the general family property and as such liable to partition among the coparceners. But as to the Poona, Sholapur, and Ahmednagar giants the High Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge that they were part of the general family property and as such liable to partition among the coparceners. They were not included in the special saranjam assigned by the Government as an appanage of the title, but on the regrant were made heritable and lost their character of impartiality. Kenworthy Brown, Lowndes, and G. P. Dick, for the appellant, contended that the Bombay estate the subject of appeal was proved to be impartible by custom and also by reason of the nature of its tenure. The revenue records in evidence classify all the villages in the Bombay estate as saranjams, which expression is merely the equivalent of jagir and connotes impartibility. Various official documents in evidence refer to the whole Bombay estate as the impartible appanage of the Deur title. There was no presumption under the circumstances that the villages were not heritable up to 1853 as being jagir when Raghoji III. died. Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat (( 1878) L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 54; I. L. R. 3 Bomb. 186.) was referred to and, it was contended, did not govern this case. On the evidence the Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the estates in question were heritable up to 1853 and the High Court was right in holding that they were impartible. They were also shewn to be by custom subject to the rule of primogeniture. They did not become the partible lands of the appellants family by virtue of the terms of the regrant by the British Government in 1861. The lands were held after the regrant on the same tenure as previously thereto, subject to the same incidents, and were so treated both by grantor and grantee. It was not shewn to have been the intention of the regrant that they should become partible, but there was evidence that they continued to constitute the appanage of the Raja. Reference was made to Krishnarav Ganesh v. Rangrav (( 1867) 4 Bomb. . C. A. C. J. 1, 7, 9.); Beer Pertab Sahee v. Rajender Pertab Sahee (( 1867) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 1, 35.); Mutta Vadaganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar (( 1881) L. R 8 Ind. Ap. 99.) ; the Inam Commissioners Act (XI. of 1852) and rr. Reference was made to Krishnarav Ganesh v. Rangrav (( 1867) 4 Bomb. . C. A. C. J. 1, 7, 9.); Beer Pertab Sahee v. Rajender Pertab Sahee (( 1867) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 1, 35.); Mutta Vadaganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar (( 1881) L. R 8 Ind. Ap. 99.) ; the Inam Commissioners Act (XI. of 1852) and rr. 3 and 6 made under that Act; and Sultan Sani v. Ajmodin. (( 1892) L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. 50, 51, 52.) De Gruyther, K.C., Ross, and G. K. Cadgil, for the respondent, contended that there had been concurrent findings of fact that the Bombay estate under appeal was partible and not impartible property. The sanad of 1861 read with the list drawn up by the Inam Commissioner in 1858 shews that it was the lands in the Satara district alone that were regranted as saranjam. The lands of Deur or attached to Deur as specified in the sanad meant lands within the district of Satara and did not extend beyond that district. Reference was made to Sultan Sani v. Ajmodin (L. R 20 Ind. Ap. 50, 57.); Aitchisons Treaties ( 1863 ed.), vol. iii., pp. 93 and 94; Inam Commissioners Act (XI. of 1852) ; Bombay Act II. of 1863; Vinayak Woman v. Gopal Hari (( 1903) L. R 30 Ind. Ap. 77, 78, 79.), shewing that grants on imam tenure by the Peishwa were considered to be liable to partition; Adrishappa v. Gurushidappa (( 1880) L. R 7 Ind. Ap. 162.); Nairnes Handbook of Revenue for the use of Revenue Officers, p. 490 ; Rules revised by the Government of Bombay in Bombay Gazette, May 19, 1898 ; Mutta Vadaganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar (3); Gopal Hari v. Ramakant (( 1896) I. L. R 21 Bomb. 458, 460.); Krishnarav Ganesh v. Rangrav (4 Bomb. H. C. A. C. J. 1.) ; Ramchandra v. Venkatrao (( 1882) I. L. R 6 Bomb. 598.); Ramkrishna Rao v. Nanaroo (( 1903) 5 1 Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 104 Bombay Law Reporter, 983); Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat (L. R 6 Ind. Ap. 54.); Baden Powells Land System of British India, vol. ill., bk. iv. (ed. 1892), pp. 299, 303. Kenworthy Brown in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 104 Bombay Law Reporter, 983); Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat (L. R 6 Ind. Ap. 54.); Baden Powells Land System of British India, vol. ill., bk. iv. (ed. 1892), pp. 299, 303. Kenworthy Brown in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This appeal is made against a decree of the High Court of Justice at Bombay, dated November 14, 1907, which affirmed a decree of the Subordinate Court of Poona, dated December 7, 1904. The plaintiff (respondent) and the defendant (appellant) are brothers. The main object of the suit is contained in the first prayer of the plaint, and is to have it declared that the whole of the immovable and movable estate mentioned in the schedule annexed to the plaint belongs to these two brothers as equal owners thereof. The elder brother, the defendant appellant, is Raja of Deur, and the claim is resisted by him upon the ground that the various properties referred to had been succeeded to by him, under the law of primogeniture, as an appanage to the title of Raja conferred upon him by a sanad issued under the hand of the Governor-General, Earl Canning, in the year 1861. The properties are situated in the districts of Poona, Ahmednagar, Satara, and Sholapur, all in the Presidency of Bombay. They include five mouzahs or villages, together with various vatans, hakks, and cash allowances, set forth in the schedule. It was a matter of agreement in the High Court that the main question in the case should be treated as one applicable to the villages or mouzahs, and that when the question of partibility or impartibility should be settled in regard to them, the remaining items in the schedule should follow that decision. Of the mouzahs mentioned, that of Deur is situated in Satara. In the course of the proceedings it has been admitted that the property in the Satara district is an appanage of the title of the Raja of Deur, is impartible, and is succeeded to along with the title and position of Raja accordingly, that is to say, by the rule of primogeniture. It is submitted by the appellant that the same result should have followed with regard to the rest of the properties in dispute. It is submitted by the appellant that the same result should have followed with regard to the rest of the properties in dispute. The question in the case is whether that submission is correct. The whole of the properties are, as stated, within the Bombay Presidency. This fact throws light upon the construction of many of the official minutes, despatches, entries, and others, referred to in the case, and appears to be one of cogency. It can hardly be denied that the language used in all these official documents for a period of about fifty years is at least ex facie language applicable to the possessions of the Raja in the Bombay Presidency as a whole. Points of great; historical interest are naturally suggested by a review of the pedigree put in by the parties. The records of the Bhonle family—the Rajas of Nagpur—are bound up during a long period of time with many stirring adventures and achieve ments in the course of the Maratha ascendancy and its decline. The position of the family was one of great note from the middle of the seventeenth and during the whole course of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. The possessions of these Rajas were extensive, stretching throughout many portions of the Central Provinces, the North-West Provinces and Berar, as well as of the Bombay Presidency. The last of the Rajas of Nagpur, Raghoji III., held the title, estates, and rights from the year 1817 till his death in 1853. The forfeiture of 1818 followed by the treaty and free gift of 1826 need not be referred to, the facts of ownership and possession being substantially as stated. He died without issue. 1 Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 105 He himself was an adoptive son of one Pursoji Bhonle, and with his death in these circumstances the Bhonle dynasty of Nagpur came to an end. It is an admission of parties that in that year the title of Raja of Nagpur lapsed and that the estates and rights of the deceased Raghoji III. fell to the British Government. The widows of Raghoji, however, adopted Janoji in the year 1855. He survived till 1881, leaving behind him the two sons who are contestants in the present case. fell to the British Government. The widows of Raghoji, however, adopted Janoji in the year 1855. He survived till 1881, leaving behind him the two sons who are contestants in the present case. During the Mutiny of 1857 a female member of the family, the Rani Baka Bai, appears to have powerfully and loyally assisted the British cause and to have rendered services worthy of official recognition. She was the widow of a former Raja of Nagpur, namely, Raghoji II., and she was anxious for the continuance in the family of the title of Raja and the attachment to it of such property as would mark and maintain its dignity. The Government of the day declined to restore the Nagpur title, but was willing to create—by sanad issuing from the Governor-General—a fresh Rajaship. The title pitched upon was derived from Deur, a small village in the Satara district of the Bombay Provinces. It is manifest from the official documents issued that it was one of the objects of the Government to make such a provision—in land and revenues accompanying the title—as, though small and unimportant if viewed relatively to the ancient Nagpur possessions, would still be sufficient to gratify, so far, the desire of Baka Bai, and to support in becoming dignity the newly created title. It is accordingly important to note what were the exact terms of the sanad under the hand of Earl Canning, Governor-General. It is dated October 10, 1861. The Subordinate Judge of Poona has closely examined it and the translations. As stated by the learned judge, it is written in Urdu, and its text is translated as follows, it being super-signed by Lord Canning and bearing the seal of the Government of India — " Sanad granted by His Excellency the Viceroy and the Governor-General of India in Council to Raja Janoji Bhonle Bahadur conferring upon him the title of Raja Bahadur of Deur. "Whereas it has been proved and verified that Maharani Bakabai Saheb was loyal towards the noble British Government and the good behaviour and loyalty of that family during the Mutiny has been proved and verified ; in recognition thereof the title of Raja Bahadur of Deur together with the lands attached to Deur has been conferred upon and given on this auspicious occasion, to that Meherban himself and his heirs in succession whether begotten or adopted in perpetuity and the sanad thereof has been executed. It must be deemed incumbent that in return of this gift and kindness you will always remain loyal to the noble British Government and you will look upon this sanad [sic] a perfect one." The point of the case is, What meaning is to be given to the words " lands attached to Deur" ? Are these lands limited to the village of Deur itself ? Or do they extend to the possessions in the Satara district ? Or do they cover the possessions as a whole which lay within the Presidency of Bombay ? Neither party to the case maintains that the grant should be confined to the lands in the village of Deur alone; and it is conceded by the respondent that other lands in the Satara district must be held to be included. This concession is perfectly reasonable, for otherwise the lands attached to Deur, if confined to the village of Deur itself, would reduce the maintenance of the dignity of the Raja almost to a shadow. But the mere inclusion of the Satara lands also reaches a very inconsiderable total. These lands are worth over Rs.3000 per annum. The villages, lands, and others in the whole of the Bombay Presidency, mentioned in the plaint, yield a total revenue of over Rs. 12,000, and it would appear from 1 Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 106 this that if all these lands were dealt with as lands which were attached to Deur by the sanad they would form, taken together, a fund for the maintenance of the dignity of the Raja which could not be said to be over ample. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 106 this that if all these lands were dealt with as lands which were attached to Deur by the sanad they would form, taken together, a fund for the maintenance of the dignity of the Raja which could not be said to be over ample. But if the lands attached to Deur are confined to those in the Satara district alone, then the result of such a con struction of the sanad is to set up this Raja with an appanage of about Rs.3000 per annum for the support of his dignity and title. Their Lordships are not surprised to learn that during all the years since the sanad, in many of which the Court of Wards have had possession, and in all of which the Government have had cognizance of the facts, no one apparently until the institution of this suit ever thought of maintaining that the possessions attached to the position of Raja were of the slender proportions described. Upon the contrary, they have throughout been dealt with as those within the Bombay Presidency at large. As mentioned, the properties of the former Rajas were situated not only in the Bombay Presidency, in which their extent was very limited, but in the Central Provinces and Berar. A large donation or stipend of Rs.120,000 per annum was enjoyed by the late Raja Janoji at the time of his death. After that event, in 1881, the Government of the day had to consider the question of the allowances to be made to his successors, namely, his two sons. A pension amounting to Rs.90,000 was fixed, and in the despatch of February 10, 1882, by the Assistant Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, the grounds are explained of the distribution of this pension. " The two sons," it is said, " will succeed to the landed property of the late Raja in the Central Provinces and Berar, and to the personality in equal shares. This is in accordance with the Hindu law and Maratha custom. The elder son will succeed to the title of Raja of Deur and to the estate in the Bombay Presidency, which goes with that title. The value of this estae is, however, comparatively small, the bulk of the landed property of the late Raja being situated in the Central Provinces and Berar. The elder son will succeed to the title of Raja of Deur and to the estate in the Bombay Presidency, which goes with that title. The value of this estae is, however, comparatively small, the bulk of the landed property of the late Raja being situated in the Central Provinces and Berar. There will not, therefore, be much difference in the private income of the two sons should they hereafter separate." This passage is quoted as an indication of the view which is repeatedly exhibited in the documents with regard to the attitude of the Government, from whom the grant by way of sanad proceeded. This interpretation was undoubtedly that the Raja of Deur should take the estates in the Bombay Presidency, which were comparatively small, as an appanage of the title ; that these should accordingly follow the rule of primogeniture ; whereas the larger and more important estates in the Central Provinces and Berar should be partible equally between the two sons. Contemporanea expositio as a guide to the interpretation of documents is often accompanied with danger, and great care must be taken in its application. But in the present case their Lordships do not feel themselves able to reject the assistance which it affords. The sanad upon which these important rights are founded is a document of a general and informal character. It admittedly is capable of a variety of constructions. The extreme literal construction—its confinement to the single village of Deur—is adopted by neither party. And when the ambiguity covers the geographical and pecuniary extent of an admittedly ambiguous grant, their Lordships think it legitimate to observe what was the footing upon which the grantors, namely, the Government and its successors and officials, from the date of the grant and for a long period of time, proceeded. It may be pointed out that since 1881, namely, since the death of Janoji, the question of partibility was, of course, practically and sharply raised, and the fact is that the whole of the income derived from the estates in the Bombay Presidency, amounting to about Rs. 12,000 per annum, has been uniformly treated as the exclusive income of the elder son, namely, the present appellant. This was done both while he and his brother were wards in the Court of Wards and at other times. 12,000 per annum, has been uniformly treated as the exclusive income of the elder son, namely, the present appellant. This was done both while he and his brother were wards in the Court of Wards and at other times. That Court managed the possessions of the appellant until he came of age in 1893. Again in 1895 the Court of Wards re-entered, by request of the Raja, into possession and management for a time. In 1899 the younger brother came of age, the property in the Central Provinces and Berar was divided equally, and the Bombay estate was treated as impartible and continued with the Raja as an appanage 1 Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 107 of the title. In the opinion of their Lordships, this throughout was a correct course; and the present suit, the object of which is to diverge from that course, is not in accordance with the rights of parties. In one view, what has been said might appear to be sufficient for the disposal of this case. But in the judgments of the learned judges of the Courts below, and in the arguments addressed to their Lordships, further considerations were urged as assisting towards a conclusion and falling to be dealt with. There can be little doubt that the whole of the lands in issue were originally jagir lands, and the legal position of such property quoad succession, and the competency or incompetency of assisting the construction of the sanad of 1861 by such considerations, were much discussed. There are three points with reference to the position of property such as that now in suit which stand logically clear of each other, and with regard to which there has been a certain element of confusion. These three points are, first, was the land impartible ? Secondly, did the law of hereditary succession apply to it? And thirdly, was it subject to the law of primogeniture ? These three points are, first, was the land impartible ? Secondly, did the law of hereditary succession apply to it? And thirdly, was it subject to the law of primogeniture ? The Subordinate Judge, after referring to the fact that some of the villages are referred to as jagirs in the old records, is of opinion that " that fact per se is not sufficient to make them impartible." If this be stated as a conclusion with regard to the jagir tenure in general, their Lordships cannot agree with it; but, upon the contrary, they are of opinion that the following statement in the judgment of the High Court is correct, namely, "The grants were manifestly grants in jagir of the ordinary character, that is to say, they were personal and not hereditary, and were resumable at pleasure. Being personal and temporary, they were necessarily impartible." This accurately distinguishes between partibility as such, and any consequence, whether in the direction of hereditary or primogenital succession, which may be supposed to flow from such a fact. The impartiality of jagir lands is in truth entirely separated from the idea of succession by the fact that the impartible lands were held together as a unit in the hands of one man who was rendering personal service to the Government of the day. It may be that upon his death a fresh grant, again to one man, and again in return for personal service, was made; and it may also be that the one man selected was in the ordinary case the eldest son; but these matters of practice were not consequences of law, and the impartiality and unity which attached to personal service were not related to, but, on the contrary, were distinct from, the idea of succession by force of law to the impartible lands. It is at this point that the case appears to have been confused and encumbered by a plea put forward by the appellant to the effect that the lands in question were not only impartible and hereditary, but were, by custom, subject to the law of primogeniture. Once grant that the lands were jagir and impartible as such, a custom of the kind alleged was not a subject for proof, because such a custom would have been radically inconsistent with the personal and non-transmissive character of a grant in jagir. Once grant that the lands were jagir and impartible as such, a custom of the kind alleged was not a subject for proof, because such a custom would have been radically inconsistent with the personal and non-transmissive character of a grant in jagir. Their Lordships agree in holding with the Courts below that this case accordingly cannot be decided on the custom alleged. All that remains on this issue, consequently, is the fact that prior to the regrant by Earl Canning the lands had been formerly jagir. But this term implied no grant of the soil, but a personal grant only of the revenue to the grantee. The Marathi equivalent to the term jagir, namely, saranjam, came in course of time to be applied to the lands; and no doubt it was also a fact in the history of the property that the senior living male of the family had in the ordinary case succeeded to it. In those circumstances, it is interesting to observe what was the delivery order issued with reference to the lands which were the subject of the sanad. This forms a not unimportant item to that contemporanea expositio to which reference has been made. Much importance—and, in their Lordships opinion, too much importance—has been attached in the judgments of the Courts below to the distinction between the term inam and saranjam. The importance has reached this point, 1 Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 108 that the learned judges treat the lands of Satara referred to in one or two of the documents as saranjam, by way, as they apprehend, of distinction from the other lands which are treated as inam. In their Lordships view, the terms are not mutually exclusive in the sense indicated. The latter term, namely, inam, is one of mere generic significance, applicable to a Government grant as a whole. But in the next place it is a very striking fact in this case that in the initial delivery order now being referred to (as indeed in many of the subsequent documents) the rights in the Bombay Presidency are dealt with comprehensively and as covered, not by one name, but by all, or at least many, of the names applicable to land and revenue rights. In the Mamletdars order, for instance, of March 19, 1862, applicable to the village of Mouje Devi Nimbgay one of the properties in Ahmednagar, the matter is treated of in this way. The village "is a jagir to the Bhonles and as a village was placed under japti (attachment); the revenue of the same was received for being credited in Government records." Then follows the definite statement But the vatan, inam, saranjam, hakks, &c.....have been entered in the name of Janoji . . . ." Therefore certain definite orders are given pursuant to the Government resolution, " directing the said village, vatan, &c, to be delivered " into the charge of Janojis managers. It would therefore accordingly appear that the term saranjam was not in point of fact confined to the lands of Satara. This ground of the judgments of the Courts below accordingly disappears. A matter of much significance must now be dealt with. On the death of Janoji in 1881 the question of partibility or impartibility,—there being two sons of that Raja,—became matter for definite consideration and regulation. What light is thrown upon the case by the conduct at and after this juncture of the Government, including the Court of Wards, which was charged with the correct distribution of these two sons shares ? Upon this head their Lordships do not conceal that they have viewed with some dissatisfaction the conduct of certain parts of the plaintiffs case. On May 6, 1882, an important letter was written by Mr. Lawrie, manager of the estates, to the Deputy Collector, " Satara, Sholapoor, Ahmednagar, and Poona." That is to say, this letter was addressed to the persons acting as Collectors in reference to all the estates within the Bombay Presidency which were the subject of issue in this case. On May 6, 1882, an important letter was written by Mr. Lawrie, manager of the estates, to the Deputy Collector, " Satara, Sholapoor, Ahmednagar, and Poona." That is to say, this letter was addressed to the persons acting as Collectors in reference to all the estates within the Bombay Presidency which were the subject of issue in this case. He forwards his appoint ment by the Deputy Commissioner of Nagpur as manager of the estate of the late Rajas minor sons; and then there follows this passage, or what was supposed to have been this passage, as the document was produced in the suit " I have the honour to request you to be so good as to cause mutation of names to be made for all villages held by the late Raja in your collectorate in favour of his two sons, Raja Raghojeerao Bhonle (only for Satara) and Laxmanrao in equal shares with my name as manager." So stated, this document would appear to suggest that all the properties except that of Satara were partible; and this would have been an important adminicle of evidence to that effect. The document, however, has a history. It is deponed to in the evidence of the plaintiffs own witness Abaji Belaji. Interlineations and remarkable alterations occur in the document, and the witness confesses, " I cannot say why and by whose order the words only for Satara,’ two, the s added to the word son, and the words and Laxmanrao in equal shares with my name as manager were written." As the document stands it suits the plaintiffs case; but it appears to be legitimate, and, indeed, proper and just, to read the document without the doubtful and unexplained interlineations and alterations. So read, the letter is as follows " I have the honour to request you to be so good as to cause mutation of names to be made for all villages held by the late Raja in your collectorate in favour of his son Raja Raghojeerao Bhonle." The letter is addressed to the Collector, not of Satara alone, but to the Collectors of Satara, Sholapur, Ahmednagar, and Poona, and it would, so read, accordingly appear to demonstrate that, at the important time when the administration of the deceased Raja Janojis estate was taken up by Government, all the estates in the Bombay Presidency were treated, without exception, as an appanage to the title of Raja. It is right that a further reference should be made to a cognate topic. It would rather seem that the learned judges of the Courts below have been induced to treat as authentic various entries in the Collectors books which were not the entries as originally made, but were entries subject to "correction 1 Law. Rep. 39 Ind. App. 202 ( 1911- 1912) Shrimant Raje Bahadur v. Shrimant Raje Lakshmanrao 109 " ; a correction made upon an ex parte application on behalf of the plaintiff. This application was preferred, and apparently granted, behind the back of the defendant, and during the course of this present litigation. The date of the suit was August 22, 1900, and on August 5, 1901, a memorial was presented to the Governor in Council at Bombay with the statement " This is forwarded to the Chief Secretary by letter of the 13th August, 1902." It is plain from a perusal of these documents that certain registers, including in particular the register of the Collector of Ahmednagar, together with certain despatches, had been the subject of investigation on behalf of the plaintiff, and that that investigation had revealed facts which were considered to be contrary to his interests. The application admits that in these documents the Collector of Ahmednagar had "been directed to treat the villages referred to in the petition as impartible saranjam." Then the letter proceeds " The villages of Devi Nomgaon, Jat Deola, and Jalalpur, in the Ahmednagar district, were up to 1864 regarded as inams and saranjams, and the deshmukhi and other hacks as wattans, as contradistinguished from saranjams. There was and is no room for asserting that they were ever treated as impartible saranjams held on political tenure." This remarkable document winds up thus " In view of the facts and arguments above set forth, you will be pleased to issue orders to correct the Land Revenue Register by expunging that portion of it in which " the villages " are specified as political saranjams." The facts and arguments here referred to are simply those which have been urged in the present litigation. The one fact outstanding from the whole of these proceedings is that the argument now preferred, to the effect that the Satara property and that alone was treated as saranjam, while the other properties were throughout treated as inam, is contrary to what is admitted to have been the original entries in the books referred to. In these circumstances, it appears to their Lordships to be quite unsafe to place reliance upon a denomination of these lands dependent upon a " correction " which, appears, or is alleged, to have been made while the case was sub judice, and upon an ex parte representation. Their Lordships think that the original state of the records before the so-called corrections were made was that alone to which a Court of law should have looked. This would at least be the safe and ordinary rule, and there do not appear to be any facts in the present case to ground an exception to it- It is not for their Lordships to pronounce upon the procedure by which such " corrections" of official documents and records can be possible in those districts in circumstances such as are here disclosed. Various difficulties are presented by reason of expressions which appear in despatches from those in authority in the Central Provinces. In those despatches language is used which would appear to signify that the lands attached to Deur in the Bombay Presidency were the Satara lands alone. The language is not clear, and it had reference to a matter lying beyond the jurisdiction of the writers. Difficulties also arise with regard to the terminology employed in some of the entries in which saranjam is applied to Satara and inam to the other districts, whereas in others there appears to be an application of both terms to the same lands and in various districts. Difficulties also arise with regard to the terminology employed in some of the entries in which saranjam is applied to Satara and inam to the other districts, whereas in others there appears to be an application of both terms to the same lands and in various districts. Their Lordships, upon the whole, have had little difficulty in coming to the conclusion that too restricted an application has been made by the Courts below of the term " the lands attached to Deur." They think the expression extends to the whole scheduled lands in the Presidency of Bombay. They will humbly advise His Majesty that the judgments of the Courts below should be reversed, that the lands referred to in this suit are impartible, that they are attached as an appanage to the title of the Raja of Deur, and that the suit should be dismissed with costs here and below. The respondent will also pay the costs of a petition for further documents which was before the Board on February 24, 1911.