JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against an order of adjudication made in a proceeding under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1907. The Respondent is employed as a guard on the Bengal-Nagpur Railway. He resides at Dungagarh in the Central Provinces and has worked there for over two years. But he runs his train ordinarily from Dungagarh to Nagpur. He adds that he works also from Dungagarh to Kharagpur, but has no permanent residence at the latter place, where he stops with guard Atkins, his son-in-law. The application for insolvency was lodged in the Court of the District Judge of Midnapur on the 8th August 1911, immediately after the Appellants had obtained a decree against him in the Court of the Munsif at Midnapur. There is no controversy that his debts exceed Rs. 500. Consequently the only question for consideration is, whether the petition has been presented to a Court having jurisdiction under the Provincial Insolvency Act in the local area in which the debtor ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, within the meaning of sub sec. (2) of section 6. The District Judge has held that as a decree for money has been obtained against him in the Court at Midnapur, the application might be entertained there. This view clearly cannot be supported. It is possible that a suit for realisation of a debt may be instituted in a place other than the one where the debtor ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. The question for determination consequently is, where does the debtor in this case ordinarily reside or personally work for gain, because there is no room for suggestion that he carries on business within the meaning of sub sec. (2) of section 6 within the jurisdiction of the Court of the District Judge of Midnapur. In our opinion, upon the facts stated, it cannot be held that the debtor ordinarily resides at Kharagpur. The term "resides" is not defined in the statute, but its ordinary interpretation is explained in the case of Kumud Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Jotindranath Chowdhury 13 C. L. J. 221 (1911). In our opinion, upon the facts stated, it cannot be held that the debtor ordinarily resides at Kharagpur. The term "resides" is not defined in the statute, but its ordinary interpretation is explained in the case of Kumud Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Jotindranath Chowdhury 13 C. L. J. 221 (1911). If the Respondent had ordinarily run his train from Dungagarh to Kharagpur, it might possibly have been contended with some show of reason that he resided in both places, it might also have been argued that he personally worked for gain at Dungagarh as well as at Kharagpur. But, as already stated, he runs his train, ordinarily from Dungagarh to Nagpur, and only occasionally from Dungagarh to Kharagpur. The mere fact that when at Kharagpur he stops with his son-in-law does not show that he resides at Kharagpur, much less can it be said that he ordinarily resides at Kharagpur. The language used in sub-sec. (2) of section 6 is identical with that of section 6 of statutes 46 and 47, Victoria, Chap. 52. With reference to the latter statute, it was ruled in the case of In re Erskine 10 T. L. R. 32 (1693) that a man who paid several visits to London during a period of more than a year, and who, when in London, had his bed-room in a lodging house where he slept could not be said to have ordinarily resided in London during the required period. That there may be room for difference of opinion in the application of the law to the facts of a particular case is illustrated by the decision in In re Norris 5 Mor. 111, where it was ruled that a foreigner who had a room at a hotel in London for about eighteen months before the presentation of petition and paid for the same continuously during that period had ordinarily resided in London during the required time. The tendency of Courts in this country as is illustrated by the decision in In re. Tietkins 1 B. L. R. O. C. 84 (1868) and In re Rampaul Singh 8 C. L. R. 14 (1884) has been to construe the expression "ordinarily resides" strictly. [See also In re. Cockburn 2 Ind. Jar. N. S. 326 (1867), In re Tarineychurn Guha 11 B. L. R. App. 26 (1873), Subramaniam v. Pichai [1911] 4 Bur. L. T. 81]. [See also In re. Cockburn 2 Ind. Jar. N. S. 326 (1867), In re Tarineychurn Guha 11 B. L. R. App. 26 (1873), Subramaniam v. Pichai [1911] 4 Bur. L. T. 81]. But whether the expression be strictly or liberally construed, upon the facts of this case, it is impossible for us to hold that the Respondent ordinarily resided at Kharagpur at the time of the presentation of the application for insolvency. It must further be remembered, as pointed out in In re Erskine 10 T. L. R. 32 (1893), that the burden is upon the Petitioner to establish that the Court to which he has presented his application has jurisdiction to entertain it. In the case before us, the Petitioner has failed to discharge that burden. We are not prepared to hold that the Petitioner ordinarily resides or personally works for gain at Kharagpur within the meaning of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 6. Consequently, the inference follows that the Court below had no jurisdiction to deal with this matter. We desire to add that we cannot accept as well-founded the argument advanced with considerable ingenuity by the learned Vakil for the Respondent that we should apply to this case the principle which underlies sec. 21 of the CPC of 1908, in view of the provisions of sec. 47, sub-sec. (1), of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Sub sec. (1) of sec. 47 provides that, subject to the provisions of the Act, the Court, in regard to proceedings under the Act, shall have the same powers and shall follow the same procedure as it has and follows in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction. But this section does not, directly or by implication, render sec. 21 of the CPC of 1908 applicable to proceedings under the Provincial Insolvency Act. Consequently, we cannot apply to these proceedings the doctrine that no objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate Court, unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. The question of jurisdiction is thus open for examination, and for the reasons assigned, must be decided against the Respondent. 2. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the order of the Court below discharged. The question of jurisdiction is thus open for examination, and for the reasons assigned, must be decided against the Respondent. 2. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the order of the Court below discharged. But the Respondent will be at liberty to present a fresh application under the Provincial Insolvency Act in a Court of competent jurisdiction. Under the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs either here or below.