Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (April 3, 1911) reversing a decree by Macleod J. (June 23, 1910). The suit was brought by the respondent against the London and Lancashire Life Assurance Company and the appellant. It related to a policy issued by the company on the life of one Dwarkadas Dharamsey, who died on August 28, 1909. The company paid the amount of the policy into Court on April 14, 1910, and was discharged from the suit. The question decided was whether the respondent was entitled to the said amount as held by the High Court, or whether the appellant was so entitled as held by Macleod J. The respondents claim was based upon a deposit of the policy with him by the assured some time about the end of the year 1904. No instrument in writing was then or at any time executed by him transferring the policy or any rights thereunder to the respondent, nor was any notice given to the company of the respondents claim until September 4, 1909, that is, some days after the policy had become due. The appellants claim was based upon a deed of assignment of the policy duly executed in his favour by the assured on August 13, 1909, of which notice was given to the company on August 27 following, the deed being then sent to it for registration and duly registered by it on the same day. Macleod J. dismissed the suit. He held that the respondent had obtained an equitable interest in the policy deposited with him, but that on August 13 the appellant had obtained the legal estate therein, and said " On the contest between the owner of the legal estate and the prior equitable mortgagee, as nothing has been proved which should have put the owner of the legal estate on inquiry, and as it has not been proved that he had notice actual or constructive of the prior equitable charge, it follows that the owner of the legal estate must succeed." The High Court held that, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882) as amended by Act II. of 1900, the respondent had by the deposit of the policy with him acquired a charge thereon and upon the moneys secured thereby. of 1882) as amended by Act II. of 1900, the respondent had by the deposit of the policy with him acquired a charge thereon and upon the moneys secured thereby. They also held that it would be inconsistent with the provisions of that Act to hold that the appellant had gained priority over the respondents charge by reason of his having first given notice to the company of a written assignment in his favour. The High Court also found on the evidence that at the time of the assignment the appellant had constructive notice of the respondents charge. Upon the question of the respondents title under the deposit the material passage of the judgment of the High Court is as follows — "The words of s. 130 are similar to the words in s. 54 and s. 59 which provide that transfers by way of sale or mortgage can be effected only by registered instrument in the case of transactions exceeding Rs. 100 in value. The existence of these provisions however does not interfere with the creation of charges upon immovable property as is clear from the terms of s. 100. There is therefore no reason to suppose that the words relied upon in s. 130 were intended to prohibit the creation of charges upon securities for money, or other documents of title not covered by s. 137. To use the words of Lord Macnaghten in The Bank of New South Wales v. OConnor (( 1889) 14 App. Cas. 271, 282.), it is a well-established rule of equity that a deposit of a document of without either writing or a word of mouth will create in equity a charge upon the property to which the document relates to the extent of the interest of the person who makes the deposit. In the absence of consent that charge can only be displaced by actual payment of the amount secured.’ The cases of Crossley v. City of Glasgow Life Assurance Co. (( 1876) 4 Ch. D. 421.) and Spencer v. Clarke (( 1878) 9 Ch. In the absence of consent that charge can only be displaced by actual payment of the amount secured.’ The cases of Crossley v. City of Glasgow Life Assurance Co. (( 1876) 4 Ch. D. 421.) and Spencer v. Clarke (( 1878) 9 Ch. D. 137.) illustrate the application of this rule to policies of life insurance." Upon the question of the appellants title the material passage of that judgment is as follows— "The use of the expression legal estate in connection with the transfer executed in favour of the defendant loses sight of the fact that in this case we are concerned with the law regarding the transfer of actionable claims or what in England is called the assignment of choses in action and not with the English law regarding legal and equitable estates in land. It is one of the conditions of a transfer of an actionable claim that the transferee takes it subject to the equities to which the transferor was subject in respect thereof at the date of the transfer. It is the same in England in the assignment of choses in action subject to the acquisition of priority by notice which we will shortly consider. The result is that (subject to the question of notice) equitable rights cannot be overridden and transferees stand in the same position inter se as possessors of equitable rights upon property of the nature of real estate. The closeness of this parallel is illustrated by the case of In re Morgan, Pillgrem v. Pillgrem (( 1881) 18 Ch. D. 93.), where Sir G. Jessel said of the depositee of a trust lease with whom it had been deposited for his own purposes by a trustee who had renewed it in his own name, He was therefore a purchaser without notice, who did not get the legal title, therefore he must take the lease subject to prior equities, that is to the trust on which it was held. Chapter VIII. of the Transfer of Property Act does not exactly reproduce the English law. Chapter VIII. of the Transfer of Property Act does not exactly reproduce the English law. "In England where several successive assignments are made of the same debt or fund, the assignees presumptively take in order of date because each assignment is presumed to operate only upon the beneficial interest left in the assignor after the prior assignments, but an assignee who takes without notice of any prior assignment may secure his own assignment by giving notice to the debtor and thereby obtain priority over the prior assignee who has neglected to give notice Leake on Contracts, 4th ed., p. 832. Chapter VIII. of the Transfer of Property Act as amended by Act II. of 1900 contains no provision allowing a transferee giving notice to obtain priority over a previous transferee who had failed to give notice. "Under the Act prior to the amendment, s. 131 provided that no transfer of any debt should have any operation against the debtor unless express notice of the transfer was given to him, unless he was otherwise aware of such transfer, and on receiving such notice the debtor was bound by s. 133 to give effect to the transfer. The validity of a transfer thus depended entirely upon the giving of notice. Therefore the person who gave no notice acquired no interest in the debt. These provisions went much further than the English law by which an assignment is good as between assignor and assignee although notice may not have been given to the debtor. As the law stands under the amended Indian Act the validity of the transfer in no way depends upon the giving of notice to the debtor although notice is necessary to prevent the debtor from dealing with the debt to the prejudice of the assignee. The English rule which permits an assignee to obtain priority over earlier assignees by giving notice no longer finds any counterpart in the Act." Younger, K.C., and Lowndes, for the appellant, contended that the respondent had not acquired any title to or interest in the policy moneys by virtue of the deposit of the policy with him. They referred to the Transfer of Property Act, s. 130, as amended by Act II. of 1900. The right to the proceeds of the policy was an actionable claim (see s. 3 of the Act). Sect. They referred to the Transfer of Property Act, s. 130, as amended by Act II. of 1900. The right to the proceeds of the policy was an actionable claim (see s. 3 of the Act). Sect. 130 applies as well to transfers by way of security as to absolute transfers and excludes the deposit made with the respondent from having any legal effect upon the title to the moneys. On the other hand the appellant has proved a bona fide written assignment thereof to him executed in the manner prescribed by s. 130. He acquired therefore a complete legal title of which he gave immediate notice to the insurance company. The respondent did not give any notice to the company of his deposit, and a claim by him against the appellant could only be made out if he proved that at the time of his acceptance of the assignment to him he had notice actual or constructive of the respondents charge if any had been effected in his favour. The evidence to that effect was wholly insufficient. The transactions in this case entirely depended for their validity upon compliance with the terms of s. 130. Reference was made to the preceding sections, 3, 5, 6, 9, 54 and 59, and also to ss. 132 and 137 ; Shephard and Browns Commentaries on the Act, 7th ed., p. 13; Ex parte Whitbread. ((1812) 19 Ves. 209.) De Gruyther, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the respondent, contended that the High Court was right in deciding that both the parties had merely equitable rights and that the charge in favour of the respondent had priority, being the earlier creation. They relied also upon the evidence on which the High Court had found that the appellant did not take his assignment in good faith without notice of the respondents claim. Beet. 130 does not prevent the respondent from having a valid charge by virtue of the deposit. On its true construction it relates to absolute assignments, that is of all the transferors " rights and remedies," and not to transfer by way of charge where the transferor does not part with all his rights. For an illustration of this distinction see Tancred v. Delagoa Bay and East Africa Ry. Co. (( 1889) 23 Q. B. D. 239, 241, 242.) Reference was also made to Act IV. of 1882, ss. 2 (6), 130, 134. For an illustration of this distinction see Tancred v. Delagoa Bay and East Africa Ry. Co. (( 1889) 23 Q. B. D. 239, 241, 242.) Reference was also made to Act IV. of 1882, ss. 2 (6), 130, 134. Counsel for the appellant were not heard in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MOULTON. The question in this appeal is as to whether the appellant or the respondent is entitled to a sum of Rs. 29,426.14.0 now standing in Court to abide the result of the action. It represents the net proceeds of a policy of insurance on the life of Dwarkadas Dharamsey, who died on August 28, 1909. The appellant bases his claim on an assignment in writing under the hand of Dwarkadas Dharamsey, dated August 13, 1909. It is in form an absolute assignment, and was according to the evidence given under pressure from the appellant, to whom Dwarkadas Dharamsey was then indebted in a much larger sum, The validity of the assignment is therefore established. It may well be that although absolute in form it was intended to i be only by way of security so as to be subject to a right of redemption, but this does not affect the rights of the parties under the circumstances of the present case. The respondent bases his claim upon a deposit of the policy with him by Dwarkadas Dharamsey undoubtedly with the intention of its acting as security for the payment of a debt then owing by him to the respondent. This deposit was made in November, 1904, and was unaccompanied by anything in writing The particular debt owing at the time was subsequently paid off, but in and subsequently to April, 1909, Dwarkadas Dharamsey again became indebted to the respondent, and it is claimed that the deposit was made on the terms that it should act as security not only for the then existing debt but for any indebtedness that might subsequently arise. Whether or not this contention of fact is established is not in their Lordships opinion material. The decision of the matter in issue turns entirely on the interpretation of s. 130, sub-s. 1, of the Transfer of Property Act, 1900. Whether or not this contention of fact is established is not in their Lordships opinion material. The decision of the matter in issue turns entirely on the interpretation of s. 130, sub-s. 1, of the Transfer of Property Act, 1900. It is as follows — " The transfer of an actionable claim shall be effected only by the execution of an instrument in writing, signed by the trans feror or his duly authorised agent, and shall be complete and effectual upon the execution of such instrument, and thereupon all the rights and remedies of the transferor, whether by way of damages or otherwise, shall vest in the transferee, whether such notice of the transfer as is hereinafter provided be given or not " Provided that every dealing with the debt or other actionable claim by the debtor or other person from or against whom the transferor would, but for such instrument of transfer as aforesaid, have been entitled to recover or enforce such debt or other actionable claim, shall (save where the debtor or other person is a party to the transfer or has received express notice thereof as hereinafter provided) be valid as against such transfer." It is admitted that the right to the moneys becoming due under the policy is an actionable claim. Their Lordships are also of opinion that the section covers transfers by way of security as well as absolute transfers. If any doubt existed on either of these two points it would be set at rest by the second illustration j to the section which is given in the Act. In the present case the respondent bases his claim on a deposit of the policy and not under a written transfer, and claims that this creates a charge on the policy. The section specifically enacts that such a 49 Law Rep. 40 Ind. App. 24 ( 1912- 1913) Mulraj Khatau V. Vishwanath Prabhuram Vaidya 153 proceeding shall not have any such effect; such a charge can only be created by a written document. It follows that the respondent acquired no right whatever to the policy or its proceeds by reason of the deposit. The appellant on the other hand claims under an instrument in writing conforming in all respects to the provisions of the section. He therefore acquired by the execution of that instrument an absolute right to the proceeds of the policy. It follows that the respondent acquired no right whatever to the policy or its proceeds by reason of the deposit. The appellant on the other hand claims under an instrument in writing conforming in all respects to the provisions of the section. He therefore acquired by the execution of that instrument an absolute right to the proceeds of the policy. The decision of the Court below was therefore erroneous. The error arose from the learned judges not having appreciated that the positive language of the section precluded the application in India of the principles of English law on which they based their decision. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be allowed, and that it be declared that the appellant be entitled to the moneys standing in Court, and that the respondent pay the costs in the Courts below as well as the costs of this appeal.