Judgement Appeal from a judgment of the Chief Court (March 7, 1910) reversing a judgment of the said Court in its original jurisdiction (January 28, 1908). The respondent, who had by process of law recovered possession of the land and buildings hereinafter mentioned, sued on September 8, 1906, to recover damages against the appellant for wrongful interference therewith. The appellant pleaded inter alia that the suit was barred by s. 41 (6) of Act IV. of 1898 (Burma). The section is as follows " No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to determine.... "(b) any claim to any right over land as against the Government." The judgment of January 28, 1908, was that under that section the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The respondent appealed, contending that s. 41 (b) was ultra vires, and the Chief Court referred the question of law to the Full Bench, which held on February 14, 1910 (see 5 Lower Burma Rep. 163), by a majority of three to one, that the section was ultra vires of the Burma Legislative Council. The judgment of March 7, 1910, was in accordance with this decision, and, holding t that the suit was not barred, remanded it for trial on the merits. The main objection urged by the respondent to the validity of the section relied upon was that it contravened the provisions of s. 65 of the Government of India Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Viet. D. 106), which is cited in their Lordships judgment. The main objection urged by the respondent to the validity of the section relied upon was that it contravened the provisions of s. 65 of the Government of India Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Viet. D. 106), which is cited in their Lordships judgment. Upon this point Fox, Chief Judge, said "If persons and bodies politic could previous to the Act have sued the East India Company in respect of a claim to land, persons in Burma at the present day are in a different and obviously worse position in respect to claims as against Government to land in towns and villages from that in which people were in 1858, for if the clause under reference is valid, although they may institute suits in respect of claims to land, they cannot have such claims determined by a Civil Court." After reviewing the authorities, he added "In the absence of anything being shewn to the contrary I think it must be taken that before the transfer of the territories under the Government of the East India Company to the Crown, members of the public in Burma could sue the Company upon claims to or in connection with land." Robinson J. on the other hand held that the true construction of s. 65 of the Act of 1858 was, that whereas the only legal remedy against the Crown would have been by petition of right, that section provided that the subject should have the same remedy (that is by suit) against the Crown as it formerly had against the East India Company. The intention was to secure the rights of the subject, leaving it to the local Legislature to decide whether the remedy should be in a Civil or Revenue Court. He was of opinion therefore that this clause was not ultra vires. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Dunne, for the appellant, contended that the section was not ultra vires. It had not taken away all remedy against the Government in suits respecting rights over land. It merely took away the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain, try, and decide such suits. Sect. 65 of the Act of 1858 meant on its true construction that the rights of the subject against the Crown should remain the same as before and that he should not be deprived of his remedy. It merely took away the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain, try, and decide such suits. Sect. 65 of the Act of 1858 meant on its true construction that the rights of the subject against the Crown should remain the same as before and that he should not be deprived of his remedy. But it did not intend that the remedy should always remain the same and should be incapable of alteration. The particular mode of enforcing such rights was within the discretion of the Legislature, and accordingly it had power by s. 41 (b) to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court over particular suits. Sect. 65 ought not to be so construed as to withdraw the procedure to be adopted by the subject from the control of the Legislature. At the time that Act IV. of 1898 (Burma) was passed the Acts which regulated legislative power in India were the Indian Council Acts of 1861, 1869, 1871, 1874, and 1892. Sect. 22 of the first of these Acts was referred to. [VISCOUNT HALDANE L.C. The whole point turns on s. 65 of the Act of 1858.] Reference was made to 13 Geo. 3, c. 63, and 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85; Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State (5 Bomb. H. C., App. A, 1, 4, 5, 7.); and Vasuder Sadashiv Modak v. Collector of Ratnagiri. (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 119.) De Gruyther, K.C., Eddis, and A. P. Pennell, for the respondent, were not heard. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by VISCOUNT HALDANE L.C. This appeal raises the question whether the Government of India could make a law the effect of which was to debar a Civil Court from entertaining a claim against the Government to any right over land. The question is obviously one of great importance. The proceedings out of which the appeal arises related to an ordinary dispute about the title to land, in the course of which there emerged a claim to damages for wrongful interference with the plaintiffs property. The only point which their Lordships have to decide is whether s. 41 (b) of the Act IV. of 1898 (Burma) was validly enacted. A majority of the judges of the Chief Court of Lower Burma have held that it was not, and the Secretary of State appeals against the judgment. The only point which their Lordships have to decide is whether s. 41 (b) of the Act IV. of 1898 (Burma) was validly enacted. A majority of the judges of the Chief Court of Lower Burma have held that it was not, and the Secretary of State appeals against the judgment. The section enacts that no Civil Court is to have jurisdiction to determine a claim to any right over land as against the Government. In the Court below it was held that this enactment was ultra vires as contravening a provision in s. 65 of the Government of India Act, 1858, that there is to be the same remedy for the subject against the Government as there would have been against the East India Company. Their Lordships are satisfied that a suit of this character would have lain against the Company. The reasons for so holding are fully explained in the judgment of Sir Barnes Peacock C.J. in Peninsular and Oriental Co. v. Secretary of State, reported in the appendix to vol. 5 of the Bombay High Court Reports, and the only question is whether it was competent for the Government of India to take away the existing right to sue in a Civil Court. This turns on the construction of the Act of 1858, and of the Indian Councils Act of 1801. Their Lordships have examined the provisions of the Acts of 13 Geo. 3, c. 63, and 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85, to which reference was made in the course of the argument, but these statutes do not appear to materially affect the argument. The Act of 1858 declared that India was to be governed directly and in the name of the Crown, acting through a Secretary of State aided by a Council, and to him were transferred the powers formerly exercised by the Court of Directors and the Board of Control. The property of the old East India Company was vested in the Crown. The Secretary of State was given a quasi-corporate character to enable him to assert the lights and discharge the liabilities devolving on him as successor to the East India Company. The property of the old East India Company was vested in the Crown. The Secretary of State was given a quasi-corporate character to enable him to assert the lights and discharge the liabilities devolving on him as successor to the East India Company. The material words of s. 65 enact that 11 the Secretary of State in Council shall and may sue and be sued as well in India as in England by the name of the Secretary of State in Council as a body corporate ; and all persons and bodies politic shall and may have and take the same suits remedies and proceedings, legal and equitable, against the Secretary of State in Council of India as they could have done I against the said Company." Sect. 66 is a transitory provision making the Secretary of State in Council come in place of the Company in all proceedings pending at the commencement of the Act, without the necessity of a change of name. Sect. 67 is also a transitory provision making engagements of the Company entered into before the commencement of the Act binding on the Crown and enforceable against the Secretary of State in Council in the same manner and in the same Courts as they would have been in the case of the Company had the Act not passed. By s. 22 of the Indian Councils Act of 1861 the Governor-General in Council is given power to make laws in the manner provided, including power to repeal or amend existing laws, and including the making of laws for all Courts of justice. But a proviso to this section enacts that there is to be no power to repeal or in any way affect, among other matters, any provision of the Government of India Act, 1858. Their Lordships are of opinion that the effect of s. 65 of the Act of 1858 was to debar the Government of India from passing any Act which could prevent a subject from suing the Secretary of State in Council in a Civil Court in any case in which he could have similarly sued the East India Company. They think that the words cannot be construed in any different sense without reading into them a qualification which is not there, and which may well have been deliberately omitted. The section is not, like the two which follow it, a merely transitory section. They think that the words cannot be construed in any different sense without reading into them a qualification which is not there, and which may well have been deliberately omitted. The section is not, like the two which follow it, a merely transitory section. It appears, judging from the language employed, to have been inserted for the purpose of making it clear that the subject was to have the right of so suing and was to retain that right in the future, or at least until the British Parliament should take it away. It may well be that the Indian Government can legislate validly about the formalities of procedure so long as they preserve the substantial right of the subject to sue the Government in the Civil Courts like any other defendant, and do not violate the fundamental principle that the Secretary of State, even as representing the Crown, is to be in no position different from that of the old East India Company. But the question before their Lordships is not one of procedure. It is whether the Government of India can by legislation take away the right to proceed against it in a Civil Court in a case involving a right over land. Their Lordships have come to the clear conclusion that the language of s. 65 of the Act of 1858 renders such legislation ultra vires. It was suggested in the course of the argument for the appellant that a different view must have been taken by this Board in the case of Vasudev Sadashiv Modak v. The Collector of Ratnagiri. (L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 119.) The answer is that no such point was raised for decision. Their Lordships will humbly advise that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.