JUDGMENT 1. The first ground taken in Appeal is the ground of limitation. It appears that the Plaintiff instituted a case under sec. 278 of the old CPC on the 24th January 1902 preferring a claim to the property in dispute. On the 8th February 1902 the case under sec. 278 was "dismissed for" "absence". The present suit was filed on the 4th June 1909. It is contended that article 11 of the Limitation Act applies and that Plaintiff's suit is barred, inasmuch as it was not instituted within one year of the date of the order passed under sec. 281 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are of opinion that the order "dismissed for absence "was an order passed not under sec. 281, C. P. C., but under the sees, of the Code which enabled the Court to dismiss a miscellaneous case for default. We are confirmed in this view by the Rolling of this Court in the case reported in Sarat Chandra v. Tarini Prasad I. L. R. 34 Cal. 491 (1907), which Settled that Art. 11 of the Limitation Act applies only in respect to orders passed after enquiry. It is true that that case related to proceedings under sec. 335 of the Code. We are unable to distinguish proceedings instituted under sec. 278 and cases under sec. 335 of the Code in this connection. The wording of Art. 11 has been altered in the new Limitation Act of 1908. The result of the alteration of the wording may be an alteration of the law in this matter. But even if we were to hold that the law has been altered we are of opinion that sec. 30 of the new Act is sufficient to save the Plaintiff's suit. We are not prepared to limit the operation of sec. 30 to cases in which the period of limitation has been expressly altered. We are of opinion that the section applies also to a case where the period of limitation has been altered as the result of an alteration of the description of the suit. We are therefore of opinion that the suit was not barred by limitation. It was then contended that the lower Court should have held that the conveyance to the Plaintiff was vitiated by fraud that is, that it was a conveyance for the purpose of defrauding the creditors. We are therefore of opinion that the suit was not barred by limitation. It was then contended that the lower Court should have held that the conveyance to the Plaintiff was vitiated by fraud that is, that it was a conveyance for the purpose of defrauding the creditors. The learned Subordinate Judge went into this question in detail and came to the finding that fraud had not been proved and we are not satisfied that the case of fraud was so strong as to justify our interference with that finding which is a finding of fact. 2. The next ground taken in appeal is that the plaintiff having purchased an occupancy holding was not rightly held to have obtained any right by her purchase in the absence of proof that the holding was transferable. But the Munsiff had held that the transfer to the Plaintiff had been recognised by the Plaintiff's landlord, and this finding has not been upset by the learned Subordinate Judge. 3. Reliance in the last resort is placed upon a sentence in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge to the effect that what the defendant's father purchased must have been a Korfa right, which was an under-raiyati right. This is said to be a finding that there was a valid purchase of an under-raiyati right. This is not the meaning we attach to this sentence which is merely an incidental sentence at the end of the judgment. It was not the Defendant's case that they had acquired an under-raiyati right ; and if it was the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge, it was a finding which could not be supported in the absence of evidence that under-raiyatis are transferable. The contentions in appeal fail and the appeal is dismissed with costs.