JUDGMENT 1. The only question raised in this Appeal is the question of limitation. The Defendant No. 1, Jadu Nath Belel, purchased the occupancy jote of one Kurukhetra on the 9th Ashar 1303 corresponding to the 22nd June 1896. The present suit was brought by the 8 annas landlord on the 12th February, 1909. The suit was for partition of the Plaintiff's 8 annas share from the 8 annas held by Defendant No. 1. The preformed Defendants who are the 8 annas landlords had recognized the Defendant No. 1 as their tenant. The alternative prayer of the Plaintiff was for joint possession of the said share with Defendant No. 1. The Defendant's argument is based on the fact that there is no question that he was in possession of the joe throughout the period of 13 years, and that the Plaintiff now says that he is a mere trespasser as far as his 8 annas is concerned. He therefore contends that Art. 142 of the Limitation Act applies to this case, although there has been no dispossession of the Plaintiff as landlord or discontinuation of his possession within 12 years. Had it been the fact that Defendant No. 1 had encroached upon the Plaintiff's land and had held it as a trespasser after the landlord had repudiated any relation of landlord and tenant for 12 years, then this case might fall within the very limited interpretation which was put by Mr. Justice Mookerjee upon this article in the case of Ishan Chandra v. Ram Ranjan 2 U. L. J. 125 (1905) this was further considered by the same learned Judge in the case of Raktoo Singh v. Sudhram Ahir 8 C. L. J. 557 (1907)., in which it was held that it is open to the Defendants in the first place to plead that the lands were comprised in their tenancy, and that consequently the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover possession; and in the second place to assert that if the tenancy was not established, as they had held possession for more than 12 years, the right of the Plaintiffs to recover possession was extinguished by the law of limitation. But in that case the case of the Plaintiffs was that the Defendants were tenants in respect of other lands not in dispute, and that by an act of trespass they came to occupy the disputed land within 12 years before suit. But it was proved that the Defendants had been in occupation for more than 12 years; the title of the Plaintiffs to recover possession by ejecting the Defendants was barred by limitation, and the question was not one of adverse possession but of limitation, and the learned Judges distinctly say that in coming to this conclusion they follow the case of Ishan Chandra v. Ram Ranjan 2 C. L. J 125 (190) to which we have just referred. The same very limited application of Art. 142 therefore is made in that case. 2. But in this case the facts are totally different. It appears that after his purchase, Jadu Nath Belel held the jote in the name of the original tenant Kurukhetra and he himself has proved that he paid rent to the Plaintiff on behalf of the old tenant Kurukhetra in Aghran 1305, and that the Plaintiff gave him a rent receipt in which he was described as marfatdar for Kurukhetra. Of course the Plaintiff knew that he was a tenant, but he was not bound to take rent from anybody but the recorded tenant; and both patties must be held to have accepted the position that Jadu Nath Belel was paying rent in the name of the old tenant and that the Plaintiff was his landlord. Subsequently when the Revenue Officer declared in 1904 that Jadu Nath Belel was nothing better than a trespasser and had no right to the tenancy at all, the Plaintiff turned round and sought to eject his as a trespasser. But this cannot get rid of the admission of the Defendant himself that he was the Plaintiff's tenant so late as Aghran 1305, and as he was the Plaintiff's tenant at that time he cannot plead limitation. That is the only point that is argued before us and we are therefore of opinion that the Appeal must be dismissed with costs.