JUDGMENT Harington, J. - This is an Appeal by the Plaintiff against the judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Muzafferpur in a suit for possession of certain land. The Plaintiff claimed as the reversionary heir of the last full owner and his claim was resisted on the ground that the lands in question had been dedicated to the maintenance and worship of certain idols. The property in question formerly belonged to Babu Kamla Prosad Narain Singh. He died in the year 1874 leaving a son and heir named Dwarka Prosad Narain Singh and his widow Musstt. Ram Nundan Koer surviving him. Dwarka Prosad Singh died while yet a child in the year 1876, and his mother then succeeded as his heiress to the property in question. In the year 1897 she executed a deed of endowment in respect of the property in question. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the deed executed by the lady was a bond fide endowment of the land for religious purposes but he thought that she had exceeded her powers in alienating so large a proportion of the property she had inherited for this purpose. He therefore gave the Plaintiff a decree for a moiety of the land which was the subject of the suit. In appeal before us it has been contended that on the Judge's own finding the decree in favour of the Defendants cannot stand, because having found that she had exceeded her powers in making the endowment that she did he should have held that the entire settlement was void, and should not have made a settlement which was other than the settlement made by the lady. It has also been contended that the endowment was an illusory transaction and that the real object of the lady was under the cloak of religious endowment to benefit some of her favourite retainers out of the property which ought to go to the reversionary heir of her deceased son. Lastly, it is contended that even if the settlement be treated as a genuine endowment for religious purpose, then the lady had no power to alienate the family properly for such a purpose. 2. Now the first question to be considered is one of fact, namely, was this a genuine endowment or was it merely an illusory transaction. Lastly, it is contended that even if the settlement be treated as a genuine endowment for religious purpose, then the lady had no power to alienate the family properly for such a purpose. 2. Now the first question to be considered is one of fact, namely, was this a genuine endowment or was it merely an illusory transaction. The deed itself which was executed on the 29th of July 1897 is a registered document. It recites that there was a temple of Mohadeo Ji constructed by the widow of one Ganga Persad, an ancester of the executant and that of her husband. In the said temple an image of Mohadeo Ji had been set up by that widow. There was another temple containing the images of Ram Janki, Jogannath Ji and Mohabir Ji constructed by Babu Jagdeo Narayan Singh, her husband's ancestor, and that the images have been placed within the compound of the temple of Luchmi Narain Ji. It is stated that services were managed by her husband during his life-time as she has done since his death, and that her husband constructed a stone temple and gave her verbal permission to set up an image of Luchmi Narain and to dedicate under a deed of endowment a portion of the landed property. She then goes on to make the endowment in favour of Luchmi Narain Ji, Ram Janki Ji, Mohabir Ji and Mohadeo Ji of the land now subject of dispute. The management of the temples is vested in Ram Gopal Achari. To supervise the management nine Punches are appointed. Their duties are to take accounts from the Mohunt and to test the propriety or otherwise of the expenses with power to allow or disallow them. They are empowered if the Mohunt misconducts himself to appoint another person in his place. After his death, the lady provides that all the income from the dedicated property is to be in the hands of Sripat Raot and on his death his son is to succeed him as custodian of the collection money. If Sripat Raot or his heir misappropriate any of the money, the same is to be recovered from their person and property. Sripat and his successor are to receive their food and Rs. 5 a month. Provision is then made for recital of Mahabharat and Panchratnam, and Paramdhar Misser is appointed Pujari with a salary of Rs. If Sripat Raot or his heir misappropriate any of the money, the same is to be recovered from their person and property. Sripat and his successor are to receive their food and Rs. 5 a month. Provision is then made for recital of Mahabharat and Panchratnam, and Paramdhar Misser is appointed Pujari with a salary of Rs. 10 a month. The power to appoint and dismiss a servant is vested in the Mohunt. But he is expressly disabled from appointing any person as Pujari in the place of Paramdhar Misser. These are the principal provisions of the deed of endowment. 3. It is argued on behalf of the Appellant that this is really only a cloak to benefit Sripat Raot and Paramdhar Misser. All the money from the endowment which amounted to a sum of Rs. 2,000 a year was to go into the hands of Sripat Raot who is irremoveable even if he misappropriates the fund. The evidence for the Plaintiff is that the actual cost of maintaining the idols and temples was from three to four hundred rupees a year. This was not questioned in cross examination. Nor was it contradicted unless contradiction can be inferred from the statement of two of the witnesses that the income of the dedicated properties Was spent on the endowment. These witnesses were not cross-examined as to the extent of the income that was so spent. 4. On the other side it is contended that it was the duty of the lady to endow the temple which her husband had built, that the appointment of the Punches showed that the lady had taken care that the administration of the endowment should be under an efficient supervision, and that Sripat Raot is an old trusted servant and was nothing more than a custodian of the fund under the supervision of responsible people. 5. In reply to the argument, it is pointed out that out of the nine Punches four have disclaimed having anything to do with the endowment in question. Some, in their written statements, have alleged that they had been appointed without their knowledge. The one of the Punches who has in his written statement not disclaimed his connection with the endowment says that he never had any opportunity to supervise. Sripat says that he has got no money and has made no collection. Some, in their written statements, have alleged that they had been appointed without their knowledge. The one of the Punches who has in his written statement not disclaimed his connection with the endowment says that he never had any opportunity to supervise. Sripat says that he has got no money and has made no collection. It is contended, therefore, that the provision as to supervision is quite illusory and that when the evidence comes to be examined it is quite clear that the provisions in the deed were not acted on between the death of the lady in 1904 and the institution of the suit in 1907. Not only did the Punches not supervise but the Mohunt himself appears never to have carried out the duties of that office though he says he may have visited the temple 7 or 8 times after the lady's death and looked at the accounts, but did not sign them. He says that he carried out the duties of the Mohunt by his muktear, Saraswati Persad. The muktearnama has been produced and it is a little curious to observe that while the muktear is given very ample authority with reference to conducting suits and doing other business in Civil, Criminal and Revenue Courts there is no mention of these particular temples and there is no authority to him to perform the duties of the Mohunt with reference to the management of the property of this particular endowment. It is quite clear, I think, that the provisions of the deed of endowment which by the way were only known to the Mohunt, two years after the execution of the document, were in fact not carried into effect. I am unable to agree with the learned Judge in the Court of first instance in thinking that the document represents a bond fide transaction. 6. The learned Judge does not believe that the lady received any authority from her husband to establish the idols, as is recited in the deed of dedication and he gives good reasons for not believing the evidence on that point. But nevertheless he finds that the deed is a bond fide one, because he thinks it is likely that the lady would make provisions for family idols. But nevertheless he finds that the deed is a bond fide one, because he thinks it is likely that the lady would make provisions for family idols. With great respect to the learned Judge he does not seem to me to have considered the weight to be attached to the circumstance that Punches did not know that they were appointed to supervise and had not consented to their appointment and to the fact that during the three years which elapsed between the lady's death and the suit, the terms of the deed of endowment were not carried out. It is very difficult when considering these circumstances and having regard to the great disproportion between the costs of the maintenance of the endowment and the amount of the money which was allocated to it under the settlement to come to the conclusion that it was really a genuine transaction. In any view the evidence on behalf of the Defendants does not meet the points I have referred to. I do not believe that the endowment is anything but an illusory transaction. 7. The next question to be considered is whether assuming the endowment to be a bond fide settlement of property for religious purposes the lady had any power to make such a settlement. 8. There are certain facts which it is important to bear in mind in considering the law on the subject. The first is that none of the idols were installed and none of the temples built by the person to whose property the lady succeeded. No idol was installed by her husband; he had built a temple. It must be taken that he did not authorise installation of any idol in that temple. There is no evidence that he intended to set up an idol: the temple may have been built for the idols which had been relegated to the compound of Luchmi Narain Ji. The other temples had been built and the idols established either by a widow of an ancestor or by the ancestors of the lady's deceased husband. These persons had not thought it necessary to execute any endowment for the maintenance of their idols. The other temples had been built and the idols established either by a widow of an ancestor or by the ancestors of the lady's deceased husband. These persons had not thought it necessary to execute any endowment for the maintenance of their idols. Then the other fact which is to be borne in mind is that the lady succeeded not as a widow and heiress to her deceased husband but as mother and heiress to her deceased son : and there appears to be no authority for saying that a mother and heiress takes any greater estate by inheritance than that taken by a widow as heiress. Indeed it was not contested in the course of the argument that whether an heiress takes as mother, daughter or widow the estate she takes is a restricted one. The onus, therefore, in any opinion lies on those who allege that this lady had the power to alienate the property she inherited from her deceased son to show that she had that power under the Hindu Law. 9. Now the cases that were cited to us as showing the powers of alienation vested in an heiress were cases with reference to the powers of the widow. Reliance was placed on the case of Lukhi Narain v. Kubali 1 Borradaile's Rep. 612.. It was decided in 1817 and contains this answer from the Shastras: " that the Respondent as widow of the brother's son, was at liberty to sell the two houses for the purpose of defraying his funeral expenses or paying his debts, but not otherwise, though she might at pleasure sell them with any good and religious object in view." It is a little difficult to see what is the precise meaning of this answer unless it means that good and religious object means something ejusdem generis with defraying funeral expenses and paying debts. If that be the interpretation it tells against the Respondents because it could not be inferred from it that the lady would have power to alienate the property to endow an idol. If that be the interpretation it tells against the Respondents because it could not be inferred from it that the lady would have power to alienate the property to endow an idol. Other authorities were cited, particularly the case referred to in the judgment of the Court of the first instance, The Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavelly Venkata Narayanappa 8 M.I.A. 500 (1867), which laid down that " for religious or charitable purposes or those which are supposed to conduce to the spiritual welfare of her husband, she, i.e., the widow, has a larger power of disposition than that which she possesses for purely worldly purposes." Putting the result of the cases at its highest in favour of alienation by the lady it would seem that she had only a very limited power of alienating property for religious purposes and that only when it would conduce to the spiritual welfare of her deceased husband. That may be placed upon the principle to be found in the text of Brihaspati, which is quoted by the learned Subordinate Judge and indicates how amongst the Hindus, the wife is regarded as half her husband, and it may be that it is this intimate relation which enabled her to use his property for purposes which have been held amongst the Hindus to be beneficial to his spiritual welfare. But there does not seem to be any authority for the proposition that the installation of an idol and the endowment of its temple come within the category of acts which conduce to the spiritual benefits of the deceased husband. On the other hand, there is one direct authority to the contrary in the case of Kartik Chandra v. Gour Mohan 1 W. R. 48 (1864), in which it is laid down that a Hindu widow cannot endow an idol with her husband's property or a portion thereof to the detriment of the reversioners. The decision which has the great authority of Shambu Nath Pundit, J., rests on the ground that such a dedication could only be supposed to conduce to the spiritual benefit of the widow herself who had made the gift without her husband's consent. The decision which has the great authority of Shambu Nath Pundit, J., rests on the ground that such a dedication could only be supposed to conduce to the spiritual benefit of the widow herself who had made the gift without her husband's consent. There is a later case reported in Ram Kawal v. Ram Kishore I. L. R. 22 Cal 506 (1895) in which it was held that when an idol was established by the mother of a deceased man his widow could not make an alienation of a substantial portion of the property for the purpose of endowing that idol. It does appear, however, from the judgment that the Judges thought that a very small portion of the property might possibly be alienated for endowing an idol of the husband. These two cases seem to be the only ones that have a direct bearing on the subject. They are destructive of the view taken by the learned Judge in the Court below, assuming it to be correct to say that a mother and heiress has no greater power than a widow and heiress. 10. There is no text that has been cited to us which places the mother as heiress of her son in the same close and intimate position in which a widow is placed as heiress to her husband. I should infer from that that her powers to conduce to the spiritual welfare of the son were less than those of a widow to promote the spiritual benefit of her husband. 11. Moreover, as in this case the idol was established by the lady without the authority of her husband, the maintenance of it would conduce only to her spiritual benefit and for that purpose she would not be entitled to alienate the property inherited by her from her deceased son. 12. In the view I take of the case it is unnecessary to consider the other question which is argued. 13. I am unable to agree with the learned Judge in the Court below in his decision either as to the bond fides of the transaction or as to the power of the lady. In the absence of any authority to show that a mother and heiress has power to deal with the property as this lady has done, I think it would he unsafe to hold that such power exists under the Hindu law. 14. In the absence of any authority to show that a mother and heiress has power to deal with the property as this lady has done, I think it would he unsafe to hold that such power exists under the Hindu law. 14. For these reasons I think that the Appeal should be allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower Court set aside and the suit decreed with costs. The Plaintiff will be entitled to mesne profits and the suit must be remanded to the Court of first instance that the amount may be ascertained and a decree made therefor. Carnduff, J. I agree with Mr. Justice Harington.