Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (December 20, 1909) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpur (December 14, 1907). The question decided in this appeal was whether property to which a Hindu mother in a family governed by the Mitakshara law becomes entitled on partition is her stridhan or not. One Gayaparshad and his three sons formed a Hindu joint family. His widow and three sons survived him. The plaintiff-appellant was the son of the eldest of the three brothers, who died in 1889. In 1894 as a minor under the guardianship of his mother he sued his fathers brothers and Gayaparshads widow, named Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwari, for partition of Gayaparshads estate. He claimed a third share, but the Court granted him a fourth share, awarding to Dulhan Sahibzad a fourth share as the widow and the same to each of the two uncles. The widow died in 1900, and on her death her two sons took possession of her fourth share, and in consequence the appellant sued them in 1907 to recover his one third share thereof. The respondents defended, pleading that the property in suit was Dulhan Sahibzads stridhan and that the appellant as her grandson had therefore no right of inheritance in it. The Subordinate Judge decided that the property was stridhan and that the widows sons succeeded Date of Decision Nov. 10, 14. 1911; Feb. 2. 1912. Debi Mangal Prasad Singh V. Mahadeo Prasad Singh 48 thereto to the exclusion of the grandson. He accordingly dismissed the suit. His judgment was as follows — " It has clearly been held in Gambhir Singh v. Makraddhuj (( 1907) 4 A. L. J. 673.) that the share in the property of her deceased husband taken by a widow on partition between her and her stepsons is her stridhan. The same view was adopted in the cases of Chhiddu v. Naubat (( 1901) I. L. R. 24 Allah. 67.) and Sri Pal Rai v. Suraj Bali. (( 1901) I. L. R. 24 Allah. 82.) On behalf of the plaintiff reliance has been placed on Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai (( 1903) I. L. R. 25 Allah. 468.)? The same view was adopted in the cases of Chhiddu v. Naubat (( 1901) I. L. R. 24 Allah. 67.) and Sri Pal Rai v. Suraj Bali. (( 1901) I. L. R. 24 Allah. 82.) On behalf of the plaintiff reliance has been placed on Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai (( 1903) I. L. R. 25 Allah. 468.)? but that case is distinguishable from the cases quoted above and the case before me, as the only question which had to be decided in it was whether the property inherited by a female from another female was her stridhan. Relying upon the authorities quoted above, I find that the property in question is Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwaris stridhan. " As a result of the above finding I hold that under the Hindu law, the plaintiff, who is the grandson of Musammat Sahibzad Kunwari, is not her legal heir and has no right of inheritance to the property in question either singly or conjointly with the defendants 1 and 2 who are the sons of that lady and, therefore, exclude the plaintiff." The High Court (Stanley C.J. and P. C. Banerji J.) held that the question raised in this appeal was concluded by the decision in Chhiddu v. Naubat (2) and dismissed the appeal. The judgment is as follows — “This was a decision of a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party. It was to the effect that according to the Mitakshara the share which the mother in a joint Hindu family obtains after the death of the father on partition of the joint family property between the mother and the sons becomes the mothers stridhan which devolves on her death upon her own heirs and not upon the heirs of her husband. The question in the case appears to have been carefully considered, and the ruling has been followed in several later cases including the case of Gambhir Singh v. Makraddhuj. (4 A. L. J. 673.) In this last-mentioned case it was contended that having regard to the ruling of the Privy Council in Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai (I. L. R. 25 Allah. 468) the rulings of this Court must be deemed to be of no authority. The ruling in question is not a ruling upon the point which is now before the Court. 468) the rulings of this Court must be deemed to be of no authority. The ruling in question is not a ruling upon the point which is now before the Court. " What their Lordships in that case held was that under the Hindu law of the Benares School property which a woman has obtained by inheritance from a female is not her stridhan in such a sense that on her death it passes to her stridhan heirs in the female line to the exclusion of males. This is not the question which is before us. Some of the considerations which arose in that case may have a bearing upon the point before us. The question is by no means free from difficulty as has been pointed out in the case of Chhiddu v. Naubat. (I. L. R. 24 Allah. 67.) We think that we ought to abide by that decision unless and until it is reversed by their Lordships of the Privy Council." Sir Erie Richards, K.C., and Dube, for the appellant, contended that by the established principles of the Hindu law according to the Mitakshara the share of Gaya parshads property which was allotted to his widow on the partition of his estate was for her maintenance only and was not her stridhan properly so called. It was not allotted to her as her absolute property and she did not become a fresh root of descent. On the contrary upon her death it reverted to her husbands heirs living at her death in whom that share vested immediately on her death by right of inheritance to Gaya parshad. The earliest definitions of stridhan are given in Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., p. 882, par. 658, and p. 822, s. 610; and see Mitakshara, c. 2, s. 11, pars. 2 and 3, Stokes Hindu Law Books, p. 458. This Board has always held that the definition of stridhan is not enlarged by the text of the Date of Decision Nov. 10, 14. 1911; Feb. 2. 1912. Debi Mangal Prasad Singh V. Mahadeo Prasad Singh 49 Mitakshara, which is not supported by Yajnyavalcya and goes further than the Dayabhaga. Reference was made to Mussumat Thakoor Deyhee v. Rai Baluk Ram (( 1866) 11 Moo. Ind. Ap. 139, 155, 174.), where the text and its con struction are fully discussed; Macnaghtens Hindu Law, vol. 1911; Feb. 2. 1912. Debi Mangal Prasad Singh V. Mahadeo Prasad Singh 49 Mitakshara, which is not supported by Yajnyavalcya and goes further than the Dayabhaga. Reference was made to Mussumat Thakoor Deyhee v. Rai Baluk Ram (( 1866) 11 Moo. Ind. Ap. 139, 155, 174.), where the text and its con struction are fully discussed; Macnaghtens Hindu Law, vol. 1, p. 38 ; Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee. (( 1867) 11 Moo. lad. Ap. 487, 504, 506, 513.) A distinction has been made between property voluntarily given or inherited and that acquired on partition Chotay hall v. Chunno hall (( 1878) L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 15, 30.); Mutta Vaduganadha Tevar v. Dorasinga Tevar (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 99, 108.) ,Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai (( 1903) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 202, 208; I. L. R. 25 Allah. 468.); Lal Sheo Partab Bahadur Singh v. Allahabad Bank. (( 1903) L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 209, 217.) The principle with regard to acquisitions by partition is that a share is given to the widow in satisfaction of her claim to maintenance which prior to partition was a charge on the whole estate. She cannot claim partition by virtue of title to a share. Her right to a share is contingent upon a partition being claimed by others and springs out of her right see Maynes Hindu Law, p. 837, s. 621; Gurudas Bonnerjis Marriage and Stridhan, 1878, Tagore Law Lectures, 2nd ed., 1896, pp. 305, 330, 331; Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy (( 1888) L. R. 15 Calc. 292.); Maynes Hindu Law, p. 703, s. 518. The Mitakshara does not mean that on partition a woman should have a share allotted to her as stridhan. In South India and Madras the practice of giving a share to a mother has become obsolete and her maintenance is provided for by other means. In Bombay the mother still has a right to claim a share on partition by her sons, but it is only for her maintenance ; while in Bengal the Dayabhaga prevails and the mothers share invariably goes back to her husbands heirs. Reference was made to Beni Pershad v. Puran Chand (( 1895) I. L. R. 23 Calc. 262.) a case under the Mitakshara law; Mitakshara, c. 1, s. 6, s. 3, r. 8, c. 2, s. 1, rr. Reference was made to Beni Pershad v. Puran Chand (( 1895) I. L. R. 23 Calc. 262.) a case under the Mitakshara law; Mitakshara, c. 1, s. 6, s. 3, r. 8, c. 2, s. 1, rr. 30 et seq.; Chhiddu v. Naubat (I. L. R. 24 Allah. 67, 74, 76.); Sri Pal Rai v. Surajbali (I. L. R. 24 Allah. 82.); Buldeo Singh v. Mahabeer Singh (( 1866) 1 Agra H. C. 155, 157.); Sheodyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree (( 1868) 9 Suth. W. R. 61, 63.); Lalljeet Singh v. Rajcoomar Singh. (( 1873) 20 Suth. W. R. 336,340.) The appellant as grandson is entitled to share equally with the sons. De Gruyther, K.C., Ross, and A. P. Sen, for the respondents, contended that the property in suit devolved on partition absolutely on the widow to whom it was allotted and became her stridhan inheritable by her stridhan heirs and did not revert to the heirs of her husband. The appellant as grandson to the widow was not her legal heir, since her sons had a preferential right, and therefore had no right of inheritance in the property in suit. The rule of succession to stridhan is that it devolves first on the womans daughters, second on her sons, third on her grandsons, and that those in a later class do not take at all if any of the earlier clas have survived her. Assuming this rule of succession to be correct, the main question to be determined is whether under the circumstances this property was the widows stridhan. She acquired it on partition between her sons, and the Mitakshara, which is the sole authority applicable, says that she does not take a share so allotted as maintenance, but precisely as the sons take their shares, that is separately and absolutely see Mitakshara, c. 1, s. 7, par. 2, and c. 2, s. 1,pars. 31, 32, and 33. The case supposed in the Mitakshara is the case of a partition during the husbands lifetime see Mitakshara, c. 1, s. 7, pars. 1 and 2, and compare c. 2, s. 11, pars. 1, 2, and 12. Reference was made to Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lall. (L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 15.) The case of Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree (9 Suth. W. R. 61.) has nothing to do with this case, for no partition had taken place therein. 1 and 2, and compare c. 2, s. 11, pars. 1, 2, and 12. Reference was made to Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lall. (L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 15.) The case of Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree (9 Suth. W. R. 61.) has nothing to do with this case, for no partition had taken place therein. The case of Mahabeer Pershad v. Ramyad Singh (( 1873) 20 Suth. W. R. 192, 195; S. C. 12 Beng. L. R. 90.) decided that a woman did not take a share. Reference was also made to Beni Pershad v. Puran Chand (( 1896) I. L. R. 23 Calc. 262.); Lalljeet Singh v. Rajcoomar Singh (5) ; Doorga Koonwar v. Tejoo Koonwar (( 1866) 5 Suth. W. R. Misc. 53.) ; Nellai Kumar Chetti v. Marakathammal (( 1876) I. L. R. 1 Madr. 166.); Bhagirthibai v. Kahnujirav (( 1886) I. L. R. 11 Bomb. 285, 302); and Gurudas Bonnerjis Marriage and Stridhan, ed. 1879, pp. 314, 320. It was contended that no single case had been decided to the effect that a mother on partition takes her share in lieu of maintenance under the Mitakshara law. The Bengal cases are useless on this point, for they are decided under the Dayabhaga. The Privy Council decisions are in Date of Decision Nov. 10, 14. 1911; Feb. 2. 1912. Debi Mangal Prasad Singh V. Mahadeo Prasad Singh 50 Thakoor Deyhee v. Rai Baluk Ram (11 Moo. Ind. Ap. 139, 173.) ; Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee (11 Moo. Ind. Ap. 487, 511.) ; Lal Sheo Partab Bahadur Singh v. Allahabad Bank (L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 209, 218.); and Hemangini Dasi v. Kedarnath Kudu Chowdhry. (( 1889) L. R. 16 Ind. Ap. 115.) See also Subramanian Chetti v. Aruna Chelam Chetti. (( 1904) 1. L. R. 28 Madr. 1.) Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy (I. L. R. 15 Calc. 292.), cited on the other side, does not decide the present point. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Robson. Ap. 115.) See also Subramanian Chetti v. Aruna Chelam Chetti. (( 1904) 1. L. R. 28 Madr. 1.) Sorolah Dossee v. Bhoobun Mohun Neoghy (I. L. R. 15 Calc. 292.), cited on the other side, does not decide the present point. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., in reply. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Lord Robson. The question to be determined in this case is whether immovable property, obtained by a Hindu widow on partition of the joint family property under the Mitakshara law, is part of her stridhan in the narrow sense of that word, indicating her separate property or peculium which passes on her death to her own heirs; or is merely part of her stridhan in the wider sense in which the word is sometimes used, as indicating any property in which she may have some right of proprietorship. The property in question originally belonged to one Gaya Parshad, who with his three sons formed a Hindu joint family governed by the Mitakshara law. He died leaving three sons and a widow. Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwari. One of his sons, Sheo Partap Singh, died in 1889, leaving a widow and his son, the plaintiff-appellant. In 1894 a partition of the joint family pro perty took place, at the suit of the plaintiff, under the guardianship of his mother, and in that suit the Court apportioned one fourth share of the family property to Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwari, who remained in possession thereof until her death on November 19, 1900. The plaintiff claims possession of one third of the property thus held by her, on the ground that it passed, under the Mitakshara law, to the heirs of her husband, of whom he is one. The first two defendant-respondents are the two surviving sons of Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwari, and their contention is that the property acquired by their mother on the said partition was her stridhan or peculium so as to descend to her heirs. This raised the further question as to whether the plaintiff, whose father had predeceased Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwari, was one of her heirs or was excluded from her inheritance by her surviving sons. The Subordinate Judge decided both these issues in favour of the defendants, and that judgment was affirmed by the High Court at Allahabad. This raised the further question as to whether the plaintiff, whose father had predeceased Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwari, was one of her heirs or was excluded from her inheritance by her surviving sons. The Subordinate Judge decided both these issues in favour of the defendants, and that judgment was affirmed by the High Court at Allahabad. The sections of the Mitakshara dealing with the property of a woman have given rise to much controversy and some conflict of decisions. In chapter 2, s. 11, paragraph 1, of that treatise, Vijnanesvara sets forth Yajnyavalkyas classification or description of womans property as follows " What was given to a woman by the father, the mother, the husband, or a brother, or received by her at the nuptial fire, or presented to her on her husbands marriage to another wife, as also any other [separate acquisition] is denominated a womans property." In paragraph 2 of the same section, Vijnanesvara repeats in substance the six-fold classification given in paragraph 1, and then in place of the general words " as also any other " he sub stitutes a further enumeration as follows " And also property which she may have acquired by inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure, or finding, are denominated by Manu and the rest, womans property." This reference to Manu is not borne out by the quotation from that authority given in paragraph 4 (s. Date of Decision Nov. 10, 14. 1911; Feb. 2. 1912. Debi Mangal Prasad Singh V. Mahadeo Prasad Singh 11). Manu is there cited as making the same classification of the different kinds of "womens property "as that above given by Yajnyavalkya, and saying that they " are denominated the six-fold property of a woman." This six-fold enumeration of the sources of a " womans pro perty/ as given by Yajnyavalkya and Manu, corresponds with the technical or narrow signification of stridhan indicating property which is under her absolute control (Turing life and on her death is descendible to her heirs. Do the same characteristics attach to a womans property derived from the additional sources specified by Vijnanesvara, namely, inheritance, partition, &c. ? The words "any other" with which Yajnyavalkya concluded his enumeration are a translation of the word " adi " or "adya," which, according to Mr. Do the same characteristics attach to a womans property derived from the additional sources specified by Vijnanesvara, namely, inheritance, partition, &c. ? The words "any other" with which Yajnyavalkya concluded his enumeration are a translation of the word " adi " or "adya," which, according to Mr. Mayne (Hindu Law, 7th ed., p. 823), means " and the like." In that view, Yajnyavalkya meant to limit his description of " womans property," or stridhan, to property acquired in any of the six modes he had just specified, or in any other manner ejusdem generis with those modes. Vijnanesvaras additional enumeration goes beyond that. When read with Yajnyavalkyas description, it constitutes a practically complete statement of the means by which a woman can acquire property rights. Dealing with this extended signification of the term " womans property " Vijnanesvara says in paragraph 3 of the same section that it "conforms in its import with its etymology and is not technical." In paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, therefore, he is speaking of stridhan in the wider sense. In paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 Vijnanesvara cites the description of "womans property" given by Katyayana, which does not expressly profess to be exhaustive, but which closely approximates in character to that given by Yajnyavalkya and Manu, and does not include any of the heads (inheritance, partition, &c.) added to the list by Vijnanesvara in paragraph 2. Then comes paragraph 8, which gives rise to the difficulty. It runs thus " A womans property has been thus described. The author next propounds the distribution of it. Her kinsmen take it if she die without issue. " The rule of devolution prescribed by the author (Yajnyavalkya) to whom Vijnanesvara refers was, so far as that author himself was concerned, no doubt intended to apply only to stridhan in the narrow signification defined in paragraph 1, and not to the enumeration as expanded by the commentator in the concluding words of paragraph 2. It is, indeed, possible to read paragraph 8 as applying only to the more limited enumeration of Yajnyavalkya. When Vijnanesvara says " a womans property has been thus described," he may have been referring to the description given by his author and by Katyayana, and have intended to confine Yajnyavalkyas rule of devolution to Yajnyavalkyas classification. It is, indeed, possible to read paragraph 8 as applying only to the more limited enumeration of Yajnyavalkya. When Vijnanesvara says " a womans property has been thus described," he may have been referring to the description given by his author and by Katyayana, and have intended to confine Yajnyavalkyas rule of devolution to Yajnyavalkyas classification. His language, however, in paragraph 8, when read with what he says in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, is open to the meaning that a womans property, of whatsoever kind, descends always to her own heirs. It is difficult to adopt the latter construction in view of the undoubted fact that, as Sir Arthur Wilson said in delivering the judgment of their Lordships Board in Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai (L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 206.), "most of the old commentators recognize, with regard to the property of a woman, whether called stridhan or by any other name, that there may be room for differences in its line of descent according to the mode of its acquisition." So far as a womans acquisition of property by inheritance is concerned the matter is now clearly concluded by authority, and a consideration of the cases decided with regard to that item in Vijnanesvaras additional enumeration will facilitate the task of dealing with the item of " partition " in the same enumeration. In the case of Mussumat Thakoor Deyhee v. Rai Baluk Ram (11 Moo. Ind. Ap. 139.) it was contended that, in the provinces governed by the Mitakshara, the widows estate in her husbands property was absolute, and that she had full power to dispose of it. In support of that argument reliance was placed on the concluding words of the second paragraph of s. 11, chapter 2, of the Mitakshara above dealt with, namely, " also property which she may have acquired by inheritance." Date of Decision Nov. 10, 14. 1911; Feb. 2. 1912. Debi Mangal Prasad Singh V. Mahadeo Prasad Singh 52 Their Lordships, however, rejected the view that those words included such property as part of a womans stridhan so as to make it descendible to her heirs. They quoted, with approval, the proposition laid down by Sir William Macnaghten in his Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law, vol. 2. 1912. Debi Mangal Prasad Singh V. Mahadeo Prasad Singh 52 Their Lordships, however, rejected the view that those words included such property as part of a womans stridhan so as to make it descendible to her heirs. They quoted, with approval, the proposition laid down by Sir William Macnaghten in his Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law, vol. 1, p. 38, where he says " In the Mitakshara, whatever a woman may have acquired, whether by inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure, or finding, is denominated womans property, but it does not constitute her peculium." It was therefore held that a widow has no power of alienating any immovable property which she has inherited from her husband, and that, on her death, such property will pass to the next heirs of her deceased husband. Similarly, in Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee (11 Moo. Ind. Ap. 487.) it was held that, by the Hindu law prevailing in Benares (the Western School), no part of the husbands estate, movable or immovable, forms portion of his widows stridhan, and she has no power to alienate the estate inherited from her husband, to the prejudice of his heirs, which, at her death, devolves on them. Sir James Colville, in delivering the judgment of their Lordships Board, says " Both the Vivada Chintamani and the Mayukha confine stridhan within the definitions of Menu and Katyayana. They exclude property inherited, and the other acquisitions which are comprehended in the last clause of the paragraph in the Mitakshara, but are excluded by Sir William Macnaghten." This observation puts partition on the same footing as inheritance, so far as the rights of a widow are concerned. In Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lall (L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 15.) it was held that, under the law of the Mitakshara, a daughters estate inherited from the father is a limited and restricted estate only and not stridhan, so that upon her death the next heirs of the father succeed thereto. The cases on the question of a womans inherited property came under review by their Lordships Board in Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debt Sahai(L. R, 30 Ind. Ap. 206), before referred to, and Lal Sheo Pertab Bahadur Singh v. Allahabad Bank. (L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. The cases on the question of a womans inherited property came under review by their Lordships Board in Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debt Sahai(L. R, 30 Ind. Ap. 206), before referred to, and Lal Sheo Pertab Bahadur Singh v. Allahabad Bank. (L. R. 30 Ind. Ap. 209.) The construction of the Mitakshara was again considered, and it was held that, under the Hindu law of the Benares School, property which a woman has taken by inheritance from a female is not her stridhan in such sense that on her death it passes to her stridhan heirs in the female line to the exclusion of males. Each of these authorities is inconsistent with the wide scope which the respondents, on the construction of the Mitakshara, seek to give to the definition of stridhan. The question now arises whether there is any substantial difference in principle between a womans property acquired by inheritance and that acquired by partition. It is a question attended with some difficulties, especially in the construction of the Mitakshara, whatever view of it may be taken. While a family remains joint a woman has no right under the Mitakshara to a specific share of the family estate. She is only entitled to maintenance, or in due course to her customary inheritance, and if a partition takes place a mother gets a share equal to that of a son. If the share given to a widow on partition is given to her as a substitute for that to which she would be entitled upon inheritance, then, according to the foregoing authorities, it would seem reasonable that it should follow the same rule of descent and revert on her death to her husbands heirs. If, on the other hand, it is given to her by way of provision for her maintenance, it seems equally reasonable that when the necessity for her maintenance has ceased the property should revert to the estate from which it was taken. If, on the other hand, it is given to her by way of provision for her maintenance, it seems equally reasonable that when the necessity for her maintenance has ceased the property should revert to the estate from which it was taken. Of course, the members of a joint family effecting a partition may agree that a portion of the pro perty shall be transferred to the widow by way of absolute gift, as part of her stridhan, so as to constitute a provision for her stridhan heirs; but, in the absence of any such intention, their Lordships do not feel justified in putting property acquired by a widow, on a partition of the joint estate, upon a Date of Decision Nov. 10, 14. 1911; Feb. 2. 1912. Debi Mangal Prasad Singh V. Mahadeo Prasad Singh 53 footing different from that on which property coming to her by way of inheritance has been placed. The contrary view was taken by the High Court at Allahabad in Chhiddu v. Naubat. (I. L R. 24 Allah. 67.) The learned judges in that case laid great stress upon chapter 1, s. 6, paragraph 2, of the Mitakshara. Vijnanesvara there deals with the rights of a son born after the partition, and says that on the demise of his parents he obtains both their portions,—"his mothers portion, however, only if there be no daughter, for it is declared that Daughters share the residue of their mothers property after payment of her debts. " Again chapter 1, s. 3, paragraph 8, runs as follows " It has been declared that sons may part the effects after the death of their father and mother. The author states an exception in regard to the mothers separate property The daughters share the residue of their mothers property, after payment of her debts.’" This paragraph refers only to the mothers separate property or peculium whatever that may be. But it is by no means certain that either in that paragraph or in s. 6, paragraph 2, the property coming to her by way of partition is necessarily included in that peculium. But it is by no means certain that either in that paragraph or in s. 6, paragraph 2, the property coming to her by way of partition is necessarily included in that peculium. That there is a distinction in the rules of descent between different kinds of a womans property, according to the mode in which it has been acquired, is beyond question, but the Mitakshara does not always discriminate between these different kinds of property, and in the doubt that arises as to its precise intent and construction in reference to this point, the principle upon which the cases relating to inheritance have been decided appears to be a safe guide in dealing also with cases of partition. In this view, it is unnecessary to discuss the second question as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to share in his grandmothers estate as one of her heirs equally with his uncles. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed; the decrees of the Courts below set aside with costs; and in lieu thereof a decree made in favour of the appellant for the one third of the share with mesne profits which came to Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwari on partition and was held by her. The respondents will pay the costs of the appeal.