JUDGMENT : RAFIQ, J. This is an application in revision from an order of the District Magistrate of Etah passed under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It appears that one Sulaiman Shiko Gardner was the original proprietor of Mauza Pachgain in the Etah district. He executed a deed of usufructuary mortgage in respect of that village on March 9, 1867, in favour of the grandfather of Lalta Prasad in lieu of Rs. 25,000. One of the conditions of the mortgage was that the mortgagee was to pay Rs. 2,070 per annum to the mortgagor as malikana allowance. In 1883 Gardner executed a deed of sale in respect of the equity of redemption of Mauza Pachgain in favour of Raja Shankar Singh of Kasganj. Beni Ram and Janki Prasad of Hathras had a simple money decree against Raja Shankar Singh for about a lac of rupees which was purchased by the Raja of Awa. The latter put the said decree into execution and the entire property of Raja Shankar Singh was sold and purchased by the Raja of Awa and Raja Khushal Pal Singh of Agra. The sale took place after the death of Raja Shankar Singh and the proceedings were held against his sons named Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh. They contested the validity of the sale and the case came up in appeal to this Court. The sale was set aside on a compromise between the parties. On May 21, 1912, in accordance with the decree of this Court, possession of the property sold was restored to Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh through the Amin of the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh. By mistake possession over Mauza Pachgain was also proclaimed by the Amin of the court in favour of Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh. Ten days after that proclamation, on May 31, 1912, Lalta Prasad presented an application to the District Magistrate of Etah complaining that the men of Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh had taken possession of his “zilla house” in Pachgain and were attempting to collect rents Another application was made by Lalta Prasad on June 7, 1912, to the Magistrate complaining of the disobedience of Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh to the [oral orders given to the latter by the Magistrate, on receiving the application of May 31. 1912, to desist from interfering with the possession of Lalta Prasad and asking for police guards. 1912, to desist from interfering with the possession of Lalta Prasad and asking for police guards. 2. Both the applications were dismissed by the Magistrate. On June 8, 1912. Lalta Prasad presented an application under Order 21, Rule 100, of the Civil Procedure Code, to the Assistant Judge of Aligarh, who had the powers of a Subordinate Judge, asking for the restoration of possession against Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh. The learned Judge dismissed the application on the ground that the possession of the applicant had not been disturbed by either the decree-holder or the purchaser. On July 8, 1912, Lalta Prasad made a similar application to the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh who admitted that a mistake had been made in May 1912 in proclaiming the possession of Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh without any qualification. He accordingly directed that a fresh proclamation should be made, and it was made by the Amin on the spot, that the possession of the two brothers, Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh, was that of mortgagors only. On September 3, 1912, Pershadi Lal, Karinda of Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh, filed a complaint under section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code against Lalta Prasad. On September 12, 1912, Lalta Prasad filed a counter-complaint against his opponents and their servants. Towards the end of October and the beginning of November, while the collections of the Khar if rents were in progress the situation became critical. Each side attempted to prevent the other from collecting rents and many tenants sent their rents by money orders to the Collector. Thereupon the latter started proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Both parties produced evidence as regards their possession, each claiming to be in possession. The learned District Magistrate found that Lalta Prasad was in actual possession and directed Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh not to disturb or to interfere with his possession. Sheoraj Singh and Maharaj Singh have come up in revision to this Court and challenge the order of the learned District Magistrate. A preliminary objection is taken on behalf of Lalta Prasad to the effect that no revision lies from the order complained of, nor can this Court interfere with the order under section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act of 1861. In support of this contention the case of Jhungar Singh v. Ram Partap,[1909] I.L.R., 31 All, 150 is relied upon. In support of this contention the case of Jhungar Singh v. Ram Partap,[1909] I.L.R., 31 All, 150 is relied upon. The learned counsel for the applicant meets the objection by contending that the learned District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to start proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The contention is based on the ground that Lalta Prasad himself had admitted in his applications to the District Magistrate, the Assistant Judge and the Subordinate Judge of Aligarh, that he (Lalta Prasad) had been dispossessed in May 1912. And as the proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code were not instituted till November 1912, more than two months after the admitted dispossession of Lalta Prasad, they were taken without jurisdiction. I do not think that the question of jurisdiction arises in the case. The jurisdiction, of a Magistrate to initiate proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not determined by the date of dispossession of one of the parties claiming the land. It is determined by an apprehension, based on reliable information, that a dispute-likely to cause a breach of the peace exists between two partied concerning some land situate within the local limits of the Magistrate's jurisdiction. What the learned counsel really means is that as on the applications of Lalta Prasad himself he had been dispossessed, though wrongfully, more than two months prior to the institution of the proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate should not have found in Lalta Prasad's favour on the question of possession. The argument is based on the proviso to clause (4) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which is to the effect that if a party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months of the order of the Magistrate calling upon the disputants to put in written statements of their respective claims as to the fact of actual possession of the land in dispute, the Magistrate may treat the party so dispossessed as if he had been in possession at the date of the order. The proviso merely recites a circumstance under which presumption of possession may be made in favour of one of the disputants. It does not debar the Magistrate from deciding the question of actual possession on other grounds also. The proviso merely recites a circumstance under which presumption of possession may be made in favour of one of the disputants. It does not debar the Magistrate from deciding the question of actual possession on other grounds also. In any case a Magistrate does not act without jurisdiction if he decides the question of actual possession on grounds other than the presumption referred to in clause (4) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. I think the preliminary objection taken by the opposite party must prevail. I allow it and dismiss the application.