JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, J. This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff claimed to redeem a mortgage dated 10th March 1872. The court of first instance decreed the plaintiff's claim in part. The lower appellate court modified that decree and allowed the plaintiff to redeem the entire mortgage. On second appeal to this court the decision of the lower appellate court was confirmed. The facts appear very fully in the judgment of the lower appellate court. The mortgage is proved to have been made by one Maula Bux in favour of Raunaq Ali. The mortgage was usufructuary. Maula Bux left a widow, a daughter and two sons. The mortgagee transferred his rights to one Ewaz Ali. The sons of Maula Bux were at first no parties to the suit. The plaintiff's allegation was that Maula Bux had transferred all his rights in the mortgaged property to his widow and his daughter and that the widow and daughter had transferred the rights, so acquired by them, to him. Had the plaintiff been able to establish that he had so acquired the rights of Maula Bux, he would no doubt be entitled to redeem the entire property. To prove his title however he had to prove by secondary evidence the execution of two deeds from Maula Bux toms widows and daughter. It was admitted that these documents had never been registered. The appellants contended in the loner appellate court and in the second appeal to this court and also in the present appeal, that the interest of Maula Bux could not be transferred to his widow and his daughter except by a duly registered deed. We think that this contention is well founded. We have already mentioned that the mortgage in favour of Raunaq Ali was usufructuary. All that Maula Bux had left in him after the mortgage had been executed was the right to redeem this mortgage The right, in our opinion, came within the meaning of the expression “other intangible thing” in the second clause of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. In our opinion it certainly was not “tangible immoveable property”, within the meaning of those expressions in the Transfer of Property Act, possession of which could be given to the transferee. In our opinion it certainly was not “tangible immoveable property”, within the meaning of those expressions in the Transfer of Property Act, possession of which could be given to the transferee. In our opinion therefore the plaintiff failed to prove that he had acquired any of the rights of the widow and daughter of Maula Bux except such rights as they acquired as some of the heirs of Maula Bux. This would also seem to have been the view of the learned Judge of this Court but he considered that it was unnecessary to go into this particular question, holding, as he did, that the plaintiff had acquired some part of the equity of redemption in the property and was therefore entitled to redeem the whole mortgage on behalf of himself and the other persons entitled. 2. We think the learned Judge overlooked the fact that the appellants had acquired the interest of the sons of Maula Bux. It is true that this interest was so acquired by the appellants after the suit. But the sons of Maula Bux were not originally parties. They were necessary parties on the assumption that Maula Bux had not transferred his interest to his wife and daughter. The sons were then made parties but meantime the appellants had acquired their interest. 3. We think for these reasons the appeal should be allowed. The judgment of the first court is correct but the decree has been wrongly drawn up. The general form has been used without due attention to the necessary change of words to be used in the case of a usufructuary mortgage. The office in drawing up the decree will correct this error. 4. We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of this court and also of the lower appellate court and restore he decree of the court of first instance after the error to which we have called attention has been corrected. The appellants will have the costs of both hearings in this court and also in the lower appellate court.