JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal on behalf of the Plaintiffs in an action in ejectment. The land in dispute was originally held under the Plaintiffs by one Bhuban Mandal, who came into occupation in 1883. On the 2nd October 1888, Bhuban Mandal executed a permanent sub-lease in favour of the Defendant, whose occupation of the land had commenced from some time before. This lease was granted on the assumption that Bhuban Mandal was a tenure-holder. The document was consequently registered without objection. The property ultimately devolved on one Bhabini Dasi who made default in payment of rent to the Plaintiffs. The latter, as the superior landlords, thereupon obtained a decree for arrears of rent, and in execution thereof the tenancy was brought to sale and purchased by the Plaintiffs themselves on the 14th February 1907. The sale was confirmed on the 21st March following and symbolical possession was delivered to the Plaintiffs as purchasers on the 8th June 1907. The Plaintiffs were, however, unable to obtain actual possession, as the Defendant was in occupation. They thereupon caused a notice to be served upon him as required by sec. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Notwithstanding the service of notice, the Defendant refused to vacate the land. The Plaintiffs thereupon commenced this suit on the 12th March 1909, to eject the Defendant on the ground that his interest, if any, had been validly terminated, and ho was consequently liable to be ejected as a trespasser. The Court of first instance decreed the suit. Upon appeal that decree has been reversed by the Subordinate Judge. The Courts below have concurrently found that the tenancy held by Bhuban Mandal constituted an occupancy holding. It is clear therefore that the sub-lease granted by Bhuban Mandal to the Defendant on the 2nd October 1888 should not have been admitted to registration in view of the provisions of sub-sec. (2), of sec. 85, of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In fact, as the instrument purported to be a permanent sub-lease, it would not have been admitted to registration but for the fact that the land demised was described as comprised in a permanent tenure. It follows accordingly that the sub-lease so registered in contravention of the statute is not operative. This view is supported by the decision in Jarip Khan v. Dorfa Bewa 17 C. W. N. 59 (1912). It follows accordingly that the sub-lease so registered in contravention of the statute is not operative. This view is supported by the decision in Jarip Khan v. Dorfa Bewa 17 C. W. N. 59 (1912). It is plain that the question which was raised in the case of Manik Borai v. Bani Ch. Mandal 13 C. L. J. 649 (1910), namely, whether a sub-lease registered in contravention of the statute is operative as between the lessor and the lessee, does not consequently arise in the present case. Judicial opinion is unanimous to the effect that a sub-lease registered in contravention of the provisions of sec. 85, sub-sec. (2), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, is not operative against the superior landlord of the occupancy raiyat. We must therefore determine the rights of the parties on the footing that the Defendant did not acquire any title under the sub-lease of the 2nd October 1888. As already stated he was in occupation from before the 2nd October 1888 : his status, from the commencement of his tenancy, was accordingly that of an under raiyat. The question is, whether he has a sub-tenancy which is required to be annulled by the purchaser under cl. (a), of sec. 161, of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Now section 159 provides that when a holding is sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent due in respect thereof, the purchaser shall take it subject to the interests defined as protected interests, but. with power to annul those defined as encumbrances. It is argued on behalf of the Defendant that he has an interest which falls within the description of protected interest as also of an encumbrance. This contention requires consideration, because the Courts below have found that the notice under sec. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was not served upon the Defendant in accordance with law. If the notice had been served upon him, it would have become needless to consider, whether he held a sub-tenancy which had to be annulled as an encumbrance within the meaning of sec. 161; but it would have been necessary to determine whether he had a protected interest within the meaning of sec. 160. 2. Now in so far as sec. 161; but it would have been necessary to determine whether he had a protected interest within the meaning of sec. 160. 2. Now in so far as sec. 161 is concerned, the case for the Defendant is that he is an under-raiyat, independently of the invalid sub-lease of the 2nd October 1888, and that he has consequently a sub-tenancy within the meaning of sec. 161, cl. (a). It may be conceded that the term " any sub-tenancy " is, by itself, comprehensive " enough to include the interest of an under-raiyat. But the question arises, whether there is a sub-tenancy in so far as the plaintiffs are concerned, because the Plaintiffs are not only purchasers at the sale in execution of the decree for arrears of rent, they are also the superior landlords in respect of the occupancy holding which was brought to sale. Sec. 85, sub-sec. (l), provides that if a raiyat sublets, otherwise than by a registered instrument, the sub-lease shall not be valid as against the landlord, unless made with his consent. It has not yet been investigated, whether the Plaintiffs as landlords of the occupancy holdings consented to the grant of the sub-lease to the Defendant as an under-raiyat. But we shall assume, for the purposes of argument, that such consent was not given. If, then, the Defendant was inducted upon the land as an under-raiyat without the consent of the landlords of the occupancy-raiyat, it is plain that there is no sub-lease in his favour which is valid against the superior landlords. Consequently he does not hold any sub-tenancy which may be treated as an incumbrance within the meaning of cl. (ft) of sec. 161 as against the landlord auction-purchaser. The landlord auction-purchaser cannot, accordingly, be called upon to annul this sub-tenancy as an encumbrance. The view we take is in accord with that taken by this Court in the case of Peary Mohan v. Badal Chandra I. L. R. 28 Cal. 205 (1900). We do not pronounce any opinion upon a question which may hereafter arise, namely, as to the precise position of a stranger who purchases at a sale held in execution of a decree for arrears of rent. As regards the case now before us, it is sufficient to observe that sec. 205 (1900). We do not pronounce any opinion upon a question which may hereafter arise, namely, as to the precise position of a stranger who purchases at a sale held in execution of a decree for arrears of rent. As regards the case now before us, it is sufficient to observe that sec. 161 clearly is of no assistance to the Defendants, if it is assumed that his interest as under-raiyat was created without the consent of the landlord. 3. In so far as sec. 160 is concerned, reliance is placed by the Defendant on cl. (c) by which protection is afforded to any lease of land whereon dwelling houses, manufactories or other permanent buildings have been erected or permanent gardens, plantations, tanks, canals, places of worship or burning or burying grounds have been made. Here, again, precisely the same question arises as in the case of sec. 161. It cannot be reasonably contended that the Defendant has a lease of land within the meaning of cl. (c), sec. 160, when as against the Plaintiffs such lease is not valid, because not shown to have been made with their consent. Here, too, we reserve the question which may possibly hereafter arise as to the position of a stranger purchaser. But it is obvious that sec. 160 also is of no assistance to the Defendant. 4. It finally becomes necessary to determine whether sub-sec. (1) of sec. 85 applies to this case. The Courts below have not determined whether the land was sublet to the Defendant with the consent of the superior landlords of the occupancy raiyat. The determination of that question was unnecessary in view of the frame of the suit. The Plaintiffs as already explained sought to eject the Defendant on the ground that his interest had been annulled in accordance with the provisions of sec. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. That case has failed. Consequently the point just mentioned must be investigated. The learned Vakil for the Defendant has also contended that even if cl. (c) of sec. 160 be held inapplicable, the Defendant may still be able to establish that the Plaintiffs are estopped, by reason of their conduct, from seeking relief by way of ejectment, and. he has explained that the question of estoppel was not pointedly raised in view of the frame of the suit. (c) of sec. 160 be held inapplicable, the Defendant may still be able to establish that the Plaintiffs are estopped, by reason of their conduct, from seeking relief by way of ejectment, and. he has explained that the question of estoppel was not pointedly raised in view of the frame of the suit. We are of opinion that in these circumstances, the question of estoppel should be investigated. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decrees of the Courts below set aside and the case remanded to the Court of first instance in order that the Court may determine upon evidence to be adduced by the parties the following questions; namely, first, whether the Defendant was granted a tenancy as an under-raiyat with the consent of the landlord of his grantor, the occupancy-raiyat; and, secondly, whether the claim for ejectment is barred by the doctrine of estoppel. If it is found upon the first question that the sub-lease to the Defendant was granted with the consent of the Plaintiffs or their predecessors, or, if it is found upon the second question that the Plaintiffs are estopped by reason of their conduct, the suit will stand dismissed. If both the questions are decided against the Defendant the suit will stand decreed. Each party will pay his own costs in all the Courts up to the present stage.