JUDGMENT 1. This is an Appeal by the first Defendant in a suit for declaration of title to immoveable property and for an injunction to restrain the sale thereof in execution of a mortgage decree. On the 7th October 1896 the first Defendant took a mortgage of the property from the other four Defendants. He subsequently sued to enforce the security and obtained the usual mortgage-decree on the 25th August 1899. The decree was put into execution in due course, and a proclamation was served on the 13th August 1908, under which the sale was notified to take place on the 15th September 1908. On the 25th August 1908, the Plaintiffs, who are the sons of the mortgagor, commenced this suit for declaration that they were not bound by the mortgage or by the decree nude on the basis thereof, and, also for consequential relief. The Court of first instance held in substance that the Plaintiffs were bound by the mortgage transaction, and that they were only entitled to redeem, as they would have been if they had been made parties to the mortgage-suit. Upon appeal the Subordinate Judge has reversed that decision and given the Plaintiffs a decree, which practically nullifies the mortgage-decree to the extent of their interest in the property. The Subordinate Judge has based his judgment on the ground that the first Defendant was not the real mortgagee, that he was only the ostensible mortgagee for the benefit of a real creditor, and, that consequently he was not entitled to enforce the security though it stood in his name. In support of this position, he has invoked the authority of the decision in Mahendra Nath Mukherjee v. Kali Prasad Johuri I. L. R. 30 Cal. 285 (1902). This view has been now assailed on behalf of the first Defendant as erroneous, and it has been contended that as the bond stood in his name, it was competent to him to sue to enforce the security. In support of this argument, reliance has been placed upon the case of Satchidanand Mahapatra v. Balaram Gorain ILR 24 Cal. 644 (1897), which was accepted as good law in Ham Gobinda v. Purna Chandra 11 C. L. J. 47 (1909). In our opinion, there is no room for controversy that this contention is well-founded. In the case of Satchidanand Mahapatra v. Balaram Gorain I. L. R. 24 Cal. 644 (1897), which was accepted as good law in Ham Gobinda v. Purna Chandra 11 C. L. J. 47 (1909). In our opinion, there is no room for controversy that this contention is well-founded. In the case of Satchidanand Mahapatra v. Balaram Gorain I. L. R. 24 Cal. 644 (1897), it was ruled that a suit for foreclosure of a mortgage may be brought by the person named in the mortgage deed as the mortgagee, although he was in fact only the benamdar of the beneficial owner, and that such a suit should not be dismissed on the ground that the beneficial owner has not been joined as a party. The learned Judges add that the same point had been brought up for decision to this Court before and that it had been decided that the contract could be enforced by the parties who had entered into it and that the suit should not fail merely because the beneficial owner was not on the record. The earlier decision to which reference was thus made was apparently the case of Sreenath Nag v. Chandra Nath Ghost 17 W. R. 192(1872), where, as subsequently pointed out in the case of Bhubaneswar Roy v. Jogeswar Chowdhurani 22 W. R. 413 (1874), it was ruled that in a case of mortgage where A advanced money taking a bond in the name of B, if a suit was afterwards brought in the name of B, the suit should not be defeated on the ground that he was merely the ostensible mortgagee ; A was the person who sought to enforce the mortgage and as the Defendant had received the money from A, and chosen to contract with B, it did not lie in his mouth to object to the institution of the suit in the same form. It is clear, therefore, that if this suit were insisted by the mortgagor alone, it would not be competent to him to dispute that the ostensible mortgagee was entitled to maintain it. We are of opinion that the sons of the mortgagor, who are bound by the mortgage bond equally with the executant, do not slant in any better position. The case of Mohendra Nath Mukerjee v. Kali Prosad Johury I. L. R. 30 Cal. We are of opinion that the sons of the mortgagor, who are bound by the mortgage bond equally with the executant, do not slant in any better position. The case of Mohendra Nath Mukerjee v. Kali Prosad Johury I. L. R. 30 Cal. 265 (1902), where it was ruled that a benamdar as such is not entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of possession of immoveable property which stands in his name, is plainly distinguishable and does not touch the question now before us. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Mitter in the case of Gopinath Chowbey v. Bhagwat Pershad I. L. R. 10 Cal. 697 (1884), so long as benami system is recognised, it is to be presumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that a suit instituted by a benamdar has been instituted with the full authority of the beneficial owner, and any decision made in such a suit is as much binding upon the real owner as if the suit had been brought by the real owner himself. Under these circumstances, we must hold that the ground assigned by the Subordinate Judge for his decision cannot be supported. 2. The result is that this Appeal is allowed, the decree of the Subordinate Judge set aside and that of the Court of first instance restored with one variation. The Court of first instance allowed the Plaintiffs to redeem within three months from the 14th June 1909 and directed that in the mortgage accounts interest was to be calculated only up to date of the judgment. The time fixed for redemption has long since elapsed and we understand that the Plaintiffs have not availed themselves of the opportunity afforded to them. In the circumstances of the present case, we think that as the decision of the first Court is to be restored, a fresh date must be fixed for redemption, Noor Ali v. Koni Meah I. L. R. 13 Cal. 13 (1886), Nam Narain v. Raghunath I. L. R. 22 Cal. 467 (1895), Tarachand v. Brojo Gopal 17 C. L. J. 120, 122 (1912). 13 (1886), Nam Narain v. Raghunath I. L. R. 22 Cal. 467 (1895), Tarachand v. Brojo Gopal 17 C. L. J. 120, 122 (1912). We accordingly direct that the records be sent down to the Court of first instance and that accounts be taken of the sum due under the mortgage-decree up to the date of the account (Kedar Lal v. Bishen L. R. 31 I. A. 57 : S. C. I. L. R. 31 Cal. 332 (1903), Gangadas v. Jagendra 5 C. L. J. 315, 323 (1907) Gurdeo v. Chandrika 5 C. L. J. 611, 637 (1907) and that the Plaintiffs be allowed to redeem within 15 days of the date when the sum payable for redemption has been notified to them after determination by the Court of first instance. The Defendant Appellant is entitled to his costs both here and in the Court of Appeal below. If the Plaintiffs do not redeem within the time allowed, the suit will stand dismissed with costs in all the Courts.