JUDGMENT Chaudhuri, J. - This is an application by the Plaintiff for an order supplemental to the decree passed in this suit that he may recover against the Defendant, the judgment-debtor, the sum of Rs. 4,355-56 and subsequent interest and costs by attachment of properties outside jurisdiction all though he has obtained a mortgage decree against the Defendant upon a mortgage of Calcutta property executed by him securing this amount. The Plaintiff instituted the mortgage suit on the 20th January 1911. The preliminary mortgage decree was made on the 11th August 1911. The Registrar took an account and reported on the 20th February 1912 that Rs. 4,355 5 6 would be due to the Petitioner on the 13th September, then next but now past, and appointed the 14th September for payment of the amount. The judgment-debtor did not pay the amount on the date fixed. The Petitioner states that he has been informed that one Hair Narain Gangly, an infant, as Plaintiff in Suit No. 158 of 1912 of this Court, has obtained a declaration that No. 9/1, Shikdar Began Street, the mortgaged d property does not belong to the mortgagor. This decree was obtained exparte and his apprehension is that he may be involved in an expensive title suit to get the benefit of his decree. He, therefore, applies for leave to transfer this decree, that is to say, to treat the decree as a money decree for the amount and take it to the Bewares Court to execute it against other properties belonging to the mortgagor without: exhausting, in the first instance, his remedies against the mortgaged properties. He does not wish to relinquish his remedies against the mortgaged properties, but says that in order to save the costs of an expensive litigation he has been advised to make the present application. It is contended on his behalf that a mortgage decree is also a money decree, that it is always a money decree, that in England a mortgagee is entitled to pursue all his remedies open to him and that there is nothing in the Transfer of Property Act or the CPC which militates against his getting an order in the form he applies for. He relies upon the case of Hart v. Tata Prasamia Mukherjee I. L. R. 11 Cal. 718 (1836) that a decree of this kind is a money decree. He relies upon the case of Hart v. Tata Prasamia Mukherjee I. L. R. 11 Cal. 718 (1836) that a decree of this kind is a money decree. That was a case before Mr. Justice Tottenham and Mr. Justice Agnew. The judgment was delivered by Mr. Justice Agnew and was based upon the construction of the words "money decree" under sec. 295 of the CPC of 1882, now sec. 73. So far as the expression " money decree" or '' a decree for payment of money" is concerned divergent views have been held by the Courts in India. A great deal of the divergence is due to attempts to interpret the words, taking them out of the context of the sections required to be interpreted The view taken by the two learned Judges I have mentioned was not accepted in the case of Fasil Howladar v. Krishna Bandhoo Roy I. L. R. 25 Cal. 580 (1897). That was a case in which sec. 230 of the CPC of 1882, now Or. XXI, r. 10 and r. 21, came up for interpretation. Sir Francis Maclean, C. J., held in that case that where the decree directed the realisation of the decretal amount from the hypothecated property and if such property proved insufficient, then the balance from the Defendant personally, it was a " mortgage decree '' and not a " decree for the payment of money " within the meaning of sec. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Lal Behary Singha v. Habibur Rahman I. L. R 26 Cal 166 (1898)., Ghose and Rampini, JJ., held that where in a suit for recovery of the mortgage money by sale, brought after the Transfer of Property Act (IV of (1882) had come into force, the decree of the Court was in the words '' that a decree be passed in favour of the Plaintiffs in respect of the sun mentioned; with interest and costs up to the date of realisation and that the mortgaged properties be made liable for realisation of the decretal money,' such a decree was to be regarded as a "mortgage decree" governed by the Transfer of Properly Act, though not made, in the form prescribed by that Act. They held on page 171 Reviewing the cases that in their view the decree in questions was to be regarded as a 'mortgage decree governed by the Transfer of Properly Ac, and that it followed that it was not open to the decree-holder to ask in the first instance for the sale of properties other than the properties mortgaged before exhausting the mortgaged properties and without obtaining an order such as was prescinded by sec. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the case of Kartick Nath Pandey v. Juggnnath Ram Marwati (I.L. R. 27 Gal. 285 (1899)', Mr. Justice Rampini and Mr. justice Pratt held upon the construction of sec. 230 of the CPC that the decree in that suit was a mortgage decree and not a decree for money. Their Lordships differed from the view taken in the Madras High Court in the case of Kommachi Kather v. Pakket I. L. R 20 Mad. 107 (1890)., which was the basis of the subsequent Full Bench case, Vaidhinadasamy Ayyat v. Somasundram Pillai I. L. R 28 Mad 473 (1904). There is, however, very clear authority that, ordinarily speaking, a person who has obtained a mortgage decree should not be allowed to execute the decree against other properties without exhausting his remedies under his security and decree. In the case of Gopal Das v. Alt' Mohammed I. L. R. 10 All. 632 (1888), Mr. Justice Straight held upon the constriction of sees. 88, 89, and 90 of the Transfer of Properly Act, that under the law; as it stood a mortgagee with a decree for sale of the mortgaged property could not be allowed to treat such decree as one for money which entitled him to ask for attachment of the other property of the mortgagor judgment-debtor. He held, the statue meant and said that he must first sell the mortgaged property and if it did not realise enough to pay his charge, interest and costs he might ask the Court for a decree for the balance if it was recoverable personally from the Defendant and his other property and execute it in the ordinary manner as a uuney decree. Although there are certain case in the Allahabad Court in which the have held that if a p. arson holding a mortgage decree in execution of such a decree sells a portion of the mortgaged properties and releases the rest he may, under the provision of the sec ion quoted, apply for a further decree in respect of the property. The same view has not been taken in this Court. I am referring to the case of Ram Ranjan Chakrabartty v. India Natain Dass 10 C. W. N. 862 : s. c. I. L. R. 33 CaL 890 (1906).There it was held that the sale contemplated by sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act was the sale of the whole or of a sufficient. portion of the mortgaged property, that a personal decree under sec. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act can only be made where the net proceeds of the sale (sec. 89) are insufficient to pay the amount due on the mortgage, the: a mortgagee may release a portion of the mortgaged property from the deb. but he cannot by doing so impose upon the mortgagor a personal liability to which otherwise he would no. be subject and in that view they held that the mortgagor was entitled to claim to have the mortgaged property sold before a decree could be passed against him under sec. 90. In this case the applicant desires to preserve the mortgage decree in this Court and says that he is entitled to execute that decree at Benares as a money decree or have a supplement al decree made in his favour in which the Defendant is to be directed to pay the decretal amount in the shape of an ordinary money decree keeping his mortgage decree alive in this Court for all purposes Although lie says that he is not going to take any steps in this Court upon the mortgage decree until he has exhausted lies remedies in the Benares Court, I do not thick that that course is open to him. There is clear provision in the Code that whey a person holding a mortgage gets a decree against the Defendant not in respect of the mortgaged property, before be can bang the mortgaged promptly to sale, he must do so by a suit. There is clear provision in the Code that whey a person holding a mortgage gets a decree against the Defendant not in respect of the mortgaged property, before be can bang the mortgaged promptly to sale, he must do so by a suit. If lie course suggested by the applicant was allowed, the provisions of that section might be nullified. There may be exceptional cases where a perse n may be permited to relinquish this mortgage dicree and proceed upon the personal covenant, bay: this is not a case of that character. I find that in dealing with this point, Dr. Ghose in his book on Mortagor sadist page 716, 3rd Edition:-''What the mortgagor really wants in this country is not that the mortgaged property should not be sold except under a ducted absolute for sale but that the mortgage should not be allowed to levy execution on other properties without first exhausting his security." I agree with this view and disallow the application.