JUDGMENT 1. This Appeal is directed against two orders, the first made apparently under r. 10 of Or. 22 of the CPC of 1908 and r. 10, sub r. 2 of Or. 1 and the second made upon an application by the Plaintiff for reconsideration of this order. It appears that on the 27th August 1908 Teckait Ajant Singh instituted a suit against one F. T. Christien for declaration that the purchase of the right of redemption by the Defendant had been made by him out of the consideration money covered by a deed of conditional sale for the benefit of the Plaintiff as his trustee and that the transaction had accrued to the benefit of the Plaintiff alone. On the 26th September 1910, one Sunder Mull applied to the Court and stated that he had on the 22nd June 1910 purchased from Teckait Ajant Singh and his son Thakur Dal Narain Singh the subject-matter of the litigation. He prayed accordingly that he himself might be substituted in place of the original Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff and his son Thakur Dal Narain Singh might be added as pro forma Defendants. He fur her prayed that a copy of the petition might be served on the parties concerned and an order made after they had been apprised of the application. The Subordinate Judge, however, forthwith made an order that the purchaser Sunder Mull be made a Plaintiff in place of the original Plaintiff Teckait Ajant Singh and that the latter as also Thakur Dal Narain Singh be made pro forma Defendants. On the 21st November 1910, the original Plaintiff took exception to this order and prayed for its cancellation as it had been made without notice to him. The Court thereupon held that as the order had been made, it could not be recalled. The Subordinate Judge further held that inasmuch as the title of Sunder Mull as assignee was challenged, the proper procedure for the parties to follow was to have recourse to a regular suit; and that during the pendency of such a suit, if instituted, the trial of the action before the Court might be stayed. We are invited to consider the propriety of these two orders. In our opinion, there is no room for controversy that the orders in question have been erroneously and improperly made. R. 10 of Or. We are invited to consider the propriety of these two orders. In our opinion, there is no room for controversy that the orders in question have been erroneously and improperly made. R. 10 of Or. 22 provides that in cases, (other than those mentioned in the preceding Rules) of an assignment, creation, or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved. The Subordinate Judge has correctly stated that this Rule replaces sec. 372 of the Code of 1882, and, from the circumstance that certain words which found a place in sec. 372 but have not been reproduced in r. 10 of Or. 22, he has drawn the inference that not only may an order for substitution he made ex parte, but that once such an order has been made tit parte, it cannot be recalled, even upon objection of parties in erested. Sec. 372 provided that an order for substitution could be made with the leave of the Court given either with the consent of all parties or after service of notice in writing upon them and hearing their objections if any. These words do not appear in r. 10 of Or. 22 of the Code of 1908. In our opinion, their absence do not justify the inference drawn by the Subordinate Judge. It is an elementary rule of universal application and founded upon the plainest principles of justice that a judicial order which may possibly affect or prejudice any party cannot be finally made unless he has been afforded an opportunity to be heard [Baggs case 11 Rep. 93 b., Re Hammersmith Rent-Charge 4 Ex. 97 (1849), Reg. v. Saddlers Co. 10 H. L. C. 404 (1863), Smith v. Queen 3 App. Cas. 614 (624) (1878), Balabai v. Ganesh I. L. R. 27 Bom 162 (183) (1902)]. The order may be made by consent of parties. It may be made after notice has been served upon all persons interested. It may be made ex parte, but in this event it may be challenged by parties interested. The Subordinate Judge was wholly in error when he imagined that he had no authority to recall the order made by him ex parte. It may be made after notice has been served upon all persons interested. It may be made ex parte, but in this event it may be challenged by parties interested. The Subordinate Judge was wholly in error when he imagined that he had no authority to recall the order made by him ex parte. All orders of this character, made ex parte, are subject to the implication that they may be revoked at the instance of any party prejudiced thereby, and the Court has inherent power to give such directions as the justices of the case may require [Tasliman v. Harihar I. L. R. 32 Cal. 253 (1904), Girwar Lal v. Lakshmi Narain I. L. R. 26 All. 329 (1904)]. In fact, this is the procedure followed in England under the Rules of the Supreme Court, Or. 17, rr. 4, 5, 6 and 7 which correspond to r. 10 of Or. 22 of our Code. There an application of this character is. made ex parte and an order is obtained as a matter of course. The order is next served upon all the parties concerned, and, within the period prescribed, they are allowed to take exception to the order and to have it discharged if adequate grounds are made out. The result is that in England an order of this character is not treated as conclusive against parties upon whom no notice has been served, till they have been afforded an opportunity to make their representation and to satisfy the Court that the order ought not to have been made. In so far, therefore, as the assignee has been substituted in place of the original Plaintiff the order cannot be supported. In so far as the son has been added as a party Defendant, the order must be taken to have been made under Or. 1, r. 10, sub-r. I of the Code. The son subsequently appeared and stated that he has no objection to be brought on the record as a Defendant. But it is obvious that whether he ought to be allowed to be brought on the record as a Defendant, cannot be decided till the original Plaintiff and Defendant have both been heard. Besides, it is well-settled that when a person has been substituted in place of the original Plaintiff, he is in the exact position of the person whom he represents. Chorlton v. Dickie 13 Ch. Besides, it is well-settled that when a person has been substituted in place of the original Plaintiff, he is in the exact position of the person whom he represents. Chorlton v. Dickie 13 Ch. D. 160 (1879), Johnston v. English 55 L. T. 55 (1886), Cockshott v. London General Cab Co. 47 L. J. Ch. 126 (1877). Here the assignee, in so far as he claims to be the assignee of the Plaintiff, represent the interest originally vested in the assignor; but in so far as he claims to represent the son of the Plaintiff, he seeks a relief not included in the plaint as initially framed. Whether he should, at this stage, be allowed to enlarge the scope of the suit in his character as assignee not of the original Plaintiff but of a stranger to the suit is a matter which intimately concerns the Defendant; and consequently an order of this description cannot be made till the Defendant has been heard. We are therefore of opinion that the order in its entirety is bad and must be set aside. 2. We observe that the order has been made upon an application which is not only not supported by any affidavit but is not even verified. The Subordinate Judge ought not to have made ex parte an order of this description, specially, when the applicant himself prayed that the order might be made after notice to the parties concerned. The result of the order of the Subordinate Judge has been that proceedings have been tied up for more than a year; but if his view prevailed, the trial of the suit might be postponed indefinitely, and the Defendant kept in suspense pending the investigation of the dispute between the original Plaintiff and the person who claims as his assignee. The difficulty might have been avoided if notice of the application had been served on the parties concerned and the assignee had been added as a co-Plaintiff under r. 10 of Or. 1 of the Code. The result, therefore, is that this Appeal is allowed, the order of the Court below set aside and the case remanded to that Court in order that the application of Sunder Mull, dated the 26th September 1910, may be considered in the presence of all the parties interested. 1 of the Code. The result, therefore, is that this Appeal is allowed, the order of the Court below set aside and the case remanded to that Court in order that the application of Sunder Mull, dated the 26th September 1910, may be considered in the presence of all the parties interested. We make no order as to the costs of this Appeal as neither of the parties appears to be responsible for the erroneous order made by the Subordinate Judge.