JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal by the Plaintiff in a proceeding under sec. 105A of the Bengal Tenancy Act for settlement of fair rent. The application was refused by the Court of first instance and that order has been affirmed on appeal by the Special Judge. The facts are not in controversy and may be briefly recited. The area in respect of which the Plaintiff claims to be the tenant under the Defendants and to have fair rent assessed was originally included in a village owned by one Bykuntha Nath Kar and several other persons. On the 27th March 1900, Bykuntha Nath Kar granted an amalnama in favour of the Plaintiff which covered amongst other lands in area of 8 acres. It was stated that the land was partly jungle and partly waste and that it was necessary to settle it with the grantee for the purposes of reclamation and improvement. The land was joint property, but no objection was apparently taken by any of the co-sharers of the grantor of the settlement made by him. The grantee entered into occupation and has reclaimed the land. Shortly after the settlement, a partition suit was commenced amongst the proprietors. During the pendency of this suit at one stage it seemed that the land now in dispute might fall to the share of one of the proprietors (Kashinath Kar). The Appellant in 1906 in order to protect her right took a lease from Kashinath. But ultimately when partition was completed in 1908, it was found that 58 acres fell into the share of Kashinath and other proprietors with whom we are not at present concerned and 26 acres fell into the share of the present Defendants-Respondents. In the settlement proceeding the Plaintiff was recorded as the tenant in respect of the entire area. In so far as Kashinath and his co-sharers are concerned, there has been no difficulty as they have accepted the Plaintiff as their tenant. In the settlement proceeding the Plaintiff was recorded as the tenant in respect of the entire area. In so far as Kashinath and his co-sharers are concerned, there has been no difficulty as they have accepted the Plaintiff as their tenant. But in so far as the Respondents are concerned, they have refused to treat the Plaintiff as their tenant, and when the present proceeding was commenced by the Plaintiff for ascertainment of fair rent payable by her, the Defendants took exception on the ground that she was not their tenant and no rent could be assessed in respect of the land with regard to which the relationship of landlord and tenant did not subsist between the parties. The Courts below have concurrently held that the Plaintiff is not the tenant of the Defendants in respect of this land and is consequently not entitled to have fair rent assessed. In our opinion, this view cannot possibly be maintained. On behalf of the Defendants, it has been contended that the lease from Kashinath Kar granted in 1906 superseded the amalnama and that the lease itself was inoperative, because it was granted during the pendency of the partition suit. There is clearly no force in this contention. The lease was never intended to supersede the amalnama, if it should turn out in the end that the lease itself was an invalid document. The Appellant obviously intended to strengthen her position and to protect herself from the attack of the cosharers other than Bykuntha Nath Kar, into whose hands the superior interest might pass. It has not been disputed that effect cannot be given to this lease as in was executed during the pendency of the partition suit. The Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to fall back upon the. amalnama. The question therefore arises, what were her rights under the amalnama. On behalf of the Defendants, it has been argued that it created title in her only to the extent of the interest of Bykuntha Nath Kar. We are of opinion that this contention is entirely unfounded. No doubt, he was one of the co-sharer landlords. The land however was waste and uncultivated. He had taken possession of the land apparently without any protest by his co-sharers and in the ordinary course of management of the estate he settled the land with the Plaintiff for the purpose of reclamation. No doubt, he was one of the co-sharer landlords. The land however was waste and uncultivated. He had taken possession of the land apparently without any protest by his co-sharers and in the ordinary course of management of the estate he settled the land with the Plaintiff for the purpose of reclamation. That this was a prudent act of management cannot be disputed and that view is confirmed by the circumstance that, for a period of more than ten years, not one amongst the co-sharers of Bykuntha Nath made any attempt to repudiate his action. Under these circumstances the principle of the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Watson v. Ram Chund ILR 18 Cal. 10 (1890), clearly applies. As their Lordships observed, in India a large proportion of the lands including very many large estates is held in undivided shares, and if one shareholder can restrain another from cultivating a portion of the estate in a proper and husbandlike manner, the whole estate may, by means of cross-injunctions, have to remain altogether without cultivation until all the shareholders can agree upon a mode of cultivation to be adopted or until a partition by metes and bounds can be effected--a work which in ordinary course in large estates would probably occupy a period including many seasons. In such a case, in a climate like that of India, land which had been brought into cultivation would probably become waste or jungle and greatly deteriorate! in value. It is further clear that the position of the Plaintiff is not worse than what it would have been, if she had in good faith accepted settlement from a trespasser in actual occupation of the land. In that event it is clear that she would have attained the status of a raiyat [Binod Lal v. Kalu ILR 20 Cal. 708(1893) and Mohima Chundra v. Hazari Pramanik ILR 17 Cal. 45 (1889)]. Eeliance, however, has been placed on behalf of the Defendants upon the case of liadha Proshad v. Esup I.L. R. 7 Cal. 414 (1881), which is clearly distinguishable. In the first place, that was not the case of agricultural land. 708(1893) and Mohima Chundra v. Hazari Pramanik ILR 17 Cal. 45 (1889)]. Eeliance, however, has been placed on behalf of the Defendants upon the case of liadha Proshad v. Esup I.L. R. 7 Cal. 414 (1881), which is clearly distinguishable. In the first place, that was not the case of agricultural land. In the second place, Sir Eichard Garth, C. J., laid down that when a tenant had been put into possession of joint property with the consent of all the co-sharers, no one or more of the co-sharers can turn the tenant out and without the consent of the others. But no man has a right to intrude upon the joint property against the will of the co-sharers or of any of them; if he does so, he may be ejected without notice either altogether, if all the co-sharers join in the suit, or partially if only some of the co-sharers wish to eject him. In the case before us, there is no suggestion that the Plaintiff came into occupation of this land against the will of the co-sharer of Bykuntha Nath Kar. On the other hand, they acquiesced in the occupation of the Plaintiff and in the reclamation of the land by her at considerable cost for a number of years, and it is only when the land has been reclaimed that two of the co-sharers turn round and contend that the Plaintiff has not attained the status of a tenant in so far as the lands allotted to' their shares are concerned. We are of opinion that this contention is wholly unjust and cannot be allowed to prevail. 2. The result therefore is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the District Judge set aside and the case remanded to the Court of first instance in order that fair rent may be assessed in respect of this land. The Plaintiff is entitled to pay costs throughout this litigation. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at two gold mohurs.