JUDGMENT Fletcher, J. - A point is now raised in this suit which was net raised when the matter was before me a short time ago. On the authorities and on the wording of the Act the point raised by Mr. Chakraverty is obviously right. What is the present application? It is an application by the husband for grant of letters of administration to the estate of his deceased wife. There is no other application before the Court although the Respondent, the brother who has entered a caveat to the issue of the grant to the husband, expresses a hope or desire that at some future date he may apply that a grant be made to himself. The only application that the Court has got to consider is the petition to the Court to grant letters of administration to the husband in respect of his deceased wife's estate. Under sec. 23 of the Probate and Administration Act on the allegations contained in that petition the husband would be the person who according to the rules for the distribution of the estate of the intestate is entitled to the whole or a part of the estate, the husband having alleged in his petition that part of the property is the jautuka stridhan of his wife. On the last occasion learned Counsel who appeared for the Petitioner did not take the point now taken by Mr. Chakravarti on behalf of the Petitioner and allowed the caveat or to settle issues and to put in issue whether any portion of the property left by the deceased was her jautuka stridhan. That ought never to have been done. If my attention had been called to the section or to the authorities I would have overruled that issue. No finding by the Court as to the rights of the parties as to jautuka stridhan or other stridhan would have been binding between the parties. No finding as to whether if it were jautuka stridhan would be binding on the parties. If is pot the practice of the Court in its Testamentary and Intestate Jurisdiction to go into questions of title and whether the property was jautuka or other stridhan. No finding as to whether if it were jautuka stridhan would be binding on the parties. If is pot the practice of the Court in its Testamentary and Intestate Jurisdiction to go into questions of title and whether the property was jautuka or other stridhan. It is sufficient under the Probate and Administration Act if the person making the application is according to the rule for the distribution of the estate if the deceased entitled to the whole or a part of the property and alleges the fact that there is property of that nature. This has been held in the goods of Rag hit-bar Hazam 3 C. W. N. Cclxxvii (1899) and also in Raghunath Misser v. Musst. Pate Koer 6 C. W. N. 345 (1901) and Ochavaram v. Dolatiam I. L. R. 28 BOM. 644 (1904), where it was pointed out that the rights of the parties are amply protected since before the letters of administration go out the applicant has to give security for the amount of the assets and there is obviously no necessity to determine whether the property of the deceased was jautuka stridhan or not. It seems to me that in such a small case as the present I ought not to enter into a protracted hearing to determine what is not necessary. If in the first instance these matters had been brought to my notice the matters would have been then and there determined and I would have held that it was not necessary for the applicant, the husband, for letters of administration to prove his title. There is no other application before the Court. If the husband's application be refused, it may be, no other application will be made to the Court. It seems to me that letters of administration must be granted and the caveat or must pay the costs, but the costs of the last occasion when this matter was beard ought not to be allowed to the Petitioner because the matter was not then presented to the Court in the manner it has now been presented. If it had then been so presented the Court would no doubt have directed the letters of administration to issue to the husband as I now direct. The applicant will have one day's costs of hearing.