JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. This was a suit for sale upon a mortgage executed by one Ghisa in favour of Behary Lal the predecessor-in-title of the appellants on January 10, 1895. On January 20, 1883, Ghisa executed a mortgage of a 21/2 biswansis share in favour of Behari Lal for Rs. 453/. On November 23, 1886, he mortgaged the same property to Bhawani Prasad and Fakir Chand for Rs. 400/-. This sum was paid to Behari Lal in partial discharge of his mortgage of January 20 1883, and a balance of Rs. 53/-, for principal, remained due on that mortgage. Adding to this sum of Rs. 53/- principal, interest up to January 10, 1895, Ghisa executed a mortgage in favour of Behary Lal for Rs. 177/-. In this mortgage the same property was hypothecated as also some additional property. This is the mortgage which the plaintiffs seek to enforce. Fakir Chand in whose favour the mortgage of November 25, 1886, was executed claimed priority over the plaintiff by reason of the date of his mortgage being earlier than the date of the mortgage on which the suit is based. The court of first instance overruled his plea and decreed the plaintiffs’ claim against all the defendants including Fakir Chand. On appeal by Fakir Chand the learned District Judge modified the decree of the court of first instance and held that Fakir Chand had priority, mainly on the ground that his mortgage was prior in date to the plaintiffs’ mortgage of January 10, 1895. We think that in so holding the learned Judge is in error. It is manifest that the mortgage of January 10, 1895, was executed in renewal of the mortgage of January 20, 1883, for the amount of balance due on that mortgage. In every case of this kind we have to see what was the intention of the parties. In some cases the fact of the mortgage-deed having been returned may be a circumstance which might justify a court in holding that the intention was to abandon the prior mortgage and to supersede it by a later mortgage. In every case of this kind we have to see what was the intention of the parties. In some cases the fact of the mortgage-deed having been returned may be a circumstance which might justify a court in holding that the intention was to abandon the prior mortgage and to supersede it by a later mortgage. But unless there are other circumstances from which an intention to abandon the prior mortgage can be gathered, since it is to the interests of the mortgagee to keep up his rights under the prior mortgage, it must be presumed that the mortgagee did not abandon the prior mortgage but kept it subsisting. In the present case there is nothing to justify the inference that the mortgagee gave up his rights under the prior mortgage. When it Fakir Chand took a mortgage of the property which was already mortgaged to the plaintiffs’ predecessor, Behari Lal, he was aware that a mortgage of the amount secured by the deed of January 20, 1883, still remained due. So that he clearly took a mortgage of the same property subject to the prior mortgage. It could not be the intention of Behari Lal, the prior mortgagee, to abandon his rights under that mortgage, when after the mortgage of Fakir Chand and Bhawani Prasad, the first mortgage was renewed by the mortgage of January 10, 1895. The authority on which the learned Judge relies, when carefully read, so far from supporting his view shows the contrary. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and restore that of the court of first instance with costs in all courts. We extend the time for payment of the mortgage money for a period of four months from this date.