JUDGMENT : BANERJI, J. This is an appeal from an order of remand made by the court below. The facts are these:— One Muhammad Umar, who is the husband of the appellant, made a simple mortgage of eight items of property in favour of one Lachmi Narain on the 4th of September 1895. In 1902 and 1903 the appellant purchased two of the mortgaged properties. In 1907 Lachmi Narain brought a suit for sale upon his mortgage but did not make the defendant-appellant a party to the suit. He obtained a decree on the 6th of September 1907, and in execution of it he caused seven out of the eight items of property mortgaged to be sold by auction. The plaintiff, who is the brother of Lachmi Narain, purchased the two properties which had been purchased by the defendant-appellant in 1902 and 1903. As he did not obtain possession he brought the present suit and prayed that the defendant should be ordered to pay to him Rs. 1,100, the purchase money paid by him in respect of the two properties in suit, and that in the event of her not paying the said amount possession be delivered to him (the plaintiff) over the property purchased by the defendant. The court of first instance was of opinion that the plaintiff should have brought a suit for contribution, and on that ground dismissed the suit. 2. This decree of the court of first instance has, in our opinion, been rightly set aside by the lower appellate court. The plaintiff having purchased the mortgaged property, which the defendant-appellant had previously purchased, would be entitled to possession of that property, unless the defendant had some equity in her favour which would entitle her to redeem the mortgage. In this case the defendant ought to have been made a party to the suit brought by Lachmi Narain upon his mortgage, and as she was not afforded the opportunity of redeeming that mortgage her right of redemption still subsists. All that the appellant can ask for is that she should be allowed to exercise that right. It is clear that the object of the suit is to afford to her the opportunity which was not given to her before the auction sale at which the plaintiff purchased. All that the appellant can ask for is that she should be allowed to exercise that right. It is clear that the object of the suit is to afford to her the opportunity which was not given to her before the auction sale at which the plaintiff purchased. The plaintiff was certainly wrong in asking to be paid, the full amount of consideration paid by him for his purchase. The lower appellate court has rightly pointed out that the defendant is only liable for that portion of mortgage money which is attributable to the two properties purchased by her, and if she pays that amount the plaintiff would not be entitled to obtain possession of the property, but if she does not pay it the plaintiff would clearly be entitled to the possession which he seeks. The purchasers of the other properties were not necessary parties to the suit, inasmuch as they have acquired a clear title to those properties. The plaintiff's brother, the original decree holder, was also not a necessary party to the suit. The preliminary ground upon which the court of first instance dismissed the suit was untenable and, therefore, the lower appellate court was justified in remanding the case to the court of first instance for trial on the merits. The learned judge has pointed out all the matters which the court ought to take into consideration. It will be the duty of the court of first instance after the remand to frame proper issues, and give the parties an opportunity of adducing evidence on the points to be determined. The order of remand is, in our opinion, a proper order. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.