Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (December 16, 1908). The question decided was as to the effect of Indian Limitation Act, 1908, s. 31, which came into operation on August 7, 1908. The suit out of which the appeal arose was brought in the Subordinate Court of Negapatam to recover the principal and interest due under an instrument of mortgage dated September 22, 1883. The plaintiff was the receiver appointed by the Court in a suit for the partition of the family property of the mortgagees. Under the decree in the partition suit, the interests of the family in the mortgage, and the debt secured thereby, fell to the share of the respondent, who was accordingly brought on to the record. The Subordinate Court held that part of the claim was barred by the twelve years rule of limitation. The High Court on an appeal preferred by the plaintiff held that none of the claim was barred, being of opinion that the sixty years rule of limitation was applicable. On July 22, 1907, the Privy Council held, on an appeal preferred by the defendants, that the twelve years rule of limitation prescribed by art. 132 of the Limitation Act, 1877, was applicable. An Order in Council dated August 12, 1907, accordingly discharged the decree of the High Court. As various questions raised by the plaintiff—including questions with reference to ss. 19 and 20 of the said Act—remained to be determined, the case was remitted to the High Court to be disposed of. On August 7, 1908, the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was passed, which came into force at once; s. 31 of which is set out in their Lordships judgment. The scheduled territories mentioned therein include the Presidency of Fort St. George. The defendants appeal, remitted to the High Court as stated above, came on for hearing on August 14, 1908, and was disposed of in favour of the plaintiff by a judgment delivered on December 16, 1908; the material passage in which is as follows " If nothing further had occurred it would now be necessary for us to reopen the appeal on the footing that the twelve years rule of limitation in article 132 was primarily applicable, and we should have to consider the plaintiffs pleas that by reason of acknowledgments and so forth his claim was not barred even under that rule. But in the meantime the Legislature intervened. The declaration of the Privy Council was made on July 22, 1907, and while the case so remitted was pending in this Court, the Legislature on August 7, 1908, passed the Indian Limitation Act, 1908." After referring to the first clause of s. 31 of the last-mentioned Act, the judgment continued as follows " The plaintiff contends that the latter part of this clause is applicable to the present case. We are of opinion that the contention is valid. The suit is one in the territories mentioned in the Second Schedule of the Act; it was instituted within sixty years from the date when the money secured by the mortgage became due; and it was pending in this Court as a Court of Appeal at the date when the Act was passed. We cannot therefore dismiss the suit (in whole or in part) on the ground that a twelve years limitation is applicable." In the result a decree was passed for the whole of the sum due on the mortgage. De Gruyther, K.C., and Kyffin, for the appellants, contended that the High Court was wrong in holding that the Order in Council dated August 12, 1907, was in effect abrogated by s. 31 of the new Limitation Act (IX. of 1908). The Order in Council was final and binding on the parties and was not subject to future legislation. The suit, therefore, was not a pending suit at the date of passing that Act within the meaning of s. 31. It was further contended that if the new Act operated to discharge that Order the parties were remitted to their previous rights. Reference was made to Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Filial (( 1907) L. R. 34 Ind. Ap. 186.); Act XV. of 1877, arts. 132, 147; Narayana Ayyar v. Venkataramana Ayyar (( 1902) I. L. R. 25 Madr. 220.) ; and Ramachandra Rayaguru v. Modhu Padhi. (( 1898) I. L. R. 21 Madr. 326.) The High Court should when the suit came before them have reopened the hearing on the footing prescribed by the judgment of the Privy Council that the twelve years period of limitation was applicable. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the respondent, contended that the High Court judgment was right and ought to be affirmed. Even if the suit was governed by art. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the respondent, contended that the High Court judgment was right and ought to be affirmed. Even if the suit was governed by art. 132 the evidence shewed that it was not barred. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated December 16, 1908. On September 23, 1899, a suit was brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Negapatam, founding upon a certain mortgage of date September 22, 1883, and with the object of recovering the mortgage debt by sale of the mortgaged property. That judge held that part of the claim was of a nature to which, under art. 132 of the Second Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act of 1877, the twelve years rule of limitation would apply. The High Court, on appeal, held, on the other hand, that the article applicable was No. 147, the sixty years rule of limitation. On appeal to this Board, the latter decision was reversed and the former restored. This occurred on July 22, 1907. The Order itself, by His Majesty in Council, was dated August 12, 1907. It appears that the question is one upon which there has been much diversity of opinion in India, and conflicting decisions in the High Courts of Madras, Bombay, and Allahabad were referred to in this connection. In view of the argument presented in this appeal, it is necessary to cite the exact terms of the former decision. They are these " Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that it should be declared that article 132 is the article which provides the rule of limitation applicable to this case, and that the case should be remitted to the High Court to be disposed of in accordance with this declaration." A remit took place accordingly. The reason for a remit is obvious. While the defendant had pleaded the limitation, the plaintiff had alleged payments of interest and settling of accounts which avoided the limitation, and a remit was required for the purpose of having, inter alia, inquiry and adjudication on these matters of fact. So standing the suit in the Court of Appeal, the Indian Limitation Act of August 7, 1908, was passed. So standing the suit in the Court of Appeal, the Indian Limitation Act of August 7, 1908, was passed. Its 31st section is in these terms — " Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, in the territories mentioned in the Second Schedule a suit for foreclosure or a suit for sale by a mortgagee may be instituted within two years from the date of the passing of this Act, or within sixty years from the date when the money secured by the mortgage became due, whichever period expires first; and no such suit in the said territories instituted within the said period of sixty years and pending at the date of the passing of this Act, either in a Court of First Instance or of Appeal, shall be dismissed on the ground that a twelve years rule of limitation is applicable. " (2.) Where in the aforesaid territories the claim of a mortgagee for foreclosure or for sale has been wholly or in part dismissed or withdrawn after the 22nd day of July, 1907, and before the passing of this Act, either in a Court of First Instance or of Appeal, on the ground that a twelve years rule of limitation applied to such claim, the case may be restored on an application in writing to the Court by which the claim was dismissed or in which it was withdrawn, provided the application is made within six months from the date of the passing of this Act; and on such restoration, the provisions of sub-section (1.) shall apply." The question in the present appeal is simply, and in a word, whether this supervenient legislation applies to this suit. That it was meant so to apply is fairly obvious from the citation of the date July 22, 1907, which is in fact the date of delivery of the previous judgment of this Board. Whether it does in fact so apply depends, as was admitted by the learned counsel for the appellants, solely on whether the suit was or was not a suit pending at the passing of the Act. Their Lordships do not entertain any doubt that it was. The former judgment of the Board did not end the suit; did not finally determine it. Their Lordships do not entertain any doubt that it was. The former judgment of the Board did not end the suit; did not finally determine it. It was remitted to the High Court of Madras for further procedure, and for inquiry upon allegations of fact; and at the date of the statute that procedure was not concluded and the inquiry had not indeed been entered upon. The suit in fact was neither adjudged upon nor even ready for judgment. Their Lordships express their concurrence with the opinions of the learned judges of the High Court, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.